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Abstract 
This study adopts Marxian land rent theory as a framework to understand the structure of house 
prices with explicit attention to labour reproduction in an urban context. It attempts to correct 
the misunderstandings in Marxian land rent theory and develop it for an urban context. The four 
categories of land rent of differential rent, differential rent 2, absolute rent, and monopoly rent 
are critically re-examined. Subsequently, the combination of absolute rent and differential rent is 
suggested as a general structure for land rents in an urban context. The dynamic mechanism of 
changes in land rents is explained with the concepts of emulation, differentiation and shift between 
groups of houses based on the structure of land rents. The process of the formation of housing 
submarkets has been examined for a practical preparation for empirical analysis and a theoretical 
basis for the subdivision of the housing market. Spatial submarkets are identified by focusing on 
the interactive relationship between residential spheres (a unit consisting of a centre of employment 
and the surrounding residential area). Sectoral submarkets are defined based on social and 
environmental features as well as the structural features of dwellings. For empirical analysis, three 
metropolitan cities were chosen: London as monocentric, Seoul as tri-centric and Los Angeles as 
polycentric. Empirical analysis has used commuting patterns and the contours of house prices as 
the criteria to identify spatial submarkets with the help of network analysis and GIS. Simple OLS 
regression analysis of house prices on the accessibility to centre was conducted in each identified 
submarket. The results were used to explore the structure of and the dynamic changes in land 
rents. A consistent structure of land rents was observed in each housing submarket across all 
three cities. The implication on the condition of labour reproduction was drawn out by 
interpreting the changes in land rents over a period of 10 years in each city. The analysis of 
London revealed a monocentric housing market structure and the suitability of commuting time 
over physical distance as an accessibility variable. In Seoul‟s case, the transition from tri-centric 
to monocentric housing market was observed and a comparative approach with rent and price 
data enriched the interpretation of the changes in the structure of the housing market. The 
impact of social and environmental features of the neighbourhood, such as class, ethnic 
concentration and negative externality, on house prices was highlighted in the analysis of Los 
Angeles. 
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Chapter 1.   
Introduction 
 
1-1  Background  
 
The world economy is in the crisis of  a global downturn, which was triggered by bad loans 
on subprime mortgages in the United States prior to 2008. In order to improve confidence in the 
market, most governments in the major economies initially conducted expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies in an unprecedentedly collective way. With slow recoveries despite the 
dropping interest rate and the huge budget deficit, many major economies are becoming exposed 
to the possible crisis of  a „double-dip‟ recession. The fiscal crisis in Greece, along with California, 
Portugal, Italy, and Spain in 2010 alerted the governments to the possibility of  even worse 
economic disaster. Although debates are ongoing over the best policy to follow, many 
governments are announcing austerity measures to reduce their budget deficits. The expected 
public sector spending cuts are threatening a large proportion of  the population, so the tensions 
between the governments and the ordinary people are mounting. 
In identifying the causes of  the crisis, the operation of  financial markets, particularly their 
reckless creation of, and investment in, derivatives such as mortgage backed securities have been 
criticised; there has therefore been strong argument for stricter regulation on the market. On the 
other hand, it has been argued that the fundamental innate problem of  capitalist accumulation 
has been exposed, or an attempt to verify the long-term relationship between the business cycle 
and the price of  land has been made. Although all the arguments contribute to a fuller 
understanding of  the crisis, this global crisis demands a better, more convincing theory which 
not only addresses the core problem of  the system but also entails detailed analysis.  
One of  the causes of  the crisis is investment and bad loans on mortgages in the housing 
market based on the soaring house prices in major economies which were predicted to continue 
unabated. The soaring house prices contributed to an increase in consumption of  households 
with the wealth effect and the growth of  profit margins in the financial sector let alone the boom 
in the construction industry. The combination of  overheated demand for houses and widened 
accessibility to financial products of  mortgages which is also based on the expectation of  
increasing house prices eventually results in an increase in household debt. Household 
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bankruptcy ignited by external factors, such as oil price surge, was doomed to bust the bubble in 
house prices with insolvencies in financial sector. The fall in purchasing power and the stricter 
accessibility to mortgage products due to the insolvencies in the financial sector led to the fall in 
house prices and successively resulted in a further insolvency in the sector. This vicious spiral has 
been claimed to be one of  the reasons of  the current form of  the economic crisis.  
To find the reason behind the changes in house prices across countries is an important part 
of  figuring out the whole picture of  this economic saga. The understanding is also important for 
the authorities in planning and housing to take relevant policies in response to the changes. A 
large scale provision of  housing stock in the outskirt of  cities or the growth of  subcentres often 
results in an increase in house price contrary to the expected stabilising effect. It implies that the 
housing prices cannot be properly explained by mere supply-demand relations. 
This study started from a question about the lack of  any fundamental explanation by current 
mainstream neoclassical urban economics for the changes in house prices, in spite of  its 
simplicity and the considerable power of  description available to it. An imperative to understand 
the fundamental mechanisms underlying the movement of  house price and the capital 
investment within the built environment has directed this study towards an understanding of  
land rent as the root of  an alternative to the current mainstream theories on the housing market. 
Land rent as one of  the major components of  payment for using a piece of  land is intrinsic 
to various urban phenomena, including city expansion and regeneration under capitalism. Every 
part of  land in an urban area is related to land rent as the relationship between landowners and 
users. The fact that land is a fundamental precondition for production causes producers to 
obtain use rights over a portion of  the globe and to pay rent in return. The level of  land rent 
would then be partly determined by the degree to which the usage of  a piece of  land contributes 
to create profit from production. For this reason, the analysis of  land rent focused on the 
production process on land in classical political economy. 
The land rent theories of  classical political economy began with the analysis of  agricultural 
land and the production process on the land. This emphasis on the production process was the 
fundamental basis in the land rent analysis of  Johann Heinrich von Thünen, Henry George, and 
Karl Marx although most of  their work was focused on agricultural land. Since then, however, 
the development of  land rent theory has diverged changing its focus. 
In the process of  establishing an urban land rent theory, neoclassical urban economics has 
built upon the theory of  von Thünen at the expense of  maintaining the production relationship. 
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Instead, it has developed the concepts of  utility and competition. With a demand-oriented 
approach, it has succeeded in explaining various urban phenomena in relatively clear and simple 
terms. However, it has some limitations in explaining the processes underlying the competition 
and utility to which they have attributed all urban phenomena. The comment of  Ball (1985) on 
these limitations is relevant here: “Yet competition by itself  does not explain very much. The 
ways in which production takes place on land must also be considered because production 
relations structure the conditions under which competition over land use takes place.” (Ball 
1985:503) 
„Georgist‟ researchers who follow the theory of  Henry George focus on how to levy windfall 
gain from land development. They are more interested in justifying a tax levying scheme using 
macro economic analysis to reveal the adverse effects of  an increase in land prices and the 
possible effects on the whole economy of  a tax scheme on land than in the structure of  land 
rent and its mechanism. 
The development of  land rent theories after Marx has been relatively limited due to several 
reasons, although it has maintained a focus on the production relationship in land rent. First of  
all, there have been some crucial misunderstandings of  the basic concepts and therefore 
exhaustive arguments over definitions. Secondly, the analysis of  the mechanism of  land rent has 
been relatively neglected, compared to an overwhelming degree of  interest in the issue of  social 
relations around land and the economic role of  rent1. It is undeniable that the arguments about 
these issues have brought meaningful results, such as the role of  built environment as a 
temporary shelter of  accumulation of  capital using the concept of  the secondary circulation 
(Harvey 1982) and the importance of  the historical and institutional contexts in land rent 
theories (Ball 1985). However, there has been little progress in the analysis of  the mechanism of  
land rent. The theory about the structure of  land rent and its mechanism can be the basis of  
further development of  the theories about the social relations around land and the economic 
role of  land rent. The fact that the analysis on the mechanism of  land rent so far failed to 
support and fortify the other two issues of  the social relations around land and the economic 
role of  land rent could be one of  the reasons for the general ebbing of  Marxian land rent theory. 
The lack of  empirical research into Marxian land rent theory is another cause of  the decline. 
Haila (1990) criticised this point: “Instead of  pursuing a theory applicable to modern conditions, 
rent scholars have persisted in recycling the old canons and appealing to the classical authorities. 
                                            
1 Haila (1990) classified land rent theories into three main categories: 1) the mechanism of land rent 
emerger 2) the social relations around land 3) the economic role of land rent. 
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The theory of  land rent seems to have been an article of  faith rather than a dynamic tool for 
empirical research …” (Haila 1990:275)  
This study tries to develop land rent theory for an urban context without losing the 
fundamental basis of  the production relationship. It also aims to verify it in empirical analysis of  
housing markets in different contexts. The reviewed land rent theory will be applied to an 
empirical analysis of  the housing markets in the three cities of  London, Seoul, and Los Angeles. 
The different spatial structure of  cities requires relevant analysis on the division of  housing 
submarkets. A theoretical and empirical examination of  the policentric feature of  urban 
structure for the division of  housing submarkets is another aim of  this study. A development of  
land rent theory for an urban context will contribute to complement the explanations of  the 
fundamental structure of  house prices. I hope the revival of  an old theory can bring a fresh view 
on the structure of  land rents and house prices filling the gaps in the current research on 
housing market. Furthermore I hope this research sparks many related debates and thus 
contributes to a further understanding of  the interwoven relationship between labour 
reproduction, house prices, and the economy. 
 
1-2  The structure of  the thesis 
 
The following first three chapters will provide a theoretical basis for the analysis of  the 
structure of  land rent in an urban context. Chapter 2 reviews the progress of  existing theories 
on land rent, from pre-classical economists to recent debates. The examination of  recent debates 
on land rent is focused on Marxian land rent theories. Chapter 3 attempts to correct the 
misunderstandings related to Marxian land rent theory and develop it for an urban context. The 
four categories of  land rent are critically re-examined. Subsequently, a general structure of  land 
rent in an urban context is suggested and the dynamic mechanism of  changes in land rent is 
explained. Chapter 4 provides, not only a practical preparation for empirical analysis, but also a 
theoretical basis for the subdivision of  the housing market into submarkets. Spatial housing 
submarkets are identified by focusing on the interactive relationship between commuting to 
employment centres and rents in the surrounding residential areas. While structural housing 
submarkets are identified by the physical properties of  houses, sectoral housing submarkets are 
defined based on social and environmental features of  neighbourhood as well as the structural 
features of  houses. 
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The next three chapters provide an empirical analysis of  the structure of  land rents in the 
three cities of  London, Seoul, and Los Angeles. Chapter 5 investigates the structure of  land rent 
in London, which has a monocentric structure, Chapter 6 examines the structure of  land rent in 
Seoul, an example of  a tri-centric structure, and Chapter 7 highlights the structure of  land rent in 
Los Angeles, which has a polycentric structure. In these three chapters, commuting patterns and 
the shapes of  house prices are used as main criteria to subdivide spatial housing submarkets. By 
spatial and sectoral housing submarket, a simple OLS regression analysis of  house price on the 
accessibility to the centre of  each spatial submarket is conducted. The result from the analysis is 
used in diagrammatic analysis to explore the structure of  land rent and the dynamic changes in 
land rents in all three cities. In Chapter 5, two measures of  physical distance and commuting 
time are used as a measure for accessibility. In Chapter 6, rent data as well as price data enriches 
the interpretation of  empirical analysis in Seoul. Chapter 7 highlights the impact of  social and 
environmental features of  neighbourhood such as class, ethnic concentration and negative 
externality on house price in Los Angeles. A brief  summary of  the theoretical development in 
the structure of  land rents and housing submarkets and findings in empirical analysis follows in 
the conclusion Chapter 8 with comments on limits of  the study, future studies and policy 
implications. 
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Chapter 2.   
Literature review 
 
Examining existing work on land rent is an essential prerequisite for any further 
development in the theory. In this literature review, the contributions in Marxian land rent theory 
will be examined with explicit attention to the mechanism of  land rent. Firstly, the formation of  
Marxian land rent theory is highlighted in the context of  classical political economy. Secondly, 
the contributions in the rise and the ebb of  the Marxian land rent theory in post-Marxism period 
are reviewed. Based on this, the reasons of  the decline are examined. Thirdly, neoclassical 
approaches to Marxian land rent theory and recent discussion in the theory are reviewed. 
Implication for further development of  the theory is extracted from this. 
 
2-1  The formation of  Marxian land rent theory 
 
Marxian land rent theory is inseparable to the theory of  classical political economy as his 
whole theory does. It is an irony that an attempt to criticize the „vulgar economy‟ has contributed 
to synthesize it ever more consistently. His land rent theory also contains all aspects classical 
political economists argued. The origin of  Marxian land rent theory thus could be sought from 
classical political economy, which is also indebted to the advances by pre-classical economists 
and Physiocrats. 
Pre-classical economists like William Petty (1623~1687) and Richard Cantillon (1680~1734) 
regarded land and labour as the only two sources of  wealth (Ghosh 1985). In the process of  
unfolding his economic system theory, Cantillon developed the concepts of  „natural state‟ and 
„natural price‟, which can lead to a situation where income and expenditure flows are balanced 
and the price is determined in that state. This theory prefigures Smith and Marx on value and 
price (Cantillon 1755). 
François Quesnay (1694~1774) and Jacques Turgot (1727~1781), physiocrats who 
emphasised the importance of  agriculture, formulated their theory without including capital. 
According to their theory, there are three major classes in the economy: the „productive‟ class of  
agricultural labourers and farmers, the „sterile‟ class of  industrial labourers, artisans and 
merchants, and the „proprietor‟ class of  landowners who appropriate the whole surplus as rents. 
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Like Cantillon, they thought that agricultural labour on land was the only source of  wealth. 
Between land and labour, they emphasised the importance of  land, seeing rent as the entire 
surplus of  output over wages from agricultural labour and other production costs (Ghosh 1985). 
Thus, their theory has no role for capital in production on land and the conditions under which 
rent arise are not fully examined. Physiocrats like Quesnay are often regarded to have enhanced 
the concept of  differential rent even before James Anderson and David Ricardo (Berg 2000). 
It was not until the late 18th century, when Adam Smith (1776) and James Anderson (1777) 
were working on their theories, that capital became a main concern among the rent theorists. 
Before and even after the 18th century rent theories focused on the relationship between land and 
labour, and are mainly based on the agricultural sector. 
How rent is determined was not among the main concerns of  economists until the role of  
capital became focused and the existence of  other elements of  surplus was accepted. Adam 
Smith (1723~1790) was the first theorist who handled land rent within the framework of  a 
capitalist agriculture (Ghosh 1985). Smith‟s rent theory is often regarded as inconsistent and self-
contradictory. He failed to classify and identify properly each type of  rent. He used the general 
term „rent‟ for all types of  rent, disregarding the differences in their origins, which led to 
confusion among readers and later researchers. Nevertheless, Smith rightly suggested that the 
premise of  rent arising was due to the existence of  landed property demanding rent. More 
specifically, he explained that rent arises because of  the existence of  monopoly, differential 
advantage in production, and bounty of  nature, i.e. scarcity (Gee 1981). In addition, he tried to 
explain the rent gap between unimproved land and land that had been improved by capital 
investment (Brewer 1995). Moreover, his ideas about rent in urban contexts were quite brilliant. 
He not only argued that transportation development would decrease differential rent by location 
difference, but also distinguished ground rent as abnormal excess over normal profit, 
differentiating it from building rent, which is normal profit from capital investment on buildings 
with depreciation costs2. What is most impressive is that he clarified the main characteristics of  
rent using the concept of  „natural‟ rent. Like the concept of  „natural‟ price, which is determined 
when a commodity is sold at its price of  production including cost price and normal profit, 
„natural‟ rent is what the farmer can afford to pay in equilibrium, which is the excess of  the value 
                                            
2 The term „ground rent‟ is more widely understood as the specific rent that leaseholders‟ regular 
rentcharge to freeholder on long lease contract of land in the UK and many other countries these days. 
However, „ground rent‟ in this study hereafter means land rent as abnormal excess over normal profit 
from land excluding „building rent‟.   
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of  output over the tenant‟s cost, including profit at the normal rate on the tenant‟s investment. 
With this concept he clearly demonstrated that rent of  all kinds is surplus profit. 
The first economist who systematically developed the differential rent theory perceiving the 
effect of  fertility difference on production was James Anderson (1739~1808) (Berg 2000). 
Postulating that the price of  an agricultural product is determined by the price of  production in 
the worst quality land, he proceeded to suggest that „rent is in fact nothing else than a simple and 
ingenious contrivance for equalising the profits to be drawn from fields of  different degrees of  
fertility‟ (Anderson 1777). Lower production costs on superior quality lands yield excess profit to 
the cultivator, and so landowners of  the lands demand rent for that excess. This is an extensive 
differential rent. However, Anderson failed to proceed onto the theory of  intensive rent, which 
arises because of  successive capital investments on the land, because he didn‟t accept the concept 
of  diminishing returns from land. 
This rent theory, which has its basis in the different levels of  fertility of  different pieces of  
land, became the main concern among classical economists like Robert Malthus (1766~1834) 
and David Ricardo (1772~1823). Although Malthus accepted the logic of  differential rent, he 
argued that there is no land yielding no rent, because every land has absolute fertility bestowed 
by God. He focused on the „productive‟ powers and concluded that rent becomes a part of  the 
production cost. This argument led to a famous debate on the Corn Laws with Ricardo, who 
believed that rent is determined by the market price of  an agricultural product. Although 
Malthus‟s explanation of  the rent as a part of  production cost is irrelevant, this argument 
influenced the development of  the concept of  absolute rent by Karl Marx (1818~1883). 
David Ricardo had systematically developed Anderson‟s rent theory. While the Physiocrats 
and Malthus thought that rent came from the unique productive powers of  the land, Ricardo 
attributed it instead to the scarcity of  land (Ghosh 1985). This led him to argue that each piece 
of  land has relative fertility and that non-rent-paying land could theoretically exist, which is 
directly opposing Malthus‟s idea. Free access of  capital across industries delivers a rate of  profit 
even to capitalists in the agricultural industry, so rent is determined as it equates a differential 
surplus due to the differential fertility across different pieces of  land. Therefore, in his theory, it 
is the worst land that regulates the market price of  agricultural produce, because its production 
cost is the most expensive and thus bears no rent. In addition, he highlighted the existence of  
intensive differential rent with diminishing returns from land, which Anderson omitted from his 
theory. With successive investment on the same land, a capitalist can increase the productiveness 
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of  land, for example through improving its fertility, and the surplus from the investment can 
form the other type of  differential rent, intensive differential rent. Ricardo explained rent using 
the concept of  competitiveness both between capitalists and landowners and capitalists in a 
production process on the land. Now the role of  capitalist entered as a major factor. 
The work of  Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1780~1850) which is the root of  neoclassical 
urban economics originated from his work which first appeared in 1826 and was completed by 
1863. In his rent theory, which is known as location theory in agricultural context, von Thünen 
focused on location and transport in a state comprising a city and its hinterland. While the 
Physiocrats and other classical economists perceived the difference between lands‟ fertility, von 
Thünen was the first economist who emphasised the importance of  difference in location, which 
is especially important in an urban context. He started the theory from the locational equilibrium, 
a concept which implies that every farmer would take normal profit regardless of  location of  
land they cultivate. Profit in a certain production is determined by a balance of  the market price 
over transportation cost, other production costs, and rent. If  transportation cost varies by 
location and the other production cost is not affected by location, the level of  rent which a 
farmer can afford to pay entirely depends on the location of  the land. With this emphasis on 
location difference, a farmer was regarded as an active subject with the ability to exert rationality 
like a landowner. At the same time, a decrease in the importance of  the role of  landowner has 
accompanied a decrease in the focus on rent being surplus. In addition, the conflict between the 
landowner and the capitalist and the dynamic activity of  capitalist for extensive or intensive 
differential rent was neglected in this theory. Nevertheless, its ability to be applied in various ways 
(e.g. its application to multiple types of  product of  the land) by introducing a simple proposition 
is an undeniable contribution to the development of  urban rent theory. 
Karl Marx is a political economist who tried to complete the theory of  political economy so 
that he could criticise it more fundamentally. Focusing on the relationship between labour and 
capital, he found that labour is a product which cannot be produced but instead reproduces itself  
with wages determined by an exploitative employment relationship with capitalists, so all surplus 
value is originated from this unequal exchange of  labour and wage, where labour is exploited. In 
the relationship between land and capital he also made a remarkable achievement. He 
consistently synthesised all the issues and debates which had hitherto remained unsolved among 
classical economists. Firstly, he adopted the Ricardian differential rent theory. Although there are 
some methodological differences with Ricardo‟s analysis of  intensive differential rent (Ball 1977, 
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Evans 1992, Ball 1992), and Marx denoted it as differential rent 2, it is undeniable that Marx had 
adopted Ricardo‟s theory. He also integrated the rent theory of  J. S. Mill with his explanation of  
differential rent 2. In this explanation, the excess profit from additional investment on land, 
which was often misunderstood as interest from the investment, is instead defined as differential 
rent 2, which eventually transforms into differential rent because the invested capital becomes a 
permanent part of  the productivity of  the land. Marx‟s unique contribution, though, is the 
theory of  absolute rent, which is demanded even from the tenants of  the worst land and which 
thus becomes a part of  the price of  production, which has remained controversial even until 
now. By suggesting the existence of  minimum rent due to the power of  landed property, he tried 
to end the debate between Malthus and Ricardo over whether rent is a part of  the price of  
production or just a residual surplus. According to Marx, the two main elements of  rent are 
differential rent, which is residual after production, and absolute rent, which becomes a part of  
the price of  production. Besides these, he hinted, existed a temporary category of  rent from a 
genuine monopoly price “determined by neither by the price of  production of  the commodities 
nor by their value, but rather by the demand of  the purchasers and their ability to pay”.(Marx 
1991:898) In this way, he combined various theories on rent, developed after Adam Smith, into a 
consistent theory, although there is still some space open for further development. 
 
2-2  Renaissance of  Marxian land rent theory 
 
Marxian land rent theory was almost neglected as neoclassical economics dominates. It was 
not until 1960‟s that the interests in Marxian land rent theory have been revived due to post-
Marxism and soaring land and house prices. The renaissance lasts less than two decades. Haila 
(1990) summarised the period into three phases of  consensus, transition and rupture. As Haila 
(1990) points out, the main interest in the early renaissance was absolute rent and monopoly rent.  
Harvey and Chatterjee (1974) tried to show how absolute rent can be realised in the housing 
market of  large metropolitan areas, based on empirical research on Baltimore city. They show 
there are multiple housing submarkets of  absolute urban spaces in Baltimore, which were 
formed by social, institutional (governmental and financial), and geographical features. In each 
housing submarket, they argue, levels of  absolute rent are structured by different levels of  
tension between social classes, which creates groups of  different interests around housing, such 
as tenants, building owners, and developers. They found that there are two dimensions operating 
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in the formation of  absolute rent. One is structured by opposing forces within a housing 
submarket, and the other by interactions between housing submarkets. The first dimension 
assumes that the expansion of  a housing submarket can help to reduce rents as supply of  similar 
spaces increases. At the same time, they also point out the possibility of  a shift of  landowners to 
the other housing submarket, who will change their types of  space when they face a low rate of  
return from their existing spaces. Research and empirical data on the existence of  multiple levels 
of  absolute rent organised by groups of  space in an urban area is unusual in the related field of  
research. This therefore represents an exceptionally significant achievement for the subsequent 
analyses of  spatial aggregation of  residence and the dynamic mechanism of  capital movement 
around built environment especially in residential areas.  
Harvey (1974) developed the concept of  “class monopoly rent” to explain the power of  
landowners over rent that results from the scarcity of  limited resources. Quoting the remarks 
made by Ricardo that absolute rent could not exist except for the extreme case where there is 
absolute scarcity, like on an island, he suggests that the existence of  absolute rent is more 
plausible in an urban context, where “there are a series of  man-made islands on which class 
monopolies produce absolute scarcities”. Although he does not try to resolve some problems 
related with Marx‟s concept of  absolute rent here, his theory of  “class monopoly rent” is 
employed as a similar concept. With this concept, he especially focuses on the class conflict 
between a class of  owners of  “resource units” and a class of  lessees, who have to use land. He 
seems not to be particularly interested in finding out the economic basis of  the cause of  the rent. 
He points out that consumer preference in property market is systematically produced by the 
class of  owners of  “resource units” rather than arising “spontaneously”. He succeeds in 
explaining the increased possibility of  absolute rent in an urban context with the concept of  
“class monopoly rent” focusing on the class struggle between the lessor and lessee of  urban 
space. However, his view on the lease of  space in an urban context as a consumption process 
impedes a wider interpretation of  space as a factor of  which ordinary workers actively reproduce 
their labour power. 
Walker (1976) suggests that the Marxian categories of  rent of  “absolute rent”, “monopoly 
rent” and “redistributive rent” are important in explaining the contemporary urban process, 
criticising the neoclassical method of  explaining rent as a universal rent. He rightly stresses the 
importance of  the production phase in explaining rent and tries to develop the Marxian 
categories of  rent in an urban context. His unique contribution of  the concept of  “redistributive 
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rent” focuses on the government‟s role in creating rent by public spending on infrastructure or 
legislative activities. This emphasis of  the government‟s role in changing rent in an urban context 
is appropriate and is one of  the core facts that related research should consider. Nevertheless it 
can hardly be assumed to be an independent category of  rent. It is more appropriate to regard 
that it influences the levels of  existing types of  rent. 
The main concern of  Edel (1975) is focused on monopoly rent which is regarded to be 
prevalent in an urban context. Introducing some arguments over conditions for the existence of  
absolute rent, such as low organic composition of  capital and the collective barrier of  landed 
property in urban context, he seems to conclude that these conditions can be met in an urban 
context. In drawing a distinction between absolute rent and monopoly rent, he argues that while 
both stem from the existence of  barriers to equalisation of  the rate of  profit, the scales of  the 
applicable sector of  the two rents are different. He argues that absolute rent is applied for „a level 
affecting all of  a large sector (agriculture, urban areas in general)‟ while monopoly rent is applied 
for „specific, detailed land uses‟ by „racial minorities, immigrants and other subgroups‟. 
Emphasising a detailed analysis by each group rather than a generalised analysis of  urban rent as 
a whole, he agrees with the way in which Harvey and Chatterjee (1974) tried to explain their 
findings, but suggests that the different levels of  rents of  the multiple level of  groups of  
residence by social, institutional, and geographical features should be regarded to be, not “class 
monopoly rent”, but instead monopoly rent. A similar criticism of  Harvey's position can be 
found in the works of  Basset and Short (1980:201) and King (1987:210). However, Harvey‟s 
“class monopoly rent” is a possible form of  absolute rent in an urban context, as Harvey (1974) 
admits. It is because the universal rent of  “class monopoly rent” in a group of  spaces is a rather 
structural factor in the cost of  the usage differentiating itself  from a temporary monopoly rent 
created by users‟ capricious preference and ability to pay. 
A vast review of  French literature on land and land rent was carried out by Scott (1976). 
Some of  the works done by French researchers are worth being introduced again here with 
Scott‟s view on absolute rent. Emmanuel (1969) contributes to make the concept of  differential 
rent easier to understand, with his unique supply and demand diagram. Emphasising the 
existence of  groups of  lands which have different production costs, he utilises a stepwise 
increasing supply curve rather than a smoothly increasing supply curve. This method of  
explanation is consistent with the concept of  producer surplus in welfare economics. Walras 
(1896) who is famous for his theory on general equilibrium, contributes to the issue of  price of  
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land. The traditional concept of  land price as a capitalised rent was p = λ/ρ where p land price, λ 
rent, ρ general rate of  profit or interest. Walras found that in a progressive society, rent tends to 
increase, while the general rate of  profit tends to decrease, so the price of  land would increase by 
time. Scott describes this as “a valuable exposition of  one aspect of  the fundamental nature of  
land speculation”. An interesting view of  land is also introduced . “Walras (1896) … proposes 
that the State abolish private ownership of  land, and, moreover, that the State simultaneously 
abolish all taxes, and restrict its own revenue to the income from the expropriated land. … The 
State would maximize its revenue by offering to lease land to whoever offered to pay the highest 
rent. The allocative benefits of  the market land would flow directly to the benefit of  the 
collectivity.” (Scott 1976:115) This idea resembles that of  Henry George. On the controversial 
issue on absolute rent, Scott raises two questions. The first concerns why landlords restrict the 
level of  absolute rent to value minus production price. He seems to believe that if  they could 
appropriate the amount of  value over production price, there is no reason that they could not 
charge more. The second question concerns on what basis landowners can be a barrier to the 
process of  the equalization of  the rate of  profit. He negates the possibility of  a cartel of  
landowners: “the real economic and political power of  landlords in modern capitalist society is 
probably fairly negligible”, “land lords in modern capitalist society do indeed impose a general 
levy of  some kind on land, but this levy is really a rent on the global scarcity of  land, rather than 
an absolute rent in the strict and technical sense of  that term.” (Scott 1976) Scott concludes that 
scarcity rent rather than absolute rent is likely to exist in an urban context. 
Fine (1979) and Murray (1977, 1978) stands for Marx‟s original explanation on absolute rent 
focusing on the economic situation of  the early stage of  capitalism. Focusing on the relationship 
between differential rent 2 and absolute rent, Fine (1979) tries to show the consistency of  Marx‟s 
rent theory in terms of  value theory. After introducing the basic concepts of  individual value, 
market value, and price of  production, which are crucial to understanding Marx‟s theory of  value, 
he stresses the importance in analysing rent theory of  the separation of  competition within a 
sector and competition between sectors. He points out that source of  differential rent in the 
agricultural sector is the difference of  individual values and market value in the sector before the 
equalisation of  profit, in contrast to Ricardo‟s theory. For absolute rent he accurately interprets 
Marx‟s explanation, noting that the source of  absolute rent is the difference between market 
value and price of  production after the equalisation of  profit across all sectors. He provided an 
explanation of  why the amount of  AR cannot exceed the difference between the value and the 
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price of  production of  the product in the agricultural sector in the early stage of  capitalism 
where capitalists‟ investment is limited within the sector. In this condition of  limited movement 
of  capital, the level absolute rent from investments on the new(worst) lands depends on the level 
of  differential rent 2 from successive investments on existing lands. This explanation by Fine 
might be a good answer to the question raised by Marx himself, “if  landed property gives the 
power to sell the product above its cost-price at its value, why does it not equally well give the 
power to sell the product above its value, at an arbitrary monopoly price?”(Marx 1968:332). On 
differential rent 2, he also correctly points out its temporary nature, as it ultimately transforms to 
differential rent. His contribution to interpreting Marxian land rent theory is one of  the most 
detailed and correct attempts, despite the fact that it is limited to the discussion of  the 
agricultural sector only. Although he interprets and analyses Marx writing on rents properly, he 
did not consider the possible errors in the original arguments of  Marx, which will be discussed in 
the following chapter. 
The most substantial contribution of  the work done by Murray (1977, 1978) is the debate 
over the conditions of  absolute rent. He uses his work to defend Marx‟s theory against the 
criticism. Firstly, he summarises the existing criticism of  Marx‟s theory of  absolute rent. The 
main and most common criticisms according to Murray are 1) excess profit, the source of  
absolute rent, can be higher or lower than the difference between value and price of  production. 
Why then did Marx assume that the products in the land are sold at value not price, as according 
to Marx, the level of  absolute rent is determined by supply and demand - so why should the 
upper limit of  absolute rent be the difference between value and price of  production? 2) if  there 
is a barrier in the agricultural sector that restricts the inflow of  capital, why are products sold at a 
level of  value which assumes a mixture of  all surplus values in the process of  the equalisation of  
rate of  profit? 3) is a low organic composition of  capital an essential condition for absolute rent? 
Considering the first criticism, commenting on the transformation problem between value to 
price, Murray insists that price oscillates around the gravitational centre of  value so that 
monopoly price is a rather accidental and temporary economic situation which will be disappear 
soon to be replaced by an increase in the following supply. However, as he himself  emphasised 
in his later work in 1978, the non-reproducible characteristics of  land as an essential factor in 
production make the monopoly price created in abnormal economic situation rather permanent 
with fluctuating feature. Considering the second criticism, he defends Marx, noting that a historic 
feature of  landed property and the immobility of  capital in the early stage of  the capitalist mode 
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of  production enables the systematic block of  capital and the exchange of  products at their 
values. However, all the rent theory Marx developed is based on the capitalist mode of  
production, which is neither necessary nor sector-specific in an early stage, so the fact that 
products are exchanged in a market self-evidently shows that the value the sector produced has 
already mixed with other values from all other sectors. Moreover, blocking the inflow of  capital 
is theoretically and practically an impossible situation, as capitalists would regard absolute rent as 
just a single factor of  cost and move around searching for higher profit in the contemporary 
capitalism with ever greater mobility. Considering the third criticism, he argues that increasing 
capital investment on land would reduce the landowner‟s share of  what was produced in the 
space leading to a reduction of  the power of  landownership and the disappearance of  absolute 
rent as he described it as „capital‟s subordination of  the soil‟. However, this is insufficient answer 
to the raised question.   
There has been little disagreement on the concept of  differential rent in the period as Haila 
(1990) pointed out. It is partly because the interests in differential rent were overshadowed by the 
interest in monopoly rent and absolute rent. There are few contributions which discuss the rent 
in an urban context. Harvey (1982) he has offered a significant insight into urban differential rent. 
That is the savings in commuting cost lead to an “excess wage” which could be linked to 
differential rent converted to rent by “those who hold space” (Harvey 1982:340). 
Ball (1977) explains two major points on differential rent. The first is that the differential 
rent theories of  Ricardo and Marx, which are generally assumed to be same, are in fact different. 
He distinguishes them on the basis that Marx uses an average approach while Ricardo uses a 
marginal approach in explaining the expansion of  cultivating with additional capital investment, 
which refers to Marx‟s differential rent 2. His distinction is also coupled with a different 
cultivating order. Second is the influence of  differential rent on the value of  commodities. In 
classical political economy, differential rent has been assumed to be a price-determined category 
not a price-determining category, like Smith‟s monopolistic aspect of  „rent‟ or Marx‟s absolute 
rent. However, Ball argues that not only absolute rent but also differential rent, especially 
differential rent 2, could affect the value of  commodities and the rate of  surplus value through 
successive investment in the same land. His point focuses on the fact that the existence of  
differential rent reduces the affordability of  additional investment of  capital in the land, resulting 
in the acceleration of  earlier entry of  new peripheral land. As the price of  the production on 
new peripheral land would be higher than the existing average, this would increase market price. 
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In this sense, indirectly, Ball‟s argument that differential rent could influence the value of  a 
commodity is correct.  
Starting from criticising the Marginalist approach of  main-stream urban economics in 
analysing urban phenomena, Lipietz (1985) argues that Marxian rent theories can be a useful 
analytical tool. His main criticism of  mainstream urban economics is the lack of  essential theory 
to explain the fundamental causes of  phenomena in it. Sticking to the principle that rent comes 
from production in space, he suggests that the product of  land is the built environment itself, 
which creates „the economic and social division of  space‟. This reveals his concern with the 
social relationship around land rent, as well as the economic condition. In applying Marxian rent 
theory to an urban context, he argues that 1) any distinction between absolute rent and 
monopoly rent is irrelevant; 2) absolute rent is the rent on the median land in terms of  
productivity in his formulae (total rent = absolute rent ±  differential rent); 3) thus total rent 
consists of  „land tribute‟ and „differential tribute‟; and 4) land tribute can be seen from two 
aspects: „tribute à la Marx‟ and „tribute à la Engels‟, which mean rent of  value created in the 
construction industry and rent of  value created in any branch of  industries, respectively. He 
correctly points out that the concept of  absolute rent would not be appropriate if  value created 
in one sector were mixed with values from other sectors without restriction. However, he 
maintains an ambiguous position on the possibility of  this restriction; he removed the distinction 
between absolute rent and monopoly rent on the assumption of  restriction, but at the same time 
he argues the existence of  „tribute à la Marx‟ and „tribute à la Engels‟. In addition, he argues that 
the existence of  „tribute à la Marx‟ in the construction industry obstructs investment in the 
industry, and therefore keeps the organic composition of  capital in the industry low. Ball (1985) 
criticised this point saying that the proportion of  constant capital, including circulating capital, is 
relatively high and wage level is comparatively low in the construction industry, so that the 
organic composition of  capital in the industry would not be that low. Ball (1985) also criticises 
Lipietz‟s argument about the source of  rent as surplus value created in housing sector, by arguing 
that surplus value created in the housing sector cannot be enough to pay the enormous profits 
of  building industry. Lipietz‟s argument on the level of  absolute rent is also problematic as he set 
the level to medium. Although the existence of  negative differential rent is possible in real 
housing markets, it is difficult to justify setting the absolute rent to the median of  total 
differential rent. It contradicts not only the most basic starting point of  the concept of  absolute 
rent, being a rent which exists even in the worst land, but also the concept of  differential rent, 
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being a rent as a surplus. He seems to apply the average level of  profit in general industries to the 
construction industry and extends it to rent theory as the average level of  differential rent. A 
noteworthy point of  his work is his comparison of  his „land tribute‟ to Mayer‟s (1965) sum of  
„anticipation rent‟ and „scarcity rent‟.  
 
2-3  The premature stagnation 
 
The heated debates and suggestions in 1960-70s have faded since 1980‟s. Leaving debates 
unfinished, the interests in the theory has vanished. With different versions of  interpretations 
and unripe application of  the theory to an urban context, a seemingly premature stagnation has 
put the theory back in the closet again. There are many reasons behind the stagnation. Let alone 
the external factors like the surge of  neo-liberalism, there are some internal problems in the 
ebbing in the development of  Marxian land rent theory.  
First, the overwhelming degree of  interest in the issue of  social relations around land and 
the economic role of  rent has made the analysis of  the mechanism of  land rent relatively 
neglected. Although the role of  built environment as a temporary shelter of  accumulation of  
capital using the concept of  the secondary circulation (Harvey, 1982) and the importance of  the 
historical and institutional contexts in land rent theories (Ball, 1985) are undeniable achievement 
from the argument about the issues, there has been little progress in the analysis of  the 
mechanism of  land rent itself. The deficiency of  analytical approaches to the mechanism of  land 
rent impeded further development of  the theories and made them abstract discussion rather 
than detailed empirical research. 
Second and third reason is closely related with the stagnated analysis of  mechanism of  land 
rent. The discussions over the technical condition of  absolute rent and its relationship with 
monopoly rent stuck in limbo with little agreement. While some pointed out the innate problem 
of  the condition of  low organic composition of  capital for the existence of  absolute rent, while 
others tried to support Marx‟s original explanation on absolute rent focusing on the economic 
situation of  the early stage of  capitalism. Some researchers suggested that absolute rent is the 
same as „monopoly rent‟ and even some went further arguing that absolute rent is not land rent. 
This will be discussed in Chapter 3 in detail. 
Third, there has been inappropriate application of  the theory to urban context in identifying 
the product of  the land in an urban context. Ball (1977) suggests „buildings‟ as the product from 
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the land saying that “the main effect is that the relationship between the market price of  the 
commodity produced and the rent extracted differs: the commodity produced in agriculture 
being „corn‟ and on urban land, „buildings‟.” (Ball, 1977:400). It is a pity that the researcher who 
contributed to differentiate the Marxian land rent theory against neoclassical urban economics 
has also made it difficult to develop the theory further with an inappropriate proposition. 
Focusing on commercial building provision, Ball (1985) asks that rent on buildings should not be 
confused with rent on land. His concepts of  rent from buildings might cause confusion because 
of  his rough juxtaposition of  building and land. It is true that rent from buildings is different 
from that of  land. Nevertheless, the space in buildings and the rent from the space are still based 
on the use of  land, as a building is a kind of  fixed capital for improving the productivity of  land 
use. It is more appropriate to regard buildings as a fixed capital to improve productivity in land. 
The inappropriateness of  the concept of  „building‟ as a product of  land and „building rent‟ in an 
urban context has also been criticised by other authors in series of  papers (Clark, 1986; Haila, 
1989; Clark, 1990). 
Fourth, as Haila (1990) pointed out, there was a division of  the two lines of  thoughts which 
emphasises general laws and concrete situations respectively. In her historical paper on rent 
theory, Haila (1990) arranges and classifies past arguments on land rent. She classifies the works 
into two categories. The first one is „the ideographic group‟ which emphasises the importance of  
analysing concrete situations in their historical and institutional context and denies the possibility 
of  a general theory of  rent. The second group is „the nomothetic group‟, which assumes a 
tendential uniformity of  economic agents in the capitalist mode of  production in space and 
searches for general laws in rent theory. Ball (1977, 1985, 1986) and Harvey (1973, 1974, 1982) 
are said to be the representative authors in each group respectively. Ball (1986) points out that 
the decline of  Marxian urban studies may be attributed to a tendency to focus on the 
functionalists approach to the use of  land, examining the theories of  three influential researchers 
(Manuel Castells, Jean Lojkine and David Harvey). He argues that the social relations of  building 
provision are substantial not only in rejuvenating Marxian rent theories but also in the proper 
understanding urban phenomena as a whole. Having pointed out multiple social agents around 
building provision, including landowners, developers, building firms, building workers, financiers, 
building owners and final users, he suggests three basic frames which can bridge the building 
provision and social environment: functional, historical, and political linkage. Harvey (1987) 
demands that researchers in Marxian camp should deepen and sharpen the theory, criticising the 
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looser „realist‟ theorists who have abandoned or withdrawn the fundamental Marxian conception 
from urban studies. He offers three barriers to be overcome: 1) the influence of  Althusserian 
Marxism, 2) the abstraction of  Marxist theory and the specificities in geography leading to the 
importance of  empirical data work on concrete issue, and 3) the tendency to prefer a discourse 
about „totalities‟. It is important to recognize the general structure of  land rents, but at the same 
time, it should be unfolded through concrete and empirical analysis. The division of  the two lines 
coincide with the timing of  the plummeting interest on Marxian land rent theory. 
 
2-4  Neoclassical approaches 
 
Ironically, what filled the empty place of  Marxian land rent theories in 1980-90s was 
neoclassical approaches. There has been a considerable body of  neoclassical approaches to 
Marxian land rent theory. They tried to interpret or solve the problems in Marxian land rent 
theory in terms of  their own economic concepts and terms. 
Karl Pribram (1940) unfolds his theory on urban ground rent, starting from the theory of  F. 
von Wieser, allegedly the first economist to focus on ground rent in an urban context. The main 
point of  Wieserian theory is that the main source of  urban ground rent is “largely independent 
of  differences in costs of  production; it is due to differences in the demand for the services 
rendered by different real-estate properties and, consequently, to differences in the prices paid 
for such services” (Pribram 1940:62), which emphasises the role of  demand for a group of  
properties with the same features in the market. The concept of  residual rent, which is borrowed 
from Hoyt (1933), is a more concrete form of  the urban ground rent. The rent refers to “any 
surplus return on the land and building above that necessary to pay operating expenses, taxes, 
interest, and depreciation on the building is properly assigned to the non-reproducible element in 
the combination – land” (Hoyt 1933:451). He then focuses more heavily on the concept of  
absolute ground rent which seems to indicate residual rent over differential rent. Although he 
does not mention Marx‟s theory of  land rent, his theory of  absolute ground rent resembles that 
of  Marx, except for the condition of  low organic composition. Another interesting contribution 
made by Pribram is the relationship between the movement of  absolute ground rent and cycles 
of  the building industry in Europe and the USA. 
Emmanuel (1985) suggests that it is necessary to apply the concept of  monopolistic 
competition to analyzing land and the housing market, instead of  the assumption of  perfect 
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competition. Presuming land itself  as a product and housing as product of  land, he suggests that 
the products are not homogenous because of  their location differences. Based on this difference 
of  products, Emmanuel adopts a condition of  a market structure of  monopolistic competition. 
However, the supply of  land and housing cannot be controlled without any limit. As the supply 
of  land is naturally limited and the relative importance of  the location of  each piece of  land is 
determined by social development, land is generally assumed to be in a different category of  
product from others. Thus the special gain from a particular feature with exclusive 
landownership has led to a development of  rent theory as a unique economic field. However, it 
is rather more appropriate to separate the feature of  location from any product and to instead 
explain the difference in location by the concept of  transport cost. Nevertheless, his adoption of  
monopolistic competition may have a significant role in explaining absolute rent in an urban 
context as the concept of  „multiplicity of  preference‟ by „homogeneous collectivity of  
consumers‟ by Chamberlin (1899~1967) can be linked to different housing submarkets by 
structural features. 
Persky and White (1988) review the possibility of  existence of  absolute rent, referring it to 
as a rent raised by “a land monopoly or extensive collusion among landowners” (Persky and 
White, 1988:165). They suggest that the collusion of  landowners is likely to arise in so-called 
„bad‟ time when supply curve in the land market lies even further right than the zero marginal 
revenue point, with the addition of  a downward sloping average revenue (demand curve) with a 
marginal revenue curve and a perfectly inelastic supply curve of  land. In order to avoid loss in 
this situation, they suppose, landowners would collude to control supply in the market. Although 
it is a unique attempt to explain absolute rent using a supply and demand diagram, there are 
some irrelevant points. Firstly, as the supply of  land is inelastic and the shift of  the supply curve 
is for various reasons difficult to control, its fixity and durability makes it difficult to increase or 
reduce supply of  land in the short run. Furthermore, the situation of  “extensive collusion 
among landowners” is almost impossible where numerous landowners try to maximise their own 
interest in a contemporary urban context. 
The main interest of  Bryan (1990) is how to differentiate between the natural and man-
made attributes of  land focusing on differential rent 2. Admittedly, differentiating the ground 
rent from a “natural” contribution and the interest from a man-made contribution is not an easy 
task. Bryan seems to have started with the belief  that “land must be understood in the same way 
as capital generally” and concludes the same demanding that “neoclassical economic theory has 
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divorced the concept of  rent from land and attached it to a general conception of  monopoly. 
Marxist theory could well do the same.” (Bryan, 1990). However, the difficulty in differentiating 
between types of  ground rent cannot itself  be a sufficient condition for annihilating concepts of  
difference. Excess profit over and above price of  production is the fundamental source of  any 
ground rent. If  there is no contribution of  capital, then all excess profit made from the products 
of  the land can be regarded as ground rent, regardless of  whether it was appropriated by 
landowners or capitalist lessee. If  there is some capital investment, the normal profit from it can 
be regarded as interest. The reason why rent should still be differentiated from interest is that 
land and amortised or mixed capital with land have different features from general capital. As 
there can by definition be no two pieces of  land with exactly the same location and productivity 
levels, each piece of  land has monopolistic features and there is a somewhat permanent hierarchy 
which would yield positive differential rent. In addition, fixity, durability, and scarcity make it 
yield basically permanent absolute rent from different groups of  land. Above all, it is because 
space is an essential condition of  any production. The need for this distinction is pointed out by 
Murray (1978).  
Evans (1991) tries to suggest a consistent concept of  monopoly rent after reviewing various 
ways of  understanding, and usage of, the concept by many economists. He classifies the different 
thought processes into three: class monopoly rent, site monopoly rent, and Marxian monopoly 
rent. He points out that Marshall has transformed the concept of  class monopoly rent, which 
was prevalent in classical economics, into the concept of  economic rent by as it refers to the 
common surplus profit over and above normal profit due to its limited resource. Secondly, he 
clarifies the misunderstanding of  site monopoly as the source of  monopoly rent. Although site 
monopoly rent is based on the unique features of  each piece of  land and monopolistic 
ownership of  the piece of  land, the rent landowners appropriate is not due to their monopolistic 
control over each site but by is instead due to the passive residual after competition. The 
meaning of  this concept is exactly same as differential rent, which originated from the 
unevenness among lands. Evans also argues, rather close to the concept of  differential rent. 
Finally, he suggests that Marxian monopoly rent may exist in some contexts, especially in an 
urban context where planning regulations limit land use. As an example, he uses the case of  a 
unique purpose-built shopping centre. This paper has contributed to clarifying the confusing 
mixed use of  the term „monopoly‟ on rent throughout a wide selection of  previous literature.  
Tracing back through Ball‟s work in 1977, Evans (1992) agrees with Ball‟s argument about 
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the difference of  the theories of  differential rent (including differential rent 2) between Marx and 
Ricardo. The main divergence between them lies in the way in which capitalist tenants regard 
cost and return from additional investment in either an average approach or a marginal approach. 
Subsequently he argues that Marx‟s theory on differential rent is wrong in practice, as capitalist 
tenants would “act along the lines suggested by the Ricardian marginalist approach, and not in 
the way which Marx‟s use of  the averaging procedure supposes” (Evans, 1992:85). However his 
argument is difficult to accept. The average procedure is more likely to prevail in calculating the 
price of  production and profit. It is because it is hardly possible to distinguish the difference of  
return from the investment which makes differential rent 2 from the natural difference of  land as 
it would eventually become part of  the „natural‟ feature of  the land after the expiration of  the 
contract between capitalist tenants and landowners. Moreover, in an urban context, capital 
investment is rarely made in incremental way but generally instead on a large scale, normally in 
the form of  constructing buildings infrastructure.  
Houghton (1993) classifies the meaning of  monopoly into two sections. The first is 
„complete ownership and control‟ and the second is „a state of  organization (structure) of  a 
market‟. With the second definition being one of  market structure, he reviews the use of  the 
term of  „monopoly‟ in related works on land rent. He focuses on the intentionally behavioural 
feature of  agents in the real estate market to create monopolies, rather than stipulating that 
certain type of  space or land can yield monopoly rent. In the process, he suggested two criteria 
for creating monopoly in urban space. The first is „non-substitutability‟ and the second is 
„consumer sovereignty‟. Essentially, the space should be unique within a „reasonable‟ distance 
from central city and should be backed by sufficient demand. This approach can provide a useful 
frame for understanding the dynamic movement of  capital investment to appropriate higher 
rents in an urban space. 
Evans (1999a, 1999b) argues that the generally accepted interpretation of  Marx‟s concept of  
absolute rent is incorrect. The controversial issue surrounding the conditions for the existence 
of  absolute rent is the concept of  low organic composition of  capital, which means that the 
proportion of  capital is lower than the proportion of  labour in a sector. Although there have 
been many debates over the condition suggested by Marx, it has generally been thought that 
Marx argued that a sector with low organic composition of  capital is a potential source of  
absolute rent. In contrast, Evans argues that the existence of  absolute rent makes the organic 
composition of  capital in a sector low, because it reduces further investment of  capital. For him, 
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the low organic composition of  capital is not a prerequisite condition but instead a result of  
absolute rent. In a later paper in the same year, he examines the possible base of  landowners‟ 
claim on absolute rent. The first possible base suggested is transaction cost including 1) the cost 
of  setting up a contractual agreement between landowner and tenant, and 2) the cost of  
monitoring the activities of  the tenant who might harm the property of  the landowner. The 
second possible base suggested is uncertainty, as the landowner can be unwilling to lease sites for 
a low rent if  there is a possibility that a higher rent might be obtainable in the future. However, 
the base of  appropriation of  absolute rent which Evans suggested is difficult to accept. It is 
more appropriate to regard transaction and monitoring costs as part of  total cost. Keeping land 
due to uncertainty in the market is also merely an individual economic judgement of  landowners. 
Uncertainty itself  cannot be a sufficient base for absolute rent. 
 
2-5  Recent development in Marxian land rent theory 
 
Since the „rupture‟ period of  Marxian land rent theory in 1980‟s, there has been little 
contribution to the rent mechanism itself. The majority of  contribution to Marxian land rent 
theory focused on Harvey‟s concept of  „secondary circuit‟ which emphasised the function of  
built environment as a temporary shelter for capital accumulation. 
Ross King (1987) investigates a long term change of  trend in the housing construction 
industry in Melbourne utilising the vast amount of  data of  transactions in housing from the 
1930s to 1980s. He distinguishes between absolute rent and monopoly rent based on scale 
difference. He seems to understand absolute rent as „all rent in a particular region or submarket‟ 
by collective power of  the landowners, and monopoly rent as excess profit from a monopolistic 
position by a few landlords a particular piece of  land. He argues that investment in the housing 
sector before 1973 was a „secondary circuit‟ of  the capital accumulation of  Harvey (1982) 
seeking absolute rent in the housing sector as a whole, while investment after 1973 was another 
„secondary circuit‟ for monopoly rent depending on the „uneven development of  spatially 
differentiated housing submarkets‟. For an explanation of  differential house price changes, firstly 
he suggests that shifts in consumer preference to various conditions, such as accessibility to 
employment, accessibility to private and selective schools, and the proportion of  employed males 
in professional occupations can be major causes, which can be linked to differential rent from 
different levels of  „fertility‟ of  labour reproduction. Secondly, he claims that the differential 
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house price changes may come from 1) excess demand as a consequence of  class structuration 
and the changing distribution of  income, 2) restricted supply in a particular submarket, 3) 
augmented or restricted demand from general financial conditions, and 4) the creation of  a new 
submarket or the radical transformation of  an existing one, which can create monopoly rent 
from excess profit in the limited housing resources. Although the theoretical base of  his 
distinction between absolute rent and monopoly rent is not fully discussed in his work, his 
application of  Marxian rents to an urban context is a noteworthy work, especially where he links 
different conditions of  labour reproduction to differential rent and analyses the differentiation 
process in the housing sector; his applying a theoretical frame to empirical data is the first 
prominent attempt since the work of  Harvey and Chatterjee (1974). 
Anne Haila (1989) tries to find an appropriate framework for empirical analysis of  land use 
and investment on land and verifies it using empirical data from Helsinki. She classifies four 
types of  theories of  investment in land and property: 1) the theory of  derived demand by 
effective demand for profit using land, 2) the theory of  switched investment focusing on 
Harvey‟s „secondary circuit‟ to use the built environment to alleviate the crisis in the „primary 
circuit‟, 3) the theory of  conditions for restructuring, regarding the built environment as a basic 
condition for the reproduction of  labour and means of  production, 4) the theory of  the real 
estate sector‟s intrinsic dynamic, emphasising the internal mechanism inside the sector 
distinguishing itself  from Harvey‟s „secondary circuit‟. Subsequently, she classifies investment on 
land and property into four types by purpose and timing: 1) investment for present actual 
demand, 2) investment for present lettings, 3) investment for future actual demand, and 4) 
investment for future sales.  
Using empirical data collected from cities in West Germany, S. Krätke (1991) argues that 
traditional land rent theory on capital accumulation needs to be reformulated. Traditionally the 
appropriation of  land rent has been regarded to have a negative influence on capital 
accumulation, as it removes values created in production spheres. Noticing the trend that capital 
is actively involved in property development in urban space, and focusing on the phenomena of  
the fusion of  capital and landed property, he suggests that land rent needs to be regarded not as 
a barrier to capital accumulation but as an alternative source. There is some research highlighting 
the merger between the two classes and increasing the tendency of  capital inflow to the built 
environment (Massey and Catalano 1978, Harvey 1982). This opinion can be also found in 
Scott‟s argument (1980). He suggests a new perspective on the role of  rent as an assistant, not a 
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barrier, to capitalist accumulation. He considers that rent has a positive function in capital 
accumulation, because “land rent enters immediately into the stream of  new investments 
generally, where it contributes directly to the accumulation process” (Scott 1980:30). However, 
this trend of  merger does not necessarily mean reversing the tendential fall of  rate of  profit in 
capital accumulation. This issue can be examined in two aspects: easing over-accumulation and 
creating new surplus value. Their argument would only be feasible in the context either that the 
diversion of  capital investment to built environment prevents over-accumulation and 
overproduction in production spheres, or that capital invested in built environment creates a 
considerable source of  value in the construction process. If  the advance of  capital in land as 
merged landownership takes the form of  purchasing or mortgaging existing property to 
appropriate current land rents, thus attracting financial investment, the existence of  land rent 
would not only remain a barrier to capital accumulation, but also become an abyss over which 
capital accumulation as a whole would be, behind a temporal easing effect to individual capital. 
As appropriating land rent in the form of  profit cannot change its role as a distributional form 
of  surplus value, the inflow of  capital into land in that way (transfer of  ownership) would have a 
negative impact on capital accumulation in term of  creating surplus value. In addition, as 
opposed to Scott‟s argument, it is more probable that rent would circularly flow back into land as 
an investment in a fictitious commodity, rather than in the production sphere. Moreover, 
financial investment fever around the built environment as a fictitious commodity would 
eventually raise the cost of  using housing and offices in the area, leading to a decrease in 
purchasing power, which is another big threat to capital accumulation in the long run. Harvey 
(1982, 1989) has been the most effective so far in explaining these phenomena. Pointing out, 
firstly, the positive aspect of  rent in capital accumulation - the over accumulation problem can be 
alleviated by diverting capital into land on the so-called secondary circuit - he concludes that this 
would not be an ultimate solution but would rather aggravate the problem due to an 
overinvestment in this fictitious commodity. 
There has been an interesting discussion of  the impact of  nationalisation on land rents. As a 
politician in India, Namboodiripad (1984) has worked on land rent theory, focusing on practical 
policies suggested in India. From the point of  view of  agrarian communism, Marx‟s land rent 
theory is reviewed in a hypothetical situation of  the nationalisation of  land. The use of  
quotations by Kautsky and Lenin on differential rent and absolute rent is very interesting. Their 
main points are 1) the two types of  rent are the most important types of  rent, 2) in reality, as the 
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two rents are mixed together even with the interest of  capital invested, the division of  categories 
of  rent is difficult but extremely important, and 3) the nationalisation of  lands would abolish 
absolute rent but not differential rent, as the difference of  location and fertility of  lands remains 
even after nationalisation. The argument on the abolition of  absolute rent is valid only if  there is 
single use of  land. However in an urban context, as spaces are fragmented by different 
combinations of  capital, there is likely to be different levels of  absolute rents within a similar 
group of  spaces. As differential rent cannot be abolished after nationalisation, due to different 
location and figures, absolute rent by a group of  space would remain, except for in the worst 
group of  spaces.  
Utsa Patnaik (1999) reviews the Marxian land rent theory comparing it to those of  Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo in the form of  a response to the paper by Namboodiripad (1984). Her 
claim on the origin of  Marxian terms of  differential rent and absolute rent is a unique 
contribution. She argues that the „rent‟ of  Smith is a rent “which arose because private property 
not only existed, but was monopolised in a few hands.” (Patnaik 1999:52) and Marx denoted this 
„rent‟ of  Smith as absolute rent. She also argues that „rent‟ to Ricardo means „the extra profit 
over and above the average profit‟ and that Marx denoted this as differential rent to differentiate 
it from absolute rent. On the issue of  nationalisation and the following impact on the ground, 
which was raised by Namboodiripad (1984), she takes the same position, that absolute rent 
would disappear whereas differential rent would remain. 
Economakis (2003) reignites the discussion on the condition of  absolute rent. As one of  the 
rare attempts to examine the rent from value theory, he correctly interprets the condition of  
absolute rent suggested by Marx and highlights the real problem in the condition. Considering 
the fact that sectors with high organic composition have a higher rate of  surplus value, he 
demonstrates the possibility that the value of  a product in a higher organic composition of  
capital can have a greater value than that in low organic composition of  capital with concrete 
figures of  values. He argues that the concept of  absolute rent should be accepted only when it 
has monopoly price, which means that absolute rent can exist when the market price exceeds the 
price of  production. Comparing this to differential rent, he refers to “political rent”. His 
emphasis of  the class relationship between landowners and capitalist tenants over the 
appropriation of  ground rent is very similar to the concept of  “class monopoly rent” by Harvey 
(1974). 
The institutionalist approach of  Jäger (2003) is a unique contribution to the theory. He 
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revaluates existing urban land rent theories and suggests that it could be useful to analyze urban 
rent from the perspective of  the French Regulation School. Jäger properly emphasises the 
influence of  „institutional regulations‟ on differential rent 2. He points out that “institutional 
regulations limiting the type of  use of  urban land, like zoning or building restrictions, are of  
decisive importance in preventing or enabling the formation of  intensive rent” (Jäger 2003:245). 
He also suggests that “gentrification may be interpreted as resulting from the real estate 
developers‟ search for a cheap urban space in order to capture DR2” (Jäger 2003:245).  
Regulations on urban land use and building, such as zoning, total floor area, and height limits, 
would set the structural feature of  property. As absolute rent and differential rent differ between 
each group of  housing with similar structural features, changes in this regulation would lead to 
changes in the potential level of  rent. Successive capital investment can then valorise this 
increased potential. However, it might not be appropriate to presume all these potential or actual 
changes in the level of  rent to be differential rent 2. Increased rent by capital investment for the 
highest return the site can get could be notionally regarded as differential rent 2, but the true 
nature of  it is the gap between the combination of  absolute rent and differential rent in the 
group of  housing it entered and the combination of  them in the existing group. Otherwise, in 
the case that it creates a unique and popular type of  property, the true nature of  increased rent 
would be monopoly rent. This will be discussed in chapter 3. 
 
2-6  Conclusion 
 
The development of  Marxian land rent theory has been stagnated by some crucial problems 
which were revealed during the period of  heated debates, let alone the lack of  empirical analysis. 
Based on these, I suggest four main needs for the further development of  the theory. 
First, the research for a consistent theory of  the mechanism of  land rents is needed. The 
issue of  how land rents emerge was overshadowed by the massive interest in class relations 
around space, which is easy to remain abstract. However, detailed analytical approach with the 
categories of  land rents can provide useful tool for empirical research to explain various urban 
phenomena. The discussion over class relationship around space can be fortified with the 
advances in the theory of  land rent mechanism. 
Second, the product of  the land needs to be identified for an urban context. The 
proposition of  „buildings‟ as the product of  the land in an urban context has brought confusion 
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in the field. Land rent is based on the relationship between landowners and users over the 
production process in the land. In this context, what is the product of  the land in different types 
of  spaces is a crucial question in the development of  the theory. 
Third, the debates on the condition of  absolute rent and the relationship between absolute 
rent and monopoly rent needs to be re-examined. The urban spaces of  fragmented uses and 
features make absolute rent and monopoly rent important. Without sorting out the problems, 
related research would remain as the discussion at an abstract level. 
Lastly, a consistent theory of  the structure of  land rent in an urban context needs to be 
established. The original theory based on agricultural production conditions needs to be 
reorganised to be suitable for an urban context. Of  course, this requires proper handling of  the 
previous two needs. 
It is undeniable that Marxian land rent theory at this stage is not perfect for analysing the 
structure of  house prices. However, it has the potential to be a convincing alternative to 
mainstream economics as it focuses on the fundamental basis of  the changes in house prices. 
For further advance of  the theory, the four needs should be properly addressed. 
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Chapter 3.   
A renovation of  Marxian land rent theory  
in an urban context 
 
3-1  The product of  the land 
 
3-1-1  The relationship between land and production 
 
The monopoly of  landed property and the inseparable relationship between production and 
land are two fundamental sources of  land rent. Exclusive ownership of  scarce resources of  land 
is a basic condition of  claiming land rent. However, legal ownership of  land alone does not 
provide the sufficient conditions for the appropriation of  land rent. Another basic condition for 
the collection land rent is the economic condition that capitalists3 have to employ land as an 
essential factor or instrument of  production. Marx pointed out that legal power alone cannot 
generate land rent but instead, the appropriation of  land rent is only possible when particular 
economic conditions support it. 
“Landed property presupposes that certain persons enjoy the monopoly of  disposing of  
particular portions of  the globe as exclusive sectors of  their private will to the exclusion of  all 
others. Once this is given, it is a question of  developing the economic value of  this monopoly, i.e. 
valorizing it, on the basis of  capitalist production. Nothing is settled with the legal power of  
these persons to use and misuse certain portions of  the globes. The use of  this power depends 
entirely on economic conditions, which are independent of  their wills.”   (Marx 1991:752) 
Marx then summed up this feature of  ground rent as follows. 
“Ground rent is thus the form in which landed property is economically realized, valorized.”   
(Marx 1991:756) 
Given this feature of  ground rent, the following questions naturally arise. Which economic 
conditions enable a landowner to demand ground rent? How is the level of  ground rent 
                                            
3 Capitalists can become landowners by buying land and in the same manner landowners can also be 
capitalists if  they use their own land for production. Ordinary workers also lease land for various purposes 
including reproduction of  their labour power. Although the actual relationships across land may vary, in 
the following discussion the separation between a lessor and lessee of  land will be maintained to make the 
renting relationship straightforward.   
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determined? These are central issues in the theory of  rent mechanism, which will be reviewed 
throughout this chapter. In order to approach these questions properly, it is essential to examine 
the relations of  production in land where the economic conditions between the capitalist and the 
landowner are reflected in determination of  the level of  ground rent. Despite the importance of  
the production phase in the chain of  „land ownership – production – ground rent‟, this has not 
been properly examined in related research. It is crucial to have a clear idea of  the economic 
relations of  production not only to understand the complicated concepts of  ground rents but 
also to apply these concepts to an urban context. 
Although detailed mechanisms vary across the different categories of  ground rents, the 
basic source of  ground rent is the excess profit4 made by capitalists in the production utilising a 
particular piece of  land. The landowners would claim that a part of  the excess profit is due to 
the superiority of  their land and that part of  excess profit would thus be converted to ground 
rent.5 However, landowners cannot arbitrarily claim an unreasonable level of  ground rent as 
capitalists can move their demand elsewhere. At the same time, capitalists‟ choice in selecting 
land as a factor of  production is also limited. The level of  excess profit contributed by using a 
particular piece of  land is dependent upon various factors like land use, location, and 
productivity of  land. The economic decisions of  landowners and capitalists are likely to be based 
on these considerations. These economic decisions would form the basis of  an underlying 
mechanism of  ground rent centred by fluctuating market rent levels, which is the main focus of  
this chapter. 
In any analysis on economic relations of  production in land, the question of  what is the 
product of  the land should first be properly identified. The „product of  the land‟ means the 
product which the capitalist produces using land. Market price and production cost6 of  the 
product of  the land are major factors in determining the amount of  profit for capitalists, who 
have to decide which land they lease and how much they have to pay as rent. Therefore one of  
the major concerns of  capitalists leasing land is choosing which product they will produce. Most 
                                            
4 Excess profit means the amount of  total revenue left after taking away the cost of  production and 
normal profit. As normal profit means an average level of  profit in industries, the profit exceeding this 
average level is also called abnormal profit or supernormal profit. 
5 Hereafter the excess profit due to the contribution of  the land will be assumed as ground rent regardless 
of  whether it is taken by landowners as rent or by capitalist tenants / capitalist landowners as excess profit. 
Although actual payments of  ground rent vary between people, time, or market conditions, excess profit 
or ground rent hereafter means Smith‟s „natural rent‟ which actual payments fluctuate around. This 
relationship between natural rent and real rent is similar to the relationship between price of  production 
(see footnote 8) and market price. 
6 Marx uses the term „production cost‟ and „cost price‟ for the same meaning of  total cost of  production. 
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of  the rent theories from classical political economy used corn as the product of  the land in 
developing their theories, because agriculture was the main industry and corn was the main 
product of  the land in that time. In identifying the product of  the land, it would be useful to 
clarify the main features of  the product of  the land in classical rent theories. Based on classical 
rent theories, the product of  the land has two main features. The first is that the product of  the 
land is the final product from various possible production processes using each piece of  land. 
The price of  the product of  the land also plays a major role in determination of  the level of  
ground rent. Firstly, corn is a final product from a production in land. Secondly, its price mainly 
determines the level of  ground rent in the following ways: 
1. differences in productivity in terms of  fertility or location would generate excess profit 
creating differences between production cost and market price of  corn; 2. an additional capital 
investment for fertility or accessibility improvement on land could lead to an increase in excess 
profit over and above the production cost, through increased productivity; 3. particular situations 
of  excess demand in the corn market could make a further common experience of  excess profit 
in the sector due to increased market price of  corn; 4. if  corn from a particular piece of  land has 
a monopoly price because of  a special quality, excess profit could be generated. Part of  these 
excess profits from the gap between market price and production cost would be appropriated by 
the landowner as ground rent. However, in an urban context, this question of  what is the 
product of  the land has not yet been properly answered. 
 
3-1-2  The product of  the land in an urban context 
 
As opposed to in agriculture, in the urban context there are some different arguments about 
what constitutes the product of  the land. Ball (1977, 1985), who was influential in the 
developments in Marxian rent theory, argued that a building itself  could be understood as the 
product of  the land in an urban context. He suggested that it is relevant to see building provision 
as a production process in an urban context. 
“The main effect is that the relationship between the market price of  the commodity 
produced and the rent extracted differs: the commodity produced in agriculture being „corn‟ and 
on urban land, „buildings‟.”   (Ball 1977:400) 
This, however, is one of  the most serious misunderstandings in the related research. 
According to the two main features derived from classical rent theories, buildings are irrelevant 
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to be the counterpart of  corn in an urban context. 
Firstly, a building is not a final product from the production process. Buildings are not final 
product from land, but fixed capital to improve land rents. Clark (1987b) argued that buildings 
are fixed capital pointing out the inappropriateness of  buildings as the product of  the land. 
“My criticism is that in their distinction they compare the products of  agriculture with urban 
fixed capital, … one may just as well reverse the order by comparing urban products with 
agricultural fixed capital.”   (Clark 1987b:1123) 
The same point is also found it Marx‟s own writing.“Capital may be fixed in the earth, 
incorporated into it, both in a transient way, as is the case with improvements of  a chemical kind, 
application of  fertiliser, etc., and more permanently, as with drainage ditches, the provision of  
irrigation, levelling of  land, farm buildings, etc.”   (Marx 1991:756)  
Developers and investors in building properties may regard a building is a final product 
which can be sold and bought. Considering that sales of  properties are entirely normal in 
contemporary society, this view seems to be acceptable. However, the reason why buildings are 
commercially traded is that the property rights on buildings are based on the rights on the rents 
from the potential lease of  spaces in buildings. Marx made a clear point on this. 
“…, it is ground rent and not the houses themselves that forms the real basic object of  
speculative building; … the builder makes very little profit out of  the buildings themselves; he 
makes the principal part of  the profit out of  the improved ground rents.”   (Marx 1991:909) 
Physically, buildings appear to be yields from the soil, rooted on the ground like corn or 
other agricultural crops. To regard the product of  the land as product of  the soil can create this 
kind of  misconception. To avoid this, the product of  the land should be understood not as the 
product of  soil but as the product of  space. The essence of  the use of  land and the following 
land rent appropriation is the lease of  space. Building as a fixed capital is essential to create 
spaces from land but it is not appropriate to see it as the fundamental source of  land rent.7 Land 
rent, then, should be understood as space rent. 
Secondly, it is not appropriate to regard the price of  building as determining the level of  
land rents. The price of  building mainly consists of  the production cost of  constructing building, 
normal profit, and capitalised land rents in the future. However, it is more appropriate to see that 
level of  land rent determines the price of  building. The price of  a building depends on what 
                                            
7 In this sense, regulation on the total floor area of a building can determine the total area of space based 
on a piece of land and the total sum of land rents in the building. It thus functions as a crucial determinant 
of land rents and price of a piece of land. 
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production activities are conducted in and how much rent could be yielded from the spaces in 
the building. Haila (1989) went further than Clark with commenting that the product of  the land 
in the urban context is commodities and services. 
“The correct counterpart in the urban case is commodities and services, not buildings.”   
(Haila 1989:1527)  
This is a correct point as commodities in industrial land and services in commercial land are 
the final product in each production process and the level of  prices of  them determines the level 
of  land rent in each use of  land. Yet Haila‟s suggestion does not cover residential space, although 
the most dominant use of  urban land is residential use. As housing is the essential base of  any 
kind of  reproduction of  labour power, labour power can be seen as the appropriate counterpart 
of  the product of  the land in residential space. In housing, ordinary workers manage the 
reproduction process for their daily labour power, including that of  their family in the long run. 
Thus, the demand for housing reflects this desire of  people to reproduce their labour power in a 
decent space. The source of  appropriation of  land rent in residential land then can be seen as a 
reproduction process of  labour power. Labour power is a final product of  the residential land 
and it influences the determination of  land rent in residential land.  
 
3-2  Land rent in general context 
 
3-2-1  Differential rent 
 
Classical rent theories had mainly focused on the agricultural sector which was the major 
industry at that time. In cultivating crops, the fertility of  soil is one of  the main determinants 
which influence productivity and profit. The formation of  the market price of  crop and the 
production cost or price of  production8 in each agricultural production using land was the main 
focus in the theories. Classical economists expressed little difference in the concept of  
differential rent (DR)9. They thought that the different conditions of  production by land were 
the fundamental source of  DR. Farmers have different production costs due to various factors 
                                            
8 Marx use the term of  „price of  production‟ (production price) of  individual capitalist meaning the sum 
of  cost of  production and normal (average) profit. 
9 In fact, classical political economists rarely classify land rent into separate categories. For example, Adam 
Smith‟s „rent‟ means all categories of  land rents as he explains „rent‟ arises out of  monopoly, differential 
advantage in production, and scarcity, which lead to considerable confusion (Gee 1981). In the same 
manner, David Ricardo, a major contributor to the theory of  differential rent, refers it as „rent‟, along with 
James Anderson and Robert Malthus. Marx invented the name later (Patinaik 1999). 
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of  production although they produce homogenous products like corn. The market price of  the 
agricultural product is likely to be determined by the level of  the price of  production from 
producers in the worst condition10 as they have the highest production costs. If  the market price 
is determined below the level of  production price according to change in supply and demand, 
the producers in the worst condition would have to leave the sector as they would face loss. In 
contrast, if  the market price is determined over and above the production price level, other 
capital would flow into the sector leading to expansion of  cultivation because of  the opportunity 
to enjoy a higher profit level in this sector. Once the market price was determined, other 
producers who had a lower production cost than the farmer in the worst land would have excess 
profit, comprising the difference between the market price and their production cost.11 The 
landowner leasing lands would then demand a part of  the excess profit claiming that this 
difference in production cost originates from the superior fertility or location of  their lands. 
Therefore the excess profit due to different conditions of  production in land could be 
appropriated by landowners. Otherwise landowners would try to replace the lessee to secure their 
right to the excess profit. Through the struggle between landowners and capitalists with changes 
of  lease contracts for appropriating a portion of  the excess profit, an underlying basis of  ground 
rent would be formed. This appropriated excess profit, created by different conditions in land, is 
regarded as DR. 
If  demand for a product of  the land in a sector increases for some reason, that would 
temporarily increase the market price. Capital from other sectors would then flow into the sector 
seeking a higher rate of  profit from excess demand. Capitalist tenants would then have to lease 
lands for production and choose less fertile lands or lands further from the market, because 
superior lands are likely to have been already leased by existing producers. Because they would 
have to use inferior lands in production, the production cost would be higher than that of  
existing producers and some of  them would therefore be operating under the worst production 
conditions in the market. If  the demand remains the same, cultivation in agriculture would 
expand further and the market price would go up due to increased production costs for the 
                                            
10 The worst condition of  production in agriculture normally means the worst fertility but it can also 
mean the poorest accessibility to central market in terms of  location difference.  
11 This is consistent with the concept of  producer surplus in welfare economics. Compared to the nominal 
concept of  consumer surplus consisting of  potential benefit, this would be real excess profit to producers. 
If  the excess profit due to having lower production cost is from other factors such as innovation in 
technology or production process, it would be likely to remain as excess profit to capitalist. However if  
some part of  it is attributed by superiority of  land, the part of  it would be transferred to landowners as 
ground rent. 
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worst cultivation. This expansion of  production on inferior land would therefore widen the gap 
between the market price and price of  production of  existing producers using superior lands, 
which is likely to lead to an increase of  the volume of  DR in the market. This increase of  DR 
from the expansion in cultivation of  inferior lands is referred to extensive DR of  differential rent 
1. 
At the same time, when there is an increase in demand for the product, the producer could 
choose options other than leasing inferior land. As productivity can be improved with 
investments on existing land (such as fixed capital investment including irrigation, fertilization, 
and drainage), the production costs of  producers can vary as the result of  it. The worst land 
before capital investment will not necessarily have the highest production costs in the market as 
there could be vast improvements in productivity by investment. The producers who invest 
successive capital or employ more labour on their existing land can appropriate excess profit 
depending on the improvement in productivity. However, landowners can also take away this 
excess profit from the lessees when the lease contract has expired, because most capital poured 
into land is likely to be sunk costs. This excess profit is referred to differential rent 2. 
Although there are some arguments on the methods in development of  rent theory 
especially on intensive DR between the Ricardian and Marxian approach (Ball 1977, Evans 1992, 
Ball 1992), it is generally accepted that there is little difference in the main idea. However, as the 
Marxian explanation includes various cases of  the consequences of  additional investment and 
employs mainly fixed capital investment cases which are helpful in understanding the 
fundamental feature of  intensive DR, the Marxian approach of  DR will be dealt with here.  
Marx denotes the increased ground rent by additional capital investment as differential rent 
2 (DR2). This originates from the widened profit margins by successive investments on the same 
land. As DR is based on the unevenness of  productivity of  different lands and the comparison 
between them, DR2 is also based on the mechanism of  comparison between the worst land and 
superior land in terms of  productivity. Before the expiration of  the contract on a land, the 
capitalist tenants can enjoy the excess profit from successive investment on the land as excess 
profit. However, once the contract on the use of  the land expired, landowners would try to take 
the improvement as rent by renegotiating terms of  contract of  tenancy, which leads to an 
eventual transformation of  the profit to rent. After all, several changes in tenancy would make it 
hard to discover whether the difference of  productivity comes from existing productivity of  the 
land or additional investments on it. This feature of  DR2 is clearly stated by Marx. 
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“Although these are the product of  capital, they operate just like the natural differential 
quality of  the soil”   (Marx 1991:844) 
“In the case of  differential rent II, they (differential results) must first be made 
distinguishable, they must in fact be transformed back into differential rent I, and this can only 
be done in the manner indicated”   (Marx 1991:861) 
This surplus increased by additional investment within the same lands would be regarded as 
excess profit for the capitalists before the expiration of  the contract. However, after the 
expiration of  the lease contract, it would be regarded as improved ground rent of  DR2 to 
landowners. However, it eventually transforms into DR1 as division between DR1 and DR2 
becomes ambiguous. Therefore DR2 can be seen as a temporary category of  ground rent in 
Marxian rent theory12 and DR1 (abbreviated as DR) comes to assimilate successive rounds of  
investment in ways which make it seem indistinguishable from the 'natural' qualities of  the place. 
The changes in DR and DR2 depend on the way in which capitalists invest. Capitalists 
always search for a more profitable form of  investment. In general, capitalists can either intensify 
existing production or extend production. In terms of  land use, capitalist tenants can either 
invest more on existing land or expand their production by leasing other lands. Considering the 
general demands of  the market, price of  production, and the productivity change from 
additional investment on the same land, capitalists would take the investment offering the best 
return. If  the demand within the market increases, many capitalists would find it more profitable 
to simply extend their production to outer lands, which are generally worse lands. This inflow of  
worse lands would increase the highest production cost in the industry. DR in the sector as a 
whole would then increase following the increase in market price. On the other hand, if  an 
investment is thought to significantly change the productivity of  a land when the demand of  the 
market remains at a similar level, capitalists would find the investment on existing production 
more profitable. The excess profit from successive investment on the same land can be regarded 
as DR2. However, this would only change the level of  ground rent in the specific piece of  land, 
as the influence of  successive investment is confined to the related lands only. In this way, there 
are dynamics of  capital movement between additional investment on the same land and 
expansion to new land, which would determine the level of  DR and DR2. 
 
 
                                            
12 This is also pointed out by Fine (1979). 
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3-2-2  Absolute rent 
 
Differential rent (DR) and absolute rent (AR) are the key components in Marx‟s land rent 
theory. This fact can be found not only in his outline on rent analysis13 but also in his direct 
remark that DR and AR are the only normal rents14. Marx adopted DR theory from classical 
political economists like David Ricardo, and developed it further with the concept of  differential 
rent 2 in various situations15. However, it is generally accepted that AR theory has been 
developed by his unique contribution. 
“The only thing I have got to prove theoretically is the possibility of  absolute rent, without 
violating the law of  value. … Ricardo denies this possibility. I maintain that it exists.” [requoted 
from Limits to Capital (Harvey 1982:349), Selected Correspondence (with Engels), p.134] 
Through this remark in his early days it is not difficult to deduce the importance of  this 
theory to him. However, the importance and the implication of  AR to recent researchers varies a 
lot. This variation is mainly attributed to the technical condition of  low organic composition of  
capital (OCC) in a sector suggested by Marx. 
Emmanuel (1972) and Economakis (2003) pointed out the innate problem of  the technical 
condition. Referring to the incompleteness of  Marx‟s text on the question, Emmanuel suggested 
that AR can exist without the condition but it is different from „monopoly rent‟ or „scarcity rent‟. 
Fine (1979) and Murray (1977, 1978) explained the condition further focusing on the economic 
situation when the original text was written. But they might overlook the possibility of  the innate 
problem of  Marx theory on this to be applied to different economic contexts. Harvey (1973, 
1982) acknowledged the condition of  AR in particular occasions like the early stage of  capitalism 
in agriculture but recognised it less important in the contemporary capitalist mode of  production. 
While some regard AR as same as „monopoly rent‟ or „scarcity rent‟ in an urban context 
discarding the technical condition (Pribram 1940, Harvey and Chatterjee 1974, Scott 1976, 
Lipietz 1985, Persky and White 1988), some suggested new labels for the rent. Harvey (1974) 
suggested „class monopoly rent‟ and Economakis (2003) suggested „political rent‟. Even some 
argue that AR is not land rent. Jäger (2003) argued that it is not a rent in a strict sense, regarding 
it as a reservation price. Evans (1999b) suggested that it is relevant to regard it as the mixture of  
                                            
13 Marx 1991:860; the heads of  proposed rent analysis are A. differential rent B. absolute rent C. The price 
of  land D. Final consideration on ground rent 
14 Marx 1991:898 
15 Explanation about DR 2 takes five chapters out of  eight on the whole analysis on ground rent (rest two 
chapters for DR and one chapter for AR) 
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transaction cost, monitoring costs, and risk-taking compensation. 
In the following, AR theory of  Marx will be critically re-examined. A new approach will be 
attempted for the interpretation of  AR. In the process, Marx‟s confusing conceptualisation over 
the condition of  AR will be tackled. 
Marx developed AR theory which could be compatible with DR theory finding that land 
rent was actually demanded even in the worst land. If  a landowner in the worst land with no DR 
can demand some amount of  land rent for the lease, other landowners operating under superior 
conditions in the same sector would also demand a similar amount of  land rent as the worst land 
in addition to their existing DRs which result from the difference in productivity. Once the 
amount of  additionally demanded land rent is established generally as that in the worst land, the 
land rent (AR) would be a basic toll to be raised from every piece of  land in the sector. Marx 
wondered what conditions made this universal and cost-increasing land rent (AR) possible.  
Comparing the rent with tax imposed by the state power (Marx 1991:892), he suggested two 
conditions for the existence of  AR. The first condition was that the organic composition of  
capital (OCC) in a sector must be lower than the social average. In the sector of  lower OCC, 
more surplus value is generated. He thought that it was the positive gap between the value and 
the price of  production that allowed the landowners to demand AR.  
 “In any case, it still holds theoretically that it is only on this premise that the value of  
agricultural products can rise above their price of  production; i.e. that the surplus-value 
produced in agriculture by a capital of  a given size, or, what comes to the same thing, by the 
surplus labour that it sets in motion and commands (i.e. the total living labour applied), is greater 
than for an equally large capital of  the average social composition.  
This assumption is therefore sufficient as far as the form of  rent we are examining here is 
concerned, and it is a necessary assumption for this rent to arise. Where this hypothesis is 
inapplicable, the form of  rent corresponding to it disappears.”   (Marx 1991:894) 
“If  the average composition of  agricultural capital were the same as that of  the average 
social capital, or even higher than this, the result would be the disappearance of  absolute rent in 
the sense developed above, namely a rent that is different both from differential rent and from 
rent depending on an actual monopoly price.”   (Marx 1991:899) 
About this condition, Evans (1999a) argued that Marx stated the low OCC is not a 
necessary condition but the consequence of  AR. From the quotations above it can be recognised 
that Marx clearly said that the low OCC is a necessary condition for AR. Nevertheless, it is a 
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critical argument from Evans that the AR demanded by the landlord would make the OCC low 
in agricultural sector. If  there were a barrier against capitalist investment due to an existence of  
AR in a sector, the OCC in the sector would be lower than those in others.16  
After making the argument about low OCC, Marx went on to suggest that the low OCC 
condition alone was not sufficient for the existence of  AR, because not all sectors with low OCC 
yield AR. He added one more condition. 
“This simple fact, however, of  a surplus in the value of  agricultural products over and above 
their price of  production would in no way be sufficient in itself  to explain the existence of  a 
ground rent…”   (Marx 1991:894) 
“… landed property is the barrier that does not permit any new capital investment on 
formerly uncultivated or unleased land without levying a toll, i.e. demanding a rent”   (Marx 
1991:896) 
The other necessary condition for appropriation of  AR is the power of  landed property. 
Marx thought that both low OCC and landed property were essential conditions for the 
existence of  AR. That is to say, AR arises when low OCC in the agriculture sector makes room 
(positive gap between value and price of  production) for it, and landowners consciously demand 
it with the monopolistic power on their lands. On these conditions for appropriation of  AR, 
however, two main points should be examined further: 1. whether the condition on OCC is 
relevant and 2. where the power of  landed property comes from. 
 
1. Relevance of  the condition of  low organic composition of  capital 
The low OCC statement implies that AR is allowed only when the value is greater than the price 
of  production. According to Marx‟s own writing and the interpretations of  other authors on this 
(Emmanuel 1972, Harvey 1974, Scott 1976, Murray 1977, Fine 1979, Lipietz 1985, Economakis 
2003), the amount of  AR cannot exceed the gap between the value and price of  production of  
the product in the sector, so market price of  a product including AR cannot exceed its value. 
“…, this rent forms the excess of  the value above the price of  production, or a part of  this 
excess.”   (Marx 1991:896) 
“… as a result of  the barrier that landed property sets up, the market price must rise to a point at 
which the land can pay a surplus over the price of  production, i.e. a rent.‟   (Marx 1991:896) 
“[where AR applies]… agricultural products are always sold at a monopoly price, not because 
                                            
16 See appendix 3-1 
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their price stands above their value but rather because it is equal to their value, or is below their 
value but above their price of  production.”   (Marx 1991:897) 
“…, it is clear that in these sectors of  production a surplus profit will arise, from the excess of  
commodity value above its price of  production, this being transformed into rent and as such 
becoming autonomous vis-à-vis profit.”   (Marx 1991:896) 
These statements are based on the assumption that AR in a sector originates from the surplus 
value generated in the sector. Marx thought that the sector with low OCC could yield excess 
value over its price of  production17 and a part of  the excess surplus value could transform into 
AR. He seems to have assumed that the appropriation of  the excess as AR in a sector can 
prevent the surplus value from flowing into the general equalisation process of  the general rate 
of  profit. His thought can be understood as the production and distribution of  surplus value in 
the AR-bearing sector and other sectors operate separately and therefore the surplus values from 
different sectors are hardly mixed together. 
This particular situation where landed property can play a decisive role in limiting the 
movements of  surplus value and capital may be possible in the early stage of  capitalism especially in 
agriculture (Harvey 1973, Fine 1979). Focusing on the relationship between DR2 and AR, Fine 
(1979) provided an explanation of  why the amount of  AR cannot exceed the difference between 
the value and the price of  production of  the product in the agricultural sector in the early stage 
of  capitalism where capitalists‟ investment is limited within the sector. This explanation by Fine 
might be a good answer to the question raised by Marx himself, “if  landed property gives the 
power to sell the product above its cost-price at its value, why does it not equally well give the 
power to sell the product above its value, at an arbitrary monopoly price?”18. 
This condition is, however, inappropriate in the contemporary capitalism. With ever greater mobility 
of  capital, the surplus value in the low OCC sector can actually get mixed with surplus value 
from all other sectors of  different OCCs. Once goods and services produced in a land are traded 
in markets, the issue of  where a particular quantum of  surplus value comes from becomes 
meaningless in the process of  equalisation of  the general rate of  profit where capitalists take an 
                                            
17 As 1) price of production is sum of cost of production (constant capital + variable capital) and average 
profit and 2) value of product is sum of cost of production and surplus value, excess value means excess 
surplus value over average profit. 
18 Marx 1968:332, Emmanuel 1972:219, Harvey 1973:182; Emmanuel pointed out the incompleteness of 
Marx‟s theory in this question quoting this as it is a posthumous work edited by Engels; In addition to this, 
Marx left a seemingly opposite explanation on the monopoly price saying AR can make the market price 
greater than value. “Conversely, the rent would create the monopoly price if corn were sold not only 
above its price of production but also above its value, as a result of the barrier that landed property 
opposes against the rent-free investment of capital on untilled land.”   (Marx 1991:910) 
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aliquot from the whole mixture of  surplus value according to their size of  capital input. 
Furthermore capitalists would regard AR appropriation in a sector as an extra cost, so they can 
withdraw their capital from the sector if  the rate of  profit was lower than the social average after 
paying the cost or they would remain in the sector if  the rate of  profit was higher than the social 
average even after paying the cost. Under the contemporary capitalism, it is hardly meaningful to 
assume that surplus value produced in a certain sector can be blocked by any barriers. Thus low 
OCC in a particular sector is inappropriate to be a necessary condition of  the existence of  AR in 
the contemporary capitalism. Economakis (2003) also denies the low OCC condition for AR on 
the basis of  the fact that value of  product in high OCC can have greater value than that in low 
OCC if  it has higher rate of  surplus value (rate of  exploitation). He suggests to replace absolute 
rent without the OCC condition with „political rent‟ which reflects the class conflict between 
bourgeois and landowners.  
If  the determination of  the level of  AR is not limited by the value over price of  production, 
there would be no restriction on the amount of  AR. Market price including AR could therefore 
be over and above, below or coincidently equal to the value of  the product. Actually there are 
many sectors which have a considerable level of  common rent in each sector that function like a 
toll for production in the sectors regardless of  their OCC. The condition of  low OCC seems to 
be valid only in the particular condition of  agricultural sector in the early stage of  capitalism. 
However, it may confine the development of  land rent theories to apply the technical condition 
to other contexts in a different stage of  capitalism. 
Facing this complicated problem, some researchers tried to apply this condition to an urban 
context without proper examination19 while some abandoned the entire concept of  AR because 
they thought it reinvigorated the old dispute over the labour theory of  value.  
This study suggests to keep the name of  AR for the common rent in a sector without the 
technical condition of  low OCC for some reasons. First of  all, in spite of  the confusing 
condition of  low OCC, the institutionalised common rents do exist in many sectors, especially in 
the urban context, where fragmented groups of  spaces increase the possibility of  landed 
property to appropriate the rents. 
Secondly, it is inappropriate to take the common rent in a sector as monopoly rent. This 
                                            
19 Lipietz (1985) and Edel (1975) argue that building industry can have AR in the urban context for the 
reason that the industry has low organic composition of capital like agricultural sector. They confine the 
source of AR in urban context to surplus value created in construction sector. This point has been 
appropriately criticised by Ball (1985). 
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common rent in a sector is a structurally institutionalised cost to users of  space in the whole 
sector rather than that from a monopoly price. The relationship between this rent and monopoly 
rent will be discussed in the next section. Thirdly, new labels for this rent may overlook the 
original feature of  the rent. For example, „class monopoly rent‟ or „political rent‟, may overlook 
the economic aspect of  the rent, while it is also difficult to regard this rent as „scarcity rent‟ 
which does not involve production relationship in the space and the tension between landed 
property and tenants. For these reasons, this study regards this rent as AR without the condition 
of  low OCC focusing on the basic feature of  the institutionalised common rent in a sector.20 If  
the technical condition is discarded, the concept of  AR can be a very useful frame to understand 
the structure of  urban land rents without confusion over the value of  the product of  the land.  
 
2. The source of  power of  landed property 
The discussion on the source of  landed power appropriating AR could be followed by these 
questions. Firstly, why do capitalists invest their capital into the AR-bearing sector when AR, an 
apparent barrier, would increase their production cost? Other things being equal, capitalists 
would be reluctant to invest in a sector of  higher cost. Secondly, what makes landowners have 
the power to claim AR? The answer to this could be either that they have a strong coalition or 
there is a particular condition to make it possible. These two questions are inseparably related to 
each other.  
On this condition of  AR, Marx has provided an important clue. 
“Legal ownership of  land, by itself, does not give the proprietor any ground rent. It certainly 
does give him the power, however, to withdraw his land from cultivation until economic 
conditions permit a valorization of  it that yields him a surplus, … He can neither increase nor 
reduce the absolute quantity of  this field of  occupation, but he can affect the quantity of  it on 
the market.”   (Marx 1991:891) 
According to this, landowners should wait until certain economic condition allows capitalist 
tenants to afford land rent in a sector. The particular economic condition arises where excess 
demand exists in the sector resulting in a higher market price and excess profit. This enables 
capitalist tenants to afford to pay land rent regardless of  which land they use in the sector. The 
landowners can appropriate a part of  the excess profit as AR. Although Marx emphasised the 
                                            
20 Emmanuel (1972) pointed out the existence of this rent as AR without the technical condition. 
“Absolute rent can very well exist, however, without this yardstick and without the limit.” (Emmanuel 
1972:220) 
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ability of  landowners to control the supply of  land on this condition, the coalesced strategic 
behaviour of  landowners to control land supply is not a sufficient condition for AR in the 
contemporary capitalism21. It is instead due to combined factor of  increasing and inelastic 
demand for land as an essential factor of  production and limited or inelastic supply of  land in a 
sector. The importance of  demand-supply in the formation of  AR can be found in the following 
arguments of  Marx. 
“Whether the rent is equal to the whole difference between the value and the price of  
production, or only to a greater or lesser part of  this difference, depends entirely on the state of  
supply in relation to demand and on the scale of  the area newly brought under cultivation.”   
(Marx 1991:896) 
“… absolute rent can only be small in normal conditions, …”   (Marx 1991:906) 
One may regard AR unimportant because this particular economic condition would soon 
disappear due to competition between capitals. However, the possibility of  the existence of  such 
particular conditions can be pervasive, especially in an urban context where every piece of  land is 
in high demand for various purposes fragmented by the numerous different possible types of  
land uses. Scott (1976) has also rightly pointed out this issue saying that. 
 “In the urban system, landlords certainly earn massive rents due essentially to the scarcity 
of  land equipped with urban infrastructure, including housing.”   (Scott 1976:132) 
In most AR related debates, capitalists were thought to have a passive role compared to 
landowners. Actually, however, capitalist tenants also have a crucial role in this process because 
they are willing to pay AR to landowners only when they can get excess profit over and above the 
production cost and taking AR into account with their ability to withdraw and relocate their 
capital. Following the argument of  Marx implies that the relationship between landowners and 
capitalist tenants on AR is not unilateral. 
“The landowner is always ready to draw a rent, i.e. to receive something for nothing, but 
capital requires certain conditions in order to fulfil its desire.”   (Marx 1991:906) 
 As the market condition of  land would determine the affordability of  AR for the capitalist 
tenants, the AR appropriation of  the landowners would be forced to change with it. In this 
context, the relationship between landowners and capitalist tenants on AR is not inevitably 
favourable for landowners, but rather depends upon economic conditions. 
 
                                            
21 Scott negates the possibility of a cartel of landowners: “… the real economic and political power of 
landlords in modern capitalist society is probably fairly negligible, …” (Scott 1976:129) 
  
56 
 
 
3-2-3  Monopoly rent 
 
For the feature of  AR being identified as a consequence of  excess profit from an economic 
imbalance in a sector, the concept of  monopoly rent (MR)22 has little difference from AR. Marx 
described MR as a result from a pure monopoly price of  a commodity which is determined 
neither by the price of  production nor by the product‟s value, but rather by the willingness and 
ability of  purchasers to pay. He introduced the concept of  this rent twice in chapter 45 and 
chapter 46 of  Capital Volume 3 in his distinction from AR. 
“In any case, this absolute rent, … , is simply a part of  the agricultural surplus-value, … , its 
seizure by the landowner; just as differential rent arises from the transformation of  surplus profit 
into rent, its seizure by landed property, at the general governing price of  production. These two 
forms of  rent are the only normal ones. Apart from this, rent can derive only from a genuine 
monopoly price, which is determined neither by the price of  production of  the commodities nor 
by their value, but rather by the demand of  the purchasers and their ability to pay, consideration 
of  which therefore belongs to the theory of  competition, where the actual movement of  market 
prices is investigated.”   (Marx 1991:898) 
“It is necessary to distinguish whether the rent flows from an independent monopoly price 
for the products or the land itself, or whether the products are sold at a monopoly price because 
there is a rent. By monopoly price here we mean any price determined simply by the desire and 
ability of  the buyer to pay, independently of  the price of  the product as determined by price of  
production and value. … Here, therefore, the monopoly price creates the rent. Conversely, the 
rent would create the monopoly price if  corn were sold not only above its price of  production 
but also above its value, as a result of  the barrier that landed property opposes against the rent-
free investment of  capital on untilled land.”   (Marx 1991:910) 
In these two explanations, while AR is a normal rent which is added to production cost due 
to landed property resulting in a monopoly price for the land product, MR is an abnormal rent 
which is exceptionally resulting from an external condition of  monopoly price.  
However, AR also results from external economic conditions resulting in monopoly prices. 
Moreover, from the point of  view of  the capitalist tenants using MR-bearing land, MR has no 
difference from AR, because this rent which is initially regarded as a windfall would eventually 
                                            
22 The term monopoly rent was not named by Marx, but subsequently, the concept suggested by him has 
been widely called monopoly rent. 
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become an internal part of  the production cost paid by the capitalist tenants23. The distinction 
drawn by Marx between the two thus becomes weak and even meaningless. 
However, there can be another way of  differentiating the two without this distinction of  
whether the monopoly price is determined within the inner mechanism of  price of  production 
or results from external economic conditions. Uniqueness of  land can distinguish the two.24 MR 
can exist in a particular land which displays exceptionally good qualities for creating a 
monopolistic commodity differentiating itself  from other lands, whereas AR is a universal rent 
paid on all lands in a sector.25  
There is an interesting relationship between MR and AR. In a situation in which a uniquely 
profitable land produces a particular commodity, the land can yield a large amount of  MR. 
However, if  more pieces of  land with similar qualities were launched into the market, the 
situation would be changed. If  the launch were successful and the products from the lands were 
recognized as the same as the original, the capitalist tenants would get the excess profit from 
selling them at monopoly price too. The landowners of  the newly-launched lands would then 
request land rent as much as the original MR-bearing land yields. As a consequence, they would 
appropriate the similar amount of  rent and the level of  MR would probably fall to a lower level 
as the scarcity of  the products would have been reduced. This means that there would be no MR 
remaining in the sector. According to the change of  market conditions, the land rents of  the 
original land and very similar lands would fluctuate together. If  AR could be described as a land 
rent which is commonly appropriated in a particular group of  lands regardless of  their OCC, 
then AR would be the correct name for this rent. In an urban context, there are numerous types 
of  uses of  land as space, depending on the structure of  fixed capital, buildings, etc. This fact 
increases the possibility of  the existence of  numerous MRs and ARs arising in a unique piece of  
space or a group of  similar spaces. 
To sum up, the competition between capitalist tenants for excess profit transforms unique 
MR into shared ARs in a sector. Namely, a monopoly of  a unique space would be transformed 
                                            
23 In the same context, Lipietz (1985) argued that any distinction between AR and MR is irrelevant. 
24 Reaching the same conclusion that AR can exceed value of the product of the land so that the 
distinction between MR and AR can be meaningless, Harvey properly suggests that MR and AR can be 
distinguished as MR in individual level and AR in general level by a particular sector as a whole. (Harvey 
1973:182) However, shortly after this distinction, he provides another way of distinction. He suggests AR 
arises when „technical and social condition affects a particular sector as a whole‟ and MR arises when 
„producers within a sector establish cartel arrangement among themselves‟. Later he seems to develop 
these concepts of AR and MR in the second distinction into a concept of „class monopoly rent‟ (Harvey 
1974) focusing on the collective powers of landowners and land users over the AR and MR in land.  
25 For MR in urban context, criteria by Houghton (1993) are noteworthy. He suggested two criteria of 
„non-substitutability‟ and „consumer sovereignty‟ for creating monopoly in urban space.  
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by the competition of  capitalist tenants into a broader market of  very similar spaces. The 
amount of  both MR and AR depends on the demand-supply conditions of  markets. Therefore, 
the more similar spaces as substitutes entered into the market, the less monopolistic power of  
landowners and common AR will be. 
While MRs are transformed to ARs by this emulation process, at the same time, the 
differentiation process endlessly creates new MRs. The differentiation, here, means that new 
specific spaces enter the market differentiating themselves from others in order to appropriate 
MR. Capitalist tenants or landowners themselves would try to get excess profit by additional 
capital investment in land to make it unique. These two processes, along with the movement of  
capital, are the most fundamental impetuses which shape urban development.26 
It is interesting to examine how these two processes of  emulation and differentiation have 
certain similarities and contrasts with the production processes in general industry. There are two 
ways of  increasing surplus value other than absolute surplus value. They are extra surplus value 
by innovation and relative surplus value. Capitalists try to improve productivity by adopting new 
technology, including new machinery and new manufacturing process. With new techniques, 
capitalists can appropriate more excess profit by reducing production cost. When other 
capitalists respond by adopting the same machinery, the social production cost of  the product 
and price of  product would be reduced due to improved productivity in the society as a whole. 
This reduction lessens the burden of  the capitalist on the wage of  labourer through alleviating 
the reproduction cost of  labour power. This also applies to the endless differentiation process 
and emulation process. However, the internal mechanisms are somewhat different. The 
processes in MR and AR are based on the mechanism of  increasing market price through 
monopoly price, whilst those in general industries, Marx explained, are based on the mechanism 
of  reducing production costs through new production technology. However, there exist similar 
mechanisms in general industries to land rent mechanism. The artificially created and protected 
ownership, such as intellectual property rights, and patents function, to increase the price of  
products is in the same way as the mechanism of  land rent based on land ownership. 
                                            
26 A study on housing construction in Melbourne by King (1987) shows the two patterns of periods. The 
first period is characterised by massive construction of similar housing before 1973 and the second period 
is characterised by differentiated small scale housing development after 1973. Similar patterns are observed 
in various countries although the periods of different patterns vary.(the U.K.:Malpass and Murie 1982; 
South Korea:Lim 2005) although the periods of different pattern vary. The first period can be seen as the 
period of an emulation process for sharing ARs by constructing similar types of housing and the second as 
the period of a differentiation process for creating MRs with unique spaces. These patterns also can be 
seen as a transformation of Fordism to Post-fordism in production.   
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3-3  Land rent in an urban context 
 
Marx‟s explanation of  land rent in urban areas is limited in terms of  quantity and level of  
detail compared with that in agricultural land. The explanation of  „Rent of  Buildings‟ is included 
in chapter 46 of  Capital, vol. 3, and covers just 3 pages. In spite of  their limited nature, his 
comments on rent of  buildings are comprehensive enough to guide further theoretical advances 
for the urban context.  
First of  all, he argued there would be DR in cases where the lessee could get surplus profit 
by taking advantage of  a „well-situated building site‟. 
“Wherever rent exists, differential rent always appears and always follows the same laws as it 
does in agriculture. Wherever natural forces can be monopolized and give the industrialist who 
makes use of  them a surplus profit, whether a waterfall, a rich mine, fishing grounds or a well-
situated building site, the person indicated as the owner of  these natural objects, by virtue of  his 
title to a portion of  the earth, seizes this surplus profit from the functioning capital in the form 
of  rent.”   (Marx 1991:908) 
He also pointed out the „prevalence of  a monopoly price‟ with MR and AR from a building 
site, when he outlined three characteristics of  land for building.  
“As far as land for building in concerned, … This rent is characterized first by the 
preponderant influence that location exerts here on the differential rent … ; Secondly, by 
palpable and complete passivity  displayed by the owner… ; finally, the prevalence of  a 
monopoly price in many cases, …”   (Marx 1991:908) 
DR2 linked with „the development of  fixed capital‟ was also emphasised as an important 
factor increasing the rent on buildings. 
“The rise in population, and the consequent growing need for housing, is not the only 
factor that necessarily increases the rent on buildings. So too does the development of  fixed 
capital, which is either incorporated into the earth or strikes root in it, like all industrial buildings, 
railways, factories, docks, etc., which rest on it.”   (Marx 1991:909) 
The inseparability between „any production and any human activity‟ and „land as space and 
foundation‟ was also highlighted. 
“Two elements come into consideration here: on the one hand the exploitation of  the earth 
for the purpose of  reproduction or extraction, on the other the space that it required as an 
element for any production and any human activity. On both counts landed property demands its 
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tribute. The demand for building land raises the value of  land as space and foundation, ….”   
(Marx 1991:909) 
Based on these basic features of  land rent for buildings, how the four types of  land rents 
can be understood in an urban context and how they are functioning will be discussed especially 
focusing on residential land. 
 
3-3-1  Reproduction of  labour power and commuting 
 
A residential space is an essential factor for the labour reproduction process. Every worker 
has no choice but to use a certain space for reproducing his or her daily labour power. The 
reproduction process of  labour which includes sleeping, eating, excreting, taking a rest, avoiding 
harsh weather, and even breeding children takes place within a housing space. Housing also 
entails social aspects of  labour reproduction, such as education, health care, and neighbourhood 
environments.  
In addition to these processes, considered in the trade of  labour power, this concept of  
reproduction of  labour can be expanded to involve the intermediate processes of  commuting 
before the sales of  the labour power in a work place. This makes commuting cost of  time cost 
and transportation cost a part of  the whole reproduction cost, as well as the other costs. 
The commuting costs mainly depend on the distance between the work place and house.  
This provides an implication that there could be surplus „profits‟ available to workers generated 
by location differences. That is to say, there is an unevenness among houses by location, which 
would entitle landowners to demand the surplus as land rent of  DR in an urban context. In this 
way, the law of  DR using Ricardo‟s agricultural explanation of  the unevenness of  fertility and 
von Thünen‟s theory of  the unevenness of  location can be taken to be still valid in urban 
residential context. Harvey (1982) also pointed out the feasibility of  existence of  DR in 
residential land relating to reproduction process of  labour power. 
“The cost of  reproduction, and therefore the value of  labour-power, is, given Marx‟s general 
rule on transport costs, sensitive to the cost of  getting to and from work. If  all workers receive a 
flat wage rate, then those who live in „favoured locations‟ have a relative advantages over those 
who live further away. If  the wage is set at a level needed to ensure the reproduction of  the 
worker who lives furthest away (as can sometimes happen under conditions of  labour scarcity), 
then all other workers receive a wage somewhat above value. It then follows that those who hold 
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space can convert the excess wage into ground rent without in any way disturbing the value of  
labour-power.”   (Harvey 1982:340) 
In this brief  comment, he has offered a significant insight into urban DR. Of  course, there 
are some inappropriate assumptions which make it difficult to accept the main idea: flat wages, 
and wage setting based on the worker who lives furthest away. Obviously, there is a vast range of  
levels of  wages and determination of  wage is not simple but instead a highly complicated 
process. Nevertheless, he provides an important point in understanding urban DR: saving in 
commuting cost lead to an “excess wage” which could be linked to DR converted to rent by 
“those who hold space” (Harvey 1982:340). 
 It is clear that there is a reproduction cost gap due to commuting cost difference 
depending on location of  houses. This gap would be appropriated by the landowners27 as a part 
of  DR because the savings in commuting cost are based on the use of  the space which has an 
advantageous location. This is analogous to the logic used in agriculture to argue that more 
fertile land allows more surplus profit which is appropriated by the landowner as DR. 
The magnitude of  the commuting cost gap in an urban residential space would be far 
greater than that in the agricultural land of  von Thünen‟s theory. This is because commuting 
takes place on a daily basis while the frequency of  farmers‟ trips to buy farming tools or trade 
crops in the central market is much lower. Thus the cumulative commuting cost would be 
reflected to a significant proportion of  the whole land rent in an urban context. 
As DR is related to residential cost, the relationship between transportation cost and 
residential cost becomes important in analysing urban residential rent. A representative work in 
this field is the seminal contribution by Alonso (1964) on the trade-off  effect between journey-
to-work cost and residential cost. Having started from von Thünen‟s theory, Alonso turned the 
focus on the production process in the theory to consumer‟s demand using bid-rent concept.28 
As a result, the dynamics of  land rents beneath the bid-rent on the surface is mainly overlooked 
in this stream of  research. On the other land, the feature of  DR theory in an urban residential 
context is useful to understand some dynamics of  land rents.. Firstly, the consequence of  the 
growth and expansion of  cities on land rent level can be explained. An increase in population in 
                                            
27 As land in an urban residential context is developed with a fixed capital of buildings and the ownership 
of land on which a building base is often separately shared by multiple people, space-owners would be 
more appropriate term for the lessor of land in the form of space.  
28 The same origin of the two theories of differential rent in classical political economy and agricultural 
rent in von Thünen has been correctly pointed out by many authors (Walker 1974, Jones 1978, Persky and 
White 1988). Considered that the neoclassical urban economics models are based on von Thünen‟s model, 
it can be said that they are also originated from the analysis based on the production process in land. 
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cities corresponding to growth of  employment would lead to geographical expansion of  cities. 
Other things being equal, as the city expanded, the average distance of  commuting and 
consequent average commuting cost would increase. This widened gap of  commuting cost 
means that the relative advantages of  superior spaces (primarily meaning well-situated spaces) 
become augmented, leading to an increase in total DR in the city. In brief, therefore, the 
geographical expansion of  a city would increase the total land rent in the city. Secondly, a change 
in marginal commuting cost can affect the level of  DR in a city. The relative gap between spaces 
would be widened if  there is an increase in marginal commuting cost, such as an increase in time 
cost due to congestion or income increase, or an increase of  transportation cost, which would 
lead to a growth of  total DRs in the city. Therefore, any factors which affect the change of  
commuting cost would influence the level of  land rent. 
 
3-3-2  The reproduction of  labour power and differentiated preferences for housing 
 
“The residence for your dignity”, “The place you live makes what you are” 
These are some examples from commercial advertisements for property sales. They are not 
only marketing catchphrases to target a minority of  rich people to live in exceptionally luxury 
residences, but also a general enticement for people to consume a residence suitable for their 
living. This advertisement may allow developers collect surplus profit from the monopoly price, 
appealing the uniqueness of  property and stimulating the tastes of  the rich who have ability to 
pay. For a rental market this surplus profit could be seen as MR and for a sales market the 
capitalised value of  MRs would consist of  the main part of  the surplus profit in an urban 
context. This type of  luxury housing submarket may play an important role in pushing up an 
average house price. Yet its importance may be less significant in analysing the general structure 
of  housing markets as the key actors in the housing market are the ordinary workers. 
Nevertheless, the dynamics of  capital movement seeking surplus profit can change this 
niche market to a market for broader consumers. An appropriation of  MR from a unique space 
would tempt other capital to follow the same strategy with the pioneer capitalist resulting in the 
provision of  similar spaces in the market, which was explained as emulation process. This process 
would form a group of  houses with a similar level of  common rent of  AR. The more similar 
houses enter the housing market, the less AR would be and the more affordable the houses to 
ordinary workers. Thus, the unique housing submarket for the rich can be expanded to 
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accommodate a broader class of  people.29  
When considering the relationship between the widened submarket and labour reproduction, 
the advertisement is rather close to propaganda, encouraging people to reproduce their labour in 
a proper space. This can be regarded as an outcome of  external instigation by capital. The reality 
of  the consumer preference is indicated to be intentionally and systematically produced by 
capital30. The different quality of  labour reproduction by consuming differentiated housing is 
also largely exaggerated by capital in pursuit of  an excess profit. From the point of  view of  the 
capitalists, the greater the gap between the preference of  labour reproductions by consuming 
different housing product, the more profitable the housing industry is and the more successful 
the propaganda is. 
However, the differentiating process of  spaces is also supported by the embedded desire of  
people. It is difficult to deny that desire for better living or labour reproduction lies in the 
fundamentals of  the housing market as demand. Thus a class or a status of  people is often 
represented by which group of  housing they live in. 
This combined demand from embedded desire and instigation for the differentiated labour 
reproduction is revealed as differentiated demand in the housing market. These differentiated 
demands interact with supplies in each group of  houses resulting in different levels of  AR. 
Housing is one of  the typical types of  goods which have a strong hierarchy due to some innate 
features of  inelastic supply, durability, non-substitutability, and above all necessity. These 
characteristics increase the possibility of  the existence of  hierarchically graded submarkets by 
comparison31. In the whole market where the preference for submarkets are uneven, demand 
would tend to crowd to superior groups of  houses first. Because of  the limited stock in each 
submarket, excess demand for the superior submarkets would yield MR or AR in each group of  
houses..  
The dynamics of  differentiation and emulation process for MR and AR are widely observed in 
the contemporary housing market. Firstly, capitalists in the house building industry are always 
                                            
29 The unique houses which differentiate themselves with massive floor area, luxurious interior, exclusive 
views or surrounding environments may succeed to keep their position as MR bearing spaces.  
30 Harvey (1974) also pointed out that consumer preference in property market is systematically produced 
by the class of owners of “resource units” rather than arising “spontaneously” focusing on the struggle 
between classes. The concept of consumer preference has this feature of passiveness exaggerated by 
capital. The use of term „consumer preference‟ hereafter in this study implies the influence of intentional 
and systemic instigation by capital. 
31 This lies in the same line with the idea of Chamberlin (1933) where Emmanuel (1985) adopted his 
concept of monopolistic competition. The concept of „multiplicity of preference‟ by „homogeneous 
collectivity of consumers‟ can be linked to this different housing submarkets by structural features, which 
may have a significant role in explaining absolute rent in an urban context. 
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trying to create more convenient and favoured types of  housing than existing types of  housing 
in a way. At the same time, once a group of  housing becomes preferred in the housing market, 
other capitalists follow to build a similar type of  houses. Although the two processes are not as 
fast as in other more general products due to the inelastic feature of  housing supply, these 
differentiation and emulation processes are shaping the landscape of  urban residential area with 
its perpetuating movement. 
 
3-3-3  The formation of  multiple land rents in an urban context 
 
The formation of  the structure of  land rent by group of  houses can be construed in the 
historical context of  the growth of  a city. The dominant type of  housing depends on the 
profitability when it is built. The location of  the housing stock changes as the city grows and 
available lands are limited.  
Firstly, the level of  total rent in urban land and the price of  properties are deeply related to 
the types of  housing. In contrast to the single sector assumption in the agricultural context, there 
are a variety of  types of  land use forming multiple sectors in urban areas. A piece of  land can be 
used in various forms by land use, building type, infra-structure, density, surrounding 
environment and so on. The formation of  multiple groups of  similar lands by these features 
would eventually set certain levels of  AR by each group. For example, ARs between modern 2-
bedroom flats and 3-bedroom terrace houses would be different. Even within a same group of  
3-bedroom terrace houses, ARs are likely to be different depending on other features, such as 
whether it has double-glazed windows or a newly furnished kitchen. The types of  housing and 
the resulting space have corresponded to the dominant preference, which would have 
determined the greatest profitability at those times. For example, if  a particular type of  housing 
is dominantly preferred at a certain time, it would be the most profitable, so the type of  housing 
would form the majority of  newly constructed houses at that time. The detailed process of  the 
formation of  a dominant housing type in a certain period is related to the transformation of  MR 
to AR. If  a property capitalist succeeds to create a new favourable type of  housing 
(differentiation), the emulation process would follow, which leads to the creation of  a group of  
housing of  a similar houses. This differentiation, emulation and the subsequent formation of  a 
group of  houses continue to form multiple groups of  houses with different ARs.  
Next, a consideration of  the fixity of  property and the growth of  a city with these different 
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types of  housing by time and preference highlights an interesting relationship between group of  
houses and DR. As a city expands, large parts of  the newly expanded area will be filled with 
residential properties. As the supply of  residential properties is likely to be influenced by the 
most preferred type of  housing at the time, the newly expanding area would be dominantly filled 
with a certain type of  residence over time. As a city grows in this way with different types of  
housing being preferred and therefore built in each period, the fixity of  land and the durability 
of  building could lead to concentric ring-shaped belts of  residential areas of  dominant groups 
of  houses. Within each group of  houses, the differences in location would be transformed into 
DR via the excess profit of  the workers who used superior residences in terms of  location, 
rather than living in a residence of  marginal location. The further a city expanded involving 
inferior spaces in terms of  location, the greater relative differences of  housing would be. If  
marginal commuting cost is constant in a city, the DR level of  a group of  houses depends on 
how far they are built from the centre and how far the boundary of  the group is. In the case that 
this can be also applied to the other groups, there can be multiple-levels of  DR depending on the 
physical boundaries of  each group. 
Therefore, the structure of  land rents of  housing in an urban context can be modelled as 
the multiple layers of  potential rents by group of  houses. Figure 1 shows the structure of  land 
rent of  an imaginary city of  3 different groups of  houses. DRs in each group vary with the 
location of  each house and the boundary of  each group of  houses. The more extended a group 
to outer area, the greater the rent cone of  DR of  the group would be. In addition to varying 
DRs, each group also share a common rent of  AR and the levels of  ARs are likely to be different 
by group depending on the hierarchy of  preference to the groups. Consequently, levels of  AR 
are differentiated by group of  houses and each group would internally have different levels of  
DRs. Therefore the probable structure of  total rent would be multiple layers of  combination of  
AR by group and DR within group. The fact that a plot of  land may have different levels of  
potential rents makes a land of  good location in the less favourable group exposed to the 
pressure of  redevelopment. For example, the properties in the group 1 in Figure 1 are likely to 
be redeveloped to the group 3 of  highest potential rent. This is not because AR of  the group 3 is 
the greatest among the three groups (actually the group 2 has the greatest AR), but because the 
sum of  AR and DR in the group 3 is the greatest. 
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Figure 1   The probable structure of land rents of housing in an urban context 
Based on this structure, the detailed process of  the transformation of  MR to AR can be 
understood with a series of  diagrams in Figure 2. When a successful launch of  a new favourable 
space takes MR, other similar spaces would enter the market. This forms not only a certain level 
of  AR (less than previous MR) in the group but also different DRs in the group. As more spaces 
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enter the market, the level of  AR decreases. As a consequence, except for MR-bearing land, 
every piece of  land would have a land rent structure of  the combination of  AR and DR. 
A bid rent curve appears to be unique because highest bid rents shape the whole rent curve 
of  a city. The underlying potential rents, however, also exist and influence the future changes in 
not only land use but also group of  houses in residential land use. Thus, it is appropriate to 
analyse land rents in housing markets by different groups of  houses which have different 
combinations of  AR and DR. 
 
Figure 2   The transformation of MR to the combination of AR and DR 
3-3-4  Investment on residential land and the shift between groups of  houses  
 
Capital investment on the space for improvement is inevitably involved in the competition 
over how to make a space more favourable than others (differentiation for MR) or how to make 
spaces similar to MR-bearing space (emulation for AR). This necessarily relates to the concept of  
DR2. 
As DR2 represents the gap between rents before and after the extra capital investment less 
the interest cost of  invested capital, DR2 would appear as the actual increased total rent of  a 
compound of  AR and DR, or MR by capital investment on space. This can be seen as the 
process that the space would transfer into another group of  houses when an extra capital 
investment changed its physical features and equipment. Before the expiration of  the contract, 
the increased excess revenue by this extra capital investment would be seen as mere excess profit 
to the capitalists. After expiration of  contract, however, it would be regarded differently by the 
landowners: 1) If  the investment improves accessibility to central area leaving physical features 
same as before, the excess profit from the investment would be DR; 2) If  the investment creates 
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a new type of  space, the excess profit would initially be MR; 3) If  a space become very similar to 
one of  the spaces in an existing group of  lands, the excess profit would be the difference 
between combinations of  AR and DR of  the two groups before and after the transfer of  the 
space. 
Therefore, DR2 may not be a perpetual and tangible concept of  land rent but a transitional 
and nominal concept. The real form of  the increase of  land rent by successive investment on the 
same land to landowners would be transformed into DR, a combination of  AR and DR in a 
newly-entered sector, or MR in the new space to which the investment successfully created. 
Although the form of  the capital investment in residential lands varies from a whole new 
development to a refurbishment, the investment is normally expected to yield higher rent than 
the current use of  space. The difference of  land rents between the current use and the potential 
use is what developers are always seeking. The concept of  „rent gap‟ introduced by Neil Smith 
(1979) explains this difference. He tried to explain the fundamental impetus of  gentrification 
with the gap between the potential level of  rent and current level of  rent. The detail of  the profit 
from the investment is likely to be the balance of  the sum of  new land rents which will be 
appropriated from the sum of  invested capital, opportunity cost, and the previous sum of  land 
rents. 
A space in a group of  houses can transfer to another group through the process of  property 
development. The shift between groups of  houses can be used as a term meaning these transfers 
which enable a space to appropriate a different combination of  AR and DR, or MR. This 
concept of  shift between groups of  houses is crucial to understanding the underlying impetus of  
capital investment on residential space, which aims to acquire higher sum of  rents in the upper 
group of  houses. For example, if  a 2-bedroom bungalow which yields a certain combination of  
AR and DR is changed to a 2-storey 3-bedroom detached house which is assumed to be more 
popular and profitable than 2-bedroom bungalow type, it could yield different combination of  
AR and DR in the upper group of  houses.  
Given a considerable part of  profit from property development originates from land rent, 
capitalists in the building industry would consider the property type and location for potential 
land rents in order to maximise profit. This is well highlighted in Marx‟s comments. 
“It is impossible nowadays for any contractor to get along without speculative building, and 
on a large scale at that. The profit on the actual construction is extremely slight; the main source 
of  profit comes from raising the ground rent, and from the clever selection and exploitation of  
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the building land.”   (Marx 1992:312) 
“… particularly where building is carried on factory-style, as in London, it is ground rent 
and not the houses themselves that forms the real basic object of  speculative building … … the 
builder makes very little profit out of  the building themselves; he makes the principal part of  the 
profit out of  the improved ground rents.”   (Marx 1991:909) 
As capitalists in the building industry regard the return from the development as mere profit, 
the rate of  profit in the industry may be seen higher than others. This supports the argument of  
Harvey (1982) that the influx of  capital into built environment has eased the crisis of  capitalism 
by absorbing the part of  excess capital otherwise doomed to bring a fall in the rate of  profit. 
However, there are limits to this appropriation of  profit in the building industry. Firstly, what 
proportion a capitalist would take in excess profit entirely depends on the balance of  power 
between capitalists and landowners. Landowners would not let capitalists take all excess profit 
but would try to appropriate the excess profit from the capitalists as much as possible. In the 
case of  the merge of  the ownership of  land with property capital, the unity could appropriate all 
the excess land rents without these conflicts. But if  capital has to pay part of  a potential increase 
of  land rents to the landowner in the process of  the merge, the amount of  the profit would be 
reduced. It can even have a loss, if  it is the case that the capitalist paid too much for the purchase 
of  land. The second limit comes from the change of  land rents in the property market. 
Especially, the level of  AR depends on the economic conditions arising from the imbalance 
between supply and demand. The changes in preference or supply in a group of  houses could 
influence the level of  AR. This would mean that the rate of  profit in this industry would depend 
on the change in land rent and the balance of  power between landowners and capitalists. 
Nevertheless, it is definite that space of  land provides a great deal of  opportunities for capital in 
terms of  accumulating profit and for capitalism in terms of  easing over-accumulation. In this 
vast space of  possibility, the construction industry tries to increase profit through various ways, 
such as purchasing land in advance of  change in regulation on land or stimulating the consumer‟s 
desire and preference to live in a particular type of  place. 
 
3-4  Conclusion 
 
Throughout this theoretical analysis, there has been an attempt to establish a consistent land 
rent theory in an urban context. In the process, the product of  the land in an urban context was 
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reviewed first. The relationships between the four categories of  differential rent, differential rent 
2, absolute rent, and monopoly rent were reviewed and applied to an urban context.  
Major findings in the theoretical analysis are as follows. 
1. The product of  the land in a residential space is suggested to be labour power. The 
product of  the land is often misconceived as buildings. However, it is more appropriate to regard 
buildings as a type of  fixed capital in an urban context. The view on the product of  the land as 
labour power enables us to understand the relationship between the use of  space in residential 
land and the reproduction of  labour power in terms of  commuting and differentiated preference 
for groups of  housing. 
2. The difference from commuting cost due to locational advantage could be transformed to 
a part of  differential rent in a residential area. The surplus of  savings in commuting cost from 
the locational advantage of  land could be appropriated by landowners as differential rent. Thus, 
location differences in a residential area differentiate the reproduction cost of  labour power, and 
the savings in commuting cost from the reproduction of  labour power could be transformed to 
a part of  differential rent in an urban context. 
3. It has been suggested that the source of  absolute rent is a particular economic condition 
which allows capitalist tenants to earn excess profit from using land. This particular condition 
also benefits landowners, by enabling them to demand this part of  the excess profit from 
capitalist tenants as absolute rent. The technical condition of  low organic composition of  capital 
for the existence of  absolute rent in a sector assumes that the rent is allowed when landed 
property can block additional capital investment on marginal land in the sector where there is 
excess surplus value over the price of  production. This should therefore satisfy the condition 
that the rent must come from the surplus value produced in the sector. However, this technical 
condition for an existence of  absolute rent may be inappropriate as the flow and mixing of  
surplus value across all sectors can be hardly blocked by any barriers due to the ever greater 
mobility of  capital in the contemporary capitalist mode of  production. What enables the 
appropriation of  absolute rent under landed property is the particular economic condition in a 
sector creating excess profit which makes capitalist tenants use the spaces in spite of  the rent 
rather than the condition of  low organic composition of  capital in the sector. 
4. Given that the technical condition of  low organic composition of  capital is discarded in 
explaining absolute rent in an urban context and it is determined by external economic condition, 
the concepts of  monopoly rent and absolute rent seem to be indistinguishable. The possible 
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yardstick which can be used to differentiate them is whether the monopolistic rent is solely 
appropriated in a particular space or commonly in a group of  similar spaces. When a particular 
space monopolises and bears monopoly rent, other capitalists are likely to launch similar spaces 
in order to share the monopolistic rent if  they can. As a consequence, this emulation would form 
a group of  spaces and the group would share a similar amount of  rent which can be seen as 
absolute rent. Capitalist developers, at the same time, may try to differentiate their land to appear 
unique to allow the sole appropriation of  monopoly rent. These two processes would result in 
various groups of  housing. 
5. The concept of  differential rent 2 is related to the differentiation and emulation of  spaces 
for monopoly rent and absolute rent, as the two processes necessarily requires additional 
investment on the land. Given differential rent 2 as the gap between rents before and after the 
extra capital investment, it can be seen as a transitional and nominal category of  rent which is 
eventually transformed to other forms of  rent. If  the investment succeeded to make a space 
unique creating monopoly price, the actual form of  differential rent 2 would be monopoly rent. 
If  it succeeded to make a space similar to existing monopoly rent-bearing land so that it could 
share in the excess profit, a combination of  absolute rent and differential rent in the sector 
where the space entered would be the actual form of  differential rent 2. 
6. As a city expands with the growth of  employment and population, it is very likely that 
ring-shaped residential belts of  different types of  housing would surround the centre of  the city. 
The fixity and durability of  buildings would result in different groups of  housing which would 
have been built in different times. Each group of  houses would have a different level of  absolute 
rent as a sector and differential rents in the sector, which makes multiple levels of  potential 
combinations of  absolute rent and differential rent in a piece of  land. This difference of  
potential land rents in one site is one of  the most dynamic impetuses of  regeneration in urban 
areas. 
Location differences in a group of  housing would contribute to differential rent, while 
preference differences for the reproduction of  labour power between groups of  housing would 
contribute to absolute rent. Differential rent within a residential area and absolute rent by group 
of  houses and its associated implication to the reproduction of  labour power should be an 
integral part of  the analysis of  the structure of  land rent in an urban area.
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Chapter 4.   
The structure of  housing submarkets 
 
In this chapter, the structure of  housing submarkets will be analysed on the basis of  the 
concepts of  land rents developed in the previous chapter. The structure of  the housing 
submarkets is complicated, associated as it is with various centres of  employment, different 
accessibilities to central areas, different types of  residential properties, ethnic concentration, the 
uneven distribution of  infrastructure, education and health-care facilities, and other factors 
which create numerously fragmented spaces in urban area. These factors make a whole housing 
market divided into numerous submarkets by their features. Therefore, proper analysis on the 
housing submarkets need to precede the application of  land rent theory to empirical analysis. 
However, the structure of  housing submarkets itself  is also inextricably bound up with land rents. 
Thus, the structure of  housing submarkets will be discussed alongside the concepts of  land rent. 
In addition to this, the dynamic interactions between differential rent and absolute rent within 
each housing submarket and between housing submarkets will be examined. The structure of  the 
housing market and its dynamic mechanism, based on land rent theory, will be empirically 
verified and explored in the housing markets of  three cities in the next three chapters. 
 
4-1  Introduction 
 
In a city, there are numerous centres of  employment incorporating various types of  jobs of  
manufacture, retail activities, public services, clerical work, the provision of  healthcare and 
education, and all other activities which employ people and attract people to live nearby. The 
location of  such activities may be determined by various factors such as organic growth in an 
existing town, a firm‟s pursuit of  optimization of  profit, or an external political decision 
planning an artificial centre of  employment32. In any case, each employment centre would be 
surrounded by a residential area so that workers could live nearby and reproduce their labour 
power. (Harvey 1982) This complex comprising a centre of  employment and its surrounding 
residential area is a basic unit of  a city, and will be defined as a residential sphere hereafter. One 
residential sphere may comprise a whole city, such as in the case of  a small medieval city. In 
                                            
32 Canary Wharf  in London and YeoUiDo and GangNam in Seoul are typical examples of  centres of  
employment which have been developed by political decision plannings. 
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contemporary cities, however, the majority of  cities have a merged form of  multiple residential 
spheres. 
The size and scale of  a centre of  employment in a city can vary immensely. It can be one 
individual retail shop in an ordinary high street, an office building, a block of  buildings in a city 
where many firms agglomerate, a distinct region administered by a single council, a region 
including several local councils, or a large industrial complex. Some of  them might be isolated, 
while others might be so close that they overlap with each other. As smaller employment centres, 
such as retail shops and office buildings, are often close together and merged in a contemporary 
city, they form clusters of  centres of  employment. The residential area would then surround the 
clusters and form a bigger residential sphere. The growth of  employment in the clusters and the 
following expansion of  the residential spheres would lead to more overlap and merger between 
different residential spheres at a higher level. All of  these changes in the clusters of  employment 
and surrounding residential area make it difficult to develop relevant research on the housing 
market. One of  the main issues in the research about the housing market is the need to identify 
housing submarkets.  
This chapter is an extension of  a body of  research into the housing market that emphasise a 
proper identification of  housing submarkets, assuming the whole housing market as a non-
unitary system. Watkins (2001) pointed out that the concerns of  researchers in relation to 
housing submarkets had subsided as the emerger of  neoclassical urban economics in the 1960‟s 
diverted concerns to the relationship between accessibility and house price, on the assumption 
that a housing market in a city is a unitary entity. A sizable volume of  hedonic house price 
literature succeeded neoclassical urban economics in housing studies, without much concern 
over the housing submarkets. However, as the complexity of  the housing market in the 
contemporary metropolitan cities makes the explanatory powers of  the analyses less significant, 
the concerns over the proper identification of  housing submarkets has been revived. Maclennan 
and Tu (1996) emphasised the importance of  the proper division of  housing submarkets as 
follows:  
“If  a housing system, in any cross-section study, comprises a series of  sub-markets with 
different degrees of  disequilibrium rather than a unitary, coherent system, then conventional city-
wide hedonic and demand function estimates may be mis-specified. Even more important, such 
reductionist analysis disregards the real nature of  signals that the system is producing and, by 
default, disregards the adjustment processes involved.” (Maclennan and Tu, 1996:389) 
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A proper division of  housing submarkets is not only important in order to analyse the 
structure of  house price but also crucial to applying appropriate policies in planning, housing, 
and transportation (Goodman, 1998; Jones, 2002). In this context, many researchers have tried to 
find proper housing submarkets based on geographical area, physical or neighbourhood housing 
characteristics or demander group (Ball and Kirwan, 1977; Bourassa et al., 1999; Brown and 
Hincks, 2008; Goodman, 1981; Hincks and Wong, 2010; Jones, 2002; Maclennan and Tu, 1996; 
Michaels and Smith, 1990; Palm, 1978; Royuela and Vargas, 2009; Straszheim, 1975).  
However, as Watkins (2001) pointed out, there is the problem of  the absence of  a coherent 
definition of  the housing submarket and little consensus when identifying a housing submarket 
in practice. Therefore, firstly, the concept of  the housing submarket needs to be clarified. The 
criterion of  a proper division of  the housing submarket has mainly been regarded as the 
uniformity of  house prices or the existence of  substitutability between houses in each housing 
submarket (Fisher and Fisher, 1954; Grigsby, 1963; Jones, 2002; Rapkin et al., 1953; Watkins, 
2001). As Stigler and Sherwin (1985) requote the view of  the market by Marshall, following 
Cournot and Jevons, a market for a product is the place where the product is traded on a 
uniform basis: 
"Thus the more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the tendency for the same price to 
be paid for the same thing at the same time in all parts of  the market: but of  course if  the 
market is large, allowance must be made for the expense of  delivering the goods to different 
purchasers.” (Marshall, 1920, Book V Chapter I) 
Therefore, given that a perfect housing submarket has a coherent price system, the main 
criteria should focus on which method of  division is better for understanding the structure of  
house prices in defining each housing submarket. 
In the review of  the research on housing market subdivision, Watkins (2001) found that 
structural division, by property characteristics, and spatial division, by geographical region, are 
the most common methods used and argued that the best way of  identifying housing submarkets 
is to apply these two criteria simultaneously. There is less variance in defining structural housing 
submarkets by property characteristics as physical differences in houses, such as floor areas, 
housing type, number of  rooms or number of  bathrooms, are relatively clear and the associated 
demand for houses also shows coherent differences (Allen et al., 1995; Dale-Johnson, 1982). The 
concept of  „housing product groups‟33 by Maclennan and Tu (1996) is parallel to that of  the 
                                            
33 A group of housing which shares similar physical characteristics are defined as group of houses, which 
lies in the same line with structural housing submarkets. Sectoral housing submarkets are more 
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structural housing submarket. Unlike in the division of  structural housing submarkets, the 
methods used to identify spatial housing submarkets vary greatly and there is little theoretical 
basis for the division (Watkins, 2001). The most similar concept to the spatial housing submarket 
is housing market areas (HMAs). Jones (2002) pointed out that the access space model, 
developed in neoclassical urban economics (Alonso, 1964; Evans, 1973; Muth, 1968; Wingo, 
1961), implicitly assumes that the housing market is defined by the area where households trade 
off  journey-to-work costs for housing expenditure, which is parallel to the system of  spatial 
labour markets using travel-to-work areas (TTWAs). He subsequently argued that the assumption 
of  the monocentric employment location in the approach is problematic as it is difficult to apply 
the model to metropolitan cities, where the tendency to decentralisation of  employment from 
the city centre exists.  
Many researchers have adopted various approaches in their empirical analyses in order to 
find a proper method of  identifying structural and spatial housing submarkets. The housing 
submarkets divided by each approach were then mostly tested with statistical methods. Census 
boundaries or local government administrative boundaries were used in the analysis by Schnare 
and Struyk (1976) and Ball and Kirwan (1977). Adair et al. (1996) and Watkins (2001) used the a 
priori knowledge of  the local housing market for their analysis. Some of  the research used 
statistical methods to identify housing submarkets initially, after pooling all the housing data 
(Bourassa et al, 1999; Goodman, 1981; Leishman, 2009; Maclennan and Tu, 1996). Some 
researchers used the knowledge of  local real estate agents (Brown and Hincks, 2008; Michaels 
and Smith, 1990; Palm, 1978). Brown and Hincks (2008) used the Intra-Max procedure, based on 
the migration flows within a housing submarket, after setting core HMAs in consultation with 
real estate agents. The research by Jones (2002) was also based on the migration flows within a 
housing submarket, which is assumed to be a contiguous area comprising groups of  settlements 
with a high degree of  housing market self-containment. The research by Royuela and Vargas 
(2009) relating to Catalonia‟s (Spain) case is also in same line with the aforementioned. They 
compared different approaches to commuting and migration data in explaining house prices. The 
result, using the Theil Inequality Index, demonstrates that the commuting algorithm is shown to 
be superior in explaining the uniformity of  house prices than the migration approach. Recently, 
the geographical information systems (GIS) has been used to identify housing submarkets. Bibby 
(2005) explored the landscape of  house prices in the West Midlands area of  the UK. Hincks and 
                                                                                                                            
differentiated than this as the same groups of houses can be divided further by different social and 
environmental features.   
  
76 
 
Wong (2010) adopted statistical analysis and visual GIS mapping of  commuting flow to explore 
the nature of  housing and labour market interaction. 
Although all these areas of  research highlight various aspects of  the possible criteria for the 
identification of  housing submarkets, there has been little attention to the interaction between 
residential spheres (a unit consisting of  a centre of  employment and surrounding residential 
area) and associated patterns of  commuting and rent in large cities. 
This chapter is to suggest an alternative method of  identification of  spatial housing 
submarkets and to examine dynamic changes of  land rents in each submarket. The relationship 
between savings in commuting costs and house prices is reviewed first. The interaction between 
residential spheres is examined, focusing on the relationship between the changes in rent curve 
and the subsequent changes in the direction of  commuting. A probable form of  a merged 
structure is suggested based on the process of  expansion-overlap-merger between residential 
spheres. The associated changes in rent curves and the subsequent changes in commuting 
pattern can be used as the criteria for the identification of  spatial housing submarkets. 
 
4-2  Spatial housing submarkets  
 
4-2-1  Residential sphere and differential rent 
 
The feature of  differential rent as a surplus has been highlighted in section 3-2-1 in 
agricultural context. An application of  the concept to an urban context focusing on labour 
reproduction process then has been attempted in section 3-3-1, which is partly indebted to 
Harvey‟s idea. On the assumption that wage rate and other costs of  reproduction are uniform in 
a city, the difference in commuting cost can be diverted to rent. The effect of  a „trade off ‟ 
between commuting saving and rent level would put residents of  a residential sphere in the same 
position in terms of  economic cost regardless of  where they live. Differential rent in the urban 
context reflects the savings of  labour reproduction cost, especially the saving in commuting cost 
in the whole labour reproduction cost. If  it is assumed that marginal commuting cost is constant, 
the saving in commuting cost will increase linearly as the distance from an employment centre 
increases.34 Thus, the better the accessibility to a centre of  employment is, the greater the saving 
                                            
34 There is no substitution between input factors in a structural housing submarket because the density of 
land use can be assumed to be same in the submarket. This would make the rent curve linear. In addition, 
this study assumes the constant marginal commuting cost and the linear rent curve for simplicity. In realty, 
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in commuting cost. If  the saving in commuting cost is transferred to landowners as differential 
rent, in coordinate axes where the horizontal axis represents the distance to an employment 
centre and the vertical axis represents saving in commuting cost and differential rent, an upward 
sloping commuting cost line and a downward sloping differential rent line can be drawn like 
figure 3. In this simplified graph, the point where the differential rent line meets the horizontal 
axis can be seen as the outer boundary of  the residential sphere, because the saving in 
commuting cost is zero at the boundary of  the residential sphere.35 
The trade-off  effect between commuting cost and housing expenditure on rent is built upon 
the rent theory of  von Thünen, which is in line with the concept of  differential rent in the 
classical political economy (Jones, 1978; Persky and White, 1988; Walker, 1974). The basis of  the 
rent is mainly locational advantage, which is expressed economically in money terms. The 
location advantage incorporates various aspects, including accessibility to education and leisure 
facilities, as well as accessibility to centres of  employment. Although the importance to house 
prices of  being in the catchment area of  a good secondary school is increasing in many cities 
(Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995), the savings in commuting costs are regarded as the greatest 
contributing factor to the locational advantage identified to date. The observation of  the trade-
off  between the distance from a centre of  employment and housing expenditure is based on this 
reflection of  locational advantage in accessibility to the level of  rent. Although pensioners or 
families valuing educational accessibility often play a pivotal role in the formation of  house 
prices, ordinary workers occupy the majority of  the space in urban residential areas for the 
labour reproduction process. The ordinary workers‟ rent bids play a decisive role in the 
formation of  rental levels in housing markets. For the same reason, the majority of  urban 
monocentric city models assume that commuters have a dominant position in setting the level of  
rents. 
If  a city is monocentric there is a trade-off  between commuting costs and housing 
expenditure; a structural housing submarket in the city may be regarded as having a unitary 
house price system, where all houses in the sector can be substituted equally. However, if  the city 
is polycentric, the substitutability between houses is not established across the whole city. When a 
                                                                                                                            
however, marginal commuting cost is not constant. It tends to be higher in central area because time cost 
and external cost arise in central areas due to congestion. An exponential model of rent curve is then more 
realistic. 
35 The total rent line does not meet the horizontal axis at the boundary of the residential sphere because 
there are other components included in total rent reflecting building construction cost and other types of 
rent such as AR. 
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city of  polycentric employment centres is divided properly into areas where the trade-off  
relationship becomes unitary, each area can be regarded as a spatial housing market area with 
substitutability. Therefore, focusing on the unitary trade-off  relationship in each submarket can 
be a crucial criterion to divide the entire housing market into spatial submarkets. There is a body 
of  research focusing on the trade-off  between commuting costs and housing expenditure, which 
supports the TTWAs and labour market area. As Jones (2002) argued, however, a further 
theoretical development for the non-monocentric city, where a unitary trade-off  effect is 
irrelevant, should be followed so that empirical analysis can be supported. 
 
 
Figure 3   Differential rent in the urban context 
 
4-2-2  Expansion, overlap, and merger of  residential spheres 
 
Given a structural housing market of  similar physical characteristics, including housing type 
and floor area, the assumption of  the marginal commuting cost as being a constant would make 
the rent curve linear36. Thus, the better the accessibility to a centre of  employment, the greater 
                                            
36 There is no substitution between input factors in a structural housing submarket because the density of 
land use can be assumed to be same in the submarket. This would make the rent curve linear. In addition, 
this study assumes the constant marginal commuting cost and the linear rent curve for simplicity. In reality, 
however, marginal commuting cost is not constant. It tends to be higher in the central area because time 
cost and external cost arise in central areas due to congestion. An exponential model of rent curve is then 
more realistic. 
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the saving in commuting costs and the level of  the rent is. The rent containing this aspect of  
locational advantage in the whole rent is referred to as locational rent. Total rent and house price 
includes building construction cost and other types of  rent, such as scarcity rent, as well as this 
locational rent. This section focuses on locational rent in dividing spatial housing submarkets, on 
the assumption that other factors would be the same in a structural housing submarket. 
The planar shape of  residential spheres would be a circle if  there were no geographical or 
regulatory restrictions on expansion, as most people would want to live close to their work place. 
If  centres of  employment were located at a great enough distance from each other, the 
surrounding residential areas in each sphere would not overlap, which is the case of  independent 
housing markets in an area. The growth of  each centre of  employment, however, would lead to 
an overlap of  residential areas associated with the expansion of  each sphere. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine closely the consequent relationships between 1. the growth of  centres of  
employment and overlap; 2. overlap and expansion; and 3. the expansion and merger of  spheres.  
The growth of  employment in residential spheres could cause the peripheral residential 
areas to overlap the neighbouring residential spheres. Under the assumption of  a uniform 
density of  land use for residence in a structural housing submarket, the overlap of  multiple 
spheres would lead to a shortage of  dwellings as much in each side of  the overlapped areas as 
inside them, which leads to a further expansion in the direction of  the non-overlapped areas of  
the spheres. The level of  rent then would be higher than in the case of  growth without overlap 
(see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4   Overlap of two residential spheres 
Next, an intensified overlap could lead to a new phase in the dynamics of  merger between 
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residential spheres. When a residential sphere that has a faster growth rate of  employment leads 
the overlap of  multiple spheres, the sphere of  faster growth would also dominate the further 
expansion of  spheres. From a certain point, the boundary of  the dominant residential sphere, 
under the influence of  the faster growth of  employment, would exceed the boundaries of  other 
residential spheres. This uneven growth of  employment would eventually merge multiple spheres 
into one sphere (see Figure 5). The dominant centre of  employment would then lead to further 
growth and other, previously independent, centres of  employment and residential spheres would 
become sub-centres and sub-spheres to the merged residential sphere. 
 
 
Figure 5   Growth, overlap, expansion, and merger process and associated commuting pattern 
of two residential spheres  
Lastly, the influence on the merged sphere of  the growth of  employment in a sub-centre 
could be examined. If  the employment in a sub-centre grows, the sub-sphere would need a larger 
residential area for the workers. Subsequently, a part of  the existing dwellings for the workers 
who work in the dominant centre would be replaced by those for the workers of  the sub-centre, 
because the sub-sphere could not expand physically in this phase. Therefore, this occupation of  
dwellings by the workers in the sub-centre would eventually lead to a further expansion of  the 
whole merged sphere. An accelerated speed of  growth of  this sub-centre can make the boundary 
of  the sub-sphere surpass the expansion of  the boundary of  the merged sphere, so that the sub-
sphere could partially separate from the dominant sphere and the peak of  the rent cone of  the 
sub-sphere could escape from the dominant rent cone, resulting in a break in their unity. 
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4-2-3  The spatial structure of  merged residential spheres and changes in commuting patterns 
 
This merger process is significant in understanding the spatial structure of  housing markets 
in metropolitan cities that have multiple centres of  employment. The growth of  a residential 
sphere causes not only a geographic expansion of  the residential area but also an increase in rent 
levels. The wider a residential sphere expands, the greater the total level of  rent increases. At the 
same time, a merger of  residential spheres means not only a geographic merger of  multiple 
circular spheres, but also the regulation of  the rent levels in the whole merged sphere by the rent 
cone of  the dominant residential sphere. If  a fully merged residential sphere is under the 
influence of  one fully merged rent cone, the whole housing market within the sphere can be 
regarded as one market (see the last diagram in Figure 5), meaning that regarding previous sub-
spheres as independent housing markets is irrelevant. The substitutability between houses (Jones, 
2002; Watkins, 2001) then exists in the whole housing market. If  a partly merged residential 
sphere has multiple independent peaks of  rent cones the whole housing market within the 
sphere could be separated into multiple areas along the hollow borders of  merged rent cones 
(see the middle diagram in Figure 5). The unitary trade-off  effect and substitutability between 
houses can exist in each area as a spatial submarket. 
The merger process between residential spheres suggests the possible structure of  housing 
market of  a merged form of  a few dominant residential spheres, which have multiple sub-
spheres of  different sub-centres. These also lead to a possible explanation of  why the level of  
rent in a city is often regulated by a few main centres of  employment, although it has many sub-
centres, such as town centres. 
It is also crucial to the understanding of  the housing market structure to examine the 
changes in inner commuting patterns of  a city, as well as the structure of  rent in the city. In an 
independent residential sphere, the majority of  commuting would direct towards the centre of  
employment shaping a circular form. In the overlapping zone of  two partly merged residential 
spheres, there would be two groups of  commuters heading in opposite directions. Out of  this 
zone, commuting would direct towards each centre of  employment shaping a circular form in 
each non-overlap sphere. However, once one dominant sphere had merged with the others and 
its level of  rent became the level of  rent in the whole merged sphere, there would be a 
significant change in commuting patterns. In Figure 5, commuting to centre B in the overlap 
zone exists before the full merger but disappears afterwards. This is because the level of  rent in 
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the sphere of  centre A now has a dominant influence on the level of  rent in the whole merged 
sphere. It means that commuters to centre B in the zone may not be able to afford the increase 
in rent in the previously overlapped zone. They may find it rational to reside on the other side of  
centre B. However, commuters to centre A may be content to reside in any place in the merged 
sphere, as the rent level of  the sphere of  centre A becomes the level of  rent in the merged 
sphere. Thus, commuters to A may reside anywhere in the area, whereas commuters to B tend to 
reside in the opposite side of  B to centre A. The consequence is that commuting towards the 
dominant centre comes from all directions, while commuting towards sub-centres is limited in 
direction. These characteristics of  the commuting pattern can be an important criterion in 
working out the spatial structure of  the housing market. This can provide a useful clue to answer 
the related questions of  which centres are dominant centres, which are sub-centres in a city and 
to what degree dominant residential spheres are overlapped or independent in an urban area. 
Practically, this theoretical examination of  the merger process of  residential spheres can be 
used to identify and divide spatial housing submarkets in a city. 
 
4-2-4  Spatial housing submarkets and polycentric urban areas 
 
The confusion between sub-centres and housing submarkets as well as the clarification 
between monocentric city and polycentric city can now be reviewed on the basis of  this merger 
process between multiple residential spheres. 
Firstly, a sub-centre does not necessarily mean an independent housing submarket. As 
multiple residential spheres (units of  a centre of  employment and surrounding residential area) 
merge together, the rent level in the merged market is mainly determined by the few dominant 
residential spheres in merger process where multiple sub-spheres subsequently become 
subordinate parts. Thus a sub-centre does not necessarily consist of  a whole housing submarket. 
It is more reasonable to understand a sub-centre as a subordinate centre of  employment in a 
merged housing market. Therefore the identification of  sub-centres37 may not be consistent to 
the identification of  housing submarkets. The housing submarkets are likely to be influenced by 
few dominant centres of  employment in a form of  merged residential spheres. 
According to the merger process between residential spheres, the dominant centres in an 
urban area would have peaks of  house prices and commuting inflows from all sides. The 
                                            
37 For example, Giuliano and Small (1991) identified 32 sub-centres in the Los Angeles region using 
employment density and total employment. 
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dominant centres which have these prominent price peaks and commuting inflows from all sides 
can be the centres of  each housing submarket. The geographical boundary of  an independent 
housing submarket can be deduced by the outer boundary of  each house price cone and by the 
outer boundary of  a hierarchical group of  areas in commuting pattern. In case of  partly merged 
residential spheres, the verges between two housing submarkets can be identified by the hollow 
border between house price cones or by the areas which have diverged major outflow 
commutings to dominant centres. This identification of  major peaks of  house price cones and 
centres of  commuting inflows can be a sensible way of  spatial division of  housing submarkets. 
Secondly, the criteria of  separating the monocentric city and the polycentric city also need to 
be clarified. The concept of  a polycentric city is based on the assumption that major centres of  
employment are not concentrated in one area but widely distributed in multiple areas. As was 
previously pointed out, it is better to understand sub-centres as subordinate centres in a merged 
residential sphere, in contrast to the major centre of  employment in it. It would be inappropriate 
to argue that the existence of  various sub-centres necessarily means that the city is a polycentric 
city in this sense, if  they are just subordinate centres in a merged residential sphere. For example, 
London is widely assumed to be a prototype of  a monocentric city but it has multiple sub-
centres of  employment such as the West End, the City, and Canary Wharf. It may be more 
proper to state that a polycentric city has multiple spatial housing submarkets, if  and only if  it 
has multiple house price peaks and commuting inflows. 
 
4-3  Sectoral housing submarkets 
 
4-3-1  Absolute rent from structural differences 
 
Capital investment into space is embodied in the form of  land improvement, infrastructure 
or building construction. Its main features of  fixity and durability distinguish it from other types 
of  investment. The land rent from a specific space faces a new phase with this capital investment 
as the use value of  space shifts to different levels. The expected increase of  land rent after capital 
investment into land has been a major impetus of  developments in an urban area. The physical 
features after capital investment have always been under the influence of  the maximum 
economic return in a given legitimate use of  land. Except for some cases in which local or 
central government is involved, the economic return from capital investment into space has been 
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mainly determined by the market condition of  supply and demand. Given the inelastic supply of  
space, demand by differentiated preference for groups of  housing has dominantly influenced 
market condition. Sometimes capital investment in land creates a whole new unique space 
leading to the appropriation of  MR, sometimes it simply emulates the one of  the existing spaces 
to share the existing level of  land rent in the target space, AR. As explained in the previous 
chapter, these are differentiation process and emulation process, and are the major ways in which 
property development has taken place in urban area. As the consumer preference38 is often 
determined and changed by time, the dominant types of  properties may vary by period. As a 
result of  these processes, the urban area would have groups of  different properties which have 
similar structural features, such as building type, number of  rooms, and number of  bathrooms. 
Although the periods when they were built are different, the groups exist at the same time with 
different consumer preference. Each group of  properties with similar features in a residential 
area can be defined as a group of  houses (and this is done conceptually in section 3-3-2 above and 
empirically in the three case study chapters below). The physical characteristics of  properties in 
the structural housing submarket lie in the same line with the concept of  the group of  houses. 
In contrast with differential rent which comes from the internal comparison of  excess profit, 
absolute rent is a common rent by each group of  houses, which is determined by market 
condition. The groups of  houses are likely to have an favorable economic condition caused by 
scarcity from limited supply and demand for housing as a necessity, which, in most cases, is likely 
to lead to AR. The level of  AR varies with each group of  houses, as market conditions of  the 
preference and level of  available stocks by each group of  houses are different. In other words, 
different degrees of  economic abnormality in equilibrium by each group of  houses may 
determine different levels of  AR.  
Given that the available housing stocks of  each group of  houses are limited, the preference 
for each group of  houses would have an order of  priority. As consumers of  space use are likely 
to prefer the superior group of  houses, and as stocks in each group are limited, the demands for 
each group are likely to cascade from the upper group to the lower groups forming certain levels 
of  AR organised by each group.39 As demand can flow up and down by various factors, ARs in 
each group of  houses are likely to perpetually fluctuate with tension. This is the competition of  
                                            
38 For the implicit meaning of „consumer preference‟ see footnote 30 
39  This is consistent with Chamberlin‟s (1933) concept of  „multiplicity preference functions‟ of  
„homogeneous collectivity of  consumers‟ in his hypothesis for the theory of  monopolistic competition 
(requoted from Emmanuel (1985)). 
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capital on space between groups of  houses. If  the total stock of  all groups of  houses meets the 
total demand of  households, there is a possibility that the most inferior group of  houses yields 
no AR. However, even in this case, the upper groups of  houses would yield certain levels of  
AR.40 This hierarchy in levels of  AR by group of  houses is one of  the main features of  
structure of  land rent in urban space.  
There are many factors that can influence the levels of  AR by each group of  houses, such as 
advertisement and supply change. The most likely strategy adopted by capital on space to 
increase AR is advertisement. Capital on space tries to attract space users by exaggerating and 
stimulating their concern about labour and social reproduction projected on to the housing. The 
developers who normally try to sell property with the price including capitalised land rents are 
eager to enhance the use value of  housing that they have constructed. If  they have already paid a 
lump sum of  money to landowners for the development, their desperation to pursue this would 
be exacerbated. Scarcity often arises through the historical aspect of  housing supply. This would 
be the case of  housing stocks that are particularly in demand by consumers, which have been 
built in previous decades and cannot be emulated by present capital investment. For example, a 
typical Victorian house in London  cannot be emulated in the present. After all, the level of  AR 
in a certain group of  houses depends on the real stock of  it as well as consumer demand. 
 
4-3-2   Absolute rent from differences of  social reproduction 
 
The differentiated preference for the housing market is likely to be influenced by concern 
about not only labour reproduction and but also social reproduction on residential space. First 
of  all, this is likely to be reflected in AR by each group of  houses. Structural features like 
building type, floor area, floor plan, number of  bedrooms, and number of  bathrooms are 
undoubtedly the major determinant in the formation of  groups of  houses. This is one of  the 
reasons why housing submarkets sorted by these physical features are called structural housing 
submarkets. However, social aspects may also influence the formation of  housing submarkets, as 
well as the structural features. Theses social features in housing market division have been 
                                            
40 Some authors like Kautsky, Lenin, Namboodiripad (1984) and Patnaik (1999) argue that nationalisation 
of  land would make AR disappear. However this feature of  different ARs by group of  houses suggests 
that their claims are not appropriate at least in urban context. Massey(1977) also comments on 
nationalisation of  land. However she focuses on the change in the contradictory relationship between 
landownership and capital accumulation arguing that nationalisation would not change the fundamental 
contradiction between the two.  
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emphasised by Harvey and Chatterjee (1974), Edel (1975), and King (1987). Ethnic 
concentration or income level, institutional (financial and governmental) difference by local area, 
distribution of  „good‟ schools, and the proportion of  male professionals employed by local area 
were identified as main social features which influence the level of  land rents in urban areas. 
However, the different categories which the authors argue to be under influence of  these 
social features vary. Harvey and Chatterjee regard the subject to the social features as “class 
monopoly rent” which means AR in urban context as understood by Harvey (1974), while Edel 
(1975) defines it as monopoly rent and King (1987) as differential rent. On the basis of  the 
definitions developed in the previous chapter, monopoly rent is not an appropriate category of  
land rent to be affected by the social features. Monopoly rent is a result of  a unique valued 
attributes for limited number of  housing units, while social features influence the level of  rent of  
entire housing stocks in an area altogether. King (1987) states that social features contribute to 
make differences of  labour and social reproduction as measured by individual housing so it can 
be seen as difference between individual spaces within a housing submarket. However, social 
features of  neighbourhood influence housing not as an individual but as an area. For example, 
ethnic concentration does not affect the land rent of  individual houses by degree, rather it is 
likely to affect the land rent of  a certain locality as a whole. The presence of  a „good school‟ also 
has a similar mechanism of  influence on land rent. It is likely to influence not by degrees of  how 
close a house is to a „good school‟ but rather by whether or not a house is in the catchment area 
which is applicable to the „good school‟. The appropriate category of  land rent influenced by 
social features is AR. Therefore social and environmental features of  neighbourhood also 
influence the AR of  a certain group of  housing as well as structural features.41 For example, 
British council housing42 is classified into different housing submarket, not just because of  the 
structural features of  building but also because of  social features. A housing submarket created 
by these structural features and non-structural features can be called the sectoral housing submarket. 
 
 
 
                                            
41 A group of houses which has similar structural properties can be divided into further submarkets by its 
social features of locality.  
42 Council housing is the name of  public (social) housing in the U.K. which have been built and managed 
by local authorities. Once it consists of  more than a third of  total housing stock in the U.K., but after 
privatisation policy of  „Right to buy‟ scheme under the Thatcher government the majority of  the stock 
have been transferred to private owners and remainders are managed by local authorities or non-profit 
organisations. 
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4-4  Dynamic movement of  land rents in housing submarkets 
 
4-4-1  Dynamic movement of  land rents within a housing submarket  
 
The movements of  land rents within a housing submarket can be categorised into three 
cases. The first case is when the commuting cost per distance increases, perhaps because of  a 
transportation fare rise followed caused by an oil price increase, or an increase in the time cost 
because of  traffic congestion. The differences of  commuting cost for each residential space 
would be consequently widened, and the gradient of  the DR line would become steeper. As this 
change would affect all groups of  houses in the same manner, there would be no change in the 
level of  AR or in the spatial boundary of  the housing submarket. 
The second case is when the imbalance of  supply and demand for a certain sectoral housing 
submarket is aggravated by the factors such as increased preference or limited stock. For example, 
an increase in single-person households would increase demand for one bedroom flats, or an 
increase in immigrants with large families or low incomes might increase demand for 4 or 5 
bedroom houses. A strict planning regime or geographical limit of  city would also contribute to a 
limit of  supply of  housing stock leading to an increase of  AR.43 This change in market 
conditions for a certain sectoral housing submarket would lead to a change in the level of  AR in 
the submarket leaving DR unchanged. 
The third case is when employment grows and a housing submarket expands to 
accommodate the housing demand from the increased labour force in the housing submarket. In 
this case, two consequences would follow: The physical expansion of  the housing submarket and 
the alleviation of  imbalance in supply and demand in the housing submarket. This would 
influence changes in both DR and AR. Alleviated imbalance would result in a decrease in AR 
while the physical expansion of  a housing submarket would eventually result in an increase of  
DR, as the increased level of  commuting cost in the area would enhance the relative advantages 
of  well-located spaces in terms of  commuting cost. The gradient of  DR would not change in 
                                            
43 Gyourko (2006) found that inelastic supply of land contributes to higher rate of increase in house price 
than housing stocks comparing changes of house price and housing stocks among US metropolitan areas. 
San Francisco, New York, and Boston were identified as the cities where the growth of house price is 
greater than number of stocks due to stricter planning regime and geographical limit in expansion, whereas 
Las Vegas and Phoenix were identified as the city where the growth of housing stocks is greater than 
house price due to relatively lighter regulation and less limit in expansion. But his extensive research does 
not highlight the following changes of DR by the expansion of a city. The interactive movement of both 
AR and DR are explained in the following.  
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this case of  expansion. The construction of  a dormitory-town in the outskirts of  a city is a 
typical example of  this case. The change in total rent level, however, depends on the extent of  
the fall in AR as is shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6   Different effect of an expansion of a city on the total level of land rents  
(same gradient of DR and different fall in AR) 
 
Figure 7   Different effect of an expansion of a city on the total level of land rents  
(different gradient of DR and same fall in AR) 
It is generally accepted that a fall in AR level would lead to a fall in the total level of  land 
rents and house price. However, it could also increase the total level of  land rents, as an 
expansion of  a city has opposite effects on DR and AR. If  a housing submarket has a relatively 
gentle gradient of  DR line, the fall in AR caused by an increased supply of  housing stock after 
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an expansion of  a city would outweigh the increase in DR. However, in case of  a relatively 
steeper gradient of  DR line, the increase in DR would outweigh the fall in AR. These two 
different effects are shown in Figure 7. 
 
4-4-2  Dynamic movement of  land rents between housing submarkets 
 
An expansion of  a city is quite a normal phenomenon as employment grows in the city 
followed by an increase in the supply of  housing around the centre. The tendency which causes 
the dominant type of  housing to vary by time, in addition to the main features of  fixity and 
durability of  buildings, creates a unique structure of  housing submarkets in the city. It is a 
multiple ring shape of  groups of  housing around city centre: older types of  houses in the central 
area and newer types of  houses in the outer area. This is a typical historical process in the 
formation of  housing submarkets in most of  the old cities. As DR reflecting commuting savings 
is mainly determined by spatial boundaries, the housing submarkets would have different levels 
of  DR with the same gradients. At the same time, each housing submarket is likely to have its 
own level of  AR too. 
The existence of  different housing submarkets in a city provides the major impetus in 
dynamic movements of  capital movements in the city. The different structures of  total rent of  
AR and DR in a city mean that there are multiple layers of  potential land rents in all spaces in a 
city. This means that every piece of  space has land rents of  current housing submarket and 
potential land rents of  other housing submarkets simultaneously. Thus, the judicious use of  
capital investment to upgrade a housing submarket to the most preferred could yield greater land 
rents and create a huge profit from trading the space in a capitalised price. The existence of  
multiple layers of  different land rents defined by housing submarket and the gap of  land rents in 
spaces is the most fundamental impetus of  dynamic movement of  capital in an urban space in 
the name of  regeneration. 
The spatial expansion of  a housing submarket would increase the level of  DR in the 
submarket, as the gaps between commuting savings are widened. This is likely to increase the 
total level of  land rents on top of  the AR. The shortage of  housing stock from the growth of  
employment does not necessarily lead to an expansion of  of  the area of  a spatial housing 
submarket. The housing stock can be increased by an intensive development within the area. In 
this case, there can be an opposite change in AR. An increased supply of  the housing stock 
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without an expansion of  the submarket would cause the level of  AR to fall in the submarket. 
The changes of  the AR in the submarket are likely to influence the levels of  land rents in other 
housing submarkets as the expansion of  the submarket absorbs part of  the demand for housing 
as a whole. Demands for each housing market are also affected by levels of  AR while ARs are 
likely to be determined by demands in each housing submarket. These changes in ARs between 
housing submarkets can be caused by different stimulation for demand of  different housing 
markets. The changes in preference would be reflected in demand in each housing submarket, 
and be realised in the form of  ARs in housing submarkets. It would lead to the perpetuating 
movement of  levels of  land rents in each housing submarket, which would be followed by 
capital investment.    
 
4-5   Conclusion 
 
After introducing the necessity of  division of  submarkets by residential spheres, each with 
their own employment centre, the dynamic process of  expansion - overlap - merger of  
residential spheres is analysed with the help of  differential rent lines and cones, which form 
spatial housing submarkets. As all dominant housing types built in distinct time periods are 
different, the housing market is also differentiated by physical properties of  housing which are 
the main constituents of  structural housing submarkets. In addition to this, social features such 
as ethnic concentration, uneven distribution of  educational, and other facilities, or environmental 
features distinguish housing submarkets in the same structural housing submarket. The level of  
absolute rent varies by these sectoral housing submarkets. Thus, a whole housing market can also 
be divided by sectoral housing submarket through these structural features and social and 
environmental features. In this context, a relevant unit for analysis of  urban housing market is a 
certain group of  houses with similar social and environmental neighbourhood in a certain spatial 
housing submarket. 
The dynamic movements of  land rents and the followed movements of  capital in the space 
within a housing submarket fall into three cases: 1) when the commuting cost per distance 
increases due to some reason; 2) when the imbalance of  supply and demand for a certain 
sectoral housing submarket changes; and 3) when the workforce expands and a housing 
submarket expands to accommodate the housing demand from the increased labour force in the 
housing submarket. The dynamic movements of  land rents and following movements of  capital 
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in the space between housing submarkets are also highlighted: 1) the existence of  different sectoral 
housing submarkets in a space provides the major impetus of  regeneration in the city, and 2) 
changes of  economic condition with supply and demand in a housing submarket would lead to 
the perpetual movement of  levels of  land rents in other housing submarkets, which will be 
followed by capital investment in the spaces. 
Empirical data analysis in the next chapters will be based on these criteria of  division in 
housing submarkets. The results from the analysis will reveal the existence of  multiple levels of  
land rents in space and the dynamic movements of  them over time in three different cities: 
London, Seoul, and Los Angeles 
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Chapter 5.   
Spatial analysis of  the housing market in London 
 
5-1   Introduction 
 
5-1-1   Premises for empirical analysis 
 
Three cities - London, Seoul, and Los Angeles - have been selected for empirical analysis in 
order to investigate the structure and dynamic changes of land rents from residential area point 
of view. London is selected as a classic type of monocentric city, Seoul as a tricentric city, and 
Los Angeles as a polycentric city. In addition to this, the three cities are located in three different 
regions, in Europe, Asia, and America, and they are all metropolitan cities with populations of 
around 10 million each. Analysis of the three metropolitan cities across different spatial and 
contextual backgrounds can be used to validate the theoretical findings about the structure and 
dynamics of land rents in an urban context.  
For empirical analysis, there are three problems which need to be clarified practically. The 
first problem is the availability of the land rent data. All residential land is used in the form of a 
space which is created through a mixture of the land and the buildings on it. However, house 
rent makes no distinction between contributions for the land and for building. Therefore, to 
collect the land rent data is practically and conceptually difficult. The house rent data is the next 
best source for analysis of land rent, considering that the variation and the absolute contribution 
from the building to house rent is relatively smaller than the rent for the land. Adam Smith 
argues that building rent can be distinguished from land rent as the sum of the return from initial 
capital invested for a building and the depreciation cost. In this manner, the contribution from a 
building as house rent can be calculated to extract the level of land rent. However, the house rent 
data is also very limited as the rental housing stock is smaller than the owner-occupied stock and 
the rental data is generally not included in housing statistics. It is much easier to replace land 
worth in all regions and countries through using house price data, which is more readily available. 
Although the house price data includes various noise factors, such as the speculation on future 
price rises or falls, interest rates, and transaction costs, it can be used as an alternative data to 
land rent as the basic foundation of the house price is the capitalised rent on space. For practical 
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availability, this study employs the house price data as a main source for the following analysis, in 
spite of the various limitations inherent in using house price as a proxy of land rent44. 
The second problem is the division of sectoral housing submarkets. In theory, there could 
exist hundreds of sectoral housing submarkets, divided by not only structural characteristics, but 
also social and environmental neighbourhood characteristics, and institutional characteristics, as 
examined in the previous section 4-3. A structural housing submarket itself can be regarded as a 
sectoral housing submarket when there is little difference in social and environmental 
neighbourhood features across the whole housing market, whereas it should be subdivided 
further into multiple sectoral housing submarkets when there is considerable difference. For an 
empirical analysis, it is difficult to differentiate sectoral housing markets by social and 
environmental neighbourhood features around them with clear criteria. For this reason, this 
study regards structural housing submarkets as sectoral housing submarkets focusing on the 
structural factors such as dwelling types, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and the 
range of floor area. The most dominant types of sectoral housing submarkets based on structural 
features are selected for empirical analysis. Table 1 shows the selected sectoral housing 
submarkets by city45. 
Table 1   Selected sectoral housing submarkets by city 
 London Seoul Los Angeles 
Sectoral 
housing 
submarkets 
3 bedroom house 
2 bedroom flat 
4 bedroom apartment    
3 bedroom apartment    
2 bedroom apartment 
3 bedroom detached house    
2 bedroom condominium 
 
The third problem is the division of spatial housing submarkets. In reality, a metropolitan 
city has multiple centres of employment. Some of these multiple centres are main centres and 
others are sub-centres. As accessibility to an employment centre is hypothesised as one of the 
major factors determining the level of differential rent in an urban context, a proper subdivision 
of spatial housing submarkets is the most crucial and, at the same time, the most difficult process 
                                            
44 For example, the level of land rent of a piece of land would vary with the density of land use (floor area 
ratio). The relationship between the land elements in the price of an apartment in a dense block is different 
from that of a single-family house on its own plot. 
45 These sectoral housing submarkets are selected because they are the most common types in each urban 
areas. For detailed figures, see section 5-2-1, 6-2-1, and 7-2-1. 
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in the empirical analysis. For a proper subdivision of spatial housing submarkets, two methods 
are adopted. Firstly, the shapes of 2-D contours and 3-D surfaces of house prices are examined 
by embodying them into tangible form. As the location of houses does not exist in the form of 
surface but a point, the embodiment of house prices needs to be based on the interpolation of 
the level of house prices at unknown points, using the level of house prices in known points. In 
constructing the surfaces of house prices of a city, a method of stratified sampling by local 
authority can be used. The associated data for each sample house is then collected. In order to 
control the variances in structural characteristics, two or three dominant groups of houses, which 
have the same building type, the same number of bedrooms, and the same number of bathrooms 
are selected. For the same reason, house prices are used in the form of the house price per unit 
floor area.46 A piece of GIS software, Surfer, produces the 2-D contours and 3-D surfaces of 
house prices in a city, organised with the house price data by location. Secondly, commuting 
patterns are mapped. The house price surfaces might not be enough to figure out spatial housing 
submarkets in a city, because house price is also affected by various factors other than 
accessibility to the centre of employment, such as educational facilities, the environmental 
condition, and the status or reputation of the neighbourhoods. These other factors can influence 
house prices so the house price surfaces might not be enough to identify spatial housing 
submarkets. The commuting pattern, however, represents the key spatial relationship of 
residential spheres. Examining commuting flows with a focus on the movements from one area 
to others can provide a crucial tool to identify spatial housing submarkets. A piece of social 
network analysis software, Pajek, produces maps which show the relationships of multiple areas 
to commuting flows. A set of commuting data showing origin and destination by local authority 
areas can be converted to a readable map of commuting flows between areas. 
 
5-1-2   Introduction 
 
London is the capital of the United Kingdom (UK). It is normally used to mean Greater 
London, which forms the biggest metropolitan city in Europe and includes parts of the post 
code districts of Kingston upon Thames, Twickenham, Uxbridge, Harrow, Watford, Enfield, 
Ilford, Romford, Dartford, Bromley, Croydon, and Sutton as well as the postal area of London. 
                                            
46 The unit of house prices are unified to 10 dollars per m2 in order to 1) control variance of floor area 
and 2) compare it with other international figures. Exchange rates of 2 $/£ and 1000 \/$ is applied for the 
currency conversion over all period. 
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Greater London covers 1,572 km2 and its official population was 7,500,00047 in 2006, equalling a 
population density of 4,758 people per km2. This is the administrative area of Greater London. 
This study deals with the metropolitan area of London in terms of commuting, which is based 
on Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs)48. This London TTWA accommodates around 9,300,000 
people and covers 2,729 km2.49 In the following analysis, London can be taken to mean the 
London TTWA. The main transport in London is public transportation including train, 
underground, bus, and overground; people do also use private transport, predominately cars, 
bicycles and walking, although the congested roads and „Congestion Charge‟ 50  road toll 
discourage private car ownership and usage in the city, especially in and near the centre.51 
 
 
Figure 8   Location of Greater London 
There are broadly 2 main types of accommodation in England: houses (82%) and flats 
(apartments) (17%). The proportion of flat accommodation is greater in London than in 
                                            
47 Source: the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
48 A definition of  a zone based on commuting from the joint work carried out by the Office for National 
Statistics and Newcastle University 
49 The Office for National Statistics, 2007, Travel-to-Work Areas: the 2007 review 
50 London Congestion Charge scheme was introduced in 2003 to reduce congestion in central London 
and raise fund for improvement of transport in London. According to this scheme, any vehicle entering 
congestion charge zone between 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. (Monday to Friday) has to make certain level of 
payment, which is currently 10 pounds per day in 2011. 
51 Transport for London, 2007, London travel report 2007 
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England as a whole, being houses (55%) and flats (43%). In detail, there are 5 main types of 
accommodation in dwelling stock in England. They are semi-detached house (32%), terraced 
house (28%), detached house (22%), purpose-built flat (13%), and conversion flat (4%). In 
Greater London the dominant forms are terraced house (32%), purpose-built flat (32%), semi-
detached house (18%), conversion flat (11%), and detached house (5%).52  
Around 35% of newly built houses from 1991 to 2010 were 3 bedroom houses and around 
64% of newly built flats in the same period were 2 bedroom flats in England. In Greater London, 
around 44% of newly built houses from 1991 to 2010 were 3 bedroom houses and around 59% 
of newly built flats in the same period were 2 bedroom flats.53  
The tenure type of dwelling stock in England falls into the three major categories of owner-
occupied, social renting, and private renting. Among the 20,452 thousand dwelling stocks in 
England, the proportion of owner-occupied properties is 68%, social renting including renting 
from local authorities and registered social landlords is 19%, and private renting accounts for the 
remaining 12%. In Greater London, however, the proportion of owner-occupied properties falls 
to 56% while the proportion of social renting and private renting rises up to 26% and 17% 
respectively.54 
 
5-2  Commuting patterns and centrality 
 
The commuting pattern is the most direct demonstration of  centres of  employment in a city. 
Having argued that the residential sphere consists of  a centre of  employment and the 
surrounding residential area, the directions of  commuting between sub-centres in merged 
residential spheres reveals the hierarchical relationship between them. Using the commuting 
pattern, spatial housing submarkets can be identified. 
 
5-2-1   Data & range of  analysis 
 
Travel flows collected from labour market statistics organised by local authority from the 
UK 2001 Census were used for Network Analysis55. The data was collected from the official 
                                            
52 Source: 2007/2008 Survey of  English Housing 
53 Source: 1991/2010 National House-Building Council (NHBC) 
54 Source: 2001 U.K. Census; Bowie (2010) 
55 It is more often referred as social network analysis. It has emerged from sociology but spread out to 
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labour market statistics website, Nomis56, which is part of the Office of National Statistics. The 
local authorities, of which there are 33 in London, 47 in the East of England, and 67 in the 
South East of England are set as a basic unit of commuting. The travel flow data contains the 
place of residence [origin], the place of work [destination], and total number of commuting 
people. A network analysis programme, Pajek, is used for the analysis.57 As the data for the 
programme, Pajek needs to use a particular form of „.net‟ file which includes numbers and 
identities of members, the location of each member, and the flow from one member to others 
represented by values of weight. For this, the commuting data needed to be modified to a „.net‟ 
file form58. 
Firstly, the origin-destination matrix from all 147 local authorities of Greater London and 
East and South East of England to all 147 local authorities were constructed for the network 
analysis. As a result, a total of 21606 pairs of origin-destination data were created. In order to 
identify the relationship between local authorities, the commuting from an origin to itself and 
flows of 0 trips are removed. As a result, a total of 17785 pairs are left. For a simple visualisation, 
three thresholds of number of trips are used. There are 374 pairs of origin-destination commutes 
where the trip exceeds 3000, comprising of 49.2% of the total trips across 147 local authorities. 
There are 184 pairs where the trip exceeds 5000 comprising of 33.4% of total trips, and there are 
70 pairs whose trip exceeds 8000 comprising of 17.7% of total trips. The details are in the 
following table 2. 
Table 2   The number of commuting trips in London 
Threshold 
Number of pairs of 
origin – destination 
Total number of trips Percentage (%) 
    
Total 17785 4564603 100 
3000 374 2246920 49.2 
5000 184 1524625 33.4 
8000 70 808025 17.7 
    
 Source: UK Census 2001 
                                                                                                                            
variety of  other fields including anthropology, biology, economics, geography, and psychology. It focuses 
on the complex sets of  relationships between members or agents in a system. Based on influences or flows 
from one member to others it highlights centrality, hierarchy, cluster, and inner structure. It is also very 
useful to visualise commuting pattern and hierarchy in commuting system in a city. 
56 https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/Default.asp  
57 Pajek is one of  the most commonly used pieces of  software for social network analysis. 
58 See appendix 5-4 
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5-2-2   Commuting patterns & centrality by local authority 
 
In the following maps of commuting patterns, each vertex represents the centroid of each 
local authority, the size of each vertex represents the number of inflows of commuting to each 
vertex, and the arrows show the directions and the volume of commuting trips. 
 
 
 
Figure 9   ID codes of local authorities in London and nearby South East 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
99 
 
Table 3   ID codes of local authorities in London 
Local authority ID code Local authority ID code Local authority ID code 
      
Barking and Dagenham 00AB Hackney 00AM Lewisham 00AZ 
Barnet 00AC Hammersmith and Fulham 00AN Merton 00BA 
Bexley 00AD Haringey 00AP Newham 00BB 
Brent 00AE Harrow 00AQ Redbridge 00BC 
Bromley 00AF Havering 00AR Richmond upon Thames 00BD 
Camden 00AG Hillingdon 00AS Southwark 00BE 
City of London 00AA Hounslow 00AT Sutton 00BF 
Croydon 00AH Islington 00AU Tower Hamlets 00BG 
Ealing 00AJ Kensington and Chelsea 00AW Waltham Forest 00BH 
Enfield 00AK Kingston upon Thames 00AX Wandsworth 00BJ 
Greenwich 00AL Lambeth 00AY Westminster 00BK 
       
 
 
Figure 10   Commuting pattern and centrality by local authority in London (over 3000 trip) 
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Figure 11   Commuting pattern and centrality by local authority in London (over 5000 trip) 
 
Figure 12   Commuting pattern and centrality by local authority in London (over 8000 trip) 
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The three maps of the commuting pattern organised by threshold in London confirms the 
initial assumption that London is a monocentric city. The majority of commuting in the region is 
directed towards the central area of London. In central London, there are three prominent 
Borough destinations of commuting: Westminster (00BK); City of London (00AA); and Camden 
(00AG). Although they appear to be separate areas as they belong to different boroughs, the 
actual employment centres adjoin each other. In this sense, they can be assumed to be a cluster 
of employment. Hereafter these areas will be regarded as a cluster of employment centres of the 
Central Activities Zone (CAZ) as Greater London Authority (GLA) identifies59. The commuting 
inflow to them comes from all sides. In the peripheral area of Greater London, Hillingdon, 
Barnet, and Ealing are prominent destinations. Despite of the considerable inflows to these 
destinations from nearby boroughs, it is not relevant to regard these as entirely independent 
residential spheres. It is because these areas are closely connected to the commuting hierarchy to 
London as there are considerable numbers of commutes from these areas to central London.60 
In the outer area beyond Greater London, Welwyn (26UL), Basildon (22UB), Southend on Sea 
(00KF), Dartford (29UD), Tonbridge (29UP), Maidstone (29UH), Crawley (45UE), Windsor 
(00ME), and Reading (00MC) have prominent inflow commuting from all directions.61 It is 
reasonable to consider that they are independent residential areas from central London as they 
are fairly remote from the city, being more than 30km from central London. 
Commuting towards the CAZ of Westminster, City of London, and Camden is from all 
directions whereas commuting towards other local authorities in Greater London is limited in 
the direction of the origins from which they draw. This implies that the CAZ are dominant 
centres and the others in Greater London are sub-centres within one merged residential sphere. 
For example, a local authority in a peripheral area to Greater London, Enfield (00AK), provides 
commuters to inner local authorities of Haringey (00AP), Islington (00AU), and the CAZ. An 
inner area of Haringey has commuters to Islington, and the CAZ. However, it also has 
commuters from Enfield. The more central area of Islington has commuters to the CAZ. 
However, it also has inflow commuters from Haringey. This implies that in one merged 
residential sphere, Enfield lies in the bottom of hierarchy, Haringey is in the middle above 
                                            
59 GLA, 2004 
60 For further details about the relationship between directions of commuting and independence of 
residential sphere, see the previous section 4-2-3. 
61 These centres of inflow commuting are exactly consistent with the centres of employment in terms of 
employment density (jobs per km2). The employment density map in London and nearby South East made 
by Buck et al. (2002) is helpful to understand general structure of distribution of employment in the region. 
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Enfield, Islington is in the upper middle above both Enfield and Haringey, and the CAZ from 
the top level. 
 
5-3   Embodiment of  house price 
 
Understanding the shape of a housing market in terms of house prices is a crucial process in 
spatial analysis of a city. It not only enables an overview of the basic structure of house prices of 
a city but also gives important information on spatial housing submarkets in the city. The average 
house price in London varies between boroughs (Table 4). The average house prices tend to be 
higher in central areas and lower in outer areas. In this section, the house prices in London are 
embodied in more detailed and readable shapes. 
 
Table 4   Average house price in London by Borough 
Average house price Boroughs 
  
Under £100,000 Barking and Dagenham, Newham 
£100,000 – £149,999 
Bexley, Croydon, Enfield, Greenwich, Havering, Hillingdon, Lewisham, 
Redbridge, Sutton 
£150,000 – £199,999 
Brent, Bromley, Ealing, Hackney, Haringey, Harrow, Hounslow, Kingston, 
Lambeth, Merton, Southwark, Waltham Forest 
£200,000 – £249,999 Barnet, Islington, Tower Hamlets, Wandsworth 
£250,000 – £299,999 City of London, Hammersmith and Fulham, Richmond 
Over £300,000 Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea 
Source: HM Land Registry; Bowie (2010) 
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5-3-1   Data & range of  analysis 
 
The house price data was collected by sampling for London. By post code districts in and 
surrounding Greater London, a total of 315 samples for 3 bedrooms house and 317 samples for 
2 bedrooms flat has been collected. For the time series analysis, price data was collected in the 9 
year period from 2000 to 200962. Rent data was collected for 2009 only, due to data availability. 
House rent and asking prices have been most recently updated in March 2009. 
The detailed method of data collection is as follows. First of all, the geographical range of 
the study area was set including Greater London (post code area of EC, WC, N, E, SE, SW, W, 
and NW) and surrounding areas (Enfield (EN), Ilford (IG), Romford (RM), Dartford (DA), 
Bromley (BR), Croydon (CR), Sutton (SM), Kingston upon Thames (KT), Twickenham (TW), 
Uxbridge (UB), Harrow (HA), Watford (WD), St Albans (AL), Chelmsford (CM), Tonbridge 
(TN), Slough (SL), Hemel Hempstead (HP), Guildford (GU)). Secondly, one sample house and 
one sample flat by each post code district are then surveyed. One of the most widely used real 
estate websites in the UK, „www.findaproperty.com‟ is used for collecting price and rental data. 
The median house price and house rent within each post code district was selected in order to 
control the problem of extreme values. Thirdly, from the same website, the structural data of 
properties, including the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, the number of 
reception rooms, floor area, tenure type, house type, and addresses, were collected. Fourthly, the 
data of post code and past transaction prices were collected from the website, 
„www.houseprices.com‟, where official data from HM Land Registry is shared. Fifthly, the 
location data, defined by longitude and latitude was collected using a GIS web programme, 
„Google Earth‟, using the post code data. Finally, the data measuring accessibility to the centre of 
employment was constructed using the location data. Physical distances between each sample 
house and flat to the centre of employment „Green Park‟ tube station were constructed first.63 
The commuting time by public transport to the centre from each sample house and flat were 
also constructed using „Journey Planner‟ programme in Transport for London webpage.64 
 
 
                                            
62 The house price data of 2009 is asking price data of all sample properties. But the house price data from 
2000 to 2008 is based on the past sold prices of houses which have same structural features in the same 
post code district to each sample property. For detailed house price data see appendix 5-2.  
63 For the details of the setting centroid of London, see section 5-5-1. 
64 More detailed process of  data construction can be found in section 5-5-1. 
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5-3-2   2-D contours & 3-D surfaces of house price 
 
2-dimensional contours and 3-dimensional surfaces of  house prices could be visually 
embodied with the help of  a GIS programme, „Surfer‟65. 3 data sets of  X (longitude), Y (latitude), 
and price66 of  each 315 houses and 317 flats were input to the programme to generate the 
embodiment of  house price in the whole housing market. For the XY data to fit in the 
programme, longitude and latitude data were transformed to plain metre based unit.67 
The following figures are the result from this analysis. They show the location of  sample 
houses, 2-D contours, and 3-D surfaces of  house and flat prices over 10 years in London.  The 
general shapes of  London‟s house price show one mountain-like cone. There is one dominant 
peak around West End which lies in the centre of  the entire area. Except for a small peak around 
Twickenham there is no prominent peak in London. Only local peaks such as Hillingdon, Slough, 
Watford, Epping, and Sevenoaks in the peripheral area of  Greater London exist. Virginia Water 
and the Egham area consist of  an independent peak. The shapes of  flat price show more local 
peaks than those of  house price. However, the basic structures, with one dominant peak in 
central London, are generally the same as those of  house price. 
From this result, it can be deduced that there is one merged residential sphere, in the sense 
defined in the section 4-1, in Greater London and other centres of  employment are merged by 
and become subordinate parts of  it. There is slight chance that Twickenham remains a residential 
sphere which is not yet fully merged. However, Twickenham cannot be seen as an independent 
residential sphere according to the commuting pattern of  London. The reason of  prominent 
house price in Twickenham is more to do with other factors, such as well-connected modes of  
transportation to the central London, educational and environmental superiority. The boundary 
of  the merged cone is around 30km from the central peak. Beyond this boundary, other 
employment centres, such as Reading, become the dominant determinations of  rent. 
 
 
                                            
65 This programme estimates values in unobserved locations using neighbouring observed data and 
creates contour and 3-D surface maps. 
66 Unit of  price are unified to 10 dollars per m2 to 1) control variance of  floor area and 2) compare it with 
other international figures. Exchange rate of  2 $/£ is applied for the currency conversion over all period. 
67 As latitude of  London is around 51.5, 1 degree of  latitude is assumed to be 111.26 km and 1 degree of  
longitude is assumed to be 74.2 km 
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Figure 13   Location of samples houses in London  
(2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 from the top)  
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Figure 14   2D contours of house prices in London (10 $/m
2
)(2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 from 
the top)    
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Figure 15   3D shapes of house prices in London (10 $/m
2
) 
(2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 from the top) 
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Figure 16   Location of samples flats in London  
(2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 from the top) 
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Figure 17   2D contours of flat prices in London (10 $/m
2
) 
(2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 from the top)    
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Figure 18   3D shapes of flat prices in London (10 $/m
2
) 
(2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 from the top)    
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5-4  Subdivision of the housing market 
 
 
Figure 19   Major spatial housing submarket in London 
It has been identified that the commuting pattern flows towards one central point of 
London. This implies that London has only one spatial housing submarket. The fact that the 2-D 
contours and 3-D surface cones of house and flat price in London form only one dominant peak 
also verifies the structure of the spatial housing submarket in London. Although there are three 
main centres of commuting inflow of Westminster, Camden, and the City of London, the spatial 
housing submarket of London appears to be singular. It can be explained by supposing that the 
three dominant residential spheres surrounding the three centres merged together into one, due 
to their relative proximity to one another. It is appropriate to regard the three centres as one 
cluster of employment in this status. The geographical boundary of the spatial housing 
submarket of London is around 30km in terms of physical distance and 90mins in terms of total 
commuting time including waiting time from the centre of London68.  
In the following analysis, London can thus validly be treated as one spatial housing 
submarket in itself. In terms of the sectoral housing submarkets, two sectoral housing 
                                            
68 The location of  the central point of  London and data of  commuting time will be discussed in the 
following section; gradient of  house and flat price become even in the outer area of  around 30 km radius 
boundary or 90 mins commuting time. 
  
112 
 
submarkets, of 3 bedroom houses and 2 bedroom flats, will be the subject of the following 
analysis. 
 
5-5  The spatial structure of  the housing market   
 
Based on the subdivision of the spatial housing submarket in the previous section, this 
section will investigate the contribution of accessibility to employment centres to house prices in 
a spatial housing submarket and its changes, along with the general level of house prices by time 
period. Throughout this section, the implication of differential rent and absolute rent as 
fundamental components of land rents in the residential space will be examined with their 
dynamic features. 
 
5-5-1  Data & range of  analysis 
 
The first step for the analysis on the spatial structure of house price in a city is to set the 
location of the main employment centre of the city. In London, this thesis has identified three 
major centres of commuting inflow of Westminster, Camden, and the City. Among the three 
main centres of commuting inflow to London, Westminster is the most dominant commuting 
centre; Westminster is the destination for 496,991commuting trips, compared to 307,197 for City 
of London, and 222,938 for Camden. As Westminster itself is a broad area covering more than 
20 km2, a further origin-destination analysis is needed to set a proper geographical centre of 
Westminster as the centre of employment in London. For this, the origin-destination data from 
all council areas of Greater London, East, and South East to the 20 electoral wards within 
Westminster was analysed. 20 electoral wards in Westminster are Abbey Road, Bayswater, 
Bryanston and Dorset Square, Church Street, Churchill, Harrow Road, Hyde Park, 
Knightsbridge and Belgravia, Lancaster Gate, Little Venice, Maida Vale, Marylebone High Street, 
Queen's Park, Regent's Park, Saint James's, Tachbrook, Vincent Square, Warwick, West End, 
Westbourne. Among the wards in Westminster borough, St. James‟s and West End are detected 
as the most frequently commuted centres, as St. James is the destination for 178,846 commuting 
trips and West End for 145,617 while others are the destinations for fewer than 25,000 except 
for Marylebone High Street, which is the destination for 48,623. As the border of the two wards 
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is Piccadilly from Hyde Park Corner to Piccadilly Circus, based on the commuting data, the 
following analysis will assume Green Park tube station as the centre of the employment centre in 
London as it is in the centre of the border road between the two wards. The location of Green 
Park tube station is [51°30 2´5´´  N, 0°08 3´5´´  W] in degrees69.  
Several measures reflecting differences of accessibility to the centre of employment were 
collected, including physical linear distance, net transportation time, waiting time, and the 
number of changes of modes of transport during commuting. The physical linear distance from 
each location of property to Green Park station was constructed by using the method of 
calculating distances between two points of coordinates. The data of net transportation time, 
waiting time, and the number of changes was collected as a measure of commuting costs. As 
public transportation is the main mode of transportation for commuting in London, a web-based 
journey planning programme on public transport, „Journey Planner‟ in the official Transport for 
London was used. 70 In each set of data, the destination was set to Green Park station.  
The measures of net commuting time, waiting time and the number of changes are collected 
on the basis of the median value. The median commuting time to Green Park station was set 
using the arrival time of at 9a.m. on 16 September 2009. The commuting time data of 261 out of 
315 sample houses and 256 out of 317 flats could be constructed from the web programme, as 
commuting using public transportation from properties in the outer area of Greater London is 
difficult or impossible and therefore could not be constructed using the programme. 
The unit of price of house and flat are unified to 10 dollars per m2 to control the variance of 
floor area and to be comparable to other international figures. The exchange rate of two US 
dollars to the pound sterling is applied for the currency conversion over all periods. The unit of 
physical distance is set to km and the unit of commuting time is set to minutes. 
 
5-5-2   Regression analysis of  house price on accessibility by submarket 
 
A simple OLS regression analysis of price of house and flat on accessibility has been 
conducted in this section. Using this process, the contribution of accessibility to the centre of 
                                            
69 In order to transform the geographic coordinate system to linear units of metres, the length of 1 degree 
of latitude is assumed to be 111.26 km and the length of 1 degree of longitude is assumed to be 74.2 km 
when the latitude of coordinates is in the range of around 51.5 degrees. This means that the location of 
Green Park station is [10.615 km W, 56.4 km N], where 0 degree of longitude is the base line of x 
coordinates and 51 degrees of latitude is the base line of y coordinates. 
70 www.tfl.gov.uk 
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London to house and flat price can be examined. In addition, the coefficients of gradients and 
constants can be applied to analyse the structure of land rents in an urban context. Regression 
analysis has been conducted on independent variables of physical distance and total commuting 
time respectively. The first regression analysis was on house price on accessibility variables. 
Scatter plots, regression fit lines, and 95% confidence intervals are on the following diagrams. 
The statistical results from the regression analysis of R2, coefficients, t-values, and 5th 
percentiles71 are summarised in the table 5. 
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Figure 20   Scatter plot of house price on distance to employment centre in London  
(2000 top left, 2003 top right, 2006 bottom left, 2009 bottom right) 
                                            
71 This study uses 5th percentile as the minimum level of house prices and rents. To control the extreme 
cases in the smallest value, 5th percentiles assuming normal distribution are chosen as the value for the 
minimum. 
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Some clear observations can be made from the diagrams. Firstly, house prices and physical 
distance from the centre of employment show the expected negative correlation throughout the 
periods. Secondly, the gradients of the fitting line get steeper over time. Thirdly, a few extremely 
expensive samples close to the centre increase variance in the regression fit as a whole and this is 
aggravated over time. These features are also observed the same in the result of the regression 
analysis of house prices on commuting time instead of physical distance. 
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Figure 21   Scatter plot of house price on commuting time to employment centre in London  
(2000 top left, 2003 top right, 2006 bottom left, 2009 bottom right) 
 
A simple regression analysis of house price on the accessibility to the centre of employment 
across housing submarkets over time shows some characteristic points. 
Firstly, results from the regression analysis show similar patterns for both the distance 
variable and the commuting time variable. In both analyses, the explanatory power of the 
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analysis has dropped from about 30% to 20% from 2000 to 2003. However, it has been 
improved in the following periods reaching up to more than 40%. Nevertheless, the explanatory 
power of the commuting time variable is slightly greater than the variable of physical distance. 
The possible reason for this will be discussed with the result of analysis with the flat data. 
Second, the coefficients of accessibility and the constants have increased over time. They are 
all statistically significant at 0.1%. The increases in coefficients have been accelerated over time.  
Third, the 5th percentiles of house price have also increased during the periods. The change 
from year 2000 to year 2003 is especially noticeable. 
 
Table 5   OLS Regression of house price on distance / commuting time to employment centre in London 
 Year Sample size R
2
 Coefficient of accessibility Constant 
5
th
 
percentile* 
Distance 
2000 129 0.2844 -15.1 (-7.10) 610 (17.02) 195 
2003 129 0.1999 -12.9 (-5.63) 728 (18.62) 344 
2006 147 0.3584 -22.3 (-9.00) 990 (23.58) 396 
2009 242 0.4290 -37.8 (-13.43) 1335 (28.66) 418 
Commuting time 
2000 129 0.2882 -6.5 (-7.17) 736 (14.11) 195 
2003 129 0.2184 -6.0 (-5.96) 868 (14.61) 344 
2006 147 0.3476 -9.3 (-8.79) 1162 (18.96) 396 
2009 242 0.4309 -16.2 (-13.48) 1659 (24.10) 418 
Notes: Values in parentheses are t-values 
Coefficients and constants are all statistically significant at 0.1% level 
* 5th percentiles are based on normal distribution 
 
The following diagrams and table are the result of regression analysis of the price of flats on 
the accessibility variables of physical distance and commuting time. The values of scatter plot, 
regression fit lines, and 95% confidence intervals are on the following diagrams. The statistical 
results from regression of R2, coefficients, t-values, and 5th percentiles are shown in the table 6. 
In general, results from the regression analysis of price of flat on accessibility variables show 
similar characteristics from those of house price. Firstly, the expected negative correlation 
between price of flat and the physical distance from the centre of employment has also been 
identified throughout the periods. Secondly, the gradients of the fitting line get steeper over time 
as well. Thirdly, few extremely expensive samples close to the centre increase variance in the 
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regression fit as a whole. The observations from the regression of price of flat on commuting 
time show similar features. 
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Figure 22   Scatter plot of flat price on distance to employment centre in London  
(2000 top left, 2003 top right, 2006 bottom left, 2009 bottom right) 
 
The simple regression analysis of price of flat on the physical distance to the centre of 
employment across housing submarkets over time shows some characteristics. 
First, the commuting time variable shows more significance than the physical distance of 
around 5% points in terms of explanatory power. There are many properties whose location has 
greater accessibility in terms of transportation so less commuting cost even though the physical 
distance is far away from the centre of employment. For example, properties around Surbiton 
station in zone 6 can have similar commuting time as those around Wimbledon in zone 3 which 
locates nearer than Surbiton to the central area because there are frequent express trains from 
Surbiton to Waterloo station in central area which takes even less than from Wimbledon to 
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Waterloo. This kind of improved transportation infrastructure makes South Western area of 
London more expensive than closer areas to central London such as Ealing, Harringay, and 
Lewisham. 
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Figure 23   Scatter plot of flat price on commuting time to employment centre in London 
(2000 top left, 2003 top right, 2006 bottom left, 2009 bottom right) 
Second, the difference of explanatory power of the commuting time variable over the 
physical distance variable in the flat submarket is greater than that in the house submarket. The 
difference in the flat submarket is around 4% points whereas it is less than 1% points. This can 
be explained by the fact that flats are located more closely to stations than houses. 
Third, explanatory power of the analysis shows greater figures than that of the analysis of 
house price. Accessibility variables explain around 45% of the variation of flat price in London. 
This difference of more than 10% explanatory power of the accessibility between house and flat 
can be explained in two ways. One possible reason is that the housing submarket of 2 bedroom 
flat is more influenced by commuting factors than house. The reason why the gap between the 
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physical distance and the real commuting time is greater in housing submarket of flat is in the 
same context with this significance of commuting in the market. The other possible reason is 
that there are wider variances in the data of sectoral housing submarket of 3 bedroom house. 
The samples of 3 bedroom house fall into two sub-types of semi-detached house and terraced 
house. This existence of the two slightly different types in the data would increase the variance in 
price of house resulting in lower explanatory power. In addition to this, the sectoral housing 
submarket of house has other factors which increase variance in price such as the size of back 
garden, conservatory, and garage. In general, the narrower a sectoral housing submarket is, the 
more significant the contribution of accessibility will be. 
Table 6   OLS Regression of flat price on distance / commuting time to employment centre in London 
 Year Sample size R
2
 Coefficient of accessibility Constant 
5
th
 
percentile* 
Distance 
2000 150 0.4183 -11.3 (-10.32) 556 (30.20) 237 
2003 157 0.3831 -12.2 (-9.81) 753 (35.76) 355 
2006 159 0.4465 -20.1 (-11.25) 989 (31.89) 433 
2009 245 0.4958 -27.8 (-15.46) 1184 (39.86) 487 
Commuting time 
2000 150 0.4555 -5.2 (-11.13) 668 (25.13) 237 
2003 157 0.4311 -5.9 (-10.84) 890 (28.62) 355 
2006 159 0.4649 -8.7 (-11.68) 1160 (26.53) 433 
2009 245 0.5371 -12.7 (-16.79) 1452 (34.21) 487 
Values in parentheses are t-values 
Coefficients and constants are all statistically significant at 0.1% level 
* 5th percentiles are based on normal distribution 
 
Fourth, the coefficients of accessibility and constant have increased over time. They are all 
statistically significant at 0.1%. Although it is difficult to directly compare the coefficients of 
distance and commuting time as they have different units, both have almost tripled over 10 years. 
Fifth, the 5th percentiles of house price have also increased during these periods. It has 
almost doubled over 10 years from 2370 dollar per m2 to 4870 dollar per m2. 
These characteristics of changes can be interpreted with the understanding of the dynamic 
changes of land rents in the following section. 
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5-5-3   Dynamic changes of  differential rent & absolute rent 
 
The coefficients of the regression analysis can be used to figure out the dynamic changes of 
land rents in housing market. Firstly, the coefficients of accessibility can be understood as the 
contribution of differential rent to the variance of house and flat price. Secondly, the constants 
can be understood as the heights of the base of the cone of house and flat price. Thirdly, the 5th 
percentiles72 can be regarded as the minimum level of house and flat price in a given time in a 
certain sectoral housing submarket, which reflects the level of absolute rent in each sectoral 
housing submarket. The boundary of a spatial housing submarket then can be deduced from the 
combined use of coefficients of accessibility to the centre of employment, constants and the 5th 
percentiles of house price.73 
Based on these data of coefficients and 5th percentiles, the structure of price of housing 
market in London over time has been drawn. Residuals from sampling, extreme values, and 
other various factors affecting actual contracts of transactions of house are all making it difficult 
to find the underlying trend of price of house. Moreover, there are many factors affecting house 
price such as the construction cost and the speculative expectation on future price other than 
capitalised land rents. The substitution effect between house buying and renting also makes it 
difficult to simply regard house price as a capitalised rent. Nevertheless, the lines of house price 
by housing submarket over time in the following diagrams can be a starting point for the proper 
analysis to reveal the structure and dynamic movements of land rents in urban area. For the 
simple terminology, accessibility variance in house price which is mainly contributed by 
differential rent will be called DR proxy and the 5th percentile of house price which is mainly 
contributed by absolute rent will be called AR proxy hereafter. 
The following two diagrams show changes in DR and AR proxies over time by sectoral 
housing submarkets of 3 bedroom house and 2 bedroom flat in London. These diagrams of 
changes of house prices over time imply various points. 
Firstly, it can be seen that the gradients of DR proxies in both sectoral housing submarkets 
of houses and flats get steeper over time. Although the changes of gradients from 2000 to 2003 
are not significant, the changes from 2003 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2009 get more significant. 
As DR reflects the advantage inherent in living closer to the centre of employment, this pattern 
                                            
72 See footnote 71. 
73 The point where the slope from the y intercept meets the 5th percentile line can be understood as the 
geographical boundary of  a spatial housing submarket. 
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of changes can be interpreted to show that the costs of commuting have been increased or that 
the benefits to be gained from living closer to the central area has increased or both. For the 
same period, the international price of crude oil and the price of UK retail fuel have started to 
significantly increase from year 2002.74 In addition, the congestion charge scheme75  was 
introduced in 2003. These facts may explain the steepening changes of DR proxies in house and 
flat prices in London over the periods. 
 
Figure 24   Changes of DR and AR proxies of property prices in London 
Secondly, the levels of AR proxies have increased throughout the period regardless of 
sectoral housing submarkets. They have more than doubled over the 10 year period. The 
increase from year 2000 to year 2003 is especially significant. The AR proxies of house and flat 
have increased by 76% and 50%, respectively, in the period. They have increased in the 
successive periods with reduced but still substantial rates. This implies that the growth in 
                                            
74 Source: IMF, „monthly primary commodity prices‟; Department of  Energy and Climate Change, 
„Premium unleaded petrol and diesel prices in the EU‟  
75 See footnote 50. 
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demand chronically exceeds the supply of housing in both sectoral housing submarkets.76 This 
mismatch of demand and supply in housing market in London has been widely recognised.77  
Table 7   Changes of AR proxies of property price in London 
Year 
3 bedroom house 2 bedroom flat 
AR proxy change AR proxy change 
2000 195  237  
2003 344 + 76 % 355 + 50 % 
2006 396 + 15 % 433 + 22 % 
2009 418 + 6 % 487 + 12 % 
 
Thirdly, the pattern of movement of DR and AR proxies from 2000 to 2003 is different to 
that pattern after 2003. The shift of DR and AR proxies upwards with small changes in gradients 
from 2000 to 2003 is likely to have been caused by 1) the increase in AR proxy and 2) the spatial 
expansion of housing submarkets. On the other hand, the changes since 2003 are mainly led by 
the increase in DR proxy which implies that there has been a steady increase in the advantage to 
be gained from living closer to the central area. 
Fourthly, the pressure for development force varies by sectoral housing submarkets and 
locations. The AR proxies of both sectoral housing submarkets have changed together in similar 
patterns. However, the AR proxy for flats is slightly greater than that for houses in all time 
sections, which implies the preference for flats has grown faster than that for houses in London. 
In general, therefore, it can be construed that the incentive for development for the sectoral 
housing submarket of 2 bedroom flats is greater than for that of the 3 bedroom houses in 
London if other conditions are equal. On top of this, considering the higher density of land 
usage of flats in terms of floor area ratio, the pressure for redevelopment to build flats in 
London is far greater than the pressure to build houses. This is in the same context as the current 
prevailing conversion of houses to maisonette flats in London. In addition to this, central areas 
have experienced a greater and increasing pressure for redevelopment compared to outer areas, 
as DR proxies have increased over time. 
 
                                            
76 As house prices reflect speculation as well as real demand, a comparative approach using price data with 
rental data can provide more significant implication. This comparative analysis was conducted in Seoul‟s 
housing market in the section 6-5-3. 
77 See Barker (2003, 2004), ODPM (2005a), DCLG (2006)  
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5-6   Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigated the structure of housing market in London. Firstly, the spatial and 
sectoral housing submarkets in London were identified based on the analysis of housing 
submarkets in chapter 4. 3 bedroom houses and 2 bedroom flats were selected as two 
representative sectoral housing submarkets in London. The identification of spatial housing 
submarkets is based on two analyses: the mapping of commuting patterns and the embodiment 
of 2-D contours and 3-D surface cones of house price. The results of the two analyses showed 
that London consists of one merged spatial housing submarket in itself. 
Secondly, regression analysis was conducted to find out the contribution of accessibility to 
the centre of employment to house prices and the structure of land rents in housing market. The 
variable of accessibility to the centre and house prices shows a negative relationship in 
consistency with the traditional theoretical concept of land rent. Both of the accessibility 
variables of physical distance and commuting time show a similar level of explanatory power in 
each sectoral housing submarket. The variance in accessibility explains around 32% of the 
variance in price of houses and around 45% of the price of flats in London. 
Thirdly, the coefficients from the regression analysis were used to construct a diagrammatic 
model of the structure of house prices. The changes in DR and AR proxies over 10 years from 
2000 to 2009 suggest that there has been a significant increase in commuting cost and a growing 
imbalance between demand and supply of housing in the two sectoral housing submarkets. In 
addition, two different patterns of changes in DR and AR proxies over time were observed. One 
is the increase in AR along with expansion of the spatial housing submarket, and the other is the 
independent increase in DR. The changes in DR and AR proxies also reveal that profitability of 
development of residential properties may vary between sectoral housing submarkets and 
locations of properties. 
In spite of the limits of analysis from sampling, an alternative use of price data for land rent, 
and the imperfectness of regression fit, there are some unique and positive contributions in this 
empirical study. Firstly, the combined use of mapping commuting patterns and the embodiment 
of the shape of house price can be suggested as a useful solution to the complicated problem of 
subdivision of spatial housing submarkets. Secondly, the method of diagrammatic modelling 
based on the regression analysis of house price can be a useful tool for investigating the structure 
and dynamic movements of land rents in an urban area. 
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Chapter 6.   
Spatial analysis of  the housing market in Seoul 
 
6-1  Introduction 
 
Seoul is the capital of South Korea. The administrative area of Seoul covered 605 km2 and 
accommodated around 10,300,000 people in 2003, making its population density 17,200 people 
per km2.78 In terms of effective commuting, the boundary of Seoul extends to neighbouring 
cities including SeongNam, UiJeongBu, AnYang, BuCheon, GwangMyung, GoYang, GwaCheon, 
GuRi, NamYangJu, SiHeung, GunPo, UiWang, HaNam, GwangJu, and GimPo. This 
metropolitan area of Seoul contained more than 16,000,000 people and covered around 2,500 
km2. Hereafter „Seoul‟ refers to the Seoul metropolitan area covering the effective commuting 
area. Seoul is a multi-centre city which has 3 major employment cores. The main modes of 
transportation in Seoul are underground and train (34.6%), private car (26.9%), and bus (26.0%) 
in 2002.79 The three main housing types in Seoul are apartment (54%), detached house (20%), 
and multi-family flat (18%) in 2005.80 There are two main types of tenure of dwelling stock in 
Seoul. In 2000, 66% of dwelling stock is owner-occupied houses and 26% of it is „Jeonse‟81 
letting.  
 
6-2   Commuting patterns and centrality  
 
A commuting pattern can show the relationship between the centres of  employment in a 
city in the most direct way. Having argued that residential sphere consists of  a centre of  
employment and the surrounding residential area, the directions of  commuting between sub-
centres in merged residential spheres can reveal the hierarchical relationships between them. 
Based on the commuting pattern, spatial housing submarkets can be identified. 
                                            
78 Source: the National Statistical Office of Korea 
79 Transportation bureau, Seoul Metropolitan Government 
80 Source: the National Statistical Office of Korea 
81 „Jeonse‟ is a unique type of rent payment in Korea. It is a lump sum of deposit, which is normally worth 
about 20 times the value of monthly rent. Paying a long term deposit for a year or two years without 
monthly rent payment is the basic contract of „Jeonse‟. Any return from the deposit for the contract period 
practically functions as rent to landowners. 
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Figure 25   Location of Seoul 
 
6-2-1   Data & range of  analysis 
 
Travel flows between local authorities from the commuting trip statistics of  the 2005 
Census data in South Korea were used for network analysis in order to visualise the commuting 
pattern in Seoul metropolitan area. The commuting data from the National Statistical Office of  
Korea are constructed using 10% sample data. The data contains the place of  residence (origin), 
the place of  work (destination), and total number of  commuting people. A network analysis 
software, Pajek, is used for mapping commuting pattern in the same way as for the London data. 
The 25 local authorities in Seoul, 10 in InCheon, and 31 from GyeongGi province are set as 
basic units of  commuting. An Origin–Destination matrix from all 66 local authorities of  Seoul, 
InCheon, GyeongGi province to all 66 local authorities was constructed for the network analysis. 
A total of  4355 pairs of  origin – destination data are examined. In order to identify the 
relationship between local authorities, the commutings from an origin to itself  and flows of  0 
trips were removed. As a result, a total of  3930 pairs are left. For a simple visualisation, three 
thresholds of  number of  trips are used. There are 245 pairs of  origin–destination where the 
number of  trips exceeds 6,000, comprising 50.4% of  total trips in all 66 local authorities. There 
are 117 pairs where the number of  trips exceed 10,000, comprising 33.3% of  total trips, and 
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there are 53 pairs where the number of  trips exceed 15,000 comprising 19.9% of  total trips. The 
details are in the following table 8. 
 
Table 8   The number of commuting trips in Seoul 
Threshold 
Number of pairs of 
origin - destination 
Total number of trip Percentage (%) 
Total 3,930 5,722,710 100 
6000 245 2,885,600 50.4 
10000 117 1,904,800 33.3 
15000 53 1,138,736 19.9 
Source: S. Korea Census 2005  
 
 
 
Figure 26   ID codes of local authorities in Seoul Metropolitan Area 
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6-2-2   Commuting patterns & centrality by local authority 
 
In the following maps of  commuting patterns, each vertex represents the centroid of  each 
local authority, the size of  each vertex represents the number of  inflows of  commuting to each 
vertex, and the arrows show the directions and the volume of  commuting trips. 
 
 
 
Figure 27   Commuting pattern and centrality by local authority in Seoul (over 6000 trip) 
 
The three maps by threshold in Seoul show a consistency in the pattern of commuting. 
They all indicate that there are three main centres of commuting inflow in Seoul. In the 
commuting pattern diagrams, the prominent destinations of commuting inflows in Seoul are 
JongRo (2), YoungDeungPo (19), and GangNam (23), and, in the outer region of the 
administrative area of Seoul, InCheon (30), SiHeung (50), SuWon (36), and HwaSung (59). 
Excluding centres outside the administrative area of Seoul, the main destinations of commuting 
inflow in the Seoul metropolitan area are JongRo, YoungDeungPo, and GangNam. A closer 
observation of the commuting patterns reveals that there are affiliated destinations of 
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commuting just next to JongRo, YoungDeungPo, and GangNam. A local authority Joong (1) is 
located just next to JongRo, GooRo (17) is close to YoungDeoungPo, and SeoCho (22) is close 
to GangNam. However, it is reasonable to suppose that these are merged jnto the three 
dominant centres due to their close proximities to them. Among the three main centres of inflow 
commuting to Seoul, GangNam and SeoCho have the most frequently commuted centres, as the 
number of incoming commuting trips per day is 808,650; JongRo and Joong have 613,071 
incoming commuting trips, and YoungDeungPo and GooRo have 381,772 incoming commuting 
trips per day. 
 
 
Figure 28   Commuting pattern and centrality by local authority in Seoul (over 10000 trip) 
 
Commuting towards the three centres originate from all directions, whereas commuting 
towards other local authorities are limited in direction. This implies that the three centres are 
dominant centres and the other centres of local authorities are sub-centres in the main merging 
residential spheres. A local authority in the peripheral area of Seoul, GangDong (25), for example, 
has the dominant group of commuters to inner local authorities of SongPa (24) and GangNam 
(23). An inner area of SongPa has the dominant group of commuters to GangNam. However, it 
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also has a dominant number of commuters from GangDong. This implies that GangDong lies at 
the bottom of the hierarchy, SongPa is above GangDong, and finally GangNam is at the top in a 
merged residential sphere. 
 
 
Figure 29   Commuting pattern and centrality by local authority in Seoul (over 15000 trip) 
The border areas between the main centres have diverged outflow commuting to main 
centres around. Based on this, the borders between the main spatial submarkets can be identified. 
For example, DongJak (20) and GwanAk (21) which are the local authorities between the main 
centres of both GangNam and YoungDeungPo have similar levels of outflow commuters to 
GangNam and YoungDeungPo, which implies that the boundary between the two main 
submarkets lies in the local authorities of DongJak and GwanAk. In the same manner, 
SeongDong (4), GwangJin (5), DongDaeMoon (6), and JoongRang (7) would be the boundary 
between JongRo and GangNam, and Mapo (14) is the boundary between JongRo and 
YoundDeungPo.  
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6-3  Embodiment of  house price and rent 
 
Embodying a shape of house price or rent in a housing market can be a crucial process in 
the spatial analysis of a city. As we saw in the London case, it not only enables an overview of 
the basic structure of house prices in a city but it also provides important information on the 
spatial housing submarkets in a city. This process can provide useful criteria for the spatial 
subdivision of a housing market. 
 
6-3-1  Data & range of  analysis 
 
To discover the spatial housing submarkets in Seoul, three types of  housing are chosen as 
sectoral housing submarkets. The most dominant type of  housing stock in Seoul is the 
apartment. They form more than 50 % of  the total housing stock of  Seoul in 2005. Three the 
most dominant groups of  apartments were selected as sample groups. The first apartment group 
has 2 bedrooms with a floor area of  around 60 m2 (2 bedroom apartment). The second 
apartment group has 3 bedrooms with a floor area of  around 85 m2 (3 bedroom apartment). The 
third apartment group has 4 bedrooms with a floor area of  around 120 m2 (4 bedroom 
apartment). In the Seoul metropolitan area, 402 sample apartment complexes for the first group, 
402 for the second, and 397 for the third were collected. For the time series analysis, price data 
were collected for 4 different points of  time (1998, 2001, 2004, 2007) spanning a period of  10 
years from 1998 to 2007. „Jeonse‟ data as rent data was also collected. Structural data for 
properties and other data such as addresses, locations, and past transaction prices were also 
collected. Rent and price data for sample apartments and associated location data were 
constructed to shape the house prices of  Seoul. With the help of  the software „Surfer‟, the shape 
of  house prices of  Seoul was modelled.  
Detailed methods of data collection are as follows. 
First, the geographical range of the study area was set to include the administrative areas of 
Seoul (25 local authorities), and the surrounding areas of conurbation including 15 small cities in 
GyeongGi province (SeongNam, UiJeongBu, AnYang, BuCheon, GwangMyung, GoYang, 
GwaCheon, GuRi, NamYangJu, SiHeung, GunPo, UiWang, HaNam, GwangJu, and GimPo), 
InCheon, and SooWon. Second, price and rent data were collected from Real Estate Bank 
(www.neonet.co.kr) which is one of the most reliable real estate information firms in South 
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Korea. The stratified sampling method was used for collecting house price and rent data. Around 
8 properties per local authority were chosen, according to the proportion of populations. In 
sampling, the median values of price and rent were selected in order to control the problem of 
extreme values. Third, the structural data for properties (the number of bedrooms, the number 
of bathrooms, the floor area ratio, house type), past transaction prices, and addresses were 
collected from the same source. Fourth, location data, measured by longitude and latitude, were 
collected using a GIS web programme „Google Earth‟. 
 
6-3-2   2-D contours & 3-D surfaces of  house price and rent 
 
2-D contours and 3-D surfaces of house price and rent were visually embodied in the same 
way as for the London data. 3 data sets of the longitude, the latitude, and price and rent data of 
the three sectoral housing submarkets were input to the programme to embody their shapes. For 
the coordinates data to fit into the programme, the longitude and the latitude data were 
transformed to location data measured by metres. The unit of apartment price and rent were 
unified to 10 $ per m2 to standardise the data and to compare it with other international data. 
The exchange rate of 1 $/1000 \ is applied for the currency conversion over all periods. 
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Figure 30   Location of sample apartments in Seoul  
(2 bedroom, 3 bedroom, 4 bedroom from the top) 
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Figure 31   2D contours of 2 bedroom apartment prices in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2008 bottom right) 
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Figure 32   3D shapes of 2 bedroom apartment price in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 from the top) 
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Figure 33   2D contours of 3 bedroom apartment prices in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2008 bottom right) 
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Figure 34   3D shapes of 3 bedroom apartment price in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 from the top) 
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Figure 35   2D contours of 4 bedroom apartment prices in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2008 bottom right) 
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Figure 36   3D shapes of 4 bedroom apartment price in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 from the top) 
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2-D contours and 3-D shapes of apartment price in Seoul indicate that there are around 6 
independent peaks in the whole area. Three of them in central area are the most dominant and 
these are partly merged each other. The rest of three peaks of InCheon, IlSan, and SooWon are 
located in the outer areas of the Seoul metropolitan area. The locations of the three dominant 
peaks are consistent with the major employment centres in Seoul of JongRo, YoungDeungPo, 
and GangNam. As the locations of other peaks are relatively distant and independent from Seoul, 
it might be sensible to regard Seoul as a partly merged residential sphere with 3 dominant centres 
of employment. The boundary of the partly merged unity of the three major cones is around 35 
km from its centre. Thus the whole housing market of Seoul needs to be subdivided into three 
spatial submarkets for further analysis. This is consistent with the result of the commuting 
pattern analysis. It was not difficult to identify the three peaks until the period beginning 2001. 
After 2004, the dominance of one peak, GangNam, overshadows the other two peaks, so even in 
2007 the shape of house prices in Seoul suggests only one completely merged residential sphere.    
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Figure 37   2D contours of 2 bedroom apartment rent in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2008 bottom right) 
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Figure 38   3D shapes of 2 bedroom apartment rent in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 from the top) 
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Figure 39   2D contours of 3 bedroom apartment rent in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2008 bottom right) 
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Figure 40   3D shapes of 3 bedroom apartment rent in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 from the top) 
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Figure 41   2D contours of 4 bedroom apartment rent in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2008 bottom right) 
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Figure 42   3D shapes of 4 bedroom apartment rent in Seoul (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 from the top) 
  
146 
 
The 2-D contours and 3-D shapes of apartment rent in Seoul demonstrates little difference 
to those of apartment price. However, the distinction between the three main centres of 
employment is clearer than when it is drawn with price data. It is partly because price data 
reflects future expectation for the market. It can be therefore interpreted that the market expects 
the dominant growth of the GS spatial submarket in Seoul while the rental market remains 
somewhat distinct. 
The result of the tri-centred city structure as shown by the embodiment of the shape of 
house price is consistent with the result from the commuting patterns with dominant 
employment figures82 in the three areas. Therefore, it can be concluded that Seoul has three 
dominant centres of employment and associated residential spheres, and the whole housing 
market can be divided into three spatial housing submarkets. In the spatial division of housing 
submarkets, the borders between dominant cones can be regarded as the boundaries of each 
spatial submarket.  
 
6-4  Subdivision of  housing market 
 
The maps of  the commuting pattern with network analysis show that there are three main 
centres of  commuting inflows in Seoul. The 2 dimensional contours and 3 dimensional 
embodiment of  house price also reveal that there are three major peaks in Seoul. These imply 
that there exist three main spatial housing submarkets in Seoul. They are the GangNam-SeoCho 
(GS), Joong-JongRo (JJ), and YoungDeungPo-GooRo (YG) spatial housing submarkets. 
GangNam and SeoCho are so close that they form a centre of  merged residential spheres. So do 
Joong and JongRo, and YoungDeungPo and GooRo. The borders between the three spatial 
housing submarkets would keep changing, due to the differing relative dominance of  each, 
mainly in terms of  the employment level. The borders between the submarkets are based on the 
commuting data in 2005 and the embodiment of  rent is based on figures from 2004. These 
borders will be used in the following analysis. The geographical boundaries of  the three spatial 
housing submarkets of  GS, JJ, and YG are around 35 km, 32 km, and 28 km radius respectively. 
In terms of  the sectoral housing submarket, the three sectoral housing submarkets of  2 
bedroom, 3 bedroom, and 4 bedroom apartments will be the subject of  the following analysis. 
 
                                            
82 See appendix 6-8 
  
147 
 
 
 
Table 9   Number of sample apartments by submarket in Seoul 
Spatial sub 
Sectoral su 
GS JJ YG 
2 bedroom apartment 125 135 155 
3 bedroom apartment 125 135 155 
4 bedroom apartment 123 123 153 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43   Major spatial housing submarkets in Seoul 
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6-5   The spatial structure of  the housing market 
 
6-5-1   Data & range of  analysis 
 
As the centres of the three dominant spatial housing markets are not close enough to be 
fully merged into one, the whole housing market of Seoul needed to be divided into three spatial 
housing submarkets. For the further regression analysis, the centre of each spatial housing 
submarket needs to be identified. Based on the commuting patterns established from network 
analysis and employment data, the location of the centre of GS spatial housing submarket is 
identified as YeokSam station, which is the central area of the local authority of GangNam. In 
the same way, the location of the centre of JJ spatial housing submarket is identified as EulJiRo 
1Ga station, which is the central area of the local authority of JongRo, and the location of the 
centre of YG spatial housing submarket is identified as YeoUiDo station, which is also the 
central area of the local authority of YoungDeungPo. YeokSam station, EulJiRo 1Ga station, and 
YeoUiDo station are assumed to be centres of the three main spatial housing submarkets of GS, 
JJ, and YG in Seoul. In order to transform the location data from longitude and latitude to 
metres, the length of 1 degree latitude is converted to c.111 km and the length of 1 degree 
longitude is converted to c. 88.35 km. In this manner, the location of YeokSam station is [3.24 
km E, 55.59 km N], the location of EulJiRo 1Ga station is [1.55 km W, 62.81 km N], and the 
location of YeoUiDo station is [6.70 km W, 57.91 km N], where 127° longitude is the base line 
of the X coordinate and 37° latitude is the base line of the Y coordinate. Physical linear distances 
from each location to YeokSam station, EulJiRo 1Ga station, and YeoUiDo station were 
constructed. The unit of apartment price and rent is 10 dollars per m2. The exchange rate of 1 
$/1000 \ is applied for currency conversion over all periods. The unit of physical distance is km. 
 
6-5-2   Regression analysis of  price and rent on accessibility by submarket 
 
A simple OLS regression analysis of price and rent on the distance to the centres of each 
spatial housing submarket has been conducted in this section. Through this process, the 
contribution of accessibility to the centres of each spatial housing submarket to cost of buying or 
renting apartments can be examined. In addition, the coefficients of gradients and constants can 
be applied to analyse the structure of land rents in an urban context. 
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The first regression analysis is on the relationship between apartment price and the distance 
to the centres. The regression analysis is conducted by spatial housing submarkets (GS, JJ, YG) 
and sectoral housing submarkets (2 bedroom apartments with a floor area of around 60 m2, 3 
bedroom apartments with a floor area of around 85 m2, 4 bedroom apartments with a floor area 
of around 120 m2). A total of 402 sample apartment complexes for 2 bedroom apartments, 402 
for 3 bedroom, and 397 for 4 bedroom are used for the analysis. Scatter plots, regression fit lines, 
and 95% confidence intervals of the three main spatial housing submarkets in Seoul have been 
drawn by year from 1998 to 2007 in the following diagrams. The statistical results from the 
regression of R2, coefficients, t-values, and 5th percentiles can be seen on the tables. 
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Figure 44   Scatter plot of 2 bedroom apt price on distance to employment centre in GS of Seoul  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 45   Scatter plot of 2 bedroom apt price on distance to employment centre in JJ of Seoul  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 46   Scatter plot of 2 bedroom apt price on distance to employment centre in YG of Seoul  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 47   Scatter plot of 3 bedroom apt price on distance to employment centre in GS of Seoul  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 48   Scatter plot of 3 bedroom apt price on distance to employment centre in JJ of Seoul  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 49   Scatter plot of 3 bedroom apt price on distance to employment centre in YG of Seoul  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 50   Scatter plot of 4 bedroom apt price on distance to employment centre in GS of Seoul  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 51   Scatter plot of 4 bedroom apt price on distance to employment centre in JJ of Seoul  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 52   Scatter plot of 4 bedroom apt price on distance to employment centre in YG of Seoul  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
Several points can be observed from these diagrams. 
First, the expected negative linear correlation between house prices and the distance to the 
city centre has been observed across all housing submarkets over time. Secondly, scatter plots by 
sectoral and spatial housing submarket show the same patterns of changes over time. The 
changes in gradients over time show little difference across different housing submarkets. 
However, the boundaries of each spatial housing submarket vary a little in size, as the radius of 
GS submarket is around 35 km, JJ is around 32 km, and YG is around 28 km. The degrees of 
changes in slopes of each submarket also vary. While the changes of slopes in JJ and YG 
submarkets are similar, the changes in GS submarket are more marked. The probable reasons 
will be discussed in the following section with comparative changes between submarkets. Thirdly, 
the gradients of the fitting lines get steeper over time. The changes between 2001 and 2004 are 
especially noticeable across all housing submarkets. This strongly indicates that there were 
external common factors influencing these changes in that period. Finally, the variance in 
apartment prices increased over time across all housing submarkets.  
The results from the regression analysis of apartment price and the distance to the centre of 
each spatial housing submarket by sectoral housing submarket are summarised in the following 
tables. 
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Table 10   OLS Regression of 2 bedroom apartment price on distance to employment centre in Seoul 
Submarket year Sample size R
2
 Coefficient of distance Constant 
5
th
 
percentile* 
GS  (Price) 
1998 116 0.6935 -6.04 (-16.06) 288 (45.35) 110 
2001 154 0.7082 -7.07 (-19.21) 297 (47.51) 100 
2004 154 0.6358 -13.9 (-16.29) 527 (36.37) 126 
2007 154 0.5764 -18.62 (-14.38) 695 (31.62) 138 
JJ  (Price) 
1998 90 0.4898 -5.58 (-9.19) 250 (35.74) 110 
2001 121 0.5969 -5.39 (-13.28) 242 (42.43) 100 
2004 122 0.5749 -8.97 (-12.74) 365 (37.12) 126 
2007 121 0.4474 -11.41 (-9.81) 443 (27.27) 138 
YG  (Price) 
1998 103 0.6079 -4.89 (-12.51) 232 (40.99) 110 
2001 130 0.6488 -5.18 (-15.38) 230 (45.88) 100 
2004 130 0.6082 -8.50 (-14.10) 355 (39.59) 126 
2007 130 0.4446 -11.42 (-10.12) 454 (27.07) 138 
Values in parentheses are t-values 
Coefficients and constants are all statistically significant at 0.1% level 
* 5th percentiles are based on normal distribution in the whole market of Seoul 
Table 11   OLS Regression of 3 bedroom apartment price on distance to employment centre in Seoul 
Submarket year Sample size R
2
 Coefficient of distance Constant 
5
th
 
percentile* 
GS  (Price) 
1998 127 0.6292 -6.34 (-14.56) 312 (46.54) 120 
2001 154 0.6710 -7.10 (-17.61) 303 (44.46) 96 
2004 154 0.5815 -14.36 (-14.53) 543 (32.52) 124 
2007 154 0.5432 -21.60 (-13.44) 815 (30.01) 144 
JJ  (Price) 
1998 90 0.3871 -5.61 (-7.46) 264 (33.04) 120 
2001 120 0.5631 -5.67 (-12.33) 246 (38.67) 96 
2004 122 0.5528 -9.36 (-12.18 370 (34.25) 124 
2007 122 0.4129 -13.01 (-9.19) 498 (25.05) 144 
YG  (Price) 
1998 105 0.5798 -5.30 (-11.92) 253 (39.43) 120 
2001 129 0.6128 -5.05 (-14.18) 228 (42.83) 96 
2004 129 0.5155 -8.06 (-11.62) 352 (34.03) 124 
2007 129 0.3403 -12.47 (-8.09) 514 (22.36) 144 
Values in parentheses are t-values 
Coefficients and constants are all statistically significant at 0.1% level 
* 5th percentiles are based on normal distribution in the whole market of Seoul 
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Table 12   OLS Regression of 4 bedroom apartment price on distance to employment centre in Seoul 
Submarket year Sample size R
2
 Coefficient of distance Constant 
5
th
 
percentile* 
GS  (Price) 
1998 110 0.6556 -8.47 (-14.34) 354 (36.00) 108 
2001 152 0.6857 -9.42 (-18.09) 358 (40.95) 108 
2004 152 0.6018 -14.67 (-15.06) 543 (33.23) 137 
2007 152 0.4712 -20.54 (-11.56) 804 (26.99) 155 
JJ  (Price) 
1998 81 0.4227 -6.37 (-7.61) 286 (28.15) 108 
2001 119 0.5352 -6.50 (-11.61) 276 (35.81) 108 
2004 121 0.4984 -9.18 (-10.87) 380 (32.20) 137 
2007 121 0.3133 -11.75 (-7.37) 509 (22.83) 155 
YG  (Price) 
1998 97 0.6119 -6.09 (-12.24) 260 (34.63) 108 
2001 127 0.6787 -6.26 (-16.25) 252 (45.00) 108 
2004 128 0.5469 -7.80 (-12.33) 351 (38.33) 137 
2007 128 0.3710 -11.9 (-8.62) 519 (25.98) 155 
Values in parentheses are t-values 
Coefficients and constants are all statistically significant at 0.1% level 
* 5th percentiles are based on normal distribution in the whole market of Seoul 
 
A simple regression analysis of apartment price on the distance to the centre of each spatial 
housing submarket over time shows several characteristic points.  
First, the variation in the distance to the centre of each spatial housing submarket explains 
about 55% of the variation of apartment price in each housing submarket in general. 
Nevertheless, there are some differences in detail. For example, its explanatory power decreases 
over time. It has the lowest values in 2007 as the variance in apartment price increases. The GS 
submarket shows a higher explanatory power than the other two submarkets and the 2 bedroom 
apartment market shows a higher explanatory power than the other two submarkets. 
Second, sectoral submarkets have the similar level of gradients in each base year of 1998, 
2001, 2004 and 2007. However, the gradients of the GS submarket are greater than the other two 
submarkets in each base year. On average, the gradients are around -6 in 1998, -6 in 2001, -9 in 
2004, and -12 in 2007 in the JJ and YG submarkets, while the gradients are around -6 in 1998, -7 
in 2001, -14 in 2004, and – 20 in 2007 in the GS submarket. The gradient of the GS submarket 
almost tripled whereas those for the JJ and YG submarkets have only doubled over 10 years.  
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The gradients have increased in a similar pattern throughout the period in all submarkets. 
The changes from 1998 to 2001 are not noticeable while the changes from 2001 to 2004 and 
from 2004 to 2007 are quite significant. 
The coefficients of constant have similar values over time across all sectoral housing 
submarkets. In the same manner as the gradients, however, GS submarket has a higher level of 
constants than JJ and YG submarkets which show very similar values over time. 
Finally, the coefficients of constant have a similar pattern of changes across all sectoral 
housing submarkets. Like the pattern of changes in gradients, the changes of constants from 
2001 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2007 are far more significant than the changes from 1998 to 
2001. The pattern of changes in the 5th percentiles shows the same trend over time although the 
values vary slightly by sectoral housing markets. The 5th percentiles declined from 1998 to 2001 
then gradually increased over time. 
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Figure 53   Scatter plot of 2 bedroom apt rent on distance to employment centre in GS of Seoul  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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The second analysis is the regression of the rates of apartment rent on the distance to the 
centre of each spatial housing submarket. This analysis is expected to be more accurate than that 
using price data, as rent data reflecting actural residential demand is less influenced by some 
„noise‟ factors that influence price data, such as speculative investments. The regression analysis 
is conducted using the three spatial housing submarkets and the three sectoral housing 
submarkets, in the same way as the analysis of the price data. A total of 402 sample apartment 
complexes for 2 bedroom apartments, 402 for 3 bedroom apartments, and 397 for 4 bedroom 
apartments, are used for the analysis. The sample apartment complexes are also analysed the 
same as the analysis using price data. Scatter plots, regression fit lines, and 95% confidence 
intervals of the three main spatial housing submarkets in the Seoul Metropolitan Area have been 
drawn by year, between 1998 and 2007, in the following diagrams. The statistical results from the 
regression of R2, coefficients, t-values, and 5th percentiles can be seen in the tables. 
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Figure 54   Scatter plot of 2 bedroom apt rent on distance to employment centre in JJ of Seoul (1998 
top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 55   Scatter plot of 2 bedroom apt rent on distance to employment centre in YG of Seoul (1998 
top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 56   Scatter plot of 3 bedroom apt rent on distance to employment centre in GS of Seoul (1998 
top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 57   Scatter plot of 3 bedroom apt rent on distance to employment centre in JJ of Seoul (1998 
top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 58   Scatter plot of 3 bedroom apt rent on distance to employment centre in YG of Seoul  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 59   Scatter plot of 4 bedroom apt rent on distance to employment centre in GS of Seoul (1998 
top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 60   Scatter plot of 4 bedroom apt rent on distance to employment centre in JJ of Seoul (1998 
top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 61   Scatter plot of 4 bedroom apt rent on distance to employment centre in YG of Seoul (1998 
top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
Several points can be observed from these diagrams. Firstly, the traditional negative linear 
correlation between rent and the distance to the town centre has been verified across all housing 
submarkets over time. Second, scatter plots by sectoral and spatial housing submarket show the 
same patterns of changes over time. The changes in gradients over time show little difference by 
housing submarkets. The boundaries of each spatial housing submarkets vary a little, the same as 
the price data. The degrees of changes in the slopes of each submarket are similar, regardless of 
spatial housing submarkets. This may be due to the fact that there is no speculative factor in rent 
data. Third, the gradient of the fitting line also get steeper over time. Although the degree of the 
pattern of changes is more gradual than in the price data, it also demonstrates more changes in 
the period between 2001 and 2004. These greater changes in price data might indicate that price 
data is more sensitive to external changes, such as the commuting cost changes caused by an 
increase in oil price, as price data includes all capitalised rents in the future. Finally, the  variance 
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in apartment rent has increased over time across all housing submarkets too. The results from 
the regression analysis of apartment rent and the distance to the centre of each spatial housing 
submarket are summarised in the following tables. 
Simple regressions of apartment rent on the distance to the centre of each spatial housing 
submarket across sectoral housing submarkets over time show several characteristic points. 
First, the variation in the distance to the centres explains about 63% of the variation of 
apartment rent in each housing submarket in general, which is greater than the figure using price 
data. This suggests that rent is more strongly correlated with accessibility than price. The 
explanatory power decreases over time. It has the lowest values in 2007 as variance in apartment 
rents increases. The GS submarket shows a higher explanatory power than the other two 
submarkets and the sectoral housing submarket of 2 bedroom apartments shows a higher 
explanatory power than other two submarkets. 
Second, sectoral submarkets have a similar level of gradients in each base year of 1998, 2001, 
2004 and 2007. The gradients by spatial submarkets also show a similar level over time. The 
gradients have also increased in similar pattern over the years across all submarkets. The changes 
 
Table 13   OLS Regression of 2 bedroom apartment rent on distance to employment centre in Seoul 
Submarket year Sample size R
2
 Coefficient of distance Constant 
5
th
 
percentile* 
GS (Rent) 
1998 116 0.7120 -3.39 (-16.79) 157 (46.18) 54 
2001 154 0.7225 -4.37 (-19.90) 194 (52.16) 63 
2004 154 0.7238 -6.23 (-19.96) 268 (50.62) 77 
2007 154 0.6571 -7.02 (-17.07) 302 (43.30) 72 
JJ (Rent) 
1998 90 0.6921 -4.1 (-14.06) 151 (44.88) 54 
2001 121 0.7420 -4.03 (-18.50) 167 (54.70) 63 
2004 122 0.7056 -5.47 (-16.96) 222 (49.23) 77 
2007 121 0.6425 -6.01 (-14.62) 240 (41.77) 72 
YG  (Rent) 
1998 103 0.5646 -2.70 (-11.44) 127 (37.32) 54 
2001 130 0.6211 -3.35 (-14.48) 155 (45.12) 63 
2004 130 0.6422 -4.63 (-15.16) 207 (45.62) 77 
2007 130 0.5165 -4.78 (-11.69) 225 (37.08) 72 
Values in parentheses are t-values 
Coefficients and constants are all statistically significant at 0.1% level 
* 5th percentiles are based on normal distribution in the whole market of Seoul 
  
166 
 
Table 14   OLS Regression of 3 bedroom apartment rent on distance to employment centre in Seoul 
Submarket year Sample size R
2
 Coefficient of distance Constant 
5
th
 
percentile* 
GS  (Rent) 
1998 128 0.6674 -3.14 (-15.90) 150 (49.08) 60 
2001 154 0.6537 -3.88 (-16.94) 175 (45.32) 59 
2004 154 0.6679 -5.47 (-17.48) 236 (44.62) 71 
2007 154 0.5756 -6.25 (-14.36) 282 (38.32) 78 
JJ  (Rent) 
1998 90 0.6205 -3.97 (-11.99) 142 (40.49) 60 
2001 120 0.7232 -3.63 (-17.56) 149 (51.97) 59 
2004 122 0.6858 -4.88 (-16.90) 194 (45.96) 71 
2007 122 0.6256 -5.63 (-14.16) 224 (40.06) 78 
YG  (Rent) 
1998 105 0.5853 -2.61 (-12.06) 123 (39.32) 60 
2001 129 0.5642 -2.76 (-12.82) 136 (42.34) 59 
2004 129 0.5618 -3.60 (-12.76) 176 (41.77) 71 
2007 129 0.4407 -4.17 (-10.00) 211 (33.81) 78 
Values in parentheses are t-values 
Coefficients and constants are all statistically significant at 0.1% level 
* 5th percentiles are based on normal distribution in the whole market of Seoul 
Table 15   OLS Regression of 4 bedroom apartment rent on distance to employment centre in Seoul 
Submarket year Sample size R
2
 Coefficient of distance Constant 
5
th
 
percentile* 
GS  (Rent) 
1998 110 0.6744 -3.79 (-14.96) 150 (35.64) 40 
2001 152 0.6793 -4.91 (-17.83) 184 (39.89) 51 
2004 152 0.6665 -6.70 (-17.31) 250 (38.51) 68 
2007 152 0.6137 -7.11 (-15.44) 284 (36.74) 71 
JJ  (Rent) 
1998 81 0.5407 -3.55 (-9.64) 126 (28.35) 40 
2001 119 0.6227 -3.84 (-13.90) 146 (38.38) 51 
2004 121 0.6444 -5.30 (-14.68) 198 (39.20) 68 
2007 121 0.5687 -5.77 (-12.53) 219 (34.09) 71 
YG  (Rent) 
1998 97 0.5152 -2.49 (-10.05) 108 (28.88) 40 
2001 127 0.6645 -3.17 (-15.74) 132 (45.11) 51 
2004 128 0.6057 -3.86 (-13.91) 174 (43.07) 68 
2007 128 0.4031 -3.89 (-9.22) 193 (31.51) 71 
Values in parentheses are t-values 
Coefficients and constants are all statistically significant at 0.1% level 
* 5th percentiles are based on normal distribution in the whole market of Seoul 
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from 2001 to 2004 are the most noticeable changes all over the periods. These unified trends 
could be another reason why the rent data is a better data set than unit price in analysing the 
structure of the housing market. 
Third, the constants also demonstrate similar values by time across all sectoral housing 
submarkets. In contrast to the patterns in gradients, however, the GS submarket has a higher 
level of constants than the JJ and YG submarkets, which show very similar values over time.  
Fourth, the constants have similar patterns of changes across sectoral housing submarkets. 
Like the pattern of changes in gradients, the changes from 2001 to 2004 are more significant 
than the changes from 1998 to 2001 and from 2004 to 2007.   
Fifth, the pattern of changes in the 5th percentile shows the same trend over time, although 
its values vary slightly by sectoral housing market.  In contrast to the result from apartment 
price, the 5th percentile has gradually increased over time without fall. 
These characteristics of changes can be interpreted with an understanding of the dynamic 
changes of land rents in the following section. 
 
6-5-3  Dynamic changes of  differential rent & absolute rent 
 
This section uses the coefficients of the regression analysis for further analysis as they are 
useful to figure out dynamic changes of land rents in housing market. Firstly, the coefficients of 
accessibility to centres can be understood as the gradient of the contribution of differential rent 
to the variance of price and rent of house. Secondly, the constants can be understood as the 
heights of the base of the cone of house prices. Thirdly, 5th percentiles83 can be regarded as 
minimum level of house price in a given time in a certain sectoral housing submarket, which 
reflects the level of absolute rent in each sectoral housing submarket. The boundary of a spatial 
housing submarket then can be deduced from the combined use of the coefficients of 
accessibility to centres, the constants and 5th percentiles of house price. 
Based on these data of coefficients and 5th percentiles, the structure of apartment price and 
rent in Seoul over time has been drawn. Residuals from sampling, extreme values, and other 
various factors affecting actual contracts of transactions of house are all making it difficult to 
find the underlying trend of price of house. Moreover, there are many factors affecting house 
                                            
83 See footnote 71. 
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price such as construction costs and speculative expectation on future prices other than 
capitalised land rents. A substitution effect between house buying and renting also makes it 
difficult to simply regard house price as a capitalised rent. Nevertheless, the lines of house price 
by housing submarket over time in the following diagrams can be a starting point for the proper 
analysis to reveal the structure and dynamic movements of land rents in urban area. Forsimplicity, 
accessibility factor in house price which reflects differential rent will be called DR proxy and the 
5th percentile of house price which reflects absolute rent will be called AR proxy hereafter. 
 
 
Figure 62   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment price in Seoul (GS) 
 
Figure 63   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment price in Seoul (JJ) 
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Figure 64   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment price in Seoul (YG) 
These 9 diagrams show the changes in DR and AR proxies over time by sectoral housing 
submarkets of 2 bedroom, 3 bedroom, and 4 bedroom apartments and by the spatial housing 
submarkets of GS, JJ, and YG in Seoul (see Table 10, 11 and 12). These diagrams of changes of 
prices of apartments over time imply various points. 
First, the gradients of  DR proxies in all sectoral and spatial housing submarkets show a 
similar pattern of  changes. There were no significant changes in gradients between 1998 and 
2001 in any submarket, which implies that there was no significant change in DR proxies such as 
commuting costs. The changes of  the position of  DR proxies in the period are rather due to the 
fall in AR proxies in the period. However, the changes from 2001 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2007 
in all submarkets show some degree of  significance as the gradients get steeper with shifts 
outwards. As DR reflects an advantage to live closer to the centre of  employment, this pattern 
of  changes can be interpreted that costs of  commuting have been increased or what people will 
pay for the benefits from living closer to the central area has increased. For the same period, 
international price of  crude oil has started to significantly increase from 200284. This might be 
reflected in the changes of  DR proxies in the period. The shift of  the DR proxies line outwards 
implies that there was an expansion of  each spatial housing market in that period.85 These facts 
may explain the changes of  DR proxies of  apartment price in Seoul during the period. 
                                            
84 Source: IMF, „monthly primary commodity prices‟ 
85 Commuting area of  Seoul has expanded by the construction of  „new towns‟ around Seoul. In 1990s, the 
first generation of  new towns including IlSan, BunDang, JoongDong, SanBon, and PyungChon have 
widened the actual commuting distances to employment centres in Seoul. In 2000s, the second generation 
of  new towns of  PaJoo, GimPo, YangJoo, PanGyo, and GwangGyo are being built resulting in a further 
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Table 16   Changes of AR proxies of apartment price in Seoul 
Year 
2 bedroom apt. 3 bedroom apt. 4 bedroom apt. 
AR proxies change AR proxies Change AR proxies change 
1998 110 
 
120 
 
108 
 
2001 100 - 10 % 96 - 20 % 108 0 % 
2004 126 + 26 % 124 + 29 % 137 + 27 % 
2007 138 + 10 % 144 + 16 % 155 + 13 % 
 
Secondly, the levels of AR attributes showed similar patterns of changes across all 
submarkets over time. The slight difference in these patterns is that the AR attributes of 4 
bedroom apartments remain the same from 1998 to 2001, whereas those of 2 bedroom and 3 
bedroom apartments have fallen by around 10% and 20% respectively. The changes in AR 
attributes since 2001, however, show the same pattern across all submarkets. The AR attributes 
of the three sectoral housing submarkets bounced up substantially by 26%, 29%, and 27% 
respectively. This increase has continued in the next period by 10%, 16%, and 13% respectively. 
The decrease of AR attributes from 1998 to 2001 was substantially influenced by the Asian 
economic crisis in 1997. Actual purchasing power and available investments for properties had 
significantly declined and interest rates increased in the following years. These would contribute 
to the fall of AR attributes of price by reducing speculative factors. The changes in AR attributes 
of rent in the same period can reveal the structure of the minimum level of price of sectoral 
housing submarket. This will be discussed in the following analysis using rent data. The increase 
of 5th percentiles from 2001 implies that AR attributes increased as the growth in demand 
chronically exceeded supply of housing across all sectoral housing submarkets, even considering 
a revival of speculative investments and inflation. This can be supported by the following 
analysis with apartment rent.  
Thirdly, the pressure for redevelopment force varies by sectoral housing submarket and 
locations. The AR attributes of the sectoral housing submarkets have changed in a similar 
pattern. However, the AR attributes for 4 bedroom apartments are slightly greater than the other 
two groups since 2001, which implies that to build 4 bedroom apartments can be more profitable 
than the other two types of apartment analysed in Seoul. Thus, in general, incentives for 
redevelopment for the sectoral housing submarket of 4 bedroom apartments are greater than for 
                                                                                                                            
expansion of  the commuting area of  Seoul. 
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the other two types of apartment in Seoul. The pressure on space for redevelopments keeps 
changing over time. Particularly, as the slopes of DR attributes get steeper over time, the central 
areas demonstrate a bigger pressure for redevelopments than outer areas.  
 
Figure 65   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment rent in Seoul (GS) 
 
Figure 66   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment rent in Seoul (JJ) 
 
Figure 67   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment rent in Seoul (YG) 
These 9 diagrams show the changes in DR and AR proxies over time by sectoral housing 
submarkets of 2 bedroom, 3 bedroom, and 4 bedroom apartments and by the spatial housing 
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submarkets of GS, JJ, and YG in Seoul. These diagrams of the changes of rent of apartments 
imply various points in the comparison with those of prices. 
First, the gradients of DR attributes in all sectoral and spatial housing submarkets show a 
similar pattern of changes over time. As opposed to the decline of DR attributes in apartment 
price from 1998 to 2001, the DR attributes in apartment rent in the same period increased. The 
changes from 2001 to 2004 are led by the steepening of the gradients rather than an expansion in 
DR attributes. The changes from 2004 to 2007 are again led by an expansion in DR attributes. 
The difference between the changes of DR attributes in apartment price and apartment rent 
from 1998 to 2001 can be interpreted in various ways. One of them is the opposing movements 
of 5th percentiles in apartment price and apartment rent, which will be discussed later. The 
changes in the following periods from 2001 to 2007 are almost same as the pattern of changes of 
DR attributes in apartment price. Thus an increase in commuting costs by soaring oil prices or 
congestion can be the underlying causes of the changes. 
Table 17   Changes of AR proxies of apartment rent in Seoul 
Year 
2 bedroom apt. 3 bedroom apt. 4 bedroom apt. 
AR proxies change AR proxies Change AR proxies change 
1998 54 
 
60 
 
40 
 
2001 63 + 17 % 59 - 2 % 51 + 28 % 
2004 77 + 22 % 71 + 20 % 68 + 33 % 
2007 72 - 6 % 78 + 10 % 71 + 4 % 
Secondly, the levels of AR attributes show various patterns of changes by submarkets over 
time. The AR attributes of 3 bedroom apartments have fallen by 2% from 1998 to 2001, whereas 
those of 2 bedroom and 4 bedroom apartments rose by 17% and 28% respectively. The AR 
attributes of all sectoral housing submarkets from 2001 to 2004 increased more than 20%. In the 
last period from 2004 to 2007, the AR attributes of 2 bedroom apartments fell, while those of 3 
bedroom and 4 bedroom continued to increase by 10% and 4% respectively. With AR attributes 
of apartment price and apartment rent, the relationship between the sales market and renting 
market can be construed. With the AR attributes by sectoral housing submarket, the combined 
movements of relative preference for demand and supply of housing in each submarket can be 
construed. The fact that AR attributes in apartment rent from 1998 to 2001 have increased in 
general, while those in price have fallen during the same period, implies that 1) effective demand 
for living in apartments increased despite the diminution in purchasing power, due to the 
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economic crisis in that period, 2) the level of rent increased, as demand for property buying 
turned to demand for renting because of the substitution effect between the two. The relatively 
significant fall of AR attributes of the sectoral housing submarket of 3 bedroom apartments 
from 1998 to 2001, compared to the other two submarkets, implies that there might have been a 
large supply of 3 bedroom apartments in the period in both of sales and renting market. The 
increase of 5th percentiles from 2001 to 2004 in both apartment price and rent may be explained 
by the fact that AR attributes increased, as the growth in demand exceeded the supply of housing 
across all sectoral housing submarkets in the period, even considering the revival of speculative 
investments and inflation. These increases in AR attributes slowed in the period from 2004 to 
2007. The AR attributes in 2 bedroom apartments in rent decreased in the period. Taking 
inflation into account, in general, these changes in AR attributes in rent from 2004 to 2007 imply 
that there was a considerable degree of stability in the market condition of supply and demand of 
renting stock, despite decline of rent levels in the 2 bedroom apartment. However, as opposed to 
this fall in rent levels, the AR attributes of apartment price increased more than 10% across all 
submarkets in the same period. This was likely due to the multiple policies undertaken by the 
Korean government86 to boost the real estate market in the period. Considering the gentle 
increase in rent, the higher increase of apartment prices across the sectoral submarkets may have 
to suffer from readjustment of the market in the future.87 
Finally, the pressure for redevelopment varies across sectoral housing submarkets and 
locations. However, the pattern of the pressure is exactly opposite to that of apartment price. 
Rent data demonstrates that the AR attributes for 4 bedroom apartments are the lowest in the 
sectoral housing submarkets, while 4 bedroom apartments are the most preferable submarket in 
terms of apartment price. This implies that, in the current market, 4 bedroom apartments are the 
most valuable type in terms of sales but the most unattractive type in terms of renting among the 
three types in Seoul. However, in the long run, the preference for 4 bedroom apartments would 
be reduced, as rent data demonstrates more fundamental movements of property market. In 
actual fact, the fall in price of 4 bedroom apartments has been the most significant among the 
three groups in the recent recession in real estate markets in Korea.88  
                                            
86 The government have promoted multiple development plans of  new cities in outer regions from 2003. 
In the process, huge amount of  compensated money for land for the new cities has re-invested in real 
estate market in Seoul. This has stimulated the speculative demand for buying apartment resulting in the 
increase in apartment price. 
87 In effect, since 2009, the real estate market in Korea has been suffering from the fall in price and 
decreasing transactions. 
88 In the downturn in real estate market in Korea, properties of  larger floor area are experiencing greater 
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Just like the pattern of changes in apartment price, the slopes of DR attributes get steeper 
over time. This would make central areas exposed to heavier pressure for redevelopment than 
outer areas over time.  
The diagrams of DR and AR proxies can be applied in order to investigate the interaction 
and changes of borders between spatial housing submarkets89. The following six diagrams show 
the interactions and change of borders between 1) JJ and GS submarket, 2) JJ and YG submarket, 
and 3) YG and GS submarket in terms of apartment rent and price. Ther first two diagrams are 
those between JJ and GS submarket. 
JJ is a spatial submarket where the old town centre of JongRo is located while GS is a spatial 
submarket where the most recently developed town centre of GangNam is located. Although 
GangNam and the spatial submarket surrounding it have been developed only since the 1970s, 
its speed of growth exceeds that of others90. In 1998, the starting point of this study, GS 
submarket is ahead of JJ in dominance. The border between the two is closer to centre of JJ.  
This dominance of GS over JJ continued after 1998. As a result of the increasing dominance of 
GS, the border between the two has been getting closer to the centre of JJ. Even in 2007, the 
two spatial submarkets are merged into one in terms of apartment rent. 
 
 
Figure 68   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment rent in Seoul (JJ-GS) 
                                                                                                                            
drop in the level of  price. 
89 For the interaction between multiple spatial housing submarkets, see section 4-2-2 
90 See appendix 6-8 
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Figure 69   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment price in Seoul (JJ-GS) 
Undertaking the same analysis using price data indicates an interesting point. Although the 
pattern of changes in borders is the same as those with rent data, the timing of the merging of 
the two spatial submarkets is different. The two spatial submarkets of JJ and GS are merged in 
2004 in price data, whereas they are still separated in 2004 in rent data. This can be explained 
using the characteristics of price data. As price data reflects expectations on the future value of 
properties, this earlier merging in price can be interpreted as demonstrating that expectations of 
people on the interactions between the two markets in the future are reflected in apartment price 
prior to actual changes in the status of the current market. 
As the main factor to the variance of DR is commuting, this merging would continue as 
long as the employment growth of GS exceeded JJ. An overturn of the change in the 
employment growth might separate it into two spatial submarkets again. In a completely merged 
situation, analysis of the housing market would be conducted treating the data as one spatial 
housing market, as in the case of London. For example, in a situation where two spatial 
submarkets are merged into one, accessibility to the centre should be the distance to the centre 
of the merging submarket (in this case GS); it would be inappropriate to use two variables of 
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distances to the centre of the merged (JJ) and the merging submarket (GS) as two separated 
markets. There have been many studies which have highlighted the declining importance of 
accessibility to the centre of a city. However, these arguments should be re-examined. One of the 
most typical errors is to assume the centre of a city as the old town centre. However, if other 
centres have grown enough to form independent peaks and attract incoming commutes, they 
should be analysed as separated spatial submarkets of their own centres of employment. If the 
new town centres has grown and dominated old centres, accessibility to old town centre would 
have little significance, which is against the traditional model in the whole housing market. If 
submarkets are independent like JJ and GS in 1998, they need to be analysed separately, with 
different levels of accessibility to each centres. If a new submarket merged into an old town 
centre like GS over JJ in 2007, the accessibility variable should be the accessibility to the centre 
of GS, not the centre of JJ.  
An appropriate subdivision of spatial housing submarkets would reveal the strong negative 
relationship between house price and the distance to the centre of a city. This has been proved 
throughout this study. 
The next two diagrams show the interactions and changes in borders between JJ and YG 
submarkets over time.  
 
 
Figure 70   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment rent in Seoul (JJ-YG) 
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Figure 71   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment price in Seoul (JJ-YG) 
In 1998, JJ is more dominant than YG. Since then, however, the dominance of the JJ 
submarket over YG decreased. With rent data, in 2007, the JJ submarket still holds its dominance 
over YG. However, with price data, YG acquired dominance over the JJ submarket. Although in 
both cases the two are not merged yet, the levels of dominance are different in 2007. As 
explained, this difference can be explained with characteristics of price data. From the analysis of 
both price and rent data, it can be said that people in the market expect the growing dominance 
of YG in near future.  
 
Figure 72   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment rent in Seoul (YG-GS) 
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Figure 73   Changes of DR and AR proxies of apartment price in Seoul (YG-GS) 
The last two diagrams show the interactions and changes in borders between YG and GS 
submarkets over time.  
The pattern is very similar to those of the JJ and GS submarkets. This is because the 
dominance of the growth of employment in the GS submarket is overwhelming both JJ and YG. 
From 2004, the two spatial submarkets are merged into one, in both price and rent data.  
Based on the analysis on interactions between spatial submarkets in Seoul, the results can be 
summarised as follows. Firstly, at least until 1998, Seoul had three spatial housing submarkets of 
JJ, YG, and GS. Each spatial submarket has its own independent peaks of price and rent cone 
until then. Thus, spatial analysis before this period should assume different spatial submarkets 
with three different town centres. Secondly, since 2004, Seoul had only one spatial submarket, as 
GS submarket merged with the other two submarkets. Since then, the spatial submarket of GS 
has dominated the structure of the whole housing market in Seoul and the centre of employment 
of GS has become the centre of employment of the whole housing market. Thus, spatial analysis 
after this period should assume one merged spatial submarket with one centre, GS. Thirdly, the 
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interaction between JJ and YG after the merging by GS after 2004 has little significance in the 
structure of the whole housing market, as both of them lie under the influence of the GS 
submarket. The merger will continue permanently as long as the employment growth of GS 
continues to exceed those of JJ and YG. Finally, as a result of the merging between spatial 
submarkets, total land rent attributes would be greater than before the complete merging in the 
Seoul. 
 
6-6   Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigated the structure of the housing market in Seoul.  
Firstly, spatial and sectoral housing submarkets in Seoul have been identified. 2 bedroom 
apartments, 3 bedroom apartments, and 4 bedroom apartments were selected as the three 
representative sectoral housing submarkets in Seoul. The identification of spatial housing 
submarkets was based on two analyses: mapping commuting patterns and the embodiment of 2-
D contours and 3-D surfaces of house price. The results of the two types of analysis showed that 
Seoul consists of a half-merged unity of three different spatial housing submarkets. The major 
three spatial housing submarkets are GangNam–SeoCho (GS), Joong–JongRo (JJ), and 
YoungDeungPo–GooRo(YG). 
Secondly, regression analysis was conducted to discover the contribution of accessibility to 
the centres of each spatial housing submarket to apartment price and to construe the structure of 
land rents in the housing market. The variance in the accessibility variable of physical distance to 
the centre of each spatial housing submarket explains around 55% of the variance in apartment 
price and 63% of the variance in apartment rent across all sectoral submarkets. 
Thirdly, the coefficients from the regression analysis were used to construct diagrammatic 
models of the structure of housing market. The changes of DR and AR proxies over a period of 
10 years from 1998 to 2007 indicate that there has been a significant increase in differential rent 
deriving probably from growing commuting costs and an imbalance between the demand and 
supply operating on the housing market across all sectoral housing submarkets. In addition, two 
different patterns of changes in DR and AR proxies over time were observed. One is an increase 
in AR along with an expansion of spatial housing submarkets, and the other is an independent 
increase in DR. The changes in DR and AR proxies also reveal that the pressure for 
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redevelopment of existing residential properties may vary between sectoral housing submarkets 
and with the location of properties.  
Fourthly, the interactions and changes between spatial submarkets were investigated. The 
findings are as follows. Firstly, at least until 1998, the city had three spatial submarkets of JJ, YG, 
and GS. Any spatial analysis before this point in Seoul should regard the city of different spatial 
submarkets with three different centres. Secondly, after 2004, Seoul had only one spatial 
submarket as the GS submarket absorbs the other two submarkets. Spatial analysis after this 
point should regard the city as one merged spatial submarket with one centre, GS. Thirdly, the 
interactions between JJ and YG after the merger by GS after 2004 had little significance in the 
structure of the whole housing market as both of them lie under the influence of the GS 
submarket. Finally, the status of merger will continue permanently as long as the employment 
growth of GS continues to exceed those of JJ and YG. As a result of the merger between spatial 
submarkets, total land rent attributes would be greater than before the complete merging in 
Seoul. 
In spite of the limits of analysis from sampling, an alternative use of price data, and 
imperfectness of regression fit analysis, there are some unique and positive contributions of this 
empirical study. First, the combined use of mapping commuting patterns and the embodiment of 
the shape of house prices was suggested as a useful solution to a complicated problem of 
subdivision of spatial housing submarkets. Second, a diagrammatic modelling based on 
regression analysis of house prices can be a useful tool for investigating the structure and 
dynamic movements of land rents in an urban area. 
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Chapter 7.   
Spatial analysis of  the housing market in Los Angeles 
 
7-1  Introduction 
 
Los Angeles county is the most populous county in the U.S. with a population of around 1 
million people in 2009.91 It includes 88 incorporated cities and a majority of unincorporated 
areas. The City of Los Angeles is the biggest city in the county and the second biggest city in the 
U.S. in terms of population. The county covers 10,518 km2 with a population density of 1,000 
people per km2. The main mode of transportation in the county is the private car, based on well 
developed grid highways across the county. Major cities in the county are the City of Los 
Angeles, Long Beach, Glendale, Santa Clarita, Pomona, Palmdale, Pasadena, Torrance, Lancaster, 
El Monte, Inglewood, Downey, West Covina, Norwalk, and Burbank, each of whose population 
is more than 100,000 people each. The most dominant type of housing in the county is the single 
family detached house, which constitutes 59.3% of the whole housing stock. Other dominant 
types of housing are the single family condominium, constituting 9.2%, and the town house , 
which constitutes 10.5% in the total housing stock in the county. 
 
7-2  Commuting patterns and centrality  
 
Commuting pattern is the most direct demonstration of centres of employment in a city. 
Having argued that a residential sphere consists of a centre of employment and the surrounding 
residential area, the directions of commuting between sub-centres in merged residential spheres 
reveal the hierarchical relationship between them. Using the commuting pattern, spatial housing 
submarkets can be identified. 
 
                                            
91 U.S. Census Bureau, 2009 population estimates 
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Figure 74   Location of Los Angeles 
7-2-1  Data & range of  analysis 
 
In the commuting trip statistics of  the US 2000 Census data, travel flows by the Census 
tract block group were used for the network analysis to understand the commuting pattern in 
Los Angeles county. The commuting data are acquired from the U.S. Department of  
Transportation92, where the data of  Census Transportation Planning Products 2000 is provided. 
All of  the commuting data for Los Angeles county is extracted from the commuting data of  LA-
Riverside-Orange counties. A total 399,882 flows from 9,872 residences to 6,266 work places are 
abstracted from the raw data. As the unit of  tract blocks is too small compared to the unit of  
origin-destination data of  London and Seoul, the tract data is set to the unit of  commuting data. 
The size of  tract blocks is similar to the size of  wards in London. The most similar units of  
administrative area to the local authorities in London and Seoul are the zip code areas in Los 
Angeles. However, commuting data organised by zip code areas is not available. A zip code area 
can include around twenty tract blocks. With the unit of  tracts, there are a total of  286,539 flows 
from 3,247 tracts. As a result, a total of  21606 pairs of  origin-destination data were created. For 
a simple visualisation, three thresholds of  number of  trips are used. There are 1517 pairs of  
origin-destination commutes where the trip exceeds 90, comprised of  5.76% of  the total trips. 
There are 543 pairs where the trip exceeds 130 comprised of  2.87% of  the total trips, and there 
                                            
92 www.dot.gov 
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are 201 pairs where the trip exceeds 180 comprised of  1.43% of  the total trips. The details are in 
the following table 18.  
 
Table 18   The number of commuting trips in Los Angeles 
Threshold 
Number of pairs of 
origin - destination Total number of trip Percentage (%) 
Total 286,539 3,525,762 100 
90 1,517 
 
 
203,129 5.76 
130 543 101,229 2.87 
180 201 50,327 1.43 
 
 
Source: US Census 2000 
 
7-2-2   Commuting patterns & centrality by local authority 
 
In the following maps of  commuting patterns, each vertex represents the centroid of  each 
local authority, the size of  each vertex represents the number of  inflows of  commuting to each 
vertex, and the arrows show the directions and the volume of  commuting trips. A network 
analysis software, Pajek, is used for mapping commuting pattern in the same way as for the 
London data. 
The three maps of  commuting pattern organised by thresholds of  trips reveal similar 
structures of  commuting in Los Angeles county regardless of  the thresholds. According to the 
maps of  commuting patterns in Los Angeles county there are more than 15 centres of  
commuting inflow indicating the polycentric nature of  the county. Among the multiple centres, 
the major centres of  commuting flows in the central area are Century City–UCLA–Beverly Hills, 
El Segundo-LAX, Torrance, LA downtown, and Pasadena. Other than these, Vernon-
Commerce–East LA in the east central, Industry in the east, Long Beach and Long Beach 
Airport in the south, Santa Monica in the west, and Film industry centres such as the Warner and 
Universal headquarters in the north also attract inflow commuting from neighbouring areas 
forming clear centres of  employment. In the northern area furthest to the area, Santa Clarita and 
Palmdale are two clear centres of  commuting. This structure of  commuting pattern needs to be 
double-checked with the shapes of  house prices in the area in order to subdivide it into spatial 
housing submarkets.  
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Figure 75   Commuting pattern and centrality by tract block in Los Angeles (over 90 trip) 
 
Figure 76   Commuting pattern and centrality by tract block in Los Angeles (over 130 trip) 
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Figure 77   Commuting pattern and centrality by tract block in Los Angeles (over 180 trip) 
 
7-3  Embodiment of  house price 
 
Understanding the shape of a housing market in terms of house prices is a crucial process in 
spatial analysis of a city. It not only enables an overview of the basic structure of house prices of 
a city but also gives important information on spatial housing submarkets in the city. In this 
section, the house prices in Los Angeles are embodied to more detailed and readable shapes 
 
7-3-1  Data & range of  analysis 
 
The data used for the following analysis is the property information of  all 2,363,125 parcels 
of  land in Los Angeles county.93 It was collected by the county for various purposes including 
taxation. It includes 28 categories of  information of  all 2,363,125 parcels of  land including 
parcel size, addresses, property types, the information on houses such as the number of  
bedrooms, the number of  bathrooms, land use, the year of  build, transactions, and current value 
                                            
93 Source: Southern California Association of Governments 
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of  land and improvements. The most dominant type of  housing stock in Los Angeles county is 
the single family detached house, which forms almost 60% of  the total housing stock in the 
county.  
Two dominant types of  housing were selected for the following analysis. The first type of  
housing is a single family detached house without a pool which is 49.2% of  total housing stock 
in Los Angeles. Hereafter, the housing submarket of  a single family detached is taken to mean a 
single family detached house without a pool. The second type of  housing is the single family 
condominium which is 9.16% of  the total housing stock. In the first type of  housing, the single 
family detached with 1 unit, 3 bedrooms, and 2 bathrooms is the most dominant group in the 
stock.94 In the second type of  housing, the single family condominium with 1 unit, 2 bedrooms, 
and 2 bathrooms is the most dominant group in the stock.95 In the following analysis, hereafter, 
„detached house‟ is taken to mean a single family detached house without pools with 1 unit, 3 
bedrooms and 2 bathrooms, and „condominium‟ is taken to mean a single family condominium 
with 1 unit, and has 2 bedrooms and 2 bathrooms. 
 
Table 19   Types of housing in Los Angeles 
Use Code Frequency Percent Type of housing 
    0100 1,158,129 49.2 Single family detached 
0101 242,507 10.3 Single family detached with pools 
010C 215,623 9.16 Single family condominium 
0200 102,956 4.37 2 units town house 
010V 98,674 4.19 Vacant single family detached 
010D 59,841 2.54 Planned unit development 
0500 59,393 2.52 5 units town house 
580V 48,923 2.08 Desert 
010E 47,109 2 Condo conversion 
0300 35,899 1.53 3 units town house 
0400 32,555 1.38 4 units town house 
The rest 252,262 10.73 
 
Total 2,353,871 100 
 
    
                                            
94 See appendix 7-1 
95 See appendix 7-1 
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Compared to sample data of  median base in London and Seoul, the data of  Los Angeles 
includes all properties. To control the extreme fringes of  the property data, only the data of  
properties whose floor area and site area lies within the inter-quartile range of  the whole data are 
used. In this way, the lower 25% and the upper 25% in terms of  floor area and site area are 
excluded from the following analysis. 
Among the 352 local districts in Los Angeles county, some districts are also excluded from 
the analysis of  embodying house price shape and regression. It is because the properties in the 
districts are regionally peripheral but too expensive due to natural privileges such as mountains 
and coasts. The excluded districts are Malibu, Pacific Highlands, Agoura, Calabasas, Westlake 
Village, Topanga, and Woodland Hills. In addition to this, all unincorporated areas which are 
mainly located in northern half  of  the county of  the less-populated desert are also excluded in 
the following analysis.96 
As the parcel data does not include location data, the location data for each parcel has to be 
extracted from an ArcGIS file of  the whole map of  the parcels in Los Angeles county and 
matched to the parcel file using the unique identity numbers of  each parcel. A total of  1,045,359 
pieces of  data for single family detached houses and 198,214 pieces of  data for single family 
condominiums were used for the analysis. For the time series analysis, price data was used from 4 
different points of  time 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 - for a 10 year period from 1998 to 2007. As 
the information under the category „year‟ in the data indicates the year when ownership changed, 
the analysis at different points of  time has different sets of  properties. Structural data for 
properties such as the number of  bedrooms, the number of  bathrooms, the floor area, and 
housing type and other data such as addresses, locations, and past transaction prices were all 
included in the data. 
 
7-3-2   2-D contour & 3-D surface of  house price and rent 
 
In order to figure out the shape of  house prices in Los Angeles county, house price data for 
each property type with location data waw put into a software, „Surfer‟, in the same way as for 
the London data. It produced 2-D contours and 3-D surfaces of  house price based on the 
method of  interpolation, which estimates price values in unknown locations using known price 
                                            
96 The full list of  zips which are excluded in this analysis are 90049, 90077, 90263, 90265, 90272, 90290, 
90402, 90704, 91301, 91302, 91361, 91362, 91372, 91384, 91390, 93243, 93510, 93532, 93536, 93543, 
93544, 93551, 93553, 93563, and 93586. 
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data in neighbouring location. A data set of  longitude, latitude,97 and price of  properties were 
used for this process. The unit of  price data is set to 10 dollars per m2 which is the same as other 
two cities in order to control the variance from floor area and the exchange rate. The calculation 
of  prices of  properties in the Los Angeles parcel data consists of  price of  land and price of  
improvements by year when the ownership of  each property is changed. The two levels of  price 
data of  land and improvements are added first, and are then divided by floor area of  each 
house.98 The variable of  price used in the following analysis is based on this calculation. 
 
 
 
Figure 78   Location of samples houses in Los Angeles  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
                                            
97 Projected coordinate system (PCS) is used for identifying location of  each property in analysis of  Los 
Angeles. As the whole parcel data is based on the PCS, other location data in geographic coordinate 
system (GCS) are all transformed to PCS hereafter. 
98 It normally means the value of  improvement in house building. As price data in the other two cities of  
London and Seoul includes the price of  whole property of  land and building, price of  property in Los 
Angeles is also calculated by adding the value of  land and the value of  improvement. 
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Figure 79   2D contours of house prices in Los Angeles (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 80   3D shapes of house prices in Los Angeles (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 from the top) 
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The shape of the whole housing market in Los Angeles county looks quite different from 
those of London and Seoul. It has multiple peaks of similar sizes rather than a few dominant 
peaks. Amongst them, some of the most prominent peaks are located along with the west coastal 
areas to the Pacific ocean such as Santa Monica, Marina del Rey, El Segundo next to Manhattan 
Beach, and Torrance. In the City of Los Angeles, Century city-UCLA-Beverly Hills has 
prominent peaks and the peak in LA downtown99 is also distinguishable. The general dominance 
of major centres is consistent with the result of the commuting pattern. Other than these, there 
are prominent peaks in Long Beach and Pasadena.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 81   Location of samples condominiums in Los Angeles  
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
                                            
99 It covers large area including Vernon, East Los Angeles, and USC. 
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Figure 82   2D contours of condominium prices in Los Angeles (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 83   3D shapes of condominium prices in Los Angeles (10 $/m
2
) 
(1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 from the top) 
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This data may look like a typical polycentric city; considering, however, that the scale of  the 
county (10,518 km2) is as big as Seoul National Capital Area (11,745 km2) and the scale of  the 
City of  Los Angeles (1,290 km2) alone is as big as Greater London (1,572 km2), it is difficult to 
assume that Los Angeles county is a typical polycentric city. A close observation reveals that the 
main central area of  Los Angeles county has a small number of  merged spheres, whereas the 
outer areas have numerous independent peaks. It implies that multiple centres and the 
surrounding residential spheres have merged into and formed a few clusters of  employment and 
residential spheres in the populous area in Los Angeles county. 
The most distinguishable peaks in the county are Century city–UCLA–Beverly Hills, LA 
downtown, and El Segundo-LAX. Two peaks of  Santa Clarita and Palmdale in the northern area 
are also prominent but they are located in the peripheral area of  the county. Other than these 
peaks, the rest of  the peaks are not significant. The three main peaks in the central area of  Los 
Angeles county will be the main focus of  the following analysis. Although the shapes of  house 
prices are consistent with the commuting pattern in the previous section, there are slight 
differences in location of  centres in terms of  the shape of  house price and the commuting 
inflow. Firstly, in El Segundo-LAX, and Torrance, which are close to the coast, the centres in 
terms of  house price in the areas are closer to the coasts than to the centres in terms of  
commuting inflow. In Vernon-Commerce-East LA and Industry where industrial complexes are 
located nearby, the peaks of  house price are nearly negligible in spite of  their strong position as 
the centres of  commuting inflow. This can be interpreted as demonstrating that amenity factors, 
such as being closer to coasts or industrial complexes, are reflected in the house price. 
 
7-4  Subdivision of  the housing market 
 
The combined use of  commuting patterns and house price surfaces identifies the following 
major spatial housing submarkets in Los Angeles: 1) Century City-UCLA-Beverly Hills, 2) Santa 
Monica, 3) LA downtown, 4) Pasadena, 5) El Segundo–LAX, 6) Torrance, 7) Long Beach-San 
Pedro, 8) Industry, 9) Warner Centre, 10) Chatsworth, 11) Santa Clarita, and 12) Palmdale. 
Amongst these spatial housing submarkets, three spatial housing submarkets in the central Los 
Angeles will be analysed further. The three major spatial housing submarkets selected for further 
analysis are Century City-UCLA-Beverly Hills, LA downtown, and El Segundo-LAX. 
For the analysis of  sectoral housing submarkets, this study explores two types of  sectoral 
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housing submarkets: the single family detached house and the single family condominium. 
By sectoral and spatial housing submarkets, a total of  6 housing submarkets are used in the 
following analysis. They are: single family detached houses in the Century City-UCLA-Beverly 
Hills [CU] submarket, the LA downtown [LD] submarket, and the El Segundo-LAX [EL] 
submarket, and single family condominiums in the Century City–UCLA-Beverly Hills [CU] 
submarket, the LA downtown [LD] submarket, and the El Segundo-LAX [EL] submarket.    
The geographical boundaries of the three spatial housing submarkets are a 10 km radius for 
CU, a 13 km radius for LD, and a 15 km radius for EL. The probable reason why the boundaries 
are smaller than those in London and Seoul is the fact that these spatial submarkets are 
surrounded by other spatial submarkets. This is different from the cases of London and Seoul, 
where spatial submarkets sometimes extend to and meet agricultural land. 
 
Table 20   Major spatial submarkets in Los Angeles 
Spatial housing submarket Zips 
CU 
90016 90019 90024 90025 90034 90035 90036 90046 90048 90049 
90064 90066 90067 90069 90077 90210 90211 90212 90230 90232  
LD 
90001 90002 90003 90004 90005 90006 90007 90010 90011 90012 
90013 90014 90015 90017 90018 90020 90021 90023 90026 90029 
90031 90032 90033 90037 90039 90057 90058 90062 90063 90065 
90071 90255 90270 
EL 
90008 90043 90044 90045 90047 90056 90061 90245 90247 90248 
90249 90250 90254 90260 90266 90278 90293 90301 90302 90303 
90304 90305 90504 
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Figure 84   Major spatial submarkets in Los Angeles 
 
 
Figure 85   Major spatial submarkets by zip area in Los Angeles 
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7-5  The spatial structure of  the housing market 
 
7-5-1  Data & range of  analysis 
 
The first step of the analysis on the spatial structure of housing market is to set locations as 
the centres of each spatial housing submarket. The set centres of the three major spatial housing 
submarkets in Los Angeles are based on the centrality analysis from the network analysis, 
commuting patterns, and employment data.  
 
Table 21   Commuting inflow to top 10 employment centres in Los Angeles 
 
Centre of employment Tract ID Inflow trip 
1 LA downtown 
207710 207400 207300 226000 207500 
207900 207100 
194577 
2 Century City - UCLA - Beverly Hills 267100 265301 265510 700800 700400 115267 
3 Vernon - Commerce - East LA
100
 532400 206050 532303 532304 203300 113726 
4 El Segundo - LAX 620003 620501 278000 103697 
5 Torrance 651101 650901 650400 53391 
6 Long Beach 573500 576000 44838 
7 Industry 408202 408211 37798 
8 Pasadena 461900 463600 32768 
9 Santa Monica 701900 701801 32741 
10 Warner Center 137102 134902 29953 
 
Based on the comprehensive application of the three approaches, the location of centre of 
CU spatial housing submarket is set to the central point between Century City block, UCLA, and 
Beverly Hills as they locate closely each other with distances of less than 2 km. The location of 
the centre of LD spatial housing submarket is set to the centre point of LA downtown block, 
                                            
100 Although this area of  blocks has the third largest commuting inflow, it has been excluded from the 
following analysis. This is because this area incorporates various other factors which influence the price of  
housing markets such as ethnicity. Related research (E. Soja et al. 1983) indicates that this area has the 
largest proportion of  Black and Hispanic inhabitants. The influence of  this factor can also be identified in 
the shape of  house price, which has weak peaks, despite the fact that this area is advantageous in terms of  
commuting. This inconsistency between advantage in commuting and house price is largely due to the 
existence of  the external factors. Subsequently, this inconsistency exposes this area to the massive pressure 
for redevelopment in the name of  gentrification. 
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and the location of the centre of EL spatial housing submarket is set to the centre point of El 
Segundo block.101 
 
Figure 86   Major centres of employment in Los Angeles 
The three centre points will be assumed to be the centres of the three spatial housing 
submarkets. As the main mode of transportation for commuting in Los Angeles is private car 
use,102 the distance based on the real road system can be a relevant measure representing 
accessibility to centres. For simplicity, the physical linear distances from each location of 
property to the centres of each housing submarket are used as a measure of accessibility in the 
following analysis. 
 
7-5-2   Regression analysis of  price on accessibility by submarket 
 
A regression analysis of house price on the distances to the centres of each spatial housing 
submarket has been conducted in this section. Using this process, the contribution of 
accessibility to the centres of Los Angeles to the price of houses can be examined. In addition, 
the coefficients of gradients and constants can be applied to analyse the structure of land rents in 
an urban context. 
                                            
101 See appendix 7-6 
102 See appendix 7-5 
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The regression analysis is conducted by anlaysing the price of houses on the distances to the 
centres of each spatial housing submarket. The analysis is conducted in all three spatial housing 
submarkets (CU, LD and EL) and the two sectoral housing submarkets: 3 bedroom detached 
house and 2 bedroom condominium. As the data of house price in the past is based on the 
transaction price, the number of properties used in each analysis varies over time. In each year 
around 100 detached houses and around 50 condominiums for CU submarket are used for the 
following analysis. Around 80 of detached houses and around 40 of condominiums from the LD 
submarket are used. Around 200 of detached houses and around 60 of condominiums from the 
EL submarkets are used. Scatter plots, regression fit lines, and 95% confidence intervals of the 
three main spatial housing submarkets in Los Angeles county have been drawn at 3 years 
intervals from 1998 to 2007 in the following diagrams. The statistical results from the regression 
of R2, coefficients, t-values, and 5th percentiles can be seen on the tables. 
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Figure 87   Scatter plot of house price on distance to employment centre in CU of Los Angeles 
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 88   Scatter plot of house price on distance to employment centre in LD of Los Angeles 
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 89   Scatter plot of house price on distance to employment centre in EL of Los Angeles 
(1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 90   Scatter plot of condominium price on distance to employment centre in CU of Los 
Angeles (1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 91   Scatter plot of condominium price on distance to employment centre in LD of Los 
Angeles (1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
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Figure 92   Scatter plot of condominium price on distance to employment centre in EL of Los 
Angeles
103
 (1998 top left, 2001 top right, 2004 bottom left, 2007 bottom right) 
 
Several points can be observed from these diagrams. 
Firstly, the expected negative linear correlation between house price and the distance to the 
city centre has been found across all housing submarkets over time even in the typically 
polycentric city of Los Angeles. Secondly, the changes of gradients in scatter plots over time 
show a similar pattern of changes by sectoral and spatial housing submarket. Thirdly, the 
gradients of the fitting line get steeper over time. Finally, the variance in prices has increased 
over time across all housing submarkets. These features are the same as the result from the 
previous two cities. However there are some differences in these diagrams. 
Secondly, the boundaries in these diagrams have little substantiality as the ranges of the 
three spatial housing submarkets in Los Angeles are limited by other surrounding spatial 
submarkets. For example, CU spatial submarket is surrounded by Santa Monica in the west, 
LAX in the south, LA downtown in the east, and Warner centre and Van Nuys in the north. LD 
spatial submarket is also surrounded by CU in the west, Vernon in the south, Pasadena in the 
east, and Universal and Burbank in the north. This pattern is different from cases of London and 
Seoul where boundaries are met with non-urban land use, for example green belt or agricultural 
land. Secondly, the properties of the condominiums submarket show a particular pattern of 
clusters. As the data set is based on the change in ownership, the presence of vertical clusters of 
properties in the scatter diagram is likely to portray the initial sales of properties in one newly 
                                            
103 The reason why the scatters concentrate in few points in the diagrams is related to the characteristics 
of the data of transaction prices in the past which is based in the year when the ownership of each 
property is changed. When new condominiums are built and sold in units, multiple changes of ownership 
can be made in one place, which make the scatters concentrated in few locations. 
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built condominium or development. In regression, this existence of clusters of points in two 
places can falsely lead to a strong linear correlation between variables, forming a line between the 
two places with an increased value of R2. In spite of this fact, the following result of regression 
with these variables is reliable because multiple clusters are forming linear relationship. 
Results from the regression analysis of house prices on the distance to the centres of each 
spatial housing submarket by sectoral housing submarket are summarised in the following tables. 
 
Table 22   OLS Regression of house price on distance to employment centre in Los Angeles 
Submarket year Sample size R
2
 Coefficient (dist) Coefficient (constant) 
5
th
 
centile* 
CU 
1998 97 0.2982 -21.0 (-6.35) *** 327 (19.28)*** 94 
2001 96 0.0994 -13.7 (-3.22) ** 382 (17.14) *** 110 
2004 125 0.1548 -24.9 (-4.75) *** 591 (21.17) *** 149 
2007 106 0.1464 -24.5 (-4.22) *** 781 (24.97) *** 270 
LD 
1998 53 0.0721 -2.7 (-1.99) * 136 (13.03) *** 94 
2001 66 0.0185 -3.0 (-1.1) 167 (8.07) *** 110 
2004 122 0.1166 -14.6 (-3.98) *** 331 (11.18) *** 149 
2007 98 0.1792 -21.4 (-4.58) *** 570 (15.57) *** 270 
EL 
1998 192 0.1614 -8.0 (-6.05) *** 207 (20.29) *** 94 
2001 188 0.0944 -8.7 (-4.40) *** 255 (16.97) *** 110 
2004 230 0.1596 -18.3 (-6.58) *** 434 (20.03) *** 149 
2007 256 0.1596 -17.4 (-6.94) *** 566 (28.24) *** 270 
Values in parentheses are t-values 
* significant at 5%  ** significant at 1%  *** significant at 0.1% 
* 5th percentiles are based on normal distribution in the whole market of Seoul 
 
The simple regression shows several characteristic points. 
Firstly, the variation in the distances to the centres explains about 14% of the variation of 
price in the group of single family detached houses and about 30% of the variation of price in 
the group of single family condominium in each housing submarket. In general, the explanatory 
power of accessibility to the centre is weaker than in London and Seoul. This is partly due to the 
allowance of the wider variance of floor area in the Los Angeles data than in the other two cities. 
The existence of other factors, such as ethnic grouping by area, might also partly contribute to 
the weakness of correlation in the case of Los Angeles. The reason that the distance factor is 
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greater for condominiums than houses is shown by the clustered pattern of properties in the 
scatter diagram. .At the same time, it might also mean that the demand for condominiums is 
more likely to be affected by the desires of real commuters to the town centres than the demand 
for houses, which was also the case in flats and houses in London. 
 
Table 23   OLS Regression of condominium price on distance to employment centre in Los 
Angeles 
Submarket year Sample size R
2
 Coefficient (dist) Coefficient (constant) 
5
th
 
centile* 
CU 
1998 37 0.6437 -8.15 (-7.95) *** 190 (30.59) *** 84 
2001 33 0.5627 -11.1 (-6.32) *** 269 (24.33) *** 112 
2004 67 0.2767 -16.9 (-4.99) *** 455 (23.01) *** 158 
2007 43 0.5816 -28.1 (-7.55) *** 674 (27.02) *** 326 
LD 
1998 10 0.1651 -5.0 (-1.26) 138 (7.88) *** 84 
2001 28 0.2204 -7.6 (-2.71) ** 202 (17.27) *** 112 
2004 56 0.1631 -14.8 (-2.69) ** 372 (13.73) *** 158 
2007 43 0.4203 -24.8 (-5.45) *** 603 (26.60) *** 326 
EL 
1998 33 0.1740 -12.1 (-2.56) ** 215 (6.55) *** 84 
2001 51 0.0701 -8.4 (-1.92) * 238 (8.00) *** 112 
2004 68 0.0778 -17.6 (-2.36) ** 395 (7.64) *** 158 
2007 75 0.2133 -23.1 (-4.45) *** 571 (15.74) *** 326 
Values in parentheses are t-values 
* significant at 6%  ** significant at 2%  *** significant at 0.1% 
* 5th percentiles are based on normal distribution in the whole market of Seoul 
 
Secondly, sectoral submarkets have similar levels of gradients in each base year of 1998, 
2001, 2004 and 2007. Except for the gradients of the CU house submarket, the magnitudes of 
gradients have doubled in 10 years from around - 10 to - 20. 
The gradients have increased in a similar pattern over the years across all submarkets. The 
changes from 2001 to 2004 are the most significant while changes from 1998 to 2001 and from 
2004 to 2007 are not that significant. The coefficients of constants have similar values and a 
similar pattern of changes over time across all housing submarkets except for in the CU house 
submarket. Finally, the changing pattern of 5th percentiles shows the same trend over time. The 
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5th percentiles gradually increased from 1998 to 2004 and soared to almost double in the period 
2004 to 2007. 
These characteristics of changes can be interpreted with the understanding of the dynamic 
changes of land rents in the following section. 
 
7-5-3  Dynamic changes of  differential rent & absolute rent 
 
This section uses the coefficients of the regression for further analysis as they can be used to 
figure out the dynamic changes of land rents in housing market. Firstly, the coefficients of 
accessibility can be understood as the contribution of differential rent to the variance of house 
price. Secondly, the constants can be understood as the height of the base of the cone of house 
price. Thirdly, the 5th percentiles can be regarded as the minimum level of house price in a given 
time in a certain sectoral housing submarket, which reflects the level of absolute rent in each 
sectoral housing submarket. The boundary of a spatial housing submarket then can be deduced 
from the combined use of coefficients of accessibility to the centre, constants and 5th percentiles 
of house price. 
Based on these data of coefficients and 5th percentiles, structure of price of detached house 
and condominium in Los Angeles over time has been drawn. Residuals from sampling, extreme 
values, and other various factors affecting actual contracts of transactions of house are all making 
it difficult to find the underlying trend of price of house. Moreover, there are many factors 
affecting house price such as the construction cost and the speculative expectation on future 
price other than capitalised land rents. The substitution effect between house buying and renting 
also makes it difficult to simply regard house price as a capitalised rent. Nevertheless, the lines of 
house price by housing submarket over time in the following diagrams can be a starting point for 
the proper analysis to reveal the structure and dynamic movements of land rents in urban area. 
Forsimplicity, accessibility factor in house price which reflects differential rent will be called DR 
proxy and the 5th percentile of house price which reflects absolute rent will be called AR proxy 
hereafter. 
These 6 diagrams show changes in DR and AR proxies over time by sectoral housing 
submarkets of single family houses and single family condominiums and by the spatial housing 
submarkets of CU, LD, and EL in Los Angeles. These diagrams of changes in the price of 
detached houses and condominiums over time imply various points. 
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Figure 93   Changes of DR and AR proxies of property price in Los Angeles (CU) 
 
 
 
Figure 94   Changes of DR and AR proxies of property price in Los Angeles (LD) 
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Figure 95   Changes of DR and AR proxies of property price in Los Angeles (EL) 
Firstly, the gradients of DR proxies in all sectoral and spatial housing submarkets show a 
similar pattern of changes, except for the CU house submarket. There were no significant 
changes of gradients between 1998 and 2001, which implies that there were no significant 
changes in DR proxies such as commuting costs. However, the changes from 2001 to 2004 show 
a significant change as magnitudes of gradients increase. The gradients remain their steepness 
from 2004 to 2007. As DR reflects the advantage inherent in living closer to the centre of 
employment, this pattern of changes can be interpreted to show that the commuting costs have 
been increased or that the benefits to be gained from living closer to the central area has 
increased. For the same period, the international price of crude oil has started to significantly 
increase from 2002.104 This fact may explain the changes of DR proxies of house prices in Los 
Angeles during the period. 
 
                                            
104 Source: IMF, „monthly primary commodity prices‟ 
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Table 24   Changes of AR proxies of property price in Los Angeles 
Year 
Detached house Condominium 
AR proxy change AR proxy change 
1998 94 
 
84 
 
2001 110 + 17 % 112 + 33 % 
2004 149 + 35 % 158 + 41 % 
2007 270 + 81 % 326 + 106 % 
 
Secondly, the levels of AR proxies significantly increased with a similar pattern of changes 
across all submarkets. The level of AR proxies in detached houses tripled and the level of AR 
proxies in condominium quadrupled over 10 years. These increases are far greater than the 
increase of 50% in Seoul and 100% in London for the same period. The increase in the AR 
proxies tends to accelerate over time. The rate of change in AR proxies of detached houses and 
condominiums from 2004 to 2007 reached 81% and 106% respectively. Given that the actual 
demand for domestic properties did not increase as abruptly as this figure of 300% or 400% over 
10 years, it can be deduced that these increases of 5th percentiles are mainly based on speculative 
motivation rather than an increase in actual AR proxies. This can be crosschecked with the 
collapse of property prices after the crisis caused by the subprime mortgage market after 2008. 
The availability of rent data in Seoul enables a comparison of the changes in 5th percentiles of 
price and those of rent so that it can be identified whether the changes in 5th percentiles are due 
to AR proxies by actual demand or mere speculation. This identification is not available in the 
case of Los Angeles, due to the absence of rental data. However, the increased price of 
properties can also force AR proxies in rent to increase. If house prices are so high that the 
demand of the sales market transfer to the demand for the rental market, AR proxies can go up 
by the increase of demand in the rental market. In this case, it would be inappropriate to assume 
that price increase by speculation has nothing to do with increase in AR proxies in land rent. 
Thirdly, the pressure for redevelopment varies by sectoral housing submarkets and locations. 
The AR proxies of the sectoral housing submarkets have changed together in similar patterns. 
The AR proxies for detached houses are slightly greater than that of condominiums in 1998. The 
AR proxies of the two sectoral housing submarkets reached a similar level as in 2001. From 2001 
until 2007, the AR proxies for condominiums outstrip those of detached houses. This can be 
interpreted as demonstrating that the relative preference for condominiums exceeds that for 
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detached houses since 2001, which implies that the market recognises condominiums as more 
profitable than detached houses in general. If other conditions remained equal, space has 
therefore been more likely to be developed into condominiums than detached houses in Los 
Angeles since 2001. In addition to this, as the slopes of DR proxies get steeper over time, the 
central areas have experienced a greater and increasing pressure for redevelopment compared to 
the outer areas. The pressure on space for redevelopment keeps changing by time.  
The diagrams of DR and AR proxies can be applied to investigate the interaction between 
and changes in borders between spatial housing submarkets. The following four diagrams show 
the interactions and changes in the borders between 1) CU and LD submarket, 2) EL and CU 
submarket, 3) EL and LD submarket in terms of house price. The first two diagrams are those 
between the CU and LD submarkets. 
 
 
 
Figure 96   Changes of DR and AR proxies of house price in Los Angeles (CU-LD) 
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Figure 97   Changes of DR and AR proxies of condominium price in Los Angeles (CU-LD) 
Two simple features can be observed in these diagrams. Firstly, the borders between the CU 
and LD submarkets show little change over time. Allowing for the fact that price data includes 
speculative factors, the small amount of change between borders implies that there have been 
similar rates of growth of employment in each spatial housing submarket. This is different from 
the case of Seoul, where the spatial submarket with a faster rate of employment growth merges 
into neighbouring spatial submarkets with slower rates of employment growth. The CU and LD 
submarkets maintain their independence in terms of spatial boundaries. 
Secondly, the CU submarket shows slightly more dominance than LD submarket. 
Considering the fact that the LD submarket has almost double the amount of commuting inflow 
than the CU submarket105, this dominance of CU over LD seems to be opposite to the expected 
result. There are various factors underlying this seemingly unexpected dominance. Firstly, a 
desire to avoid living near a huge office block or industrial work can be one reason. The CU 
spatial submarket incorporates areas of UCLA, Century city, and Beverly Hills. Employment in 
the CU spatial submarket is mainly based on the university, local authorities like the City of Los 
Angeles, and retail. On the other hand, the LD spatial submarket incorporates the main office 
blocks of LA downtown, whose employment is mainly based on large offices and industrial 
works adjacent to the office blocks. Second, the different composition of residence in terms of 
                                            
105 See table 21 
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ethnicity can be another reason. In terms of ethnicity of residents, the CU submarket is mostly 
occupied by Anglo-Whites whereas the LD submarket has a considerable proportion of Black 
and Hispanic residents.106 Although the properties have same structural features when organised 
by sectoral submarkets, there might be other factors of social features, like ethnic grouping, 
which can subdivide these sectoral submarkets further. These two factors may lead to the reverse 
dominance of CU over LD. These factors are magnified in this analysis, as price data reflects 
speculative aspect than real demand for residence. 
The next two diagrams are the interactions and changes of the borders between the EL and 
CU submarkets. 
 
Figure 98   Changes of DR and AR proxies of house price in Los Angeles (EL-CU) 
 
                                            
106 Edward Soja et al. 1983 
  
213 
 
 
Figure 99   Changes of DR and AR proxies of condominium price in Los Angeles (EL-CU) 
Two simple features can be observed from these diagrams as well. Firstly, the borders 
between EL and CU submarkets show little change over time.107 This also implies that there 
have been similar rates of growth of employment in each spatial housing submarket. It can be 
said that the EL and CU submarkets maintain their independence in terms of spatial boundary. 
Secondly, the CU submarket shows slightly more dominance than the EL submarket in the 
same way as the relationship between CU and LD. The commuting inflow of the employment 
centres of the two spatial submarkets are similar as Century City-UCLA-Beverly Hills has around 
115,000 trips and El Segundo-LAX has 104,000 trips per day. The ethnic compositions are also 
similar as Anglo-White is dominant in both spatial submarkets.108 One possible difference 
between the two spatial submarkets is the environmental condition. The EL submarket is based 
on the biggest international airport in the Western US. El Segundo is also adjacent to the largest 
sewage treatment facilities and oil refinery facilities in Los Angeles. These negative externalities 
of environmental factors might influence the dominance of CU over the EL spatial housing 
submarket in terms of house price. 
                                            
107 Gradient of single family detached house in CU submarket in 1998 is out of general tendency 
compared to others. It also affects the border between CU and other spatial submarkets. The borders of 
CU to other spatial submarkets in 1998 are assumed to be insignificant here. 
108 Edward Soja et al., 1983 
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Another interesting feature is that the dominance of CU over EL or LD is greater in 
detached houses than in condominiums. This can be interpreted as showing that the detached 
house market is more sensitive to the factors of social and environmental features of 
neighbourhood than the condominium market. 
The next two diagrams show the interactions and changes of the borders between the EL 
and LD submarket. 
 
 
Figure 100   Changes of DR and AR proxies of house price in Los Angeles (EL-LD) 
 
Figure 101   Changes of DR and AR proxies of condominium price in Los Angeles (EL-LD) 
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The independence between spatial housing submarkets is also observed in the EL and LD 
submarket. The little change in borders between the two and their independence implies that 
there have been similar rates of employment growth in each spatial housing submarket.  
Given the greater commuting inflow to the centre of the LD submarket109, the slight 
dominance of EL over LD seems to be contrary to expectations. As explained, both of the two 
spatial housing submarkets have negative externalities from environment and ethnic 
concentration. Based on the results of the analysis, it can be construed that in Los Angeles, 
ethnic concentration has a greater impact on the price of the housing market than environmental 
factors. More sensitive reflection of the negative externalities on the price of detached houses 
than on the price of condominiums is also found in the result of analysis between the EL and 
LD submarket. 
 
7-6  Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigated the structure of housing market in Los Angeles. Firstly, spatial and 
sectoral housing submarkets in Los Angeles were identified. 3 bedroom detached houses and 2 
bedroom condominiums were selected as two representative sectoral housing submarkets in Los 
Angeles. The identification of spatial housing submarkets is based on two pieces of analysis: the 
mapping of commuting patterns and the embodiment of 2-D contours and 3-D surface shapes 
of house prices. Results of the analysis showed that Los Angeles is a polycentric city with 
multiple independent spatial housing submarkets. More than 15 areas, including Santa Monica, 
El Segundo-LAX, Torrance, Century City-UCLA-Beverly Hills, LA downtown, Long Beach, 
Pasadena, Santa Clarita, and Palmdale have their own distinct spatial housing submarkets. In this 
study, the three major spatial submarkets of Century City-UCLA-Beverly Hills [CU], LA 
downtown [LD], and El Segundo-LAX [EL] in the central area of Los Angeles county are 
analysed. 
Secondly, a regression analysis was conducted to discover the contribution of accessibility to 
the centre of employment to house prices and the structure of land rents in housing market. The 
variable of accessibility as physical distance shows an explanatory power of around 14% in the 
detached house market and 30% in the condominium market. The gradients and 5th percentiles 
showed similar values and a similar pattern of changes over time. 
                                            
109 See appendix 7-3 
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Thirdly, the coefficients from the regression analysis were used to construct a diagrammatic 
model of the structure of house prices. The changes in DR and AR proxies over 10 years from 
1998 to 2007 indicates that there has been significant increase in commuting cost and imbalance 
between demand and supply of housing across sectoral housing submarkets. In addition, two 
different patterns of changes in DR and AR proxies over time were observed. One is the 
increase in AR along with expansion of spatial housing submarket, and the other is the increase 
in DR without expansion of the submarket. The changes in DR and AR proxies also reveal that 
pressures of redevelopment of exiting residential properties may vary between sectoral housing 
submarkets and location of properties.  
Fourthly, the interactions and changes between spatial submarkets of CU, LD, and EL were 
investigated. The findings are as follows. First, each spatial submarket maintains its own 
independence as the borders between spatial submarkets show little change over time, which can 
be supported by the fact that the rates of employment growth in the three spatial submarkets 
have been similar over the period. Secondly, the dominances of the CU submarket over the LD 
and EL submarket are observed. This can be explained by the differences of the social and 
environmental features of neighbourhood by area in Los Angeles. Thirdly, the dominance of CU 
submarket over EL or LD submarket is greater in the sectoral housing submarket of detached 
houses than condominiums. This demonstrates that the detached house market is more sensitive 
to the factors of social and environmental features of neighbourhood than the condominium 
market. 
In spite of the limits of analysis from an alternative use of price data, and the imperfectness 
of regression fit in terms of explanatory power, there are some unique and positive contributions 
in this empirical study. Firstly, the combined use of mapping commuting patterns and the 
embodiment of the shape of house price is suggested as a useful solution to the complicated 
problem of the identification of spatial housing submarkets. Secondly, the method of 
diagrammatic modelling based on the regression analysis of house prices can be a useful tool for 
investigating the structure and the dynamic movements of land rents in an urban area.  
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Chapter 8.   
Conclusion 
 
8-1  The relationship between land and production 
 
This study began with the question of  the lack of  a fundamental explanation by mainstream 
neoclassical urban economics for various dynamic phenomena in the housing market, despite its 
simplicity and considerable power of  description. A desire to understand the reasons behind the 
movement of  house prices and the capital investment on the built environment has led this study 
to the root of  urban economics, land rent theory. The monopolistic power of  landed property 
and the inseparable relationship between production and land is the most fundamental basis of  
land rent. Neoclassical urban economics has lost the focus on the relationship of  land to 
production during its development for simple modelling. 
Marxian land rent theory is based on the core relationship between land and production, 
integrating land rent theories of  classical political economy. The theory encapsulates various 
issues and debates which had consistently remained unsolved among land rent theories in 
classical political economy and tries to synthesise them into one consistent theory. Nevertheless, 
the development of  Marxian land rent theory has not been significant enough to be yet an 
alternative analysis of  various urban phenomena. On top of  the incompleteness of  the theory 
itself, there have been some crucial misunderstandings of  the theory and the lack of  empirical 
analysis, which has retarded its development. It is undeniable that Marxian land rent theory at 
this stage is not a perfect tool for analysing the spatial structure or social relations of  the housing 
market. In order to develop Marxian land rent theory, as a first priority it is necessary to clarify 
misunderstandings over the nature of  the product of  the land. The theory, which was based on 
an agricultural context, then has to be renovated to be suitable for an urban context. A successful 
development of  Marxian land rent theory, without losing its emphasis on the production phase, 
can not only supplement some of  the limitations of  the neoclassical urban economists‟ approach, 
such as its descriptive and static nature, but also provide a useful framework within which to 
understand the dynamic movements of  land rent and the corresponding movements of  capital 
and their links with the process of  reproduction of  labour power. 
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8-2  Summary of  main conclusions 
 
Throughout the theoretical analysis in this thesis, there has been an attempt to establish a 
consistent land rent theory in an urban context. Initially, the product of  the land in an urban 
context was reviewed. The relationships between the four categories, differential rent, differential 
rent 2, absolute rent, and monopoly rent were then reviewed for an urban context.  
Major findings in the theoretical analysis are as follows. 
1. The product of  the land from production in a residential space is suggested to be labour 
power. The product of  the land is often misconceived as buildings. However, it is more 
appropriate to regard buildings as a type of  fixed capital in an urban context. The view on the 
product of  the land as labour power enables us to understand the relationship between the use 
of  space in residential land and the reproduction of  labour power in terms of  commuting and 
differentiated preference for groups of  housing. 
2. The difference in commuting cost due to locational advantage could be transformed to a 
part of  differential rent in a residential area. The surplus of  savings in commuting cost from the 
locational advantage of  land could be appropriated by landowners as differential rent. Thus, 
location differences in a residential area differentiate the reproduction cost of  labour power, and 
the savings in commuting cost from the reproduction of  labour power could be transformed to 
a part of  differential rent in an urban context. 
3. It has been suggested that the source of  absolute rent is a particular economic condition 
which allows lessees to earn excess profit from using land. This particular condition also benefits 
landowners, by enabling them to demand this part of  the excess profit from capitalist tenants as 
absolute rent. The technical condition of  low organic composition of  capital for the existence of  
absolute rent in a sector assumes that the rent can arise only when landed property can block 
additional capital investment on marginal land in the sector where there is excess surplus value 
over the price of  production. This should therefore satisfy the condition that the rent must come 
from the surplus value produced in the sector. However, this technical condition for an existence 
of  absolute rent may be inappropriate as the flow and mixing of  surplus value across all sectors 
can be hardly blocked by any barriers due to the ever greater mobility of  capital in the 
contemporary capitalist mode of  production. What enables the appropriation of  absolute rent 
under landed property is a favorable economic condition in a sector creating excess profit which 
makes capitalist tenants use the spaces in spite of  the rent rather than the condition of  low 
  
219 
 
organic composition of  capital in the sector. 
4. Given that the technical condition of  low organic composition of  capital is discarded in 
explaining absolute rent in an urban context and it is determined by external economic condition, 
the concepts of  monopoly rent and absolute rent seem to be indistinguishable. The possible 
yardstick which can be used to differentiate them is whether the monopolistic rent is solely 
appropriated in a particular space or commonly in a group of  similar spaces. When a particular 
space monopolises and bears monopoly rent, other capitalists are likely to launch similar spaces 
in order to share the monopolistic rent if  they can. As a consequence, this emulation would form 
a group of  spaces and the group would share a similar amount of  rent which can be seen as 
absolute rent. Capitalist developers, at the same time, may try to differentiate their land to appear 
unique to allow the sole appropriation of  monopoly rent. These two processes would result in 
various groups of  housing. 
5. The concept of  differential rent 2 is related to the differentiation and emulation of  spaces 
for monopoly rent and absolute rent, as the two processes necessarily require additional 
investment on the land. Given differential rent 2 as the gap between rents before and after the 
extra capital investment, it can be seen as a transitional and temporary category of  rent which is 
eventually transformed or consolidated to other forms of  rent. If  the investment succeeded to 
make a space unique creating monopoly price, the actual form of  differential rent 2 would be 
monopoly rent. If  it succeeded to make a space similar to existing monopoly rent-bearing land 
so that it could share in the excess profit, a combination of  absolute rent and differential rent in 
the sector where the space entered would be the actual form of  differential rent 2. 
6. As a city expands with the growth of  employment and population, it is very likely that 
ring-shaped residential belts of  different types of  housing would surround the centre of  the city. 
The fixity and durability of  buildings would result in different groups of  housing which would 
have been built in different times. Each group of  houses would have a different level of  absolute 
rent as a sector and differential rents in the sector, which makes multiple levels of  potential 
combinations of  absolute rent and differential rent in a piece of  land. This difference of  
potential land rents in one site is one of  the most dynamic impetuses of  regeneration in urban 
areas. Location differences in a group of  housing would contribute to differential rent, while 
preference differences for the reproduction of  labour power between groups of  housing would 
contribute to absolute rent. Differential rent within a residential area and absolute rent by each 
group of  houses and its associated implication to the reproduction of  labour power should be an 
  
220 
 
integral part of  the analysis of  the structure of  land rent in an urban area. 
After the introduction of  the necessity of  the division of  submarkets by residential spheres, 
which have their own employment centres and surrounding residential areas, the dynamic 
processes of  expansion-overlap-merger of  residential spheres were analysed. This interaction 
between residential spheres is vital to the understanding of  the landscape of  multiple residential 
spheres in an urban area. Commuting patterns are thus crucial to the understanding of  the 
structure and interaction between residential spheres. As the housing market is under the 
influence of  a dominant centre of  employment and the associated dominant residential sphere 
to which it belongs, the housing market needs to be divided into spatial housing submarkets 
according to the shape of  the whole housing market and the commuting pattern. As the 
dominant housing types built in successive periods of  time are different, the housing market is 
also differentiated by housing types, which form the main constituent of  structural housing 
submarkets. In addition to this, social and environmental features such as aggregation by class, 
ethnic concentration or income level, and uneven distribution of  educational, amenities, 
andother facilities distinguish certain groups of  housing. In this context, analysis of  the housing 
market should be conducted by spatial and sectoral housing submarkets. 
The dynamic movements of  land rents and the consequent movements of  capital in the 
space within a housing submarket fall into three categories: 1) when commuting costs increase 
due to some reason, such as an increase of  transportation fare following an increase of  oil price, 
or an increase in time costs due to traffic congestion; 2) when an imbalance of  supply and 
demand for a certain sectoral housing submarket is aggravated by factors such as increased 
preference or limited stock; and 3) when employment grows and a housing submarket expands 
to accommodate the housing demand from the increased labour force in the housing submarket. 
The dynamic movements of  land rents and resulting movements of  capital in the space between 
housing submarkets are also highlighted: 1) the existence of  different sectoral housing 
submarkets in a space provides the major impetus of  regeneration in the city, and 2) the changes 
in economic condition due to supply and demand in a housing submarket would perpetuate the 
movement of  levels of  land rents in other housing submarkets, which will be followed by capital 
investment in these spaces. 
The empirical analysis in this study is based on these criteria of  division in housing 
submarkets. The results from the analysis reveal the existence of  multiple levels of  land rents in 
space and dynamic movements of  land rents over time in different cities. 
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The three cities of  London, Seoul, and Los Angeles were selected for empirical analysis to 
verify the structure of  land rents and investigate dynamic changes. London is selected as a classic 
type of  a monocentric city, Seoul as a tricentric city, and Los Angeles as a polycentric city. In 
addition to this, the three cities are located in the three different regions of  Europe, Asia, and 
North America; they are all metropolitan cities with populations of  10 million each. Analysing 
the three metropolitan cities with different spatial and contextual structures can validate the 
theoretical findings on the structure and dynamics of  land rents in an urban context.  
For a subdivision of  spatial housing submarkets, two methods are adopted. Firstly, 
commuting patterns are mapped. The commuting pattern represents the spatial relationship of  
residential spheres to places of  work. Examining commuting flows focusing on their directions 
one area to others can be a crucial criterion in identifying spatial housing submarkets. A piece of  
network analysis software called Pajek produces maps which show the relationships of  multiple 
areas with commuting flows. A set of  commuting data of  origin-destination by local authority 
can thus be converted to a readable map of  commuting flows between them. Secondly, 2-D 
contours and 3-D surfaces of  house prices are examined. As the location of  houses does not 
exist in the form of  a surface but as points, embodying house prices needs to be based on the 
interpolation of  house prices in unknown points from house prices in known points. In 
constructing the house price surfaces of  a city, a method of  stratified sampling by local authority 
is used. The associated data for each sample house is then collected. In order to control the 
variance in house prices from structural characteristics, a couple of  dominant groups of  houses 
which have the same building type, the same number of  bedrooms, and the same number of  
bathrooms are selected. For the same reason, house prices are used in the form of  house price 
divided by floor area. A piece of  GIS software, Surfer, produces 2-D contours and 3-D surfaces 
of  house prices in a city to represent house price data by location. The house price surfaces 
might not be enough to establish spatial housing submarkets in a city because they are also 
affected by various factors other than accessibility to the centre of  employment, such as 
educational facilities, the environmental condition, and the neighbourhood characteristics. It 
should be double-checked with the commuting pattern. 
The major findings from the empirical analysis on the three cities of  London, Seoul, and Los 
Angeles are as follows. Firstly, spatial and sectoral housing submarkets have been identified based 
on the analysis of  housing submarkets. In London, 3 bedroom houses and 2 bedroom flats were 
selected as two representative sectoral housing submarkets. The identification of  spatial housing 
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submarkets is based on two types of  analysis: mapping commuting patterns and the embodiment 
of  2-D contours and 3-D surface cones of  house price. Results of  the two types of  analysis 
showed that London consists of  one merged spatial housing submarket centring on Westminster. 
In Seoul, 2 bedroom apartments, 3 bedroom apartments, and 4 bedroom apartments were 
selected as three representative sectoral housing submarkets. The combined use of  two methods 
of  identification of  spatial housing submarkets showed that Seoul consists of  a half-merged 
unity of  three different spatial housing submarkets. The major three spatial housing submarkets 
are GangNam-SeoCho(GS), Joong-JongRo(JJ), and YoungDeungPo-GooRo(YG). In Los 
Angeles, 3 bedroom single family detached houses and 2 bedroom single family condominiums 
were selected as two representative sectoral housing submarkets. The two methods of  
identification of  spatial housing submarkets showed that Los Angeles is a polycentric city with 
multiple independent spatial housing submarkets. Santa Monica, El Segundo next to Manhattan 
Beach, Torrance, Century city-UCLA-Beverly Hills, LA downtown, Long Beach, Pasadena, Santa 
Clarita, and Lancaster–Palmdale all have their own distinct spatial housing submarkets. In this 
study, the three major spatial submarkets of  Century City-UCLA-Beverly Hills [CU], LA 
downtown [LD], and El Segundo-LAX [EL] in the central western area of  Los Angeles county 
are analysed further. 
Secondly, regression analysis was conducted to discover the contribution of  accessibility to 
the centre from spatial housing submarkets to the level of  house price and the structure of  land 
rents in the housing market. Accessibility to the centre and house price shows a negative 
relationship, which is consistent with the traditional concept as perceived across all cities. In 
London, both of  the accessibility variables of  physical distance and commuting time show a 
similar level of  explanatory power for each sectoral housing submarket. The variance in the 
accessibility explains around 32% of  the variance in house prices and around 45% of  flat prices. 
In Seoul, the variance in the accessibility variable of  physical distance to the centre of  each 
spatial housing submarket explains around 55% of  the variance in the prices and 63% of  the 
rent levels of  apartments across all sectoral submarkets. In Los Angeles, the accessibility variable 
of  physical distance to the centre of  each spatial housing submarket has an explanatory power 
of  around 14% in the detached house market and 30% in the condominium market. The 
gradients and 5th percentiles showed similar values and similar patterns of  changes over time 
across all cities. 
Thirdly, the coefficients from the regression analysis are used to construct diagrammatic 
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models of  the structure of  house prices. The changes of  differential rent (DR) and absolute rent 
(AR) proxies over a period of  10 years (from 2000 to 2009 in London, and from 1998 to 2007 in 
Seoul and Los Angeles) are examined. The diagrams of  DR and AR proxies indicate that there 
have been significant increases in commuting costs including time cost and imbalances between 
demand and supply of  housing across sectoral housing submarkets in all three cities. Two 
different patterns of  changes in DR and AR proxies over time are observed. One is an increase 
in AR along with an expansion of  spatial housing submarkets, and the other is an increase in DR 
without an expansion in spatial submarkets. The changes in DR and AR proxies also reveal that 
the pressure for redevelopment of  existing residential properties to replace units in one 
submarket by another may vary across different sectoral housing submarkets and by the location 
of  properties. The biggest changes in land rent proxies around 2003 are the changes in the 
gradients of  the lines of  DR proxies across all submarkets in all three cities. This indicates that 
there has been an increase in commuting costs, which can be explained by an increase in oil 
prices in the period. The changes in land rent proxies in other periods are mainly due to changes 
in AR proxies which imply changes in economic conditions in the labour and housing markets, 
speculations about a future change, or changing interest rates. The degrees of  changes in AR 
proxies vary with city. Within each city, however, there are only small differences in the changes 
in AR proxies across sectoral housing submarkets. Los Angeles shows the greatest change in AR 
proxies with up to 300% increase over 10 years with 35% inflation, while London showed 100% 
with 19% inflation and Seoul showed 50% increase with 28% inflation. Given the minor change 
in interest rates over the whole period and the fact that the degree of  change is far beyond the 
probable change in the real housing market of  supply and demand, this increase of  AR proxies 
in Los Angeles seems to be mainly caused by speculation. The changes in AR proxies in Seoul 
showed 20% real increase in the sales market and 10% real increase in the rental market, which 
indicates that speculation is less influential in the rental market. 
Finally, the interactions and the changes between spatial submarkets are investigated in Seoul 
and Los Angeles, where there are distinct spatial housing submarkets. In Seoul, at least until 1998, 
the city had three spatial submarkets of  JJ, YG, and GS. Spatial analysis before this period in 
Seoul should regard the city as having comprised different spatial submarkets with three different 
centres. Since 2004, Seoul has only one spatial submarket, as the GS submarket merged with the 
other two submarkets during the period. Spatial analysis after this period should regard the city 
as one merged spatial submarket with one centre of  GS. The interaction between JJ and YG 
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after the merger by GS after 2004 have little significance in the structure of  housing market as a 
whole, as both of  them lie under the influence of  the GS submarket. The status of  the merge 
would continue permanently as long as employment growth of  GS continues to exceed those of  
JJ and YG. As a result of  the merge between spatial submarkets in Seoul, the total land rent 
attribute would rise significantly more than before the merge. In Los Angeles, each spatial 
submarket maintained its own independence as the borders between spatial submarkets appear 
to remain constant, which can be supported by the fact that the rates of  growth in employment 
in the three spatial submarkets have been similar over the entire period. It is possible to observe 
the dominance of  the CU submarket over the LD and EL submarkets. This can perhaps be 
explained by the difference in social and environmental features in different areas in Los Angeles. 
The dominance of  the CU submarket over the EL or LD submarkets is greater in the sectoral 
housing submarket of  detached houses than that of  condominiums. From this, it is possible to 
interpret that the detached house market is more sensitive to the factors of  social and 
environmental features than the condominium market where employment access is relatively 
stronger. 
 
8-3  Strengths and limitations 
 
This thesis tried to develop a consistent land rent theory for an urban context on the basis 
of  advances in land rent theory of  political economy focusing on the relationship between land 
and production. There are several elements in this theorisation. An identification of  the product 
of  the land in an urban context as labour power enables further appropriate analysis of  land 
rents in the housing market. The controversial issue over the condition of  absolute rent is 
discarded for a contemporary urban context where ever-greater mobility of  capital incapacitates 
the power of  landowners on the barriers to capital movement. The relationship between 
absolute rent and monopoly rent is suggested through the concepts of  the emulation and 
differentiation process with competition between property development capitals. The reality of  
differential rent 2 in an urban context is explained with the motivation of  capital investments on 
spaces. Finally, a general structure of  land rents as a combination of  absolute rent and 
differential rent is suggested. This enables the understanding of  the existence of  multiple layers 
of  potential land rents in an urban space and the motivation for redevelopments of  spaces in the 
gaps between the layers of  land rents. 
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The process of  expansion-overlap-merger of  multiple commuting spheres to form a 
merged structure of  land rents is explained on the basis of  the concept of  a residential sphere. 
This can be extended to an appropriate understanding of  the concepts of  subcentres and 
policentricity in a city. The relationship between the level of  land rents and the ensuing 
commuting pattern changes can be the basis of  the subdivision of  the housing market into 
spatial housing submarkets. This process has been verified through empirical analysis in the two 
cities of  Seoul and Los Angeles over time (London having been dominated by a single centre 
already when the study started). The changes of  the structure of  the housing market in Seoul 
over 10 years from 1998 to 2007 demonstrate the process of  the merge between different 
residential spheres particularly acutely. 
A diagrammatic analysis of  land rents over time based on regression analysis made it easier 
to understand the structure of  land rents in the housing markets and the dynamic changes in the 
land rent proxies. The changes in absolute rent and differential rent proxies from the 
diagrammatic analysis enabled more appropriate interpretations of  the causation of  the changes 
in land rents, such as the change in commuting costs and the imbalance of  demand and supply 
of  housing in a certain housing submarket. 
Land rent theory has been applied to the three cities of  London, Seoul, and Los Angeles 
which all exist in different contexts and all have different structures of  distribution of  
employment centres. With an appropriate subdivision of  the spatial and sectoral housing 
submarkets, it has been recognised that there exists a general structure of  land rents comprising 
absolute rent and differential rent proxies in cities in different contexts. 
This study tried to bridge the gaps between classical land rent theory and urban land rent in 
the housing market which are segmented into multiple submarkets. This study also tried to verify 
the structure of  land rent derived from the theoretical analysis in the empirical research and get 
implications from it. This study managed to suggest and find a general structure of  land rent 
based on classical rent theory focusing on the reproduction process of  labour power when a 
whole housing market is subdivided into appropriate submarkets. However, admittedly, it is 
undeniable that the study was too ambitious to examine the full extent of  scopes it went through. 
The limits of  this study should be properly filled with advances in future studies. 
First of  all, land rent is assumed to be the excess profit due to the contribution of  the land 
regardless of  whether it is taken by landowners as rent or by capitalist tenants / capitalist 
landowners as excess profit. Although actual payments of  ground rent vary between people, time, 
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or market conditions, the concept of  land rent is used as Smith‟s „natural rent‟ which actual 
payments fluctuate around. For this reason, the dynamic struggles over the appropriation of  the 
excess profit on land between various agents of  landowners, developers and tenants are not fully 
discussed here. 
Second, the increasing tendency of  integration between landed and capitalist classes is not 
focused upon here. Capitalists can become landowners by buying land and in the same manner 
landowners can also be capitalists if  they use their own land for production. Ordinary workers 
also lease land for various purposes including reproduction of  their labour power. Although the 
actual relationships across land may vary, the separation between a lessor and lessee of  land was 
maintained to make the renting relationships straightforward. 
Third, this study focused on residential land in examining the structure of  land rent in an 
urban context. The interaction of  residential land with other uses of  land in an urban context, 
such as commercial, industrial, and public use, is not dealt with here. The research on the 
interaction of  housing market with office markets could make the analysis more substantial. 
Fourth, this study focused on ordinary workers amongst various types of  users in the 
housing market. Although pensioners or families valuing environmental and educational 
accessibility the most often play a pivotal role in formaiton of  house price, the majority of  
spaces in urban rensidential land are occupied for the reproduction process of  labour power of  
ordinary workers. In this context, the difference of  commuting costs of  ordinary workers is 
assumed as the major locational advantage of  spaces. Whereas the accessibility to amenities, 
good schools and parks contributes to rent / house price locally, the accessibility to centres of  
employment contributes across the whole housing submarket. This view which regard the 
differnce in commuting cost as the major proxy of  differential rent may bring the criticism of  
reductionist approach. Nevertheless it is still worth seeking a major factor to find a general 
framework. Other attributes to locational advantages would contribute to the detailed fabric. 
There are also some limits in the empirical study. For empirical analysis, there are some 
problems which need to be clarified. The first problem is the availability of  land rent data. All 
residential land is used in the form of  a space which is created through a mixture of  land and the 
buildings on it. Moreover, house rent makes no distinction between contributions for land and 
for buildings. Therefore, it is practically impossible to collect data for land rent. Data for house 
rent is the next best source for analysis of  land rent, considering that the variation and absolute 
contribution from building to house rent is relatively smaller than that of  the rent for the land; as 
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Smith argues, building rent can be distinguished from land rent as the sum of  return from initial 
capital invested for a building and the depreciation cost. In this manner, the contribution from a 
building as house rent can be calculated to extract the level of  land rents. However, the house 
rent data is also very limited as the rental housing stock is smaller than the owner-occupied stock 
and the rental data is generally not included in housing statistics. The most available data 
throughout regions and countries is house price data. Although it includes various noise factors, 
such as speculation on future price rises or falls, interest rates, and transaction costs, it can be 
used as alternative data to land rents, as the basic foundation of  house price is normally assumed 
to be capitalised rent on space. For reasons of  practical availability, this study employs house 
price data as its main data source, in spite of  the various limitations inherent in using house price 
to replace land rent levels. The comparison of  the results from price data and rent data, where 
rent data are available only in the analysis of  Seoul, provides a meaningful analysis of  the 
relationship between them.  
Second, this study used 5th percentile as the minimum level of  house prices in a housing 
submarket as absolute rent proxy. As there may be some extreme prices in the lowest group of  
prices, 5th percentiles assuming normal distribution are chosen as the value for the minimum 
instead of  the actual lowest price. However, other values, such as 3rd percentiles or 10th 
percentiles may also be used as the reflection of  absolute rent proxy. The sectoral division of  
housing submarket assumes the groups of  similar housing type, size and neighbourhoods apart 
from locational differences. Given that locational differences is reflected in the diffences of  
house prices, another division of  spatial submarkets enables to assume that the minimum level 
of  house prices reflects the capitalised common rent as absolute rent as well as depreciation 
amount of  building costs and price expectations in the submarket. The problem is that it is 
difficult to figure out each proportion of  absolute rent and price expectiations in the changes in 
the minimum values. 
Third, in regression analysis, this study used simple ordinary least squares model. This 
method is insufficient to find the fittest hedonic model of  multiple attributes to house prices like 
hedonic price function model. However, this method is useful to focus on differential rent and 
absolutre rent when structural attributes of  houses are controlled by separating sectoral housing 
submarkets. This method also enabled to construct diagrams of  the structure of  land rents using 
the values of  coefficients and constants.  
Fourth, this study assumed a constant marginal commuting cost for simplicity reasons. The 
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assumption of  the constant marginal commuting cost makes the rent curve linear. In realty, 
however, the marginal commuting cost is not constant. It tends to be higher in central area 
because time cost and external cost arise in central areas due to congestion. Exponential or other 
non-linear model of  rent curve is then more realistic. 
The fifth limit is the use of  physical distances as a measure of  accessibility to employment 
centres. Although physical distances to the centres roughly correspond with commuting costs, 
the actual commuting costs through various modes of  transportation, including time costs, 
would be the best measure of  accessibility. In the analysis of  the structure of  the housing market 
in London, commuting time was used as an alternative measure to physical distances to the 
centre. It shows slightly better explanatory power than when using the measure of  physical 
distances. In the other two cases, time estimates were not available. 
The sixth problem is the division of  sectoral housing submarkets. In theory, there could 
exist hundreds of  sectoral housing submarkets, divided by structural characteristics, social 
neighbourhood characteristics, and institutional characteristics. This study focuses on sectoral 
housing submarkets based on structural factors such as dwelling type, number of  bedrooms, 
number of  bathrooms, and the range of  floor area. The most dominant types of  sectoral 
housing submarkets based on structural features are selected for empirical analysis. As is revealed 
in the analysis of  the structure of  housing market in especially Los Angeles, social and 
environmental features also affect the division of  sectoral housing markets. 
The seventh limit is the division of  spatial housing submarkets. In reality, a metropolitan city 
has multiple cores of  employment, although it is common to assume that a city has only one 
dominant centre of  employment. Some of  these multiple centres are main centres and others are 
sub-centres and it is for employers at these various centres that labour power needs to be 
reproduced. As accessibility to an employment centre is one of  the major factors determining 
the level of  differential housing rent in an urban context, a proper subdivision of  spatial housing 
submarkets is the most crucial and, at the same time, the most difficult process in the empirical 
analysis. This study used commuting patterns and the shape of  house prices in a city as the major 
criteria for the spatial division. As commuting patterns and the shape of  house prices changes 
over time, the division of  spatial housing submarkets should be also re-defined over time. 
However, commuting data for mapping commuting patterns is normally created by Census data, 
which is collected every ten years. Many parts of  the subdivision of  spatial housing submarkets 
in this study have to employ commuting data from the past. 
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The eighth limit is the difficulty of  setting the location of  the centres of  each spatial 
housing submarket. As centres of  employment exist in the form of  a cluster rather than a point, 
because of  the merger process, establishing a centre of  each spatial housing submarket from a 
central block or a cluster is inevitably rather arbitrary. 
The extension of  these limits through further work would enhance the relevance and enrich the 
implication of  this study. 
 
8-4  Future studies 
 
Applying this framework of  analysis of  land rents to other metropolises in various contexts 
could be interesting. Investigating the structures and changes of  land rents over time in 
metropolises such as New York, Chicago, Paris, Tokyo, Beijing, and Shanghai could not only 
fortify the general relevancy of  the frame of  land rent theory for an urban context but also 
provide an opportunity to incorporate various extra factors into the analysis. It could be a 
meaningful work to interpret and compare the structures of  land rents in terms of  labour 
reproduction in each city. 
The speed and the extent of  growth of  residential spheres vary with levels of  employment 
growth and the interactions between other neighbouring residential spheres. The process of  
expansion-overlap-merger between residential spheres could be simulated using agent-based 
modelling. The simulation could demonstrate how multiple residential spheres develop into a few 
dominant residential spheres in merged form, which is the prevailing form of  metropolises with 
multiple centres of  employment. The modelling can be based on the principle that 1) each 
employment centre has to accommodate commuters surrounding it forming a residential sphere; 
2) residential spheres grow and overlap with other neighbouring residential spheres; 3) the 
relative dominance between residential spheres are determined by the scale of  employment and 
the number of  commuters to the centre, which is regulated by differential land rent reflecting 
commuting savings depending on the location of  the commuters; and 4) employment growth in 
merged residential spheres is reflected in the total employment growth in the merging residential 
sphere. 
The differentiation process seeking monopoly rent and the emulation process seeking absolute 
rent are the major impetus for capital investment on land that changes the landscape of  an urban 
area. An empirical analysis of  the newly-created type of  housing and the following construction 
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of  similar houses would verify the prevalence of  these processes in an urban area. It would be a 
substantial piece of  work to demonstrate the genesis of  the general structure of  land rents to 
track the changes in the level of  rent from the moment when a newly developed housing enjoys 
its monopolistic status until the moment when multiple houses sharing similar level of  rent form 
a sectoral housing submarket and eventually when differential rents are generated by the location 
differences within the sectoral housing submarket. 
As there exist multiple layers of  potential land rents in a piece of  land, the rent gap between 
the current use of  a space and the maximum potential use of  the space varies with the location 
in an urban area. Constructing the layers of  potential land rents by sectoral and spatial housing 
submarkets can reveal the rent gaps by location. This work could subsequently reveal the most 
heavily exposed areas to the pressure for redevelopment for acquiring the rent gap as a profit in 
return. This could also cast light on the gentrification process, adding precision to the 'rent gap' 
concept as used by Smith (1979). 
 
8-5  Policy implications 
 
Some policy implications can be drawn from this study. An analysis on the structure of  land 
rents in an urban area naturally connects to the question of  how they increase and how they can 
be reduced. The factor that makes land rents greater is the differences in commuting costs within 
a housing submarket and the different economic conditions between housing submarkets. 
Governments may try to reduce the level of  land rents either by reducing commuting costs or by 
easing economic imbalances of  supply and demand between housing submarkets. These can be 
achieved through various measures, such as reducing public transportation cost and congestion, 
adding new infrastructure or increasing the supply of  specific types of  housing where demand 
exceeds supply. Governments can also influence the location of  employment growth.  
The spatial structure of  land rents by distribution of  employment centres leads to the issue 
of  the sustainability and competitiveness of  a city or of  the employers within it. The expansion 
of  neighbouring residential areas by growth in employment would lead to overlap and merger 
between the areas, resulting in a higher level of  land rents than in the situation where 
employment centres were located at a distance. In the same manner, the growth of  employment 
in dominant residential area without dispersing employment to outer areas would lead to an 
increase in the level of  land rents and consequently in house prices. As a result, the average 
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distance and commuting costs would also increase with the dominance of  a few employment 
centres. Given the same scales of  employment, a monocentrically structured urban area has a 
higher level of  land rent, longer commuting distances, higher commuting costs, and more 
congestion than a polycentrically structured urban area. By the criteria of  sustainability such as 
waste of  time and energy from congestion, a polycentrically structured urban area is more 
desirable than one with a monocentric structure. In terms of  competitiveness of  a city, higher 
land rents would lead to more expensive office leases, and it would be more expensive to employ 
workers as commuting costs and the burden of  higher living costs in the city would be reflected 
in the wages. In spite of  the existence of  economies of  agglomeration to a certain level, this 
would be a negative factor to a city in terms of  competitiveness. A government‟s efforts to 
disperse employment to outer areas can ease this problem of  over-concentration. 
The structure of  land rents reveals the social aspects of  land rent. The formation of  core 
areas of  employment and the ensuing construction of  houses inevitably leads to a lack of  
available spaces near the centre of  a city. In addition, the different economic conditions of  
supply and demand across different housing submarkets are the result of  social need and 
provision. Moreover, a regulatory power, such as the planning authorities, determines land use 
and possibly even the intensity of  land use, which subsequently determines the level of  land 
rents. The varied provision of  transportation and infrastructure by the government changes 
accessibility to the centre in the affected areas, and this will also be reflected in the change of  
land rents. In many cases, the provision of  educational facilities or amenity facilities like parks 
changes the level of  land rent in many areas. These all confirm the social aspect of  land rents in 
an urban area. Therefore, an increase in land rents needs to be controlled by a government. 
Furthermore, a government may impose various types of  windfall tax on the increase in land 
rents on the basis of  the concept of  the public ownership of  the development rights of  a piece 
of  land. The more accurate the analysis on the spatial structure of  land rents, the more justifiable 
this tax becomes. 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 3-1   Organic composition of  capital in absolute rent bearing sector 
 
 
If  there were a barrier against capitalist investment due to an existence of  absolute rent (AR) in a 
sector, the organic composition of  capital (OCC) in the sector would be lower than those in others. 
This could be proved by the following way. 
1) If  the rates of  profit of  AR-bearing & non AR-bearing sector are the same and AR is included 
in cost of  production, rates of  profit in the two sector can be written as the following. 
 Rate of  profit  =  Sa/(Ca+AR+Va)  =  Sn/(Cn+Vn)  ………………  (1) 
(a: AR-bearing sector, n: non AR-bearing sector, S: surplus value, C: constant capital, V: variable capital) 
If  the left hand side is divided by Va and the right hand side is divided by Vn, (1) can be written as 
the following. 
 [Sa/Va] / [(Ca+AR)/Va + 1]  =  [Sn/Vn] / [Cn/Vn + 1]  ………………  (2) 
2) If  exploitation rates (S/V) are the same in both sectors, (2) can be written as the following. 
 1 / [(Ca+AR)/Va + 1]  =  1 / [Cn/Vn + 1]   ………………  (3) 
(because  Sa/Va = Sn/Vn = exploitation rate) 
By making the both sides reciprocal, (3) can be written as follows. 
 (Ca+AR)/Va + 1 = Cn/Vn + 1    ………………  (4) 
 (Ca+AR)/Va = Cn/Vn     ………………  (5) 
To make (5) valid, Ca/Va should be less than Cn/Vn. 
Therefore, the OCC of  AR-bearing sector (Ca/Va) is lower than the OCC of  non AR-bearing 
sector (Cn/Vn). 
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Appendix 5-1   Sample data of  London (summary) 
 
 
Table 25   Sample house data of London (summary) 
Variable Unit 
Number 
of obs. 
Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Min. Max. 
Percentiles (%) 
10 25 50 75 90 
Floor area m² 315 1,049.6 168.1 812.0 1,900.0 871.0 934.0 1,018.0 1,145.0 1,252.0 
Distanceǂ km 315 19.2 10.4 1.4 55.2 6.1 11.5 18.0 26.3 34.6 
Time1* min. 261 58.2 20.7 15.0 135.0 33.0 44.0 57.0 70.0 84.0 
Time2** min. 261 54.6 18.7 14.0 110.0 31.0 42.0 55.0 66.0 76.0 
Time3*** min. 261 3.5 4.1 1.0 40.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 
Price 2000 
10 
$/m² 
176 353.1 175.9 143.1 1,492.1 211.2 259.0 315.7 389.8 501.6 
Price 2001 201 391.8 165.9 152.1 1,601.6 256.8 294.4 356.0 439.0 554.5 
Price 2002 189 448.2 182.5 181.0 1,444.6 289.8 335.7 412.7 497.6 674.8 
Price 2003 164 507.6 181.4 179.6 1,761.7 355.0 402.1 474.1 557.4 690.0 
Price 2004 174 563.7 265.6 195.7 2,486.7 370.5 427.5 515.0 599.5 796.9 
Price 2005 160 568.5 219.6 284.3 1,957.1 386.2 448.6 525.5 614.1 809.3 
Price 2006 193 615.0 241.7 282.6 2,054.6 408.5 465.5 560.5 689.9 905.9 
Price 2007 201 710.8 374.2 285.5 2,781.7 444.7 517.3 609.3 739.2 1,108.4 
Price 2008 134 680.3 357.0 324.0 3,150.1 443.6 500.3 584.9 742.0 1,019.3 
Price 2009 315 718.3 377.7 264.8 3,075.5 437.4 522.3 607.7 764.7 1,149.4 
ǂ distance to main centre of employment 
* commuting time (total)   ** commuting time (travel)   *** commuting time (waiting) 
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Table 26   Sample flat data of London (summary) 
Variable Unit 
Number 
of obs. 
Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Min. Max. 
Percentiles (%) 
10 25 50 75 90 
Floor area m² 316 627.9 83.7 460.0 1,001.0 530.0 564.0 620.0 676.0 737.0 
Distanceǂ km 316 19.0 10.5 1.3 54.7 5.7 11.4 17.5 26.0 34.3 
Time1* min. 256 55.6 18.6 16.0 120.0 30.0 43.5 55.0 68.0 79.0 
Time2** min. 256 52.4 17.0 15.0 105.0 28.0 41.0 52.0 65.0 74.0 
Time3*** min. 256 3.2 2.8 1.0 20.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 
Price 2000 
10 $/m² 
203 371.6 152.4 136.0 1,567.0 236.3 280.3 331.6 441.3 538.2 
Price 2001 200 406.8 140.6 174.9 897.0 255.4 305.1 373.5 488.2 613.4 
Price 2002 196 478.1 159.4 198.2 1,408.4 326.8 368.3 453.7 546.2 692.0 
Price 2003 207 549.5 157.7 268.7 1,689.6 385.2 444.1 525.5 629.7 733.9 
Price 2004 224 585.0 161.0 276.8 1,431.9 424.8 475.5 560.1 660.6 777.7 
Price 2005 193 607.3 179.3 325.2 1,871.2 432.1 499.8 572.1 668.7 848.2 
Price 2006 214 645.8 219.4 316.2 1,853.1 438.7 505.0 599.9 720.4 902.7 
Price 2007 235 740.3 270.9 370.4 2,139.2 488.3 566.0 664.5 837.2 1,057.4 
Price 2008 173 731.9 276.0 301.1 2,033.6 505.5 578.4 651.0 816.0 1,056.0 
Price 2009 316 733.9 275.7 317.0 2,014.1 487.8 561.8 654.6 809.1 1,073.3 
ǂ distance to main centre of employment 
* commuting time (total)   ** commuting time (travel)   *** commuting time (waiting) 
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Appendix 5-2   Sample data of  London 
 
Table 27   Sample house data of London 
    Street Post code 
Bed-
room 
Bath-
room 
Recep-
tion 
Floor 
areaǂ 
Type* 
  Price (10 US $/m²)   Longitude Latitude 
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000     ° ` ``   ° ` `` 
                             1 EC1 St John Street EC1V 4LY 3 2 1 1481 t 
 
1090 
    
1160 
     
W 0 6 17 N 51 31 32 
2 EC2 Holywell Row EC2A 4JB 3 2 1 1810 t 
 
899.5 
     
605 525 
   
W 0 4 57 N 51 31 22 
3 WC1 Lloyd Baker Street WC1X 9AB 3 2 2 1809 t 
 
1250 1040 
    
395 
  
241 
 
W 0 7 45 N 51 31 40 
4 WC2 Endell Street WC2H 9AJ 3 3 1 1900 t 
 
1850 
          
W 0 7 32 N 51 30 54 
5 N1 Halliford Street N1 3HD 3 2 1 1367 t 
 
780 
    
451 
     
W 0 5 25 N 51 32 25 
6 N2 Elm Gardens N2 0TF 3 2 2 1020 s 
 
575 
   
360 395 
  
263.5 240.5 
 
W 0 10 34 N 51 35 31 
7 N3 Hamilton Way N3 1AN 3 2 1 1350 t 
 
445 
 
457 
 
366 
 
340 270 288 
  
W 0 11 38 N 51 36 32 
8 N4 Ambler Road N4 2QS 3 2 2 1279 t 
 
649.5 664 
   
515 
 
410 
   
W 0 6 13 N 51 33 39 
9 N5 Elfort Road N5 1AX 3 3 2 1352 t 
 
645 717 570 517 
  
342 371 341 335 
 
W 0 6 19 N 51 33 24 
10 N6 Orchard Road N6 5TR 3 1 2 1233 t 
 
635 
  
526 467.5 381 
 
285 224 
  
W 0 8 29 N 51 34 31 
11 N7 Tavistock Terrace N19 4BZ 3 2 2 1560 t 
 
760 635 725 540 
 
557 500 
    
W 0 7 35 N 51 33 39 
12 N8 Effingham Road N8 0AE 3 1 2 1184 t 
 
465 440 
  
291 275 227.5 
    
W 0 6 8 N 51 35 6 
13 N9 Tranmere Road N9 9EJ 3 1 1 962 s 
 
250 210 237 205 
   
160 
 
118 
 
W 0 4 7 N 51 38 0 
14 N10  Pembroke Road N10 2JD 3 2 1 1085 t 
 
375 
  
350 
   
250 186 
  
W 0 8 48 N 51 36 10 
15 N11 Queens Road N11 2QP 3 2 2 989 t 
 
340 
 
265 
 
228 
  
195 160 
  
W 0 7 18 N 51 36 28 
16 N12 Birkbeck Road N12 8DZ 3 1 2 969 t 
 
400 
 
370 
 
304 
  
250 175 
  
W 0 10 53 N 51 36 48 
17 N13 Melbourne Avenue N13 4SX 3 2 2 1043 t 
 
320 
 
320 325 262 
  
250 210 192 
 
W 0 6 42 N 51 36 40 
18 N14 Mayfair Terrace N14 6HU 3 1 2 1077 s 
 
375 327 
 
355 
  
317 
 
240 
  
W 0 7 33 N 51 38 9 
19 N15 Roslyn Road N15 5JB 3 2 1 1012 t 
 
280 275 245 240 217 185 184 156 138 125 
 
W 0 4 55 N 51 35 1 
20 N16 Harcombe Road N16 0RX 3 1 1 976 t 
 
530 
  
495 405 
 
380 340 247 220 
 
W 0 4 48 N 51 33 31 
21 N17 Thackeray Avenue N17 9DX 3 1 1 1028 t 
 
245 
 
270 220 
   
141 136 
  
W 0 3 35 N 51 35 41 
22 N18 Orpington Gardens N18 1LW 3 1 1 943 t 
 
240 
 
274 
  
240 
 
166.5 160 
  
W 0 4 41 N 51 37 15 
23 N19 Giesbach Road N19 3DA 3 2 1 1320 t 
 
580 
   
346 
   
285 295 
 
W 0 7 59 N 51 33 57 
24 N20 Church Crescent N20 0JR 3 2 1 1234 s 
 
530 
   
580 
    
235 
 
W 0 9 49 N 51 37 31 
25 N21 The Alders N21 1AR 3 2 2 1172 s 
 
425 485 450 
 
383 395 
  
305 265 
 
W 0 6 4 N 51 38 20 
26 N22 Berners Road N22 5NE 3 2 2 997 t 
 
356 333 
 
330 
  
276 
    
W 0 6 33 N 51 35 53 
27 E1 Fairclough Street E1 1PP 3 2 1 1255 t 
 
575 
  
467.5 
 
400 
   
250 
 
W 0 3 58 N 51 30 48 
28 E2 Derbyshire Street E2 6HQ 3 2 2 932 t 
 
478 
 
425 
  
345 
 
323 
   
W 0 3 48 N 51 31 34 
29 E3 Hewlett Road E3 5NA 3 2 2 1177 t 
 
450 
  
475 350 315 
 
300 240 220 
 
W 0 2 9 N 51 31 57 
30 E4 Edward Avenue E4 9DN 3 1 2 942 s 
 
243 
 
220 
 
200 
  
158 135 
  
W 0 0 49 N 51 36 33 
31 E5 Daubeney Road E5 0EF 3 2 2 1075 t 
 
375 
 
325 300 
 
247 235 250 
 
175 
 
W 0 2 13 N 51 33 2 
32 E6 Southchurch Road E6 6DZ 3 1 2 888 t 
 
187 209 
 
180 230 215 185 170 135 
  
E 0 3 28 N 51 31 45 
33 E7 Trumpington Road E7 9EJ 3 1 2 826 t 
 
250 
 
278 
 
212 200 177 160 
   
E 0 0 47 N 51 33 17 
34 E8 Kenmure Road E8 1JU 3 2 2 1288 t 
 
495 515 
  
315 300 295 
 
241.5 222 
 
W 0 3 23 N 51 32 56 
35 E9 St. Agnes Close E9 7HS 3 2 1 873 t 
 
400 
 
520 
  
340 
  
202 
  
W 0 3 8 N 51 32 12 
36 E10 Francis Road E10 6NJ 3 1 1 1113 t 
 
270 
       
162 
  
W 0 0 27 N 51 33 53 
37 E11 Wallwood Road E11 1AL 3 2 1 1057 t 
 
300 
       
175 
  
E 0 0 20 N 51 34 18 
38 E12 Sixth Avenue E12 5PT 3 2 2 1007 t 
 
240 233 249 
 
235 200 178 140   93 
 
E 0 3 29 N 51 32 58 
39 E13 Greengate Street E13 0AS 3 1 2 820 t 
 
225 
 
155 
   
118 
  
83 
 
E 0 1 35 N 51 31 41 
40 E14 Portree Street E14 0HT 3 1 1 1070 t 
 
300 340 295 
 
250 242 
 
200 
 
122 
 
E 0 0 4 N 51 30 51 
41 E15 Meeson Road E15 4AW 3 2 2 1050 t 
 
285 
   
265 
  
220 
   
E 0 0 42 N 51 32 17 
42 E16 Clifford Road E16 4JW 3 2 1 1050 s 
 
245 227 250 230 228 
  
155 
 
110 
 
E 0 0 40 N 51 31 15 
43 E17 Aveling Park Road E17 4NS 3 1 2 1169 t 
 
250 231 272.5 230 
  
198 
 
146 135 
 
W 0 1 5 N 51 35 44 
44 E18 Maybank Road E18 1EJ 3 2 2 1240 t 
 
355 
 
325 250 
  
228 
    
E 0 2 1 N 51 35 46 
45 SE1 Cottesloe Mews SE1 7RU 3 2 1 1098 t 
 
700 
    
400 
     
W 0 6 36 N 51 29 55 
46 SE2 Sandycroft SE2 0XY 3 1 2 812 t 
 
200 215 211 208 192 
 
179 
 
125 
  
E 0 6 11 N 51 28 50 
47 SE3 Siebert Road SE3 7EJ 3 2 1 1189 t 
 
315 245 250 275 
 
249 197 195 145 
  
E 0 1 15 N 51 28 49 
48 SE4 Braxfield Road SE4 2AN 3 2 2 1299 t 
 
340 
 
434 
   
225 
 
170 
  
W 0 2 9 N 51 27 35 
  
246 
 
49 SE5 Sansom Street SE5 7RE 3 2 2 1332 t 
 
400 390 330 287 291 278 
 
248 
   
W 0 5 19 N 51 28 33 
50 SE6 Torridon Road SE6 1RF 3 1 1 928 t 
 
249 235 243 220 212 204 185 160 141 110 
 
W 0 0 5 N 51 26 19 
51 SE7 Floyd Road SE7 8AR 3 2 2 984 t 
 
250 
  
190 191.5 193 185 156 139 
  
E 0 2 4 N 51 29 14 
52 SE8 Trundleys Road SE8 5BD 3 2 1 1147 t 
 
325 287 332 305 235 204 192 235 200 154 
 
W 0 2 38 N 51 29 18 
53 SE9 Gerda Road SE9 3SJ 3 2 1 1114 t 
 
250 290 
 
245 
 
195 
 
160 154 150 
 
E 0 4 20 N 51 26 4 
54 SE10 Kemsing Road SE10 0LL 3 2 1 1145 t 
 
445 438 495 380 360 300 280 
  
215 
 
E 0 1 0 N 51 29 7 
55 SE11 Hanover Gardens SE11 5TN 3 2 2 1458 t 
 
700 788 775 635 525 
   
465 
  
W 0 6 49 N 51 28 56 
56 SE12 Hedgley Street SE12 8PE 3 1 1 911 t 
 
310 314 250 214 248 
 
225 200 177 150 
 
E 0 0 31 N 51 27 20 
57 SE13 Leahurst Road SE13 5LW 3 2 2 1156 t 
 
325 347 300 
 
253 225 
 
160 
 
140 
 
E 0 0 5 N 51 27 14 
58 SE14 Camplin Street SE14 5QY 3 1 2 1169 t 
 
330 300 
 
250 237.5 
 
207 
    
W 0 2 46 N 51 28 43 
59 SE15 Elcot Avenue SE15 1QD 3 1 1 1028 t 
 
345 
  
235 
  
235 
 
156 143 
 
W 0 3 52 N 51 28 42 
60 SE16 Ann Moss Way SE16 2TJ 3 2 1 870 t 
 
375 378 
 
300 250 245 
  
185 187 
 
W 0 3 14 N 51 29 46 
61 SE17 Henshaw Street SE17 1PE 3 2 2 1198 t 
 
525 420 450 350 325 320 297 256 250 
  
W 0 5 24 N 51 29 35 
62 SE18 Ankerdine Crescent SE18 3LG 3 1 1 899 t 
 
220 250 230 199 187.5 218 172 
  
120 
 
E 0 3 56 N 51 28 21 
63 SE19 Auckland Road SE19 2DT 3 1 2 946 t 
 
285 
  
320 
  
250 
 
185 
  
W 0 4 54 N 51 24 34 
64 SE20 Chesham Crescent SE20 7RW 3 1 2 1191 t 
 
275 
  
250 250 
  
187 157 145 
 
W 0 3 15 N 51 24 33 
65 SE21 Kennoldes SE21 8SS 3 2 1 1062 t 
 
275 
 
270 247 193 
 
177 
 
152 
  
W 0 5 30 N 51 26 23 
66 SE22 Worlingham Road SE22 9HD 3 2 2 1065 t 
 
595 582 522 
 
400 367 300 
 
250 
  
W 0 4 23 N 51 27 35 
67 SE23 Maclean Road SE23 1PD 3 1 2 1098 t 
 
330 310 377 292 
  
235 
  
179 
 
W 0 2 30 N 51 27 4 
68 SE24 Danecroft Road SE24 9PA 3 1 2 1192 t 
 
675 650 663 530 420 370 337 
 
307 270 
 
W 0 5 38 N 51 27 25 
69 SE25 Bungalow Road SE25 6JY 3 2 1 1074 t 
 
230 211 239 
  
189 174 135 119 96 
 
W 0 5 3 N 51 23 49 
70 SE26 De Frene Road SE26 4AF 3 1 1 964 t 
 
295 311 297 220 231 223 
 
183 152 146 
 
W 0 2 32 N 51 25 53 
71 SE27 Waldeck Grove SE27 0BE 3 2 1 986 t 
 
330 355 335 285 
  
205 180 162 130 
 
W 0 6 29 N 51 26 2 
72 SE28 Fleming Way SE28 8NR 3 1 2 843 t 
 
160 185 
   
158 155 
 
110 95 
 
E 0 7 40 N 51 30 28 
73 SW1 Lyall Mews SW1X 8DJ 3 2 1 933 t 
 
725 
  
685 
 
543 
  
450   
 
W 0 9 16 N 51 29 48 
74 SW2 Margate Road SW2 5DU 3 1 2 1023 t 
 
400 374 455 373 310 295 
   
187 
 
W 0 7 37 N 51 27 26 
75 SW3 Godfrey Street SW3 3SX 3 2 2 1313 t 
 
1750 1550 1670 
 
1135 1095 
 
852 
 
910 
 
W 0 10 0 N 51 29 23 
76 SW4 Kings Avenue SW4 8DX 3 2 2 1253 t 
 
525 395 
 
465 
   
337.5 
 
245 
 
W 0 7 44 N 51 27 24 
77 SW5 Childs Walk SW5 9RZ 3 2 1 1485 t 
 
1195 
  
930 
   
510 
 
435 
 
W 0 11 39 N 51 29 36 
78 SW6 Branksea Street SW6 6TT 3 2 2 1308 t 
 
800 
  
595 498 
  
500 
   
W 0 12 54 N 51 28 43 
79 SW7 Ennismore Gardens 
Mews 
SW7 1HY 3 2 1 1155 t 
 
1650 1690 1350 
 
1050 
  
775 
 
575 
 
W 0 10 17 N 51 29 57 
80 SW8 Robertson Street SW8 3TZ 3 2 1 1010 t 
 
550 420 520 425 380 385 385 
 
310 285 
 
W 0 8 47 N 51 28 8 
81 SW9 Trinity Gardens SW9 8DR 3 1 2 974 t 
 
520 
 
490 435 
   
335 300 280 
 
W 0 7 8 N 51 27 43 
82 SW10 Coleherne Mews SW10 9EA 3 2 1 1118 t 
 
995 
 
1295 790 
  
722 
 
665 
  
W 0 11 28 N 51 29 16 
83 SW11 Canford Road SW11 6NZ 3 2 2 1268 t 
 
685 
     
455 425 
 
387 
 
W 0 9 31 N 51 27 33 
84 SW12 Haverhill Road SW12 0HA 3 2 1 1158 t 
 
600 
 
665 524 
  
405 382 330 
  
W 0 8 28 N 51 26 38 
85 SW13 Archway Street SW13 0AW 3 2 1 1130 t 
 
675 535 650 
   
393.5 
 
360 292 
 
W 0 15 5 N 51 28 12 
86 SW14 Sheen Lane SW14 8LF 3 1 2 1115 t 
 
645 
 
650 
 
475 
 
440 405 
   
W 0 16 5 N 51 27 45 
87 SW15 Warwick Drive SW15 6LB 3 2 2 1373 t 
 
500 
  
440 370 
  
386 300 
  
W 0 14 6 N 51 27 54 
88 SW16 Colmer Road SW16 5LA 3 1 1 1218 t 
 
295 290 283 250 190 180 
 
182 
 
130 
 
W 0 7 32 N 51 24 50 
89 SW17 Moffat Road SW17 7EZ 3 1 2 848 t 
 
345 
 
410 283 249 247 207.5 
 
184.7 
  
W 0 10 1 N 51 25 51 
90 SW18 Bridgford Street SW18 3TQ 3 1 2 1116 t 
 
445 
 
625 468 480 
  
395 
 
260 
 
W 0 11 4 N 51 26 13 
91 SW19 Circle Gardens SW19 3JX 3 1 2 1209 t 
 
425 
  
460 
 
322.5 
  
286 
  
W 0 11 54 N 51 24 21 
92 SW20 Southdown Road SW20 8PX 3 1 2 1184 t 
 
360 
 
465 330 310 355 
 
285 
   
W 0 13 7 N 51 24 48 
93 W1 Wyndham Mews W1H 2PN 3 2 1 1205 t 
 
1550 
  
1150 
 
850 
     
W 0 9 39 N 51 31 9 
94 W2 St Petersburgh Mews W2 4JT 3 2 2 1580 t 
 
1195 
  
560 
 
487 540 360 405 
  
W 0 11 25 N 51 30 42 
95 W3 Wilfrid Gardens W3 0NQ 3 1 2 1252 t 
 
360 375 375 354 
  
272 
    
W 0 16 7 N 51 31 24 
96 W4 Priory Road W4 5JA 3 2 1 1054 t 
 
530 473 625 512 390 432 
  
310 
  
W 0 15 47 N 51 29 55 
97 W5 Devonshire Road W5 4TP 3 1 2 973 t 
 
400 490 540 426 
 
357 
 
305 250 250 
 
W 0 18 48 N 51 30 4 
98 W6 Silverton Road W6 9NY 3 2 2 1044 t 
 
525 
   
455 
 
300 
 
308 330 
 
W 0 13 14 N 51 29 0 
99 W7 Framfield Road W7 1NQ 3 1 1 1145 t 
 
330 
 
316 
 
250 
 
250 
 
172 165 
 
W 0 19 59 N 51 31 6 
100 W8 Kensington High Street W8 6NP 3 2 1 1560 t 
 
1450 
 
1025 
    
635 
   
W 0 12 13 N 51 29 50 
101 W9 Elgin Mews North W9 1NN 3 2 1 910 t 
 
675 
 
720 
 
512 
 
477 
  
325 
 
W 0 11 9 N 51 31 49 
102 W10 Alperton Street W10 4NG 3 2 2 1236 t 
 
465 
 
435 
    
250 
   
W 0 12 23 N 51 31 36 
103 W11 Sirdar Road W11 4EG 3 1 1 1226 t 
 
675 
    
550 
 
500 
   
W 0 12 54 N 51 30 43 
104 W12 Cobbold Road W12 9LW 3 1 1 1033 t 
 
477 450 650 482 417 387 300 
 
280 230 
 
W 0 14 43 N 51 30 13 
105 W13 Leyborne Avenue W13 9RA 3 2 2 1180 t 
 
430 485 500 438 
  
375 
    
W 0 18 51 N 51 30 16 
106 W14 Ceylon Road W14 0PY 3 2 1 1421 t 
 
825 
 
935 717.5 
 
568 
 
565 520 
  
W 0 12 54 N 51 29 54 
107 NW1 Arlington Road NW1 7HP 3 2 1 1394 t 
 
800 
 
949 
 
540 
   
425 
  
W 0 8 35 N 51 32 15 
108 NW2 Randall Avenue NW2 7TA 3 1 1 1034 s 
 
390 
   
260 
 
250 234 197.5 180 
 
W 0 14 54 N 51 33 53 
109 NW3 Perrins Lane NW3 1QY 3 2 1 1050 t 
 
1000 875 900 740 
 
630 
 
630 
 
475 
 
W 0 10 39 N 51 33 19 
110 NW4 Bell Lane NW4 2AE 3 2 1 1125 t 
 
440 
 
430 
     
236.5 
  
W 0 13 1 N 51 35 12 
111 NW5 Twisden Road NW5 1DN 3 1 1 1218 t 
 
832 776 766.5 
  
520 
  
430 
  
W 0 8 39 N 51 33 26 
112 NW6 Ravenshaw Street NW6 1NP 3 2 1 1078 t 
 
750 
  
650 
    
355 
  
W 0 12 0 N 51 33 0 
113 NW7 Ellesmere Avenue NW7 3HB 3 2 1 1019 s 
 
385 
 
309 
 
300 274 275 210 200 160 
 
W 0 15 34 N 51 37 29 
  
247 
 
114 NW8 Ordnance Hill NW8 6PR 3 2 2 1277 t 
 
1395 
 
1650 
  
1475 1045 
 
950 770 
 
W 0 10 14 N 51 32 6 
115 NW9 Silkfield Road NW9 6QU 3 2 2 1284 s 
 
315 307 
  
278 
  
190 
 
168 
 
W 0 14 50 N 51 35 11 
116 NW10 Outgate Road NW10 9UG 3 2 2 1212 t 
 
380 
   
250 247 
   
160 
 
W 0 14 52 N 51 32 42 
117 NW11 Ridge Hill NW11 8PR 3 2 1 1146 s 
 
650 
  
550 
  
460 439.5 
 
296 
 
W 0 12 27 N 51 34 16 
118 EN1 Seaford Road EN1 1NT 3 1 2 965 t 
 
245 278 
 
241 
 
224 211 
 
205 
  
W 0 4 24 N 51 39 2 
119 EN2 Birkbeck Road EN2 0DX 3 1 1 970 t 
 
325 325 
 
295 260 250 210 205 187 
  
W 0 4 53 N 51 39 54 
120 EN3 Oakhurst Road EN3 6QQ 3 2 1 910 s 
 
215 213 201.5 
 
187 
   
122 
  
W 0 2 14 N 51 40 36 
121 EN4 Ridgeway Avenue EN4 8TN 3 1 1 1106 t 
 
345 
   
250 285 249 212 195 179 
 
W 0 9 26 N 51 38 28 
122 EN5 Fairfield Way EN5 2BQ 3 2 2 1096 t 
 
295 
   
249 
   
190 
  
W 0 11 25 N 51 38 46 
123 EN6 Mimms Hall Road EN6 3DX 3 1 2 1108 s 
 
300 
 
250 285 
 
235 
   
155 
 
W 0 12 29 N 51 41 50 
124 EN7 Willow Close EN7 6RY 3 1 1 849 s 
 
250 312 289.5 
 
248 
   
180 
  
W 0 4 11 N 51 43 15 
125 EN8 Northfield Road EN8 7RG 3 2 1 1045 t 
 
220 228 212 
 
216 
  
160 130 
  
W 0 1 55 N 51 41 34 
126 EN9 Crooked Mile EN9 2ES 3 1 1 847 s 
 
250 
  
199 
    
160 
  
E 0 0 
 
N 51 41 47 
127 EN10 Briarley Close EN10 6QQ 3 1 2 1065 s 
 
370 
 
340 304 290 
  
225 
 
155 
 
W 0 1 26 N 51 44 16 
128 EN11 Dorchester Avenue EN11 9EJ 3 2 1 1040 t 
 
220 221 
 
205 
   
137 
 
120 
 
W 0 0 
 
N 51 46 12 
129 IG1 Balfour Road IG1 4HP 3 1 1 1196 t 
 
250 180 
   
145 
     
E 0 4 16 N 51 33 40 
130 IG2 Roll Gardens IG2 6TW 3 2 2 1126 t 
 
285 
 
249 245 
 
237.5 205 
 
133 124 
 
E 0 3 58 N 51 34 44 
131 IG3 Herbert Road IG3 8AL 3 2 2 1427 t 
 
275 
  
221 
 
160 
 
120 
 
110 
 
E 0 5 38 N 51 33 44 
132 IG4 Park View Gardens IG4 5NP 3 2 2 1174 t 
 
270 
 
267.5 250 
  
242.5 212 
   
E 0 3 22 N 51 35 4 
133 IG5 Dellwood Gardens IG5 0EH 3 1 2 917 t 
 
290 
 
269 250 250 230 215 183 
 
110 
 
E 0 4 1 N 51 35 14 
134 IG6 Aintree Crescent IG6 2HD 3 1 2 850 t 
 
250 
 
273 240 
  
216 177 155 141 
 
E 0 4 54 N 51 35 36 
135 IG7 Sunnymede IG7 6ES 3 2 1 969 s 
 
260 
  
340 245 
   
195 
  
E 0 7 16 N 51 37 14 
136 IG8 Canfield Road IG8 8JH 3 2 1 1088 t 
 
280 248 
 
280 
 
232 245 200 205 
  
E 0 3 4 N 51 36 5 
137 IG9 Chestnut Avenue IG9 6EW 3 1 1 927 s 
 
335 317 285 
   
230 
 
178 180 
 
E 0 2 54 N 51 37 15 
138 IG10 Cherston Road IG10 3PJ 3 2 1 862 t 
 
250 242 
  
210 
  
180 
   
E 0 4 20 N 51 38 49 
139 IG11 Cranborne Road IG11 7XE 3 1 2 999 t 
 
215 193 222 188 
 
182 177 140 
 
98 
 
E 0 5 9 N 51 32 8 
140 RM1 Hamilton Avenue RM1 4RP 3 1 2 1144 s 
 
230 
   
191 
  
160 
   
E 0 10 28 N 51 35 23 
141 RM2 Upper Brentwood 
Road 
RM2 6HX 3 1 1 1058 s 
 
250 
  
291 250 
 
235 
  
150 
 
E 0 12 42 N 51 35 17 
142 RM3 Byron Way RM3 7PR 3 1 2 902 t 
 
145 
    
177 
  
105 
  
E 0 12 37 N 51 35 43 
143 RM4 Pancroft RM4 1BX 3 2 2 1046 s 
 
250 
 
203 250 230 
    
137 
 
E 0 7 21 N 51 39 2 
144 RM5 Kingshill Avenue RM5 2SB 3 1 2 1189 s 
 
200 200 207 185 
 
180 
 
138 111 
  
E 0 10 10 N 51 36 25 
145 RM6 Heath Terrace RM6 6JR 3 1 2 937 t 
 
225 
 
191 
    
128 115.5 115 
 
E 0 7 57 N 51 34 8 
146 RM7 Crow Lane RM7 0HH 3 1 2 938 t 
 
200 218 228 197 185 
  
149 113 106 
 
E 0 8 55 N 51 34 8 
147 RM8 Charlecote Road RM8 3LD 3 1 1 925 t 
 
190 198 
 
166 166 140 
 
119 
 
85 
 
E 0 8 11 N 51 33 15 
148 RM9 Canonsleigh Road RM9 4DJ 3 1 1 988 t 
 
175 
 
210 180 140 131 131 
 
82.5 70 
 
E 0 7 5 N 51 32 7 
149 RM10 Hunters Hall Road RM10 8LH 3 1 1 899 t 
 
180 210 168 164 152 162 134 
  
77 
 
E 0 9 14 N 51 32 57 
150 RM11 Bush Elms Road RM11 1LT 3 1 1 1018 t 
 
250 
 
287 285 
 
244 218 177 146 135 
 
E 0 11 59 N 51 34 7 
151 RM12 Milton Avenue RM12 4BW 3 1 2 960 t 
 
212 
 
240 
 
230 193 178 160 126 115 
 
E 0 11 26 N 51 33 36 
152 RM13 Brights Avenue RM13 9NW 3 1 2 1257 t 
 
200 202 198 165 166 
  
115 115.5 87.5 
 
E 0 12 9 N 51 31 6 
153 RM14 Aldborough Road RM14 2RJ 3 1 2 978 s 
 
295 274 235 
 
217 226 
 
178 150 
  
E 0 14 11 N 51 33 29 
154 RM15 Callan Grove RM15 5PW 3 1 1 978 t 
 
180 198 190 176 
 
157.5 
 
99 91 76 
 
E 0 17 24 N 51 30 12 
155 RM16 St Augustine Road RM16 4NU 3 1 1 913 s 
 
165 140 167.5 
 
160 120 
   
75 
 
E 0 22 27 N 51 29 0 
156 RM17 Rectory Road RM17 6AA 3 1 1 881 t 
 
172 185 183 171 156 
  
102 83 69 
 
E 0 20 28 N 51 28 52 
157 RM18 Coleridge Road RM18 8EE 3 1 1 866 t 
 
127 
  
135 125 
    
59 
 
E 0 22 32 N 51 27 44 
158 RM19 Water Lane RM19 1GU 3 1 2 864 t 
 
160 
 
168 164 156 138 132 110 93.5 
  
E 0 14 11 N 51 29 18 
159 RM20 Palmerston Gardens RM20 4YJ 3 1 2 967 t 
 
160 
  
175 
  
140 110 
 
76.5 
 
E 0 18 3 N 51 28 46 
160 DA1 Swaisland Road DA1 3DE 3 1 1 886 t 
 
180 191 183 
  
165 
 
133 118 94.5 
 
E 0 11 48 N 51 26 55 
161 DA2 Clayton Croft Road DA2 7AU 3 1 2 1082 s 
 
215 265 
   
208 
  
156 
  
E 0 11 16 N 51 25 54 
162 DA3 Bowes Wood DA3 8QL 3 2 2 1049 s 
 
250 250 260 
    
180 157 146 
 
E 0 18 38 N 51 21 40 
163 DA4 Dartford Road DA4 9HX 3 2 2 1263 S 
 
280 
 
285 
     
170 
  
E 0 14 10 N 51 23 46 
164 DA5 Glenhurst Avenue DA5 3QQ 3 1 2 965 S 
 
270 
    
266 
 
205 195 
  
E 0 8 14 N 51 26 16 
165 DA6 Faygate Crescent DA6 7NS 3 2 2 1075 s 
 
250 
  
220 
  
213 
 
135 
  
E 0 8 51 N 51 27 6 
166 DA7 Birchington Close DA7 5ED 3 1 1 984 s 
 
240 220 245 215 
     
144 
 
E 0 9 11 N 51 28 15 
167 DA8 Alexandra Road DA8 2AX 3 1 2 1224 t 
 
170 197 205 175 164 
 
138 
 
86.5 
  
E 0 10 59 N 51 28 38 
168 DA9 Ingress Gardens DA9 9HW 3 1 2 983 t 
 
155 169 174.5 170.5 
 
155 
 
122 
 
80 
 
E 0 17 43 N 51 26 58 
169 DA10 Milton Road DA10 0LS 3 1 1 1199 t 
 
160 
 
159 
  
109 100 117 91 90 
 
E 0 18 16 N 51 26 46 
170 DA11 Woodfield Avenue DA11 7QQ 3 1 2 992 t 
 
170 
 
192.5 
 
173.5 166 148 118 113 95 
 
E 0 21 59 N 51 25 54 
171 DA12 Milton Road DA12 2PF 3 2 2 1309 t 
 
161 
 
250 240 208 135 179 
 
110 87 
 
E 0 22 38 N 51 26 24 
172 DA13 Lyndhurst Way DA13 9EN 3 1 2 1024 s 
 
238.5 250 245 196 
 
212 171.5 156 134 120 
 
E 0 20 58 N 51 24 10 
173 DA14 Langdon Shaw DA14 6AX 3 1 2 941 s 
 
240 
 
275 
  
240 
  
198 
  
E 0 5 40 N 51 25 19 
174 DA15 Old Farm Avenue DA15 8AL 3 1 1 967 t 
 
225 245 227 222 195 
  
165 131 119 
 
E 0 5 26 N 51 26 13 
175 DA16 Lodge Hill DA16 1BL 3 1 2 949 s 
 
215 
 
250 
   
214 187 155 102.5 
 
E 0 7 2 N 51 28 39 
176 DA17 Nelson Road DA17 5ET 3 2 1 1078 s 
 
180 235 
  
179.5 
  
129 
   
E 0 8 31 N 51 29 6 
177 BR1 Liddon Road BR1 2SR 3 2 1 1188 t 
 
230 
 
263 
 
220 203 207 160 130 137.5 
 
E 0 2 2 N 51 24 2 
178 BR2 Glanville Road BR2 9LN 3 1 2 980 t 
 
295 
  
293.5 236 
 
239 189 
 
148 
 
E 0 1 34 N 51 23 55 
  
248 
 
179 BR3 Broomfield Road BR3 3QD 3 1 2 1062 t 
 
278 312 337 
 
260 274 242.5 220 195 170 
 
E 0 2 19 N 51 24 0 
180 BR4 Langley Way BR4 0DR 3 1 2 1200 t 
 
305 
  
337 245 
 
240 
 
197.5 167 
 
W 0 0 
 
N 51 22 49 
181 BR5 Austin Road BR5 2BT 3 1 2 1120 s 
 
200 
  
222.5 
 
215 184 163 
   
E 0 6 11 N 51 23 15 
182 BR6 Lodge Crescent BR6 0QE 3 2 2 954 s 
 
280 
 
270 255 214 216 205 195 152 173 
 
E 0 6 21 N 51 22 35 
183 BR7 Woodside Avenue BR7 6BS 3 2 1 956 s 
 
300 
  
276 237 
  
210 180 
  
E 0 4 26 N 51 25 21 
184 BR8 Leechcroft Avenue BR8 8AP 3 1 1 922 s 
 
185 
 
227 228 
 
177 150 133 110 99 
 
E 0 10 57 N 51 23 49 
185 CR0 Rymer Road CR0 6EE 3 1 2 906 t 
 
196 248 225 210 
  
189 144 129 120 
 
W 0 4 58 N 51 23 4 
186 CR2 Hyde Road CR2 9NS 3 2 1 934 s 
 
260 304 290 272 247.5 248 250 220 168.5 
  
W 0 5 28 N 51 19 52 
187 CR3 Beechwood Road CR3 6NF 3 1 2 1149 s 
 
260 250 235 257.5 227 209 190 165 130 130 
 
W 0 4 29 N 51 17 22 
188 CR4 Mortimer Road CR4 3HS 3 1 2 1062 t 
 
220 
 
220 232 
   
176 
 
128 
 
W 0 10 2 N 51 24 36 
189 CR5 St Andrews Road CR5 3HA 3 1 2 988 s 
 
270 332 330 323 250 248 247 221 
 
177 
 
W 0 8 49 N 51 19 15 
190 CR6 Hillbury Road CR6 9TD 3 2 2 1225 s 
 
308 292 287.5 266.5 
 
250 240 191 
 
178 
 
W 0 4 16 N 51 18 35 
191 CR7 Buller Road CR7 8QW 3 1 2 941 t 
 
260 
 
275 246 
 
210 176 181 
   
W 0 5 33 N 51 24 10 
192 CR8 Valley Road CR8 5BU 3 1 2 921 s 
 
275 
  
255 
  
210 196.5 
   
W 0 5 25 N 51 19 7 
193 SM1 Prince Of Wales Road SM1 3PE 3 1 1 861 s 
 
240 
 
250 
  
193.5 
 
182 170 
  
W 0 10 47 N 51 22 31 
194 SM2 Belmont Road SM2 6DW 3 1 1 1043 t 
 
255 
 
278 
 
250 227 
  
153 
  
W 0 12 0 N 51 20 41 
195 SM3 Kingston Avenue SM3 9UF 3 1 2 1106 t 
 
250 295 285 255 236 230 210 185 167.5 158 
 
W 0 12 52 N 51 22 21 
196 SM4 Tudor Drive SM4 4PH 3 1 2 885 s 
 
240 
  
240 
 
203 
  
160 
  
W 0 13 22 N 51 23 26 
197 SM5 Bramblewood Close SM5 1PH 3 1 1 1034 t 
 
205 240 197 
   
167 162 138 
  
W 0 10 6 N 51 22 54 
198 SM6 Godalming Avenue SM6 8NH 3 1 2 920 t 
 
245 
    
230 195 
    
W 0 7 21 N 51 21 51 
199 SM7 Chipstead Way SM7 3JP 3 1 2 1111 s 
 
280 300 307 230 245 242 
 
197 170 
  
W 0 10 13 N 51 19 21 
200 KT1 Kenley Road KT1 3RR 3 1 2 1062 s 
 
325 
 
410 
   
265 
  
225 
 
W 0 16 34 N 51 24 33 
201 KT2 Tudor Drive KT2 5NW 3 2 2 1102 s 
 
450 
 
425 437 375 
 
347.5 
 
280 
  
W 0 18 14 N 51 25 48 
202 KT3 Claremont Avenue KT3 6QR 3 1 2 894 s 
 
300 355 350 
 
250 246 
 
216 
 
155 
 
W 0 14 24 N 51 23 42 
203 KT4 Elmstead Gardens KT4 7BG 3 2 2 928 t 
 
285 250 308 280 251 257 249 
  
165 
 
W 0 14 50 N 51 22 20 
204 KT5 Raeburn Avenue KT5 9EA 3 1 2 1011 s 
 
330 
  
283 
   
226 
   
W 0 16 53 N 51 23 24 
205 KT6 Ladywood Road KT6 7PD 3 1 2 985 t 
 
335 
 
273 245 
    
158 
  
W 0 17 13 N 51 22 37 
206 KT7 Greenwood Close KT7 0BG 3 1 2 956 s 
 
360 
   
315 270 
 
250 207.5 186 
 
W 0 19 48 N 51 22 57 
207 KT8 Hurst Road KT8 1QT 3 1 2 899 t 
 
300 285 
  
196 177 0 
    
W 0 22 36 N 51 24 21 
208 KT9 Sussex Gardens KT9 2PU 3 1 2 912 t 
 
240 250 266.5 266 
 
247 201 171 143 134 
 
W 0 18 40 N 51 21 41 
209 KT10 Coverts Road KT10 0LH 3 1 1 936 t 
 
320 
  
339 
 
350 317 268.5 252 
  
W 0 20 20 N 51 21 8 
210 KT11 Haleswood KT11 2NF 3 1 1 955 t 
 
360 367 
 
322 250 
   
215 
  
W 0 24 27 N 51 19 55 
211 KT12 Braycourt Avenue KT12 2AZ 3 1 2 878 t 
 
285 331 265 235 
  
211 176 173 170.5 
 
W 0 24 20 N 51 23 15 
212 KT13 Grotto Road KT13 8PN 3 1 2 956 s 
 
330 
  
295 
 
249 250 232 170 
  
W 0 27 5 N 51 22 37 
213 KT14 Caillard Road KT14 7JB 3 2 2 863 s 
 
250 
  
214 
 
177 169 147.5 118 
  
W 0 28 42 N 51 20 35 
214 KT15 King Georges Drive KT15 3RN 3 2 2 853 s 
 
250 
 
320 275 
    
  145 
 
W 0 30 12 N 51 21 3 
215 KT16 Fairway KT16 8EB 3 1 2 1191 t 
 
250 250 205 226 207.5 197 165 145 
 
143 
 
W 0 29 53 N 51 23 15 
216 KT17 Portway KT17 1SU 3 1 2 1081 s 
 
355 373 
   
270 295 210 
   
W 0 14 49 N 51 20 56 
217 KT18 Emily Davison Drive KT18 5QH 3 2 1 1018 t 
 
310 
   
278 272 235 248 
 
185 
 
W 0 14 28 N 51 18 29 
218 KT19 Horton Hill KT19 8SY 3 1 2 848 s 
 
240 
 
247 
  
194 
   
125 
 
W 0 16 32 N 51 20 30 
219 KT20 Preston Lane KT20 5HJ 3 1 2 860 t 
 
235 230 
  
179 
   
130.5 
  
W 0 13 55 N 51 18 0 
220 KT21 Taylor Road KT21 2HY 3 1 2 1044 s 
 
290 250 277.5 262 250 
  
223 190 150 
 
W 0 18 48 N 51 18 51 
221 KT22 Sunmead Close KT22 9AP 3 1 3 1133 s 
 
305 
  
245 257 262 227.5 
 
172.5 180 
 
W 0 20 17 N 51 17 33 
222 KT23 Beales Road KT23 4NA 3 2 3 1151 s 
 
315 307 
  
235 
  
215 
 
162 
 
W 0 22 18 N 51 16 26 
223 KT24 Manor Gardens KT24 5PF 3 2 2 1199 s 
 
350 
 
323.5 
  
250 
   
205 
 
W 0 23 46 N 51 16 4 
224 TW1 Newry Road TW1 1PL 3 1 1 857 t 
 
360 497 
 
480 460 416 367 337.5 265 305 
 
W 0 19 28 N 51 27 41 
225 TW2 Devon Avenue TW2 6PW 3 1 2 830 t 
 
300 290 333 285 256 275 
 
210 213 174 
 
W 0 21 17 N 51 26 50 
226 TW3 Park Road TW3 2HG 3 1 2 884 t 
 
275 
 
310 260 257 
 
227 201 208 
  
W 0 21 31 N 51 27 37 
227 TW4 Hinton Avenue TW4 6AR 3 1 2 907 s 
 
280 300 325 
 
241 244 245 170 150 
  
W 0 23 29 N 51 27 56 
228 TW5 Browning Way TW5 9BG 3 1 1 935 s 
 
265 282 327 267 280 
 
250 
 
187 169 
 
W 0 23 32 N 51 28 44 
229 TW7 The Drive TW7 4AE 3 1 2 997 s 
 
300 
 
303 
 
272 293 
 
232 183 
  
W 0 20 52 N 51 28 29 
230 TW8 Lionel Road North TW8 9QT 3 2 1 915 t 
 
325 
 
310 301 
 
262.5 238 
  
176.5 
 
W 0 17 50 N 51 29 41 
231 TW9 Manor Grove TW9 4QQ 3 1 2 815 t 
 
400 
 
360 287 320 
 
275 
 
225 200 
 
W 0 17 12 N 51 27 56 
232 TW10 Kingfisher Drive TW10 7UF 3 1 2 842 s 
 
335 423 350 
 
270 
 
250 247 210 
  
W 0 19 5 N 51 26 3 
233 TW11 Connaught Road TW11 0QF 3 2 1 935 t 
 
400 
   
419 
 
340 
    
W 0 21 4 N 51 25 46 
234 TW12 Coombe Crescent TW12 3PD 3 2 2 955 t 
 
325 
    
270 
 
230 
 
185 
 
W 0 22 59 N 51 25 20 
235 TW13 Rochester Avenue TW13 4EJ 3 1 2 1043 t 
 
210 
 
236 197 187 
 
172 
 
128 129 
 
W 0 25 18 N 51 26 35 
236 TW14 Sparrow Farm Drive TW14 0DP 3 1 1 881 t 
 
220 
 
220 190 194 190 158 143 123 
  
W 0 23 33 N 51 27 7 
237 TW15 Ashgrove Road TW15 1NY 3 1 2 1000 s 
 
250 
 
265 247 
    
185 
  
W 0 26 13 N 51 25 46 
238 TW16 Heathcroft Avenue TW16 7SP 3 1 2 943 t 
 
240 
 
238 
   
192 155 140 
  
W 0 25 14 N 51 25 13 
239 TW17 Gaston Way TW17 8EY 3 2 2 997 s 
 
280 
 
300 235 
 
248.5 235 210 
   
W 0 26 22 N 51 23 51 
240 TW18 Strodes Crescent TW18 1DG 3 2 2 1066 s 
 
265 296 268 229 216 232 
 
188 
 
158 
 
W 0 29 16 N 51 25 47 
241 TW19 Everest Road TW19 7ED 3 1 2 1170 s 
 
238 250 250 220 230 
  
169 150 131 
 
W 0 28 31 N 51 27 18 
242 TW20 Cherrywood Avenue TW20 0TF 3 1 2 997 t 
 
260 
  
236 
   
164 155 
  
W 0 34 59 N 51 25 30 
243 UB1 Tudor Road UB1 1NY 3 2 2 1029 t 
 
235 
 
220 220 203 200 
  
136 118 
 
W 0 23 6 N 51 30 48 
  
249 
 
244 UB2 Kingston Road UB2 4AW 3 1 2 1232 t 
 
260 219 
 
249 
 
212 
  
137 
  
W 0 22 40 N 51 30 14 
245 UB3 Hyde Way UB3 4PB 3 1 1 834 s 
 
250 
 
269 226 
 
221 219 154.5 
 
127 
 
W 0 25 14 N 51 29 55 
246 UB4 Blacklands Drive UB4 8EX 3 1 2 886 s 
 
220 
 
300 248 217 248 
 
183 164 137 
 
W 0 26 15 N 51 31 40 
247 UB5 Clauson Avenue UB5 4PR 3 2 2 874 t 
 
250 245 282 240 247.5 
  
195 157 146 
 
W 0 21 17 N 51 33 20 
248 UB6 Rosedene Avenue UB6 9SB 3 1 2 988 t 
 
275 
 
285 
 
244 
  
198 191 
  
W 0 22 5 N 51 31 59 
249 UB7 Edgar Road UB7 8HN 3 1 2 1133 s 
 
240 
  
235 250 225 198 
 
152 140 
 
W 0 28 5 N 51 30 46 
250 UB8 New Road UB8 3DX 3 1 2 935 s 
 
275 245 240 250 
 
232 189 175 152.5 148 
 
W 0 26 33 N 51 31 36 
251 UB9 Denham Green Close UB9 5NA 3 2 1 1015 s 
 
330 
 
300 
     
180 170 
 
W 0 29 50 N 51 34 49 
252 UB10 Star Road UB10 0QH 3 1 2 1030 s 
 
255 
 
276 247 
 
202 222 
 
145 
  
W 0 26 39 N 51 31 48 
253 HA0 Chaplin Road HA0 4UT 3 1 2 969 s 
 
265 
 
370 
 
249 269 232 180 150 167 
 
W 0 18 37 N 51 33 0 
254 HA1 Gloucester Road HA1 4PP 3 1 1 1203 s 
 
330 
 
355 343 
 
335 265 
    
W 0 21 33 N 51 35 9 
255 HA2 Malvern Avenue HA2 9EX 3 1 1 947 t 
 
265 
 
280 250 232 
 
204 193 155 160 
 
W 0 22 14 N 51 33 58 
256 HA3 Oakfield Avenue HA3 8TJ 3 1 2 1077 s 
 
288.5 
 
340 
  
280 255 
  
183 
 
W 0 18 51 N 51 35 38 
257 HA4 Long Drive HA4 0HL 3 1 2 882 s 
 
280 229 307 232 
 
249 
 
224 162.5 146 
 
W 0 23 29 N 51 33 34 
258 HA5 Melrose Road HA5 5RA 3 1 2 974 t 
 
325 
 
345 325 
 
260 250 248 200 166 
 
W 0 22 15 N 51 35 23 
259 HA6 Winchester Road HA6 1JG 3 1 2 952 s 
 
360 
  
258 270 
 
277 228 202 
  
W 0 24 47 N 51 35 50 
260 HA7 Taunton Way HA7 1DG 3 1 2 898 s 
 
290 
 
283 243 
 
242 
 
182 165 149 
 
W 0 17 36 N 51 35 54 
261 HA8 Vancouver Road HA8 5DA 3 1 3 1211 s 
 
280 
  
260 265 
  
218 
 
144 
 
W 0 16 18 N 51 36 10 
262 HA9 Grasmere Avenue HA9 8TQ 3 1 2 1079 t 
 
286.5 
   
238 
   
157 150 
 
W 0 17 58 N 51 34 22 
263 WD3 Links Way WD3 3RQ 3 2 2 1032 s 
 
290 345 272 
  
282 295 
 
178 180 
 
W 0 26 0 N 51 39 13 
264 WD4 The Orchard WD4 8JR 3 1 2 943 s 
 
325 
     
223 262 
   
W 0 26 55 N 51 42 42 
265 WD5 The Crescent WD5 0DS 3 1 2 924 s 
 
283 
 
308 282 250 262 203 164 140 
  
W 0 24 51 N 51 42 22 
266 WD6 Gateshead Road WD6 5LL 3 1 2 918 s 
 
270 
 
290 225 275 
 
243.5 170 
 
142 
 
W 0 16 25 N 51 40 6 
267 WD7 Trafford Close WD7 9HU 3 1 2 919 t 
 
310 
 
298 250 222 207 213 218 165 145 
 
W 0 17 24 N 51 41 49 
268 WD17 Lebanon Close WD17 4JW 3 1 2 954 s 
 
325 250 275 260 
 
235 
 
190 137 138 
 
W 0 25 34 N 51 40 49 
269 WD18 Cassiobridge Road WD18 7QL 3 2 2 1035 t 
 
200 243 232 193 180 191 164 149 127 112 
 
W 0 25 20 N 51 39 9 
270 WD19 Altham Gardens WD19 6HJ 3 1 1 851 s 
 
250 
 
225 
 
235 232 182 
    
W 0 23 24 N 51 37 19 
271 WD23 Highland Drive WD23 4LH 3 1 1 993 s 
 
280 295 
 
250 
 
260 
   
174 
 
W 0 21 13 N 51 38 23 
272 WD24 Maytree Crescent WD24 5NJ 3 1 2 1091 s 
 
270 
 
287 218 209 218 180 145 134 137 
 
W 0 24 49 N 51 41 0 
273 WD25 Kingswood Road WD25 0EF 3 1 2 948 s 
 
250 200 274 211 232 240 220 170 160 145 
 
W 0 23 58 N 51 41 20 
274 AL1 Cambridge Road AL1 5LG 3 1 2 937 s 
 
295 
 
295 300 
 
295 
 
232 182 
  
W 0 18 20 N 51 44 54 
275 AL2 Peters Avenue AL2 1NH 3 1 2 871 t 
 
220 225 218 
  
202 185 
  
132 
 
W 0 18 13 N 51 43 34 
276 AL3 Ladies Grove AL3 5TN 3 1 2 1006 s 
 
300 262 
    
250 
 
190 
  
W 0 20 50 N 51 45 45 
277 AL4 Beverley Gardens AL4 9BJ 3 1 1 834 t 
 
250 
 
260 287 270 223 
  
142 
  
W 0 17 42 N 51 46 10 
278 AL7 Dalewood AL7 2JP 3 1 2 891 t 
 
180 
 
233 215 195 178 165 
 
117 135 
 
W 0 9 56 N 51 47 44 
279 AL9 Old Hertford Road AL9 5EY 3 1 2 987 t 
 
240 250 
 
241 220 
  
185 153 
  
W 0 12 46 N 51 46 3 
280 AL10 Manor Road AL10 9LN 3 1 2 863 s 
 
225 
 
210 
   
190 
 
127 124 
 
W 0 14 7 N 51 46 17 
281 CM1 Begonia Close CM1 6NL 3 1 2 847 t 
 
185 202 190 145 128 158 151 114 98 88 
 
E 0 30 13 N 51 45 6 
282 CM4 The Meads CM4 0AD 3 1 2 987 t 
 
250 
    
227 205 
  
143 
 
E 0 22 51 N 51 40 15 
283 CM5 Longfields CM5 9DF 3 1 1 1179 s 
 
300 333 
 
275 
 
285 290 
 
214 200 
 
E 0 14 49 N 51 41 50 
284 CM11 Passingham Avenue CM11 2TA 3 1 1 831 s 
 
225 
 
230 
  
202 220 
 
154 107 
 
E 0 25 44 N 51 36 34 
285 CM12 Knightbridge Walk CM12 0HP 3 1 1 920 s 
 
265 
 
238 
 
225 196 210 143 
   
E 0 24 47 N 51 38 6 
286 CM13 Long Ridings Avenue CM13 1EE 3 1 1 903 s 
 
265 237 238 210 
 
240 202 154 151 
  
E 0 20 31 N 51 38 14 
287 CM14 Crescent Road CM14 5JR 3 1 2 1118 s 
 
284 
 
294 
   
210 
 
165 
  
E 0 17 51 N 51 36 45 
288 CM15 St Kildas Road CM15 9EX 3 2 1 1164 s 
 
257 
 
277 269 
 
226 
 
165 163 141 
 
E 0 17 47 N 51 37 47 
289 CM16 Lindsey Street CM16 6RE 3 1 1 871 t 
 
275 267 261 235 247 177 187 181 137 137 
 
E 0 6 41 N 51 42 27 
290 CM17 Elmbridge CM17 0JX 3 1 2 1013 s 
 
265 
 
295 250 220 297 208 165 150 143 
 
E 0 9 13 N 51 46 59 
291 CM18 Stile Croft CM18 6LW 3 1 2 969 t 
 
148 
 
147 154 
 
150 
 
122 80 76 
 
E 0 7 5 N 51 45 30 
292 CM19 Silvesters CM19 5NN 3 1 2 1071 s 
 
190 
 
230 
 
203 185 166 142 
   
E 0 4 1 N 51 45 30 
293 CM20 Ram Gorse CM20 1PZ 3 1 1 937 s 
 
260 
   
250 
 
215 
 
157 150 
 
E 0 4 55 N 51 46 32 
294 TN13 St Johns Hill TN13 3PB 3 1 2 984 s 
 
235 232 245 192 
 
190 177 145 124 100 
 
E 0 11 45 N 51 17 8 
295 TN14 Old London Road TN14 7AE 3 2 1 1216 s 
 
300 
  
295 
 
250 250 250 120 
  
E 0 8 42 N 51 20 14 
296 TN15 Oxenhill Road TN15 6RQ 3 1 2 827 t 
 
200 185 223 
 
177 
 
165 140 115 
  
E 0 12 45 N 51 18 22 
297 TN16 Jail Lane TN16 3SB 3 2 2 888 s 
 
240 
 
250 205 
 
232 185 188 128 120 
 
E 0 2 18 N 51 18 59 
298 SL0 Swallow Street SL0 0HQ 3 1 1 1071 s 
 
305 
 
282.5 
  
248.5 276 236 
 
143 
 
W 0 31 22 N 51 32 0 
299 SL1 Chiltern Road SL1 7NH 3 2 2 1022 s 
 
280 310 
 
282.5 
 
244 
 
230 168 172.5 
 
W 0 39 47 N 51 31 29 
300 SL2 Knolton Way SL2 5RY 3 2 2 1033 t 
 
218 180 230 210 207 184 185 
  
107 
 
W 0 34 13 N 51 31 18 
301 SL3 Verney Road SL3 8NY 3 1 2 1003 s 
 
245 
 
241 
  
170 
 
153 
   
W 0 32 40 N 51 30 3 
302 SL4 Wood Close SL4 3JZ 3 2 2 1109 t 
 
275 320 
  
225 262 
 
175 150 165 
 
W 0 36 43 N 51 28 9 
303 SL5 Francis Chichester 
Close 
SL5 9AG 3 1 2 1029 t 
 
250 
 
233 
 
204 
   
138 137 
 
W 0 39 58 N 51 24 11 
304 HP1 Shrubhill Road HP1 2BG 3 1 1 949 t 
 
215 165 
 
175 
 
195 
 
140 103 
  
W 0 29 46 N 51 45 3 
305 HP2 Kimpton Close HP2 7PN 3 1 2 900 t 
 
175 189 182 
  
175 
 
137 115 
  
W 0 26 18 N 51 46 32 
306 HP3 Deaconsfield Road HP3 9HZ 3 1 1 964 s 
 
215 
 
287 251 
   
145 165 
  
W 0 27 52 N 51 44 33 
307 HP5 Frances Street HP5 3ES 3 1 1 946 t 
 
210 257 
 
237 
  
209 140 142 132 
 
W 0 36 15 N 51 42 53 
308 HP6 Bridge Place HP6 6JF 3 1 1 852 t 
 
225 
  
237 
   
180 
   
W 0 35 27 N 51 40 26 
  
250 
 
309 HP7 White Lion Road HP7 9HZ 3 1 2 854 t 
 
240 
   
225 
  
165 
   
W 0 35 19 N 51 40 19 
310 HP9 Farmers Way HP9 2YY 3 1 1 900 t 
 
290 
      
235 201 185 
 
W 0 36 28 N 51 36 59 
311 GU20 Poplar Avenue GU20 6PW 3 2 2 1054 s 
 
350 337 336 265 
   
247 226 230 
 
W 0 40 18 N 51 22 24 
312 GU21 Westmead GU21 3BS 3 1 1 846 t 
 
230 
  
190 193 
   
139 114 
 
W 0 34 59 N 51 19 3 
313 GU22 Oriental Road GU22 7AH 3 1 2 876 s 
 
280 
  
270 271 
 
229 
  
175 
 
W 0 33 19 N 51 19 6 
314 GU24 Heath Drive GU24 0HQ 3 1 2 1035 t 
 
250 250 
 
241 
  
193 177 
   
W 0 38 0 N 51 18 21 
315 GU25 Stroude Road GU25 4DB 3 1 2 941 s 
 
350 
 
375 289 270 265 
 
220 200 200 
 
W 0 33 20 N 51 24 41 
                                                          
ǂ   floor area of  house is calculated as the sum of  floor areas of  bedroom, reception room and kitchen divided by 0.75, as the floor area of  bathroom, stairs and hall is 
estimated as 25% of  the total floor area of  a house. 
*   terraced house (t)   semi-detached house (s) 
 
 
Table 28   Sample flat data of London 
    Street Post code 
Bed-
room 
Bath-
room 
Recep-
tion 
Floor 
areaǂ 
  Price (10 US $/m²)    Longitude Latitude 
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000     ° ` ``   ° ` `` 
                            1 EC1 Goswell Road EC1V 7DX 2 1 1 742 
 
490 
 
427 320 
  
260 
    
W 0 5 56 N 51 31 32 
2 EC2 Barbican EC2Y 8BP 2 1 1 858 
 
535 500 598 432 377 
 
316 316 250 198 
 
W 0 5 44 N 51 31 6 
3 EC3 Pepys Street EC3N 2NU 2 2 1 875 
 
500 
 
685 
    
330 
   
W 0 4 39 N 51 30 39 
4 EC4 High Timber Street EC4V 3PS 2 2 1 951 
 
600 
     
320 
  
210 
 
W 0 5 46 N 51 30 39 
5 WC1 Naoroji Street WC1X 0GD 2 2 1 642 
 
495 560 486 440 
 
427 
     
W 0 6 38 N 51 31 42 
6 WC2 Tavistock Street WC2E 7PS 2 1 1 535 
 
495 
   
465 
  
350 
   
W 0 7 14 N 51 30 44 
7 N1 Baltic Place N1 5AQ 2 2 1 699 
 
365 350 335 350 305 243 230 203 173 162 
 
W 0 4 39 N 51 32 12 
8 N2 East End Road N2 0RX 2 2 1 600 
 
275 275 305 
 
244 
    
120 
 
W 0 10 41 N 51 35 29 
9 N3 Etchingham Park Road N3 2DS 2 2 1 660 
 
245 
 
360 
   
250 228 
 
173 
 
W 0 10 59 N 51 36 24 
10 N4 Tollington Park N4 3QT 2 1 1 561 
 
265 
 
265 243 184 195 195 194 131 127 
 
W 0 7 0 N 51 33 55 
11 N5 Drayton Park N5 1NF 2 2 1 731 
 
365 385 332 260 232 230 275 246 175 151 
 
W 0 6 13 N 51 33 19 
12 N6 Shepherds Hill N6 5RE 2 2 1 741 
 
310 
 
355 
  
295 
     
W 0 8 12 N 51 34 43 
13 N7 Bunning Way N7 9UP 2 1 1 742 
 
250 217 245 230 220 205 
 
130 122 100 
 
W 0 7 13 N 51 32 33 
14 N8 Tottenham Lane N8 7HF 2 2 1 737 
 
285 250 285 270 210 250 230 
    
W 0 2 34 N 51 35 0 
15 N9 Mottingham Road N9 8DY 2 1 1 684 
 
162 159 
   
152 125 107 
   
W 0 2 33 N 51 38 13 
16 N10 Colney Hatch Lane N10 1EB 2 2 1 597 
 
255 230 217 
  
187 182 179 126 113 
 
W 0 8 46 N 51 35 52 
17 N11 Sparkford Gardens N11 3GS 2 2 1 761 
 
300 
 
285 275 238 
  
215 180 
  
W 0 9 2 N 51 36 50 
18 N12 The Lindens N12 9DL 2 1 1 647 
 
225 
 
222 
 
170 174 180 170 135 110 
 
W 0 10 12 N 51 36 55 
19 N13 Davey Close N13 4EX 2 1 1 635 
 
245 
 
215 187.5 170 
 
135 
    
W 0 6 47 N 51 36 55 
20 N14 Leigh Hunt Drive N14 6DJ 2 1 1 545 
 
260 213 190 183 173 185 157 133 133 114 
 
W 0 7 34 N 51 37 44 
21 N15 St. Anns Road N15 3TR 2 1 1 676 
 
173 
 
170 160 148 125 132 104 105 75 
 
W 0 5 36 N 51 34 52 
22 N16 Manor Road N16 5SH 2 1 1 593 
 
215 175 
     
103 
 
90 
 
W 0 4 28 N 51 33 55 
23 N17 Lordship Lane N17 6RR 2 2 1 538 
 
140 
 
150 139 
 
125 123 85 75 59.5 
 
W 0 4 27 N 51 35 54 
24 N18 Moree Way N18 2UL 2 1 1 625 
 
140 
 
150 144.5 
  
123.5 99 
   
W 0 3 57 N 51 36 59 
25 N19 Goddard Place N19 5GT 2 2 1 614 
 
270 325 335 250 250 287 
 
235 171 181 
 
W 0 8 10 N 51 33 35 
26 N20 High Road N20 0PZ 2 1 1 612 
 
230 237 250 205 
 
225 
  
141 120 
 
W 0 10 38 N 51 37 30 
27 N21 Eversley Park Road N21 1NB 2 2 1 866 
 
250 277 245 235 
  
208 190 163 150 
 
W 0 6 39 N 51 38 34 
28 N22 Palmerston Road N22 8RJ 2 1 1 653 
 
230 
  
185.5 
 
165 
 
125 
   
W 0 6 51 N 51 36 43 
29 E1 Newark Street E1 2ET 2 1 1 614 
 
250 
 
214 
 
208 
 
180 160 150 
  
W 0 3 19 N 51 31 2 
30 E2 Victoria Park Square E2 9PQ 2 1 1 676 
 
325 
 
280 220 196 
   
174 140 
 
W 0 3 15 N 51 31 45 
31 E3 Wellington Road E3 4XG 2 1 1 582 
 
210 
  
167 159 152 145 
 
134 
  
W 0 1 28 N 51 31 27 
32 E4 Westward Road E4 8QJ 2 1 1 562 
 
165 167 155 
 
150 142.5 
  
84 
  
W 0 1 29 N 51 36 38 
33 E5 Warwick Grove E5 9LW 2 2 1 665 
 
187 
 
182 149.5 132 
      
W 0 3 22 N 51 33 54 
34 E6 Albatross Close E6 5NX 2 2 1 583 
 
170 203 185 
   
152 
    
E 0 3 32 N 51 31 8 
35 E7 Wellington Road E7 9BP 2 1 1 602 
 
188 250 200 
        
E 0 1 2 N 51 33 5 
36 E8 Holly Street E8 3XT 2 1 1 616 
 
250 
 
250 
   
210 191.5 
 
132 
 
W 0 4 19 N 51 32 27 
37 E9 Eastway E9 5JP 2 1 1 594 
 
170 
    
120 
 
105 
   
W 0 1 47 N 51 32 48 
38 E10 Skeltons Lane E10 5DB 2 1 1 460 
 
155 124 
  
110 
 
76 
  
58 
 
W 0 0 48 N 51 34 10 
39 E11 South Birkbeck Road E11 4HY 2 1 1 520 
 
190 
  
162 
 
144 136 
 
90 82 
 
E 0 0 6 N 51 33 23 
  
251 
 
    Street Post code 
Bed-
room 
Bath-
room 
Recep-
tion 
Floor 
areaǂ 
  Price (10 US $/m²)    Longitude Latitude 
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000     ° ` ``   ° ` `` 
40 E12 Queensberry Place E12 6UN 2 2 1 590 
 
215 187 188.5 172 165 166 166 140 130 
  
E 0 2 47 N 51 32 52 
41 E13 Orwell Road E13 9DH 2 1 1 511 
 
202 
 
210 
  
144 
     
E 0 2 0 N 51 31 58 
42 E14 Limehouse Causeway E14 8AG 2 2 1 645 
 
240 
     
160 
    
W 0 1 45 N 51 30 34 
43 E15 Chopwell Close E15 4RP 2 1 1 561 
 
220 200 250 214 195 181.5 160 140 
 
100 
 
E 0 0 13 N 51 32 22 
44 E16 Connaught Road E16 2AE 2 1 1 549 
 
220 
 
215 165 155 
 
153 145 
   
E 0 2 37 N 51 30 11 
45 E17 Hawthorne Road E17 4QB 2 2 1 597 
 
175 
    
165 
     
W 0 1 9 N 51 35 24 
46 E18 Victoria Road E18 1LF 2 1 1 543 
 
218 210 
 
168 165 150 140 
  
98 
 
E 0 1 59 N 51 35 25 
47 SE1 Weston Street SE1 3QZ 2 2 1 700 
 
375 355 
 
320 340 260 
 
220 190 170 
 
E 0 5 8 N 51 30 5 
48 SE2 Chantry Close SE2 9PP 2 1 1 530 
 
165 
    
176 
     
W 0 7 15 N 51 29 29 
49 SE3 Westcombe Park Road SE3 7QX 2 1 1 667 
 
270 
 
270 190 
  
177.5 
    
W 0 0 45 N 51 28 42 
50 SE4 Adelaide Avenue SE4 1YR 2 1 1 655 
 
225 243 217.5 187 
 
173 
 
140 
 
117 
 
W 0 1 43 N 51 27 32 
51 SE5 Albany Road SE5 0DS 2 2 1 542 
 
230 227 215 
  
180 165 155 130 116 
 
E 0 4 38 N 51 29 15 
52 SE6 Britton Close SE6 1AP 2 1 1 648 
 
170 
 
162 154 155 144 
  
117 
  
W 0 0 29 N 51 26 43 
53 SE7 Floyd Road SE7 8AY 2 1 1 544 
 
165 
 
200 
 
170 
  
119 
 
76 
 
E 0 2 0 N 51 29 12 
54 SE8 Glaisher Street SE8 3ES 2 1 1 529 
 
270 
 
247 210 179 202 168.5 167.5 172 140 
 
W 0 1 8 N 51 28 55 
55 SE9 Pullman Place SE9 6EG 2 1 1 597 
 
165 166 167 142 
 
140 
 
110 
 
92 
 
E 0 2 54 N 51 27 17 
56 SE10 Blackheath Road SE10 8DA 2 1 1 828 
 
235 194 220 
   
170 
  
107 
 
W 0 1 5 N 51 28 23 
57 SE11 Wincott Street SE11 4NY 2 1 1 588 
 
290 280 
 
262 235 
 
207 233 202 145 
 
W 0 6 31 N 51 29 29 
58 SE12 Burnt Ash Hill SE12 0AN 2 1 1 705 
 
170 
 
165 154 149 156 
  
93 88 
 
E 0 1 9 N 51 26 32 
59 SE13 Belmont Grove SE13 5DU 2 1 1 682 
 
200 220 218 205 
 
170 
  
136 131 
 
W 0 0 12 N 51 27 48 
60 SE14 Sterling Gardens SE14 6DU 2 1 1 674 
 
200 185 174 158 125 
 
125 
 
94 
  
W 0 2 30 N 51 28 49 
61 SE15 Kelly Avenue SE15 5LH 2 1 1 616 
 
209 212 226.5 190 
  
170 
    
W 0 4 31 N 51 28 28 
62 SE16 Brunel Road SE16 7HU 2 2 1 828 
 
300 327 
 
250 225 
  
170 
   
W 0 3 1 N 51 30 5 
63 SE17 St Pauls Terrace SE17 3QH 2 1 1 524 
 
240 256 
  
217 164 
 
160 160 121 
 
W 0 6 9 N 51 29 6 
64 SE18 Plumstead High Street SE18 1JH 2 1 1 638 
 
130 
 
135 130 
 
107 
  
78 
  
E 0 5 37 N 51 29 13 
65 SE19 Crystal Palace Park 
Road 
SE19 2LB 2 1 1 586 
 
210 
   
183 180 160 141 
   
W 0 4 42 N 51 25 6 
66 SE20 Howard Road SE20 8HH 2 1 1 779 
 
180 
 
175 
 
162 130 120 119 
   
W 0 3 24 N 51 24 44 
67 SE21 Glazebrook Close SE21 8RP 2 1 1 749 
 
220 199 248 
   
174 
 
121 
  
W 0 5 26 N 51 26 21 
68 SE22 East Dulwich Road SE22 9AN 2 1 1 523 
 
265 
 
232 
  
175 
   
110 
 
W 0 4 23 N 51 27 39 
69 SE23 Perry Vale SE23 2LG 2 1 1 530 
 
200 
 
209 
 
147 149 133 
 
80 72 
 
W 0 3 7 N 51 26 12 
70 SE24 Half Moon Lane SE24 9HS 2 1 1 621 
 
275 212 187 225 192 168 
   
115 
 
W 0 5 45 N 51 27 9 
71 SE25 Tennison Road SE25 5RP 2 1 1 615 
 
160 169 165 
   
133 132 105 
  
W 0 4 54 N 51 23 46 
72 SE26 Cricketers Walk SE26 6DR 2 1 1 606 
 
200 
 
160 
  
163 152.5 
 
118 89 
 
W 0 3 23 N 51 25 31 
73 SE27 Norwood Road SE27 9DD 2 1 1 737 
 
200 245 210 
 
182 
      
W 0 6 18 N 51 26 15 
74 SE28 Greenhaven Drive SE28 8FY 2 1 1 578 
 
154 167 157 145 
 
127 
     
E 0 6 44 N 51 30 34 
75 SW1 Cambridge Street SW1V 4EQ 2 1 1 730 
 
375 465 475 365 326 
 
296 
 
248 
  
W 0 8 29 N 51 29 19 
76 SW2 Belvedere Place SW2 5TD 2 2 1 677 
 
232.5 280 260 
 
222 192 
  
158 
  
W 0 7 15 N 51 27 38 
77 SW4 St Alphonsus Road SW4 7AW 2 1 1 589 
 
285 283 292 
  
226.5 197 
  
152 
 
W 0 8 15 N 51 27 38 
78 SW5 Collingham Place SW5 0QE 2 2 1 732 
 
479 500 472 
 
352 340 
 
343 305 
  
W 0 11 21 N 51 29 40 
79 SW6 St Olafs Road SW6 7DL 2 1 1 688 
 
345 360 333 303 265 260 230 
 
210 172 
 
W 0 12 32 N 51 28 47 
80 SW7 Cromwell Road SW7 4XB 2 2 1 1001 
 
750 785 685 
  
465 390 
 
300 
  
W 0 11 16 N 51 29 44 
81 SW8 Vauxhall Grove SW8 1TB 2 1 1 607 
 
310 
 
327 265 247 
  
220 202 180 
 
W 0 7 17 N 51 29 6 
82 SW9 Turner Close SW9 6UQ 2 1 1 602 
 
265 215 245 
 
186 
  
158 145 138 
 
W 0 6 7 N 51 28 36 
83 SW10 Coleherne Road SW10 9BS 2 1 1 688 
 
450 
 
467 365 
 
300 275 
  
250 
 
W 0 11 26 N 51 29 19 
84 SW11 Rochelle Close SW11 2RY 2 1 1 682 
 
340 
 
310 
   
260 
    
W 0 10 49 N 51 27 42 
85 SW12 Nightingale Lane SW12 8NS 2 1 1 666 
 
320 329 315 
  
230 217.5 
  
165 
 
W 0 9 28 N 51 27 2 
86 SW13 Hillersdon Avenue SW13 0EG 2 1 1 738 
 
365 362 
 
300 
 
305 
   
182 
 
W 0 14 38 N 51 28 21 
87 SW14 St Leonards Road SW14 7NG 2 1 1 716 
 
275 257 290 230 220 218 190 196 195 182.5 
 
W 0 16 11 N 51 28 2 
88 SW15 Putney Hill SW15 6BJ 2 1 1 744 
 
295 282 305 
  
220 226 
 
202 
  
W 0 13 8 N 51 27 22 
89 SW16 Averil Grove SW16 3ET 2 1 1 709 
 
200 173 202.5 
 
171.5 
  
105 87 83 
 
W 0 6 33 N 51 25 8 
90 SW17 Longley Road SW17 9LE 2 1 1 768 
 
225 215 
   
180 168 
  
129 
 
W 0 9 49 N 51 25 13 
91 SW18 Frogmore SW18 1HL 2 1 1 544 
 
280 305 295 266 235 234 220 200 188 176 
 
W 0 11 49 N 51 27 30 
92 SW19 Kipling Drive SW19 1TN 2 1 1 509 
 
240 190 250 201 192.5 
 
178 
 
136 117 
 
W 0 10 48 N 51 25 25 
93 SW20 Rothesay Avenue SW20 8JU 2 1 1 676 
 
250 226 220 190 166 
 
176 153 
 
126 
 
W 0 12 51 N 51 24 38 
94 W1 Wells Street W1T 3PN 2 2 1 794 
 
695 750 
  
427 415 
   
310 
 
W 0 8 23 N 51 31 7 
95 W2 Orsett Terrace W2 6JT 2 1 1 543 
 
395 
 
325 
 
244 
 
195 225 161.5 
  
W 0 11 1 N 51 31 5 
96 W3 Manor Court W3 8JX 2 1 1 623 
 
250 
 
270 227 205 
 
207 
 
185 145 
 
W 0 16 53 N 51 29 41 
97 W4 Chaseley Drive W4 4BD 2 2 1 613 
 
300 236 295 
 
265 202 
     
W 0 16 37 N 51 29 28 
98 W5 Ealing Village W5 2LY 2 1 1 628 
 
250 280 275.5 272 245 
 
235 
 
190 163 
 
W 0 17 49 N 51 30 57 
99 W6 Cromwell Avenue W6 9LB 2 1 1 638 
 
335 
 
320 300 230 215 205 
  
165 
 
W 0 14 8 N 51 29 31 
100 W7 Church Road W7 3BX 2 1 1 723 
 
250 
  
234 
 
212.5 
 
185 
 
139 
 
W 0 20 40 N 51 30 52 
101 W8 Pembroke Road W8 6DL 2 1 1 636 
 
595 542 
    
285 256 
   
W 0 11 49 N 51 29 42 
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102 W9 Maida Vale W9 1RJ 2 1 1 508 
 
300 212 240 213 235 
 
187 
 
177 
  
W 0 11 1 N 51 31 50 
103 W10 St Ervans Road W10 5QY 2 1 1 806 
 
310 
   
250 
 
216 178 149 
  
W 0 12 24 N 51 31 21 
104 W11 Lorne Gardens W11 4XX 2 2 1 700 
 
450 
 
363 350 285 235 280 250 220 220 
 
W 0 12 55 N 51 30 14 
105 W12 Coningham Road W12 8BY 2 1 1 655 
 
310 
 
320 
  
195 
     
W 0 14 5 N 51 30 18 
106 W13 Woburn W13 8DS 2 1 1 623.5 
 
260 
  
212 
  
158 
  
96 
 
W 0 19 7 N 51 31 28 
107 W14 Kensington High Street W14 8NY 2 1 1 576 
 
445 415 525 442 
    
235 220 
 
W 0 12 7 N 51 29 54 
108 NW1 Regents Park Road NW1 8AT 2 2 1 624 
 
460 457 415 500 
 
350 
     
W 0 9 13 N 51 32 36 
109 NW2 Campbell Gordon Way NW2 6RW 2 1 1 521 
 
245 
 
245 
  
180 
 
148 134 
  
W 0 13 53 N 51 33 30 
110 NW3 Adelaide Road NW3 5EB 2 2 1 673 
 
380 
  
280 
 
280 
  
225 175 
 
W 0 10 28 N 51 32 32 
111 NW4 Great North Way NW4 1PN 2 1 1 616 
 
245 242 
  
210 220 208.5 200 
 
143 
 
W 0 13 14 N 51 35 52 
112 NW5 Dartmouth Park Hill NW5 1HR 2 1 1 568 
 
360 
 
313 272 
 
207.5 
 
203 
 
160 
 
W 0 8 25 N 51 33 33 
113 NW6 Cavendish Road NW6 7XW 2 1 1 518 
 
300 
 
310 246 247 226 
 
180 170 150 
 
W 0 12 17 N 51 32 40 
114 NW7 Grenville Place NW7 3SF 2 1 1 609 
 
250 205 235 225 
 
220 195 165 155 130 
 
W 0 15 30 N 51 36 55 
115 NW8 Grove End Road NW8 9HL 2 1 1 657 
 
424.5 
 
400 
  
299 
   
173 
 
W 0 10 30 N 51 31 41 
116 NW9 Elmwood Crescent NW9 9AB 2 1 1 643 
 
210 216 185 185 151 140 142 
 
92 88.5 
 
W 0 15 51 N 51 35 18 
117 NW10 Butler Road NW10 9RT 2 1 1 641 
 
170 215 
   
155 127 
    
W 0 14 56 N 51 32 41 
118 NW11 Finchley Road NW11 6XX 2 1 1 632 
 
285 
 
282 246 249 240 210 165 
   
W 0 11 57 N 51 35 9 
119 EN1 Park Avenue EN1 2HR 2 1 1 490 
 
180 186 189 160 157 
 
160 126 114 83.5 
 
W 0 4 46 N 51 38 37 
120 EN2 Perry Mead EN2 8BZ 2 1 1 569 
 
200 
  
170 
  
155 
 
114 
  
W 0 5 38 N 51 39 39 
121 EN3 Roedean Avenue EN3 5QN 2 1 1 507 
 
145 135 142.5 133.5 142.5 131 
 
100 84 
  
W 0 2 45 N 51 39 53 
122 EN4 St Wilfrids Road EN4 9SB 2 1 1 548 
 
210 214 200 
 
152 147.5 
 
128 
 
116 
 
W 0 9 57 N 51 38 50 
123 EN5 Leicester Road EN5 5DY 2 1 1 537 
 
200 
 
210 
  
182 170 
 
125 
  
W 0 11 5 N 51 38 54 
124 EN6 Wayside EN6 5NE 2 1 1 657 
 
170 
 
161 150 
 
125 
 
91 93 
  
W 0 10 5 N 51 41 35 
125 EN7 Valley View EN7 5HL 2 1 1 718 
 
180 171 154 160 157 
 
125 
 
108 
  
W 0 5 10 N 51 42 38 
126 EN8 Turners Hill EN8 8SA 2 1 1 619 
 
165 
 
143 138 132 131 120 
 
95 75 
 
W 0 2 1 N 51 42 1 
127 EN9 Peregrin Road EN9 3PF 2 1 1 503 
 
160 170 167 
 
151 145 
 
110 
   
E 0 1 32 N 51 41 5 
128 EN10 Mulberry Close EN10 6HN 2 1 1 564 
 
146 
 
160 
 
125 
 
119 
 
83 
  
W 0 1 17 N 51 43 40 
129 EN11 Village Close EN11 0GQ 2 1 1 526 
 
155 160 
  
140 143 133 122.5 94 70 
 
E 0 0 27 N 51 46 5 
130 IG1 Hyacinth Close IG1 2FT 2 1 1 634 
 
150 168 
 
145 150 125 118 105 71 72 
 
E 0 4 15 N 51 32 38 
131 IG2 St Peters Close IG2 7QL 2 1 1 626 
 
150 175 157 140 
  
112 115 81 
  
E 0 5 55 N 51 34 57 
132 IG3 Express Drive IG3 9RD 2 1 1 551 
 
175 146 155 
 
125 130 
  
70 
  
E 0 7 1 N 51 33 57 
133 IG4 Margaret Way IG4 5DE 2 1 1 633 
 
190 208 220 172 
 
152 130 
 
97.5 95 
 
E 0 3 3 N 51 34 36 
134 IG5 Heathcote Avenue IG5 0QR 2 1 1 659 
 
170 
 
187 170 145 147 140 120 
 
92 
 
E 0 3 38 N 51 35 41 
135 IG6 Hatfield Close IG6 2JJ 2 1 1 659 
 
160 160 170 
 
153 152.5 
 
125 
   
E 0 4 33 N 51 35 26 
136 IG7 Keats Close IG7 5NU 2 1 1 594 
 
160 
 
175 155 144 
 
142 
 
80 73 
 
E 0 5 4 N 51 36 25 
137 IG8 The Bridle Path IG8 9LD 2 1 1 641 
 
190 
   
160 
 
148 
  
85 
 
E 0 0 37 N 51 36 17 
138 IG9 Cedar Close IG9 6EJ 2 1 1 567 
 
200 225 215 177 173 172 171 150 110 102 
 
E 0 2 55 N 51 37 25 
139 IG10 Chigwell Lane IG10 3UA 2 1 1 511 
 
165 195 173 171 155 163 153 116 96 92 
 
E 0 4 56 N 51 38 45 
140 IG11 Wanderer Drive IG11 0XN 2 1 1 533 
 
140 127 
 
136 
   
100 
   
E 0 7 3 N 51 31 33 
141 RM1 Monkwood Close RM1 2NQ 2 1 1 570 
 
170 166 162 169 162 150 149 129 107 98 
 
E 0 11 36 N 51 34 38 
142 RM2 Royle Close RM2 5PS 2 1 1 613 
 
175 165 142 
 
155 142 127 122 87 
  
E 0 12 3 N 51 34 31 
143 RM3 Holdbrook Way RM3 0JD 2 1 1 605 
 
139 151 156 
 
123 139 
 
103 82.5 67 
 
E 0 13 54 N 51 35 30 
144 RM4 Ongar Road RM4 1BN 2 2 1 737 
 
255 
 
319 
   
249 
 
195 
  
E 0 7 7 N 51 39 6 
145 RM5 Chelmsford Avenue RM5 3XH 2 1 1 769 
 
150 
  
140 130 
   
78 
  
E 0 10 40 N 51 36 5 
146 RM6 Padnall Road RM6 5ER 2 1 1 669 
 
135 120 132 123 
 
108 92 
    
E 0 8 9 N 51 34 55 
147 RM7 Dagenham Road RM7 0TH 2 1 1 604 
 
150 150 137 132 
 
122 117 
 
81 63 
 
E 0 10 31 N 51 33 47 
148 RM8 Emerald Gardens RM8 1LG 2 1 1 552 
 
125 
 
155 
  
134 
   
66 
 
E 0 8 57 N 51 33 43 
149 RM9 Wagstaff Gardens RM9 4HQ 2 1 1 531 
 
135 143 163 137.5 132 136 115 85 80 76 
 
E 0 7 14 N 51 32 15 
150 RM10 Honey Close RM10 8TF 2 1 1 570 
 
130 107 126 116 109 101 90 70 53 57 
 
E 0 9 38 N 51 32 30 
151 RM11 Ardleigh Green Road RM11 2SR 2 1 1 666 
 
165 157 160 133 
 
133 
  
79 
  
E 0 13 16 N 51 35 7 
152 RM12 Wood Lane RM12 5NH 2 1 1 553 
 
160 
 
162 142 132 
 
115 86 82.5 
  
E 0 12 5 N 51 32 35 
153 RM13 Malan Square RM13 7JA 2 1 1 655 
 
125 
 
135 126 119 120 97 77 63 
  
E 0 11 54 N 51 32 36 
154 RM14 Macon Way RM14 1NZ 2 1 1 616 
 
152 157 144 124 
  
99 
 
67 
  
E 0 16 20 N 51 34 14 
155 RM15 Gidea Close RM15 6PF 2 1 1 499 
 
106 125 125 116 116 104 89 61 54 47 
 
E 0 17 43 N 51 31 23 
156 RM16 Grenville Road RM16 6BG 2 1 1 556 
 
155 149 152 135 137 135 120 117 99 83 
 
E 0 17 17 N 51 28 59 
157 RM17 Vicarage Square RM17 6JJ 2 1 1 501 
 
125 124 130 115 110 107 95 82 54 48 
 
E 0 19 15 N 51 28 30 
158 RM18 Queen Mary Avenue RM18 8NR 2 1 1 554 
 
90 93 110 
 
101 84 78 51 45 35 
 
E 0 25 15 N 51 28 54 
159 RM19 Harrisons Wharf RM19 1QW 2 1 1 716 
 
146 158 152 149 
 
150 132 121 90 87 
 
E 0 13 57 N 51 28 54 
160 RM20 Oakley Close RM20 4AN 2 1 1 575 
 
115 123 105 103 105 93 77 56 49 42 
 
E 0 17 30 N 51 28 33 
161 DA1 Churchill Close DA1 1QL 2 1 1 499 
 
110 
 
116 115 107 107 89 70 65 53 
 
E 0 14 16 N 51 26 12 
162 DA2 Osbourne Road DA2 6RL 2 1 1 537 
 
123 127 120 102 104 104 94 75 55 48 
 
E 0 14 15 N 51 26 48 
163 DA3 Meadow Lane DA3 8PW 2 1 1 623 
 
130 169 156 145 140 138 122 115 95 75 
 
E 0 18 22 N 51 21 57 
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164 DA4 Old Mill Close DA4 0BN 2 1 1 626 
 
162 185 172 145 164 156 155 140 115 96 
 
E 0 13 4 N 51 22 22 
165 DA5 Bexley High Street DA5 1AH 2 1 1 507 
 
180 190 
   
135 145 
    
E 0 8 57 N 51 26 29 
166 DA6 Robin Hood Lane DA6 8LL 2 1 1 635 
 
168 
    
150 
   
93 
 
E 0 8 7 N 51 27 13 
167 DA7 East Street DA7 4HJ 2 1 1 644 
 
185 180 172 165 165 160 155 
 
105 91 
 
E 0 8 55 N 51 27 28 
168 DA8 Frobisher Road DA8 2PQ 2 1 1 544 
 
110 
 
115 
 
108 
 
91 80 59 
  
E 0 11 16 N 51 28 37 
169 DA9 Chalice Way DA9 9PR 2 1 1 575 
 
130 
 
135 136 133 127 115 95 90 70 
 
E 0 15 56 N 51 26 57 
170 DA10 Gilbert Close DA10 0NH 2 1 1 715 
 
135 100 123 105 108 100 
   
50 
 
E 0 17 47 N 51 26 39 
171 DA11 London Road DA11 9JR 2 1 2 489 
 
141.5 133 125 103 95 98 
 
85 
   
E 0 20 56 N 51 26 31 
172 DA12 Fenners Marsh DA12 2JB 2 1 1 579 
 
125 
   
130 
      
E 0 24 0 N 51 26 9 
173 DA13 Lances Close DA13 0EU 2 1 1 576 
 
120 
          
E 0 21 37 N 51 22 37 
174 DA14 Sidcup Hill DA14 6JS 2 1 1 523 
 
125 
    
128 126 
  
74 
 
E 0 6 55 N 51 25 13 
175 DA15 Manor Road DA15 7JA 2 1 1 705 
 
165 190 177.5 165 156.5 150 140 130 97 88 
 
E 0 6 0 N 51 25 55 
176 DA16 Axminster Crescent DA16 1EZ 2 1 1 529 
 
145 
   
140 
    
68.5 
 
E 0 7 14 N 51 28 18 
177 DA17 Hattersfield Close DA17 5QT 2 1 1 496 
 
125 
 
139 
    
110 
 
71.5 
 
E 0 8 34 N 51 29 19 
178 BR1 Blyth Road BR1 3RS 2 1 1 613 
 
205 190 211 
  
159 160 132 
 
100 
 
E 0 0 34 N 51 24 32 
179 BR2 Durham Avenue BR2 0RF 2 1 1 572 
 
200 180 187 153 152 152 141 120 100 101 
 
E 0 0 33 N 51 23 55 
180 BR3 Cadogan Close BR3 5XY 2 1 1 767 
 
212.5 226 
  
175 145 
  
124 106 
 
E 0 0 19 N 51 24 27 
181 BR4 High Street BR4 0LE 2 1 1 635 
 
215 
 
245 222.5 
 
222.5 197.5 
    
W 0 1 25 N 51 22 38 
182 BR5 Craylands BR5 3HA 2 1 1 631 
 
130 148 
 
137.5 140 146 125 115 91 82 
 
E 0 6 54 N 51 23 51 
183 BR6 Hilda Vale Close BR6 7AH 2 1 1 659 
 
199 195 197 
 
167 163 138 
 
108 111 
 
E 0 3 37 N 51 21 45 
184 BR7 Lower Camden BR7 5JE 2 1 1 694 
 
230 
  
220.5 
   
170 
   
E 0 3 12 N 51 24 33 
185 BR8 Edwards Gardens BR8 8HR 2 1 1 608 
 
140 165 
   
107 
  
60 52 
 
E 0 10 5 N 51 23 33 
186 CR0 Hardcastle Close CR0 6XQ 2 1 1 650 
 
150 175 163.5 
 
151 150 138 96.5 100 87.5 
 
W 0 4 30 N 51 23 19 
187 CR2 Heathhurst Road CR2 0BA 2 1 1 475 
 
165 
  
136 164 149 147 120 107 
  
W 0 5 28 N 51 20 53 
188 CR3 Bushes Road CR3 0BX 2 1 1 559 
 
175 188 160 160 155 147 130 119 105 82 
 
W 0 4 19 N 51 18 2 
189 CR4 Mullards Close CR4 4FF 2 1 1 661 
 
150 165 161 134 138 142 120 100 90 79 
 
W 0 9 46 N 51 22 54 
190 CR5 Coulsdon Road CR5 1EA 2 1 1 563 
 
178 
   
140.5 122.5 
   
81 
 
W 0 7 15 N 51 18 26 
191 CR6 Succombs Hill CR6 9JG 2 1 1 663 
 
160 144 158 164 
 
145 
   
92 
 
W 0 4 7 N 51 18 1 
192 CR7 Warwick Road CR7 7NH 2 1 1 552 
 
150 
 
150 156 
 
148 
 
92.5 
 
72 
 
W 0 6 57 N 51 24 6 
193 CR8 High Street CR8 2AD 2 1 1 594 
 
170 162 
    
134 112 
 
95 
 
W 0 6 47 N 51 20 25 
194 SM1 Glena Mount SM1 4HW 2 1 1 722 
 
165 185 175 160 160 
 
145 
 
98 91 
 
W 0 11 13 N 51 22 8 
195 SM2 Cedar Gardens SM2 5EQ 2 1 1 551 
 
165 190 
   
133 152 128 105 94 
 
W 0 11 18 N 51 21 29 
196 SM3 Chelsea Gardens SM3 9TN 2 1 1 572 
 
170 175 170 171 151 142 128 123 88 72 
 
W 0 12 48 N 51 22 7 
197 SM4 London Road SM4 5HG 2 1 1 499 
 
150 190 177 158 155 130 134 
 
90 
  
W 0 11 53 N 51 23 54 
198 SM5 Philips Close SM5 2FE 2 1 1 695 
 
162 187 158 155 
       
W 0 9 39 N 51 22 49 
199 SM6 Foxglove Way SM6 7JU 2 1 1 543 
 
145 169 169 150 141 141 137 111 89 76 
 
W 0 9 13 N 51 22 51 
200 SM7 Dunnymans Road SM7 2AN 2 1 1 607 
 
200 178 185 175 
 
160 
  
128 102.5 
 
W 0 12 37 N 51 19 27 
201 KT1 Kingsworthy Close KT1 3ER 2 1 1 538 
 
220 192 189 173 168 170 162 152 119 118 
 
W 0 17 36 N 51 24 26 
202 KT2 Sopwith Way KT2 5AG 2 1 1 588 
 
225 248 250 225 227 227 220 189 175 
  
W 0 18 8 N 51 24 48 
203 KT3 Wickham Close KT3 6AN 2 1 1 627 
 
210 190 
 
202 155 164 165 165 127.5 
  
W 0 15 15 N 51 23 37 
204 KT4 Percy Gardens KT4 7SA 2 1 1 760 
 
200 195 205 
 
152 175 172 137 120 105 
 
W 0 15 46 N 51 22 58 
205 KT5 Cranes Park Avenue KT5 8BU 2 1 1 641 
 
225 
 
285 219 205 216 173 163 127 137 
 
W 0 17 56 N 51 23 58 
206 KT6 Kingswood Close KT6 6DZ 2 1 1 688 
 
210 
 
245 250 217 
 
191.5 159 
   
W 0 18 3 N 51 23 22 
207 KT7 Portsmouth Road KT7 0TE 2 1 1 568 
 
230 247 257 219 187 186 175 162 140 136 
 
W 0 19 40 N 51 23 14 
208 KT8 Walton Road KT8 2HT 2 1 1 814 
 
165 177 160 150 
 
142 125 
 
83 65 
 
W 0 21 37 N 51 24 3 
209 KT9 North Parade KT9 1QN 2 1 1 630 
 
175 190 210 165 163.5 173 150 
 
105.5 
  
W 0 17 56 N 51 21 53 
210 KT10 Garson Road KT10 8LN 2 1 1 628 
 
215 
 
225 175 175 
 
203 
 
144 
  
W 0 22 57 N 51 21 49 
211 KT11 Lyster Mews KT11 1LA 2 2 1 640 
 
225 240 220 201.5 195 197 
 
162 
 
159 
 
W 0 24 28 N 51 20 7 
212 KT12 Nelson Close KT12 2ND 2 1 1 719 
 
175 165 
 
140 
  
141 117 
 
85 
 
W 0 24 42 N 51 23 7 
213 KT13 Oatlands Drive KT13 9JH 2 1 1 740 
 
225 
  
250 
 
200 
 
180 169 
  
W 0 25 49 N 51 22 58 
214 KT14 Petersham Close KT14 7HT 2 1 1 647 
 
185 171 187 
  
154 153 136 120 94 
 
W 0 28 32 N 51 20 27 
215 KT15 Langton Close KT15 2EF 2 1 1 578 
 
160 161 175 140 145 145 128 124 102 97 
 
W 0 29 38 N 51 22 39 
216 KT16 Tucker Road KT16 0HD 2 1 1 509 
 
165 147 165 159 
 
145 147 116 87 83 
 
W 0 31 41 N 51 21 54 
217 KT17 Chessington Road KT17 1TQ 2 1 1 595 
 
200 227 218 209 190 
 
186 144 
 
134.5 
 
W 0 15 12 N 51 21 7 
218 KT18 Dorking Road KT18 7NN 2 1 1 672 
 
200 
   
188 180 
 
150 123 
  
W 0 16 39 N 51 19 33 
219 KT19 Poplar Crescent KT19 9ER 2 1 1 737 
 
190 
 
224 197 186 
 
159 134 121 104.5 
 
W 0 16 35 N 51 21 36 
220 KT20 Watermead KT20 5HB 2 1 1 721 
 
155 
 
171 
 
156 152 135 115 103 
  
W 0 14 19 N 51 17 56 
221 KT21 Greville Park Road KT21 2QN 2 1 1 626 
 
200 175 203 200 
  
145 135 127 95 
 
W 0 18 10 N 51 18 33 
222 KT22 Epsom Road KT22 8TA 2 2 1 575 
 
200 
 
197 165 157 
  
140 103 94.5 
 
W 0 19 16 N 51 17 50 
223 KT23 Eastwick Park Avenue KT23 3LR 2 1 1 548 
 
176 172 165 153 
 
147 140 
 
113 105 
 
W 0 22 10 N 51 16 55 
224 KT24 Farleys Close KT24 6NB 2 1 1 576 
 
210 
 
230 179 
 
160 
 
135 111 
  
W 0 27 7 N 51 16 41 
225 TW1 Clifden Road TW1 4LR 2 1 1 738 
 
250 
 
285 247 
 
232.5 215 216 168.5 133 
 
W 0 20 2 N 51 26 54 
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226 TW2 Hampton Road TW2 5QJ 2 1 1 646 
 
217 240 248 179.5 184 171 165 143.5 136 136.5 
 
W 0 20 44 N 51 26 26 
227 TW3 Highlands Close TW3 4HA 2 1 1 621 
 
185 175 
 
160 155 147 
 
116 
 
91 
 
W 0 21 46 N 51 28 35 
228 TW4 Conway Road TW4 5LP 2 1 1 604 
 
185 182 185 150 145 150 142 155 109.5 100 
 
W 0 22 20 N 51 27 20 
229 TW5 Channel Close TW5 0PJ 2 1 1 605 
 
185 
 
205 173 173 
 
152 126 
   
W 0 22 6 N 51 28 45 
230 TW7 Twickenham Road TW7 7DZ 2 1 1 735 
 
200 
 
230 188 
 
170 
 
138.5 148.5 
  
W 0 19 56 N 51 27 42 
231 TW8 Field Lane TW8 8NA 2 1 1 662 
 
150 
 
200 169 
 
172 
  
80.5 
  
W 0 18 55 N 51 28 59 
232 TW9 Grena Road TW9 1XT 2 1 1 753 
 
250 275 
 
257 250 230.5 205 246 150 190 
 
W 0 17 23 N 51 27 48 
233 TW10 Sheen Court TW10 5DE 2 1 1 732 
 
310 
 
343 270 262 249 235 175 185 170 
 
W 0 17 1 N 51 27 54 
234 TW11 Waldegrave Road TW11 8LU 2 1 1 603 
 
225 195 
 
235 
 
170 
     
W 0 20 18 N 51 25 53 
235 TW12 Uxbridge Road TW12 1SN 2 1 1 639 
 
182 180 
  
174 174 165 137 99 
  
W 0 21 48 N 51 25 39 
236 TW13 High Street TW13 4HP 2 1 1 705 
 
152 
 
176 155 
 
135 
 
108 
 
80 
 
W 0 25 12 N 51 26 17 
237 TW14 Hounslow Road TW14 9DD 2 1 1 651 
 
160 
  
164 
   
115 
   
W 0 24 18 N 51 27 2 
238 TW15 The Clumps TW15 1AT 2 1 1 710 
 
180 175 
 
155 
  
142 120 95.5 
  
W 0 26 19 N 51 26 6 
239 TW16 Oakhall Drive TW16 7LE 2 1 1 621 
 
175 169 165 157 148 155 129 118 104 92 
 
W 0 25 28 N 51 25 44 
240 TW17 Shepperton Court 
Drive 
TW17 8EJ 2 1 1 696 
 
190 187 165 158 172 147.5 142 133 115 95 
 
W 0 27 11 N 51 23 47 
241 TW18 Laleham Road TW18 2QQ 2 1 1 667 
 
170 
  
170 167 168 
 
144 108 104 
 
W 0 30 26 N 51 25 34 
242 TW19 Jordans Close TW19 7PU 2 1 1 629 
 
160 194 191 149 166 165 152 122 
 
98 
 
W 0 29 2 N 51 27 5 
243 TW20 Greenacre Court TW20 0RF 2 1 1 624 
 
180 213 195 175 172 170 160 
 
128 110 
 
W 0 34 17 N 51 25 36 
244 UB1 Longford Avenue UB1 3QR 2 1 1 594 
 
155 
  
165 135 
    
74 
 
W 0 21 54 N 51 30 42 
245 UB2 Norwood Road UB2 4EA 2 1 1 630 
 
165 
  
160 150 
  
98 85 80 
 
W 0 22 51 N 51 29 57 
246 UB3 Croyde Avenue UB3 4EL 2 1 1 630 
 
160 
 
167 150 
 
137 
 
101 72.5 
  
W 0 25 25 N 51 29 44 
247 UB4 Portland Road UB4 8LH 2 1 1 615 
 
170 
 
161 154 
  
120 102 
 
67.5 
 
W 0 25 41 N 51 31 58 
248 UB5 Lilliput Avenue UB5 5QL 2 1 1 642 
 
180 173 
 
161 133 139.5 102 
 
84 
  
W 0 22 41 N 51 32 31 
249 UB6 Buckingham Avenue UB6 7RB 2 1 1 592 
 
205 232 
 
192 183 169 165 132 
 
86.5 
 
W 0 19 16 N 51 32 26 
250 UB7 The Brambles UB7 7UQ 2 1 1 529 
 
155 
 
183 154 
 
150 133.5 105 
   
W 0 28 25 N 51 29 44 
251 UB8 Corwell Gardens UB8 3JT 2 1 1 677 
 
169 
 
180 
  
171 155 
    
W 0 26 30 N 51 31 10 
252 UB9 Green Tiles UB9 5HX 2 1 1 711 
 
200 215 
 
185 187 175 158 
 
140 127 
 
W 0 30 5 N 51 34 51 
253 UB10 Melville Close UB10 8TY 2 1 1 536 
 
189 
 
177 168 168 
  
149 
 
106 
 
W 0 26 6 N 51 34 1 
254 HA0 Alliance Close HA0 2NG 2 1 1 584 
 
190 
 
190 190 
 
170 165 139 110 98 
 
W 0 18 9 N 51 33 21 
255 HA1 London Road HA1 3LZ 2 1 1 590 
 
240 
    
204 192 169 153 
  
W 0 20 24 N 51 34 1 
256 HA2 Stuart Avenue HA2 9BB 2 1 1 627 
 
170 167 
 
147 146 137.5 145 
 
105 81 
 
W 0 22 33 N 51 33 48 
257 HA3 Lime Close HA3 7JG 2 1 1 643 
 
170 176 178 148 
 
142 130 119 120 84 
 
W 0 19 33 N 51 36 1 
258 HA4 Edwards Avenue HA4 6UT 2 1 1 585 
 
190 
 
221 
  
160 171 
 
125 115 
 
W 0 23 47 N 51 33 15 
259 HA5 Lonsdale Close HA5 4RY 2 1 1 678 
 
215 210 200 
 
166 
 
152.5 
 
132.5 114 
 
W 0 22 42 N 51 36 24 
260 HA6 Dormans Close HA6 2FX 2 1 1 609 
 
210 
 
199 
  
195 
  
130 
  
W 0 25 38 N 51 36 32 
261 HA7 Lowther Road HA7 1ER 2 1 1 522 
 
220 
 
192 183 
 
160 
 
101 90 86 
 
W 0 17 19 N 51 35 41 
262 HA8 Gatting Close HA8 9YU 2 1 1 528 
 
175 199 165 
 
140 163 
 
97 107 88 
 
W 0 15 59 N 51 36 20 
263 HA9 Kings Drive HA9 9JE 2 1 1 751 
 
185 
 
160 
 
133 160 
 
119 84 74 
 
W 0 16 29 N 51 34 3 
264 WD3 Solomons Hill WD3 1EA 2 1 1 781 
 
190 235 221 196 184 165 172.5 
 
124 119 
 
W 0 28 12 N 51 38 23 
265 WD4 Saddlers Walk WD4 8DL 2 1 1 561 
 
160 175 164 154 150 134 
 
107 96 75 
 
W 0 26 59 N 51 42 50 
266 WD5 De Havilland Way WD5 0XF 2 1 1 553 
 
150 
 
160 
 
181 
 
140 110 
 
72.5 
 
W 0 24 59 N 51 41 58 
267 WD6 Croft Court WD6 1LL 2 1 1 559 
 
175 
 
189 172 
 
152 165 137 117 105 
 
W 0 15 15 N 51 39 23 
268 WD7 The Dell WD7 8JG 2 1 1 681 
 
215 
  
212 197 
 
145 174 137 
  
W 0 19 22 N 51 40 56 
269 WD17 Grove Mill Lane WD17 3TU 2 1 1 530 
 
185 
  
194 
 
182 215 117 
 
118 
 
W 0 25 45 N 51 40 32 
270 WD18 Crusader Way WD18 6SD 2 1 1 508 
 
175 
  
156 143 142 135 119 91 94 
 
W 0 24 44 N 51 38 47 
271 WD19 Redwood Close WD19 6SE 2 1 1 575 
 
140 135 152 121 119 120 130 92 100 80 
 
W 0 23 33 N 51 37 22 
272 WD23 Meadowcroft WD23 3BY 2 1 1 622 
 
175 185 
 
125 170 
 
135 105 80 85 
 
W 0 21 32 N 51 38 32 
273 WD24 Norbury Avenue WD24 4PD 2 1 1 580 
 
190 
 
180 181 180 165 168 119 
 
105 
 
W 0 23 24 N 51 39 56 
274 WD25 Peregrine Close WD25 9AQ 2 1 1 573 
 
170 167 159 145 137 145 127 105 87 79 
 
W 0 22 37 N 51 41 25 
275 AL1 Lemsford Road AL1 3PS 2 1 1 639 
 
200 
 
232 203 180 198 185 152 129 
  
W 0 19 30 N 51 45 27 
276 AL2 Wyedale AL2 1TG 2 1 1 541 
 
160 158 149 150 133 133 123 93 90 75 
 
W 0 17 1 N 51 43 9 
277 AL3 Blenkin Close AL3 6EB 2 1 1 712 
 
210 223 185 167 
   
110 123 104 
 
W 0 20 47 N 51 46 10 
278 AL4 Cedar Court AL4 0DL 2 1 1 538 
 
160 165 165 153 129 142 137 125 91 80 
 
W 0 17 51 N 51 45 7 
279 AL7 Hilly Fields AL7 2HD 2 1 1 593 
 
145 
 
143 146 158 117 127 108 83 65 
 
W 0 10 16 N 51 48 13 
280 AL9 Alderman Close AL9 7DS 2 1 1 594 
 
155 144 
 
152 
   
89 72 
  
W 0 13 7 N 51 44 1 
281 AL10 Malting Mead AL10 8AR 2 1 1 608 
 
165 190 180 167 133 155 146 100 72 86 
 
W 0 13 3 N 51 45 49 
282 CM1 Clematis Tye CM1 6GL 2 1 1 558 
 
135 130 140 110 120 123 102 96 74 56 
 
E 0 29 37 N 51 45 16 
283 CM4 Station Lane CM4 0BN 2 1 1 824 
 
249 
 
190 167 159 185 145 145 
 
127 
 
E 0 22 56 N 51 40 0 
284 CM5 Cripsey Avenue CM5 0AT 2 1 1 548 
 
143 
 
128 110 
 
112 100 109 62 50 
 
E 0 14 13 N 51 43 0 
285 CM11 Southend Road CM11 2RA 2 1 1 839 
 
250 208 218 207 
       
E 0 25 46 N 51 36 50 
286 CM12 St Ediths Court CM12 9HZ 2 1 1 620 
 
205 
  
158 175 154 136 
 
96 85 
 
E 0 24 54 N 51 37 25 
287 CM13 Canterbury Way CM13 3BA 2 1 1 565 
 
160 139 159 135 141 107 114 84 75 73 
 
E 0 17 55 N 51 36 5 
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    Street Post code 
Bed-
room 
Bath-
room 
Recep-
tion 
Floor 
areaǂ 
  Price (10 US $/m²)    Longitude Latitude 
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000     ° ` ``   ° ` `` 
288 CM14 Pompadour Close CM14 5LB 2 1 1 698 
 
160 
 
140 152 136 144 132 114 
 
75 
 
E 0 17 59 N 51 36 25 
289 CM15 Doddinghurst Road CM15 9EW 2 1 1 550 
 
160 148 160 140 
 
128 
  
67 71 
 
E 0 17 59 N 51 37 37 
290 CM16 Fir Trees CM16 6SJ 2 1 1 686 
 
190 
   
172 162 164 
 
108 95 
 
E 0 7 8 N 51 42 17 
291 CM17 Victoria Gate CM17 9TA 2 1 1 543 
 
145 153 147 142 138 126 123 106 83 74 
 
E 0 7 48 N 51 45 57 
292 CM18 Willowfield CM18 6RR 2 1 1 713 
 
105 
 
125 121 120 99 89 73 70 60 
 
E 0 5 34 N 51 45 35 
293 CM19 Milwards CM19 4SW 2 1 1 560 
 
85 
  
97 
 
72 84 65 
 
43 
 
E 0 4 41 N 51 44 59 
294 CM20 Dads Wood CM20 1JL 2 1 1 606 
 
115 135 137 132 120 110 113 92 75 67 
 
E 0 5 35 N 51 46 2 
295 TN13 St Johns Road TN13 3JZ 2 1 1 629 
 
205 
 
200 189 
 
183 177 172 167 155 
 
E 0 11 36 N 51 16 59 
296 TN14 Meadway TN14 7EY 2 1 1 561 
 
160 
   
155 120 130 105 
 
90 
 
E 0 8 0 N 51 19 33 
297 TN15 Collet Road TN15 6SJ 2 1 1 603 
 
190 
  
160 
       
E 0 12 47 N 51 18 29 
298 TN16 Lambert Close TN16 3DQ 2 1 1 617 
 
160 
 
165 157 159 126 128 125 79 81 
 
E 0 1 50 N 51 18 57 
299 SL0 St Davids Close SL0 0RS 2 1 1 690 
 
195 
 
188 184 179 167 172.5 138 118 
  
W 0 31 16 N 51 32 29 
300 SL1 Boarlands Close SL1 5DD 2 1 1 685 
 
145 
  
143 137.5 136.5 125 110 102 88 
 
W 0 37 59 N 51 30 58 
301 SL2 Rochfords Gardens SL2 5XJ 2 1 1 681 
 
130 
 
143.5 135 132 132 
 
87 84 73 
 
W 0 34 9 N 51 30 53 
302 SL3 Shelley Close SL3 8JW 2 1 1 697 
 
145 
 
156 156 151 148 130 118 
 
98 
 
W 0 32 48 N 51 29 40 
303 SL4 Byron Court SL4 4PU 2 1 1 639 
 
225 
 
211 216 180 180 187 
 
161 130 
 
W 0 37 56 N 51 28 15 
304 SL5 The Glen SL5 7DF 2 1 1 674 
 
225 
  
167 185 185 
 
147 139 121 
 
W 0 39 14 N 51 24 23 
305 HP1 Long Chaulden HP1 2NT 2 1 1 646 
 
138 
 
139 
 
115 
  
70 70 
  
W 0 29 58 N 51 45 23 
306 HP2 Ashby Court HP2 7QL 2 1 1 573 
 
118 110 120 116 115 115 102 74 68 61 
 
W 0 26 25 N 51 46 54 
307 HP3 Bennetts End Road HP3 8DZ 2 1 1 666 
 
150 146 134 
  
125 108 
    
W 0 26 54 N 51 44 34 
308 HP5 Broad Street HP5 3DZ 2 1 1 596 
 
158 131 132 106 127 
  
114 88 76 
 
W 0 36 39 N 51 42 32 
309 HP6 Cherry Orchard HP6 6LE 2 1 1 583 
 
197 
 
198 169 170 150 150 118 
 
88 
 
W 0 35 39 N 51 40 46 
310 HP7 Quickberry Place HP7 0BA 2 1 1 616 
 
205 
  
181 
  
146 130 106 
  
W 0 36 22 N 51 40 9 
311 HP9 Beaconsfield Mews HP9 1BF 2 1 1 765 
 
232 
 
215 
 
215 177 
 
166 
 
133 
 
W 0 40 9 N 51 36 0 
312 GU20 Fromow Gardens GU20 6QN 2 1 1 532 
 
170 
 
170 153 
 
155 125 128 0 106 
 
W 0 39 22 N 51 21 48 
313 GU21 Sussex Place GU21 2RD 2 1 1 716 
 
160 
    
150 159 121 120 101 
 
W 0 37 19 N 51 19 2 
314 GU22 Calluna Court GU22 7HU 2 1 1 555 
 
190 163 170 
 
169 165 134 128 108 95 
 
W 0 33 26 N 51 18 58 
315 GU24 Bakersgate Gardens GU24 0NE 2 1 1 564 
 
200 
 
197 193 173 150 
     
W 0 38 8 N 51 16 53 
316 GU25 Callow Hill GU25 4LT 2 1 1 546 
 
250 320 
 
305 265 242 
 
222 211 205 
 
W 0 34 40 N 51 24 37 
                                                        
ǂ   floor area of  flat is calculated as the sum of  floor areas of  bedroom, reception room and kitchen divided by 0.8, as the floor area of  bathroom and hall is estimated 
as 20% of  the total floor area of  a flat. 
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Appendix 5-3   Commuting data in London  
 
Table 29   Commuting flow matrix in Greater London 
 
00AB 00AC 00AD 00AE 00AF 00AG 00AA 00AH 00AJ 00AK 00AL 00AM 00AN 00AP 00AQ 00AR 00AS 00AT 00AU 00AW 00AX 00AY 00AZ 00BA 00BB 00BC 00BD 00BE 00BF 00BG 00BH 00BJ 00BK 
                                  
00AB 24,442 197 99 179 70 1,496 3,645 102 187 402 216 976 255 299 54 6,416 95 90 1,380 432 16 444 134 64 4,461 5,939 18 915 41 4,071 1,045 159 3,275 
00AC 104 59,511 35 5,467 77 12,077 7,715 153 1,575 4,096 101 1,573 1,433 3,844 2,625 140 1,021 612 5,770 1,843 73 1,133 129 140 389 313 229 1,789 42 2,509 548 532 16,330 
00AD 368 132 41,216 143 4,996 2,469 6,577 707 181 116 9,501 702 330 119 31 397 109 169 1,548 601 73 1,808 2,984 191 582 112 89 4,662 169 2,831 216 621 7,690 
00AE 43 6,127 31 42,988 63 8,106 4,155 180 6,707 432 119 816 3,706 731 5,110 47 2,130 1,402 2,533 3,924 110 1,112 146 207 274 108 395 1,559 57 1,661 200 665 16,412 
00AF 137 162 3,197 198 63,942 3,771 9,859 6,268 286 89 2,591 723 856 136 50 119 247 279 2,090 1,244 230 3,570 5,369 646 426 101 188 6,059 799 3,382 197 1,378 12,790 
00AG 39 1,498 33 1,349 56 36,396 8,798 145 648 291 141 1,209 1,871 664 329 42 480 466 4,989 2,272 81 1,343 138 136 288 90 195 1,785 45 2,610 201 578 18,829 
00AA 0 15 - 13 3 331 2,060 3 10 3 0 68 56 19 4 10 6 11 338 70 3 45 7 12 10 0 3 104 3 261 17 16 602 
00AH 76 212 302 317 5,153 3,252 5,920 78,408 404 118 529 595 1,291 183 93 84 457 573 1,754 1,477 827 6,842 1,559 3,517 202 60 484 4,517 6,741 1,999 138 4,273 10,583 
00AJ 34 967 30 5,269 94 4,544 4,865 178 54,258 224 132 522 8,583 260 2,594 43 13,054 9,868 1,797 4,102 364 1,033 166 363 237 81 1,586 1,315 62 1,422 135 943 13,969 
00AK 205 5,645 52 1,037 80 5,601 5,218 145 632 54,352 129 2,549 849 10,196 340 232 454 338 5,321 1,079 38 809 127 117 663 541 100 1,257 46 2,144 1,713 315 9,057 
00AL 334 177 5,049 251 3,201 3,046 5,616 695 250 195 34,333 857 612 171 40 142 149 238 1,778 929 63 2,291 5,567 251 985 130 111 5,138 137 3,644 248 942 8,851 
00AM 221 680 49 515 99 7,134 5,182 123 456 876 251 25,642 1,164 2,334 92 124 209 281 7,745 1,256 60 1,283 237 117 1,073 394 150 2,031 51 5,249 1,099 562 9,981 
00AN 22 260 20 814 57 4,005 7,965 203 2,425 84 60 578 26,684 136 170 28 1,088 2,095 1,793 7,075 265 1,158 128 465 126 43 848 1,373 118 1,939 69 1,910 15,301 
00AP 147 3,016 39 1,076 66 10,507 5,520 209 671 4,252 153 3,140 1,495 28,648 273 98 338 458 7,947 1,886 73 1,230 174 145 517 274 179 1,859 56 2,349 1,004 517 13,478 
00AQ 53 5,006 23 9,471 42 3,674 3,156 114 4,541 322 53 424 1,484 335 37,327 30 6,171 1,135 1,396 1,151 100 497 72 118 100 45 242 856 38 1,011 98 298 7,886 
00AR 7,279 194 331 156 159 1,998 8,345 143 166 552 258 1,301 259 338 66 47,262 118 85 1,935 359 29 547 138 96 3,410 4,850 42 1,390 47 5,023 1,169 155 4,691 
00AS 30 694 16 2,673 49 1,755 1,662 115 8,186 146 52 204 1,795 114 4,686 24 64,868 5,294 666 935 151 409 83 162 83 37 544 513 58 559 54 244 5,065 
00AT 17 261 34 811 61 1,748 2,348 212 5,490 96 113 246 3,589 89 397 24 12,806 43,218 759 1,804 1,007 692 125 309 94 26 7,024 658 101 760 45 763 5,921 
00AU 107 1,009 44 539 49 10,187 7,927 155 481 621 139 2,755 1,477 1,873 114 60 259 334 26,656 1,676 45 1,185 153 130 343 126 118 1,879 51 2,839 395 485 12,835 
00AW 19 238 22 555 62 3,551 10,098 164 861 55 54 442 3,682 117 103 17 574 788 1,818 25,881 108 1,030 75 219 75 37 310 1,170 62 2,952 61 1,088 15,946 
00AX 9 117 38 186 74 1,543 2,872 638 473 41 58 188 1,324 37 72 24 1,059 1,483 714 847 33,431 1,029 68 3,042 71 25 3,787 1,038 1,191 827 21 2,405 5,415 
00AY 69 414 142 480 827 8,090 9,690 3,135 671 142 599 1,467 3,375 374 89 55 468 900 4,148 4,366 527 36,385 1,346 1,831 379 114 859 8,271 802 3,418 182 8,027 24,347 
00AZ 166 273 1,171 328 6,673 4,963 7,247 2,462 461 143 4,552 1,225 1,114 270 86 93 238 368 2,668 1,790 179 5,687 35,170 583 650 147 260 11,117 398 3,948 233 1,891 13,728 
00BA 31 183 53 251 318 2,942 6,048 3,193 550 51 182 445 2,308 134 73 15 527 843 1,420 2,221 3,511 3,392 255 31,261 152 36 1,335 2,290 3,740 1,705 75 8,409 10,154 
00BB 2,696 406 144 524 207 3,847 5,011 183 432 586 734 2,390 735 674 60 939 214 284 2,709 1,496 80 1,155 388 142 31,321 2,973 132 2,088 61 9,125 2,155 539 8,558 
00BC 4,665 566 142 382 128 3,798 8,204 171 344 1,190 333 2,347 593 909 113 3,003 208 226 3,105 741 47 851 188 106 6,029 37,636 88 1,763 41 6,919 5,442 265 8,121 
00BD 10 181 12 342 64 2,505 4,831 322 1,468 49 57 288 3,179 55 161 18 3,381 6,875 1,020 1,748 3,552 1,205 76 835 61 13 33,927 1,214 260 1,202 42 1,990 8,336 
00BE 124 329 280 425 927 6,003 9,039 1,208 533 142 1,142 1,401 1,678 274 119 67 324 463 3,204 2,558 267 8,505 3,165 562 586 153 312 36,540 263 4,245 251 2,545 16,503 
00BF 34 81 72 129 517 1,444 2,557 7,601 306 39 104 223 852 48 48 25 388 540 681 883 3,117 1,829 266 6,725 95 26 746 1,407 38,226 873 38 3,214 4,696 
00BG 383 256 140 186 186 4,081 10,109 180 289 214 276 2,669 938 324 59 309 148 241 3,230 1,250 60 1,092 328 122 1,842 409 159 2,182 58 28,900 560 399 9,306 
00BH 848 714 80 495 147 5,555 6,343 261 439 2,662 341 3,962 834 2,469 112 589 210 272 4,302 1,378 49 1,055 224 134 3,252 3,730 107 1,717 41 4,796 34,796 406 10,313 
00BJ 34 299 62 417 326 7,141 13,941 1,501 973 111 255 1,047 6,228 230 132 31 850 1,691 3,397 6,214 1,804 5,942 406 4,328 216 65 2,331 4,090 983 4,030 141 40,579 24,409 
00BK 20 506 20 1,225 103 6,787 9,516 215 918 121 92 749 2,371 228 140 26 601 572 2,443 4,765 90 1,387 153 186 169 62 249 1,653 61 2,846 119 875 46,254 
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Appendix 5-4   Pajek data of commuting in London (over 8000 trip) 
 
 
*Vertices 59 
1 00AC 0.5240283 0.1923168 0.5 
2 00AG 0.5278638 0.1846633 0.5 
3 00BK 0.5276871 0.1810442 0.5 
4 00AD 0.5487962 0.1754876 0.5 
5 00AL 0.5429105 0.1768764 0.5 
6 00AE 0.5201774 0.1858286 0.5 
7 00AF 0.5428972 0.1656563 0.5 
8 00AA 0.5324844 0.1812688 0.5 
9 00AH 0.5332901 0.1635416 0.5 
10 00AJ 0.5158876 0.1817149 0.5 
11 00AN 0.5235697 0.1789502 0.5 
12 00AS 0.5078898 0.1836521 0.5 
13 00AT 0.5135165 0.1756424 0.5 
14 00AK 0.5324253 0.1964215 0.5 
15 00AP 0.5311977 0.1896426 0.5 
16 00AM 0.5343701 0.1854856 0.5 
17 00AQ 0.5149872 0.1900667 0.5 
18 00AR 0.5540503 0.1873963 0.5 
19 00AU 0.531128 0.1849778 0.5 
20 00AW 0.5255364 0.1796234 0.5 
21 00AY 0.5308436 0.1743545 0.5 
22 00BE 0.5338199 0.1766622 0.5 
23 00BJ 0.5261155 0.174047 0.5 
24 00AZ 0.5376718 0.1739816 0.5 
25 00BA 0.5254728 0.1694224 0.5 
26 00BB 0.5413568 0.1830148 0.5 
27 00BG 0.5363988 0.1816361 0.5 
28 00BC 0.5439148 0.1894646 0.5 
29 00BD 0.5173459 0.1728141 0.5 
30 00BH 0.5377572 0.1902235 0.5 
31 00KC 0.5042049 0.2556399 0.5 
32 00KA 0.5084359 0.2229117 0.5 
33 00LC 0.5776568 0.1715573 0.5 
34 29UH 0.5802495 0.1515864 0.5 
35 00MB 0.4484326 0.1725229 0.5 
36 00MC 0.4707064 0.1731567 0.5 
37 00MF 0.4776927 0.1706349 0.5 
38 00MS 0.4423333 0.1135572 0.5 
39 24UD 0.4474244 0.1155788 0.5 
40 12UG 0.5424259 0.2547642 0.5 
41 12UB 0.5458672 0.2578256 0.5 
42 22UL 0.5902213 0.1920558 0.5 
43 00KF 0.5879539 0.1866838 0.5 
44 22UN 0.6142271 0.2236606 0.5 
45 22UG 0.5967745 0.2235379 0.5 
46 24UE 0.4548356 0.1062431 0.5 
47 00MR 0.4656066 0.1027664 0.5 
48 24UH 0.4711553 0.1059288 0.5 
49 24UJ 0.4260876 0.1067734 0.5 
50 33UC 0.6237568 0.3166533 0.5 
51 33UG 0.6218557 0.3089626 0.5 
52 33UH 0.6223612 0.2957824 0.5 
53 38UB 0.4498752 0.2291692 0.5 
54 38UC 0.4524903 0.2064827 0.5 
55 38UE 0.4387404 0.192971 0.5 
56 42UG 0.6333948 0.2573532 0.5 
57 42UD 0.6167213 0.2444843 0.5 
58 45UG 0.5314604 0.1262769 0.5 
59 45UE 0.5273175 0.1378143 0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Arcs 
1 2 60.385 
1 3 81.65 
4 5 47.505 
6 2 40.53 
6 3 82.06 
7 8 49.295 
7 3 63.95 
2 8 43.99 
2 3 94.145 
9 3 52.915 
10 11 42.915 
10 12 65.27 
10 13 49.34 
10 3 69.845 
14 15 50.98 
14 3 45.285 
5 3 44.255 
16 3 49.905 
11 3 76.505 
15 2 52.535 
15 3 67.39 
17 6 47.355 
18 8 41.725 
12 10 40.93 
13 12 64.03 
19 2 50.935 
19 3 64.175 
20 8 50.49 
20 3 79.73 
21 8 48.45 
21 2 40.45 
21 22 41.355 
21 23 40.135 
21 3 121.735 
24 22 55.585 
24 3 68.64 
25 23 42.045 
25 3 50.77 
26 27 45.625 
26 3 42.79 
28 8 41.02 
28 3 40.605 
29 3 41.68 
22 8 45.195 
22 21 42.525 
22 3 82.515 
27 8 50.545 
27 3 46.53 
30 3 51.565 
23 8 69.705 
23 3 122.045 
3 8 47.58 
31 32 67.035 
33 34 41.09 
35 36 57.325 
37 36 72.885 
38 39 58.555 
40 41 103.635 
42 43 43.1 
44 45 43.855 
39 38 63.01 
46 47 42.01 
48 47 63.205 
49 38 56.84 
50 51 118.01 
52 51 72.28 
53 54 45.495 
55 54 48.135 
56 57 53.085 
58 59 41.465
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Appendix 5-5   Regression result of London  
 
 
Table 30   OLS Regression of house price on distance to centre in London 
  Price 2000 Price 2003 Price 2006 Price 2009 
Number of obs 129 129 147 242 
F 50.48 31.73 80.99 180.3 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.284 0.200 0.358 0.429 
Adj R-squared 0.279 0.194 0.354 0.427 
Root MSE 165.0 174.0 211.1 312.1 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -15.1 609.7 -12.9 728.4 -22.3 989.9 -37.8 1,335.4 
Std. Err. 2.1 35.8 2.3 39.1 2.5 42.0 2.8 46.6 
t -7.1 17.0 -5.6 18.6 -9.0 23.6 -13.4 28.7 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -19.3 538.8 -17.5 651.0 -27.2 906.9 -43.4 1,243.7 
Interval] -10.9 680.6 -8.4 805.9 -17.4 1,072.8 -32.3 1,427.2 
 
 
 
Table 31   OLS Regression of house price on commuting time to centre in London 
  Price 2000 Price 2003 Price 2006 Price 2009 
Number of obs 129 129 147 242 
F 51.43 35.48 77.26 181.75 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.288 0.218 0.348 0.431 
Adj R-squared 0.283 0.212 0.343 0.429 
Root MSE 164.6 172.0 212.8 311.5 
 
Time Constant Time Constant Time Constant Time Constant 
Coef. -6.5 736.8 -6.0 867.8 -9.3 1,162.3 -16.3 1,658.6 
Std. Err. 0.9 52.2 1.0 59.4 1.1 61.3 1.2 68.8 
t -7.2 14.1 -6.0 14.6 -8.8 19.0 -13.5 24.1 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -8.3 633.5 -8.0 750.3 -11.4 1,041.2 -18.6 1,523.0 
Interval] -4.7 840.2 -4.0 985.4 -7.2 1,283.5 -13.9 1,794.2 
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Table 32   OLS Regression of flat price on distance to centre in London 
  Price 2000 Price 2003 Price 2006 Price 2009 
Number of obs 150 157 159 245 
F 106.43 96.25 126.67 238.95 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.418 0.383 0.447 0.496 
Adj R-squared 0.414 0.379 0.443 0.494 
Root MSE 97.3 108.7 160.0 202.2 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -11.3 556.4 -12.2 753.5 -20.1 988.9 -27.8 1,183.8 
Std. Err. 1.1 18.4 1.2 21.1 1.8 31.0 1.8 29.7 
t -10.3 30.2 -9.8 35.8 -11.3 31.9 -15.5 39.9 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -13.5 520.0 -14.6 711.9 -23.7 927.7 -31.4 1,125.3 
Interval] -9.2 592.8 -9.7 795.1 -16.6 1,050.2 -24.3 1,242.3 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 33   OLS Regression of flat price on commuting time to centre in London 
  Price 2000 Price 2003 Price 2006 Price 2009 
Number of obs 150 157 159 245 
F 123.79 117.44 136.4 281.92 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.456 0.431 0.465 0.537 
Adj R-squared 0.452 0.427 0.462 0.535 
Root MSE 94.1 104.4 157.3 193.8 
 
Time Constant Time Constant Time Constant Time Constant 
Coef. -5.2 668.1 -5.9 889.5 -8.7 1,159.9 -12.7 1,452.3 
Std. Err. 0.5 26.6 0.5 31.1 0.7 43.7 0.8 42.5 
t -11.1 25.1 -10.8 28.6 -11.7 26.5 -16.8 34.2 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -6.1 615.6 -6.9 828.1 -10.2 1,073.6 -14.1 1,368.7 
Interval] -4.3 720.7 -4.8 950.9 -7.3 1,246.3 -11.2 1,535.9 
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Appendix 6-1   Sample apartment data of Seoul (summary) 
Table 34   Sample 2 bedroom apartment data (summary) 
Variable Unit Number of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Percentiles (%) 
10 25 50 75 90 
Floor area m² 401 59.8 4.3 49.0 81.0 55.0 59.0 60.0 60.0 64.0 
Distance1* km 154 14.5 8.8 0.3 35.0 4.1 7.2 13.1 21.6 26.7 
Distance2** km 122 11.6 7.9 1.9 32.1 3.7 5.2 9.5 15.0 24.7 
Distance3*** km 130 12.9 7.4 0.2 26.6 3.5 5.7 13.3 18.5 23.4 
Price 1998 
10 $/m² 
289 179.1 54.7 60.2 375.0 110.8 135.6 175.0 216.7 250.0 
Price 2001 397 168.0 62.8 67.8 400.0 102.5 119.5 154.2 200.0 250.0 
Price 2004 401 260.2 124.6 68.3 791.7 133.9 177.0 233.3 308.3 422.5 
Price 2007 400 320.2 180.6 71.7 1,206.3 142.0 200.0 276.7 384.3 541.7 
Rent 1998 289 97.9 30.4 35.9 200.0 58.0 75.8 95.8 120.8 138.9 
Rent 2001 397 113.3 41.4 38.9 258.3 63.6 83.1 112.5 139.8 162.5 
Rent 2004 401 151.0 57.5 44.2 325.0 81.9 110.2 144.1 187.5 225.0 
Rent 2007 400 165.8 67.7 38.1 468.8 87.5 118.6 156.8 208.3 254.6 
* distance to the centre of CU submarket 
** distance to the centre of GS submarket 
*** distance to the centre of YG submarket 
Table 35   Sample 3 bedroom apartment data (summary) 
Variable Unit Number of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Percentiles (%) 
10 25 50 75 90 
Floor area m² 401 84.5 1.8 76.9 96.0 83.8 84.5 84.5 84.8 84.8 
Distance1* km 154 14.4 8.8 1.3 34.7 3.9 7.0 12.9 21.6 27.2 
Distance2** km 122 11.6 8.0 1.9 32.1 3.6 5.3 9.3 14.8 25.0 
Distance3*** km 129 13.0 7.4 0.4 26.6 3.2 6.0 13.1 18.8 23.5 
Price 1998 
10 $/m² 
298 201.7 61.4 83.7 396.5 123.8 159.2 195.3 237.7 278.2 
Price 2001 396 170.3 65.8 68.3 430.3 98.2 114.4 162.2 204.8 253.5 
Price 2004 401 266.0 133.7 68.2 828.6 130.2 178.3 237.3 310.1 467.6 
Price 2007 401 372.7 221.3 67.1 1,396.8 153.3 224.0 312.5 455.8 692.5 
Rent 1998 299 97.0 29.8 33.6 189.4 64.9 74.0 91.5 114.4 142.0 
Rent 2001 396 102.5 37.5 36.6 247.6 59.2 73.8 100.6 122.6 153.9 
Rent 2004 401 133.5 51.7 35.7 307.8 70.7 100.2 129.7 163.6 201.2 
Rent 2007 401 158.6 65.0 37.4 384.7 85.5 112.5 153.3 192.4 249.6 
 
Table 36   Sample 4 bedroom apartment data (summary) 
Variable Unit Number of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Percentiles (%) 
10 25 50 75 90 
Floor area m² 396 123.1 9.6 99.0 148.0 113.0 115.0 123.0 133.0 135.0 
Distance1* km 152 14.4 8.4 0.3 33.4 4.1 7.6 13.5 21.4 26.7 
Distance2** km 121 11.6 7.8 1.9 32.2 3.9 5.3 9.3 15.5 24.1 
Distance3*** km 128 12.6 7.3 0.2 27.0 3.4 5.9 12.7 18.3 22.9 
Price 1998 
10 $/m² 
277 200.0 77.1 73.1 458.0 113.3 140.4 188.6 243.8 300.0 
Price 2001 392 186.2 80.1 70.3 504.4 105.5 124.5 171.6 226.9 289.5 
Price 2004 396 270.7 128.2 73.9 802.6 143.4 182.9 247.8 315.2 443.5 
Price 2007 396 391.0 215.0 77.5 1,314.4 165.9 243.7 345.0 485.1 720.0 
Rent 1998 277 81.7 33.2 31.5 209.4 44.4 57.7 74.0 97.0 123.0 
Rent 2001 392 96.1 42.1 35.4 280.7 52.2 66.1 85.1 115.4 152.2 
Rent 2004 396 130.7 57.0 39.0 412.3 71.1 94.2 117.6 156.5 207.1 
Rent 2007 396 149.2 66.3 37.4 460.5 74.4 103.1 140.5 175.4 247.9 
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Appendix 6-2   Sample apartment data of Seoul 
Table 37   Sample 2 bedroom apartment data of Seoul 
No. Address Apt. Complex 
  
Built 
year 
House-
holds 
Bed-
room 
Bath-
room 
Floor 
area 
  Price (10 US $/m²) Rent (Jeonse*) (10 US $/m²)   Longitude Latitude 
    1998 2001 2004 2007 1998 2001 2004 2007     ° ` ``   ° ` `` 
                             1 Seoul GangNam 수서 삼익 
 
1992.12. 650 2 1 60 
 
279.2 266.7 666.7 758.3 145.8 175.0 270.8 291.7 
 
E 127 6 2 N 37 29 20 
2 Seoul GangNam 일원 푸른마을 
 
1994.02. 930 3 1 60 
 
350.0 345.8 708.3 1041.7 166.7 220.8 316.7 333.3 
 
E 127 4 51 N 37 29 1 
3 Seoul GangNam 일원 한솔 
 
1993.12. 570 3 1 63 
 
329.4 353.2 746.0 1206.3 166.7 218.3 309.5 349.2 
 
E 127 4 36 N 37 28 54 
4 Seoul GangNam 삼성 풍림 1 차 
 
1998.08. 252 3 1 60 
 
258.3 312.5 583.3 675.0 120.8 195.8 291.7 291.7 
 
E 127 3 42 N 37 30 56 
5 Seoul GangNam 대치 대치현대 
 
1999.06. 630 2 1 60 
  
400.0 683.3 966.7 
 
258.3 325.0 433.3 
 
E 127 3 39 N 37 30 3 
6 Seoul GangNam 도곡 삼성 
 
1991.10. 231 2 1 60 
  
375.0 791.7 950.0 
 
225.0 283.3 316.7 
 
E 127 2 47 N 37 29 19 
7 Seoul GangNam 일원 삼성 
 
1987.12. 80 2 1 61 
 
270.5 286.9 680.3 1024.6 143.4 172.1 286.9 270.5 
 
E 127 5 1 N 37 29 35 
8 Seoul GangNam 도곡 한신 
 
1988.05. 421 2 1 57 
 
333.3 346.5 640.4 886.0 171.1 210.5 280.7 377.2 
 
E 127 2 27 N 37 29 14 
9 Seoul GangNam 논현 논현경남 
 
1996.09. 60 3 1 60 
  
287.5 483.3 525.0 
 
183.3 291.7 283.3 
 
E 127 2 17 N 37 30 38 
10 Seoul GangNam 신사 로데오현대 
 
1998.11. 139 2 1 55 
 
295.5 345.5 609.1 727.3 136.4 236.4 263.6 336.4 
 
E 127 2 14 N 37 31 36 
11 Seoul GangNam 청담 삼성 1 차 
 
1997.12. 158 3 1 60 
  
333.3 633.3 675.0 
 
212.5 300.0 300.0 
 
E 127 2 52 N 37 31 10 
12 Seoul GangDong 길 길동우성 
 
1994.10. 811 2 1 57 
 
241.2 228.1 359.6 416.7 131.6 153.5 219.3 219.3 
 
E 127 8 38 N 37 32 13 
13 Seoul GangDong 길 신동아 4 차 
 
1999.11. 95 2 1 57 
  
194.7 438.6 333.3 
 
140.4 184.2 166.7 
 
E 127 8 52 N 37 32 28 
14 Seoul GangDong 둔촌 중앙하이츠 
 
1995.12. 232 3 1 60 
 
237.5 216.7 345.8 350.0 129.2 145.8 216.7 208.3 
 
E 127 8 32 N 37 31 46 
15 Seoul GangDong 명일 명일 LG 
 
1996.12 772 2 1 60 
 
233.3 208.3 416.7 408.3 137.5 154.2 208.3 216.7 
 
E 127 8 44 N 37 32 56 
16 Seoul GangDong 상일 중앙하이츠 
 
1992.05. 410 3 1 60 
 
216.7 190.0 366.7 525.0 120.8 137.5 175.0 200.0 
 
E 127 9 35 N 37 33 2 
17 Seoul GangDong 성내 현대 
 
1987.11. 277 2 1 59 
 
199.2 199.2 355.9 457.6 114.4 131.4 211.9 220.3 
 
E 127 8 5 N 37 32 44 
18 Seoul GangBook 우이 성원 
 
1990.09. 262 3 1 72 
 
163.2 142.4 184.0 218.8 100.7 97.2 125.0 118.1 
 
E 127 0 50 N 37 39 42 
19 Seoul GangBook 번 주공 4 단지 
 
1991.04. 900 3 1 59 
 
178.0 188.1 248.3 288.1 110.2 114.4 152.5 161.0 
 
E 127 2 23 N 37 37 51 
20 Seoul GangBook 번 주공 1 단지 
 
1991.06. 1430 2 1 50 
 
183.0 158.0 240.0 305.0 105.0 113.0 135.0 155.0 
 
E 127 2 50 N 37 37 29 
21 Seoul GangBook 수유 수유벽산 
 
1992.10. 1454 2 1 64 
 
183.6 156.3 232.8 269.5 113.3 121.1 152.3 160.2 
 
E 127 1 8 N 37 38 35 
22 Seoul GangBook 수유 극동 
 
1990.10. 574 3 1 71 
 
186.6 151.4 221.8 246.5 102.1 102.1 130.3 154.9 
 
E 127 0 43 N 37 38 31 
23 Seoul GangBook 우이 대우 
 
2000.09. 260 3 1 60 
  
208.3 308.3 350.0 
 
137.5 208.3 208.3 
 
E 127 0 40 N 37 39 20 
24 Seoul GangSeo 가양 현대 2 차 
 
2001.08. 114 3 1 60 
  
266.7 358.3 541.7 
 
200.0 183.3 183.3 
 
E 126 51 20 N 37 33 41 
25 Seoul GangSeo 염창 동아 
 
1997.10. 778 3 1 60 
 
220.8 206.7 283.3 375.0 104.2 137.5 162.5 187.5 
 
E 126 52 22 N 37 33 16 
26 Seoul GangSeo 등촌 태영 
 
1998.06. 186 3 1 60 
 
166.7 195.8 295.8 375.0 66.7 137.5 179.2 191.7 
 
E 126 51 50 N 37 33 21 
27 Seoul GangSeo 마곡 신안 
 
1993.12. 253 3 1 60 
 
179.2 158.3 254.2 416.7 95.8 83.3 108.3 125.0 
 
E 126 49 26 N 37 34 4 
28 Seoul GangSeo 방화 동성 
 
1993.12. 686 3 1 64 
 
242.2 226.6 335.9 445.3 121.1 144.5 191.4 210.9 
 
E 126 48 44 N 37 34 46 
29 Seoul GangSeo 염창 삼성하나로 
 
1994.02. 178 2 1 59 
 
169.5 180.5 271.2 347.5 89.0 138.1 169.5 173.7 
 
E 126 52 19 N 37 33 5 
30 Seoul GangSeo 방화 현대 2 차 
 
1999.12. 202 2 1 59 
  
199.2 275.4 330.5 
 
131.4 161.0 186.4 
 
E 126 49 10 N 37 34 23 
31 Seoul GwanAk 봉천 관악현대 
 
1991.11. 2134 2 1 59 
 
216.1 190.7 292.4 457.6 127.1 144.1 186.4 237.3 
 
E 126 57 36 N 37 29 33 
32 Seoul GwanAk 봉천 낙성현대 1 차 
 
1988.05. 251 2 1 61 
 
217.2 217.2 336.1 409.8 127.0 151.6 184.4 239.3 
 
E 126 57 56 N 37 28 22 
33 Seoul GwanAk 신림 신림현대 
 
1993.05. 1634 2 1 60 
 
225.0 212.5 285.0 400.0 137.5 145.8 191.7 200.0 
 
E 126 55 57 N 37 28 30 
34 Seoul GwanAk 신림 건영 3 차 
 
1991.10. 783 2 1 59 
 
194.9 182.2 271.2 292.4 122.9 139.8 178.0 194.9 
 
E 126 57 6 N 37 28 37 
35 Seoul GwanAk 신림 동부 
 
1994.12. 592 3 1 60 
 
229.2 229.2 329.2 458.3 133.3 145.8 204.2 225.0 
 
E 126 55 45 N 37 28 50 
36 Seoul GwanAk 신림 건영 2 차 
 
1988.01. 338 2 1 60 
 
154.2 154.2 225.0 295.8 87.5 116.7 145.8 158.3 
 
E 126 55 1 N 37 28 15 
37 Seoul GwanAk 신림 우방 
 
1999.11. 201 3 1 60 
  
245.8 304.2 341.7 
 
170.8 208.3 233.3 
 
E 126 55 8 N 37 29 20 
38 Seoul GwanAk 신림 쌍용 
 
1998.01. 373 2 1 59 
 
194.9 194.9 262.7 309.3 110.2 127.1 161.0 156.8 
 
E 126 54 42 N 37 28 20 
39 Seoul GwangJin 광장 삼성 2 차 
 
1988.11. 195 2 1 59 
 
233.1 216.1 432.2 559.3 139.8 148.3 233.1 279.7 
 
E 127 6 7 N 37 32 32 
40 Seoul GwangJin 광장 청구 
 
1995.11. 654 3 1 60 
 
266.7 241.7 416.7 541.7 154.2 166.7 241.7 266.7 
 
E 127 5 46 N 37 32 33 
41 Seoul GwangJin 군자 일성파크 
 
1996.01. 357 3 1 60 
  
200.0 291.7 375.0 
 
120.8 191.7 195.8 
 
E 127 4 21 N 37 33 4 
42 Seoul GwangJin 중곡 선경 
 
1999.09. 182 2 1 58 
  
232.8 310.3 353.4 
 
133.6 198.3 254.3 
 
E 127 5 11 N 37 34 8 
43 Seoul GwangJin 자양 한라 
 
1996.02. 329 2 1 60 
 
241.7 229.2 395.8 500.0 137.5 150.0 216.7 241.7 
 
E 127 4 12 N 37 32 7 
44 Seoul GwangJin 자양 현대 6 차 
 
1999.02. 178 3 1 60 
  
245.8 450.0 633.3 
 
158.3 241.7 266.7 
 
E 127 4 18 N 37 31 58 
45 Seoul GooRo 개봉 삼환 
 
1995.11. 783 3 1 59 
 
207.6 173.7 258.5 288.1 105.9 122.9 165.3 169.5 
 
E 126 51 16 N 37 29 40 
46 Seoul GooRo 고척 청구 
 
1998.09. 448 2 1 60 
 
151.7 200.0 258.3 304.2 73.3 129.2 158.3 158.3 
 
E 126 51 50 N 37 30 5 
47 Seoul GooRo 구로 럭키 
 
1993.03. 427 2 1 60 
 
212.5 187.5 283.3 290.0 120.8 139.2 191.7 191.7 
 
E 126 53 38 N 37 29 31 
48 Seoul GooRo 구로 구일우성 
 
1998.01. 829 2 1 59 
 
165.3 165.3 227.1 339.0 89.0 131.4 148.3 190.7 
 
E 126 52 37 N 37 29 25 
49 Seoul GooRo 신도림 동아 1 차 
 
1999.11. 1095 3 1 60 
  
250.0 370.8 491.7 
 
154.2 220.8 220.8 
 
E 126 52 59 N 37 30 39 
50 Seoul GooRo 오류 동부 
 
1996.08. 252 3 1 60 
 
170.8 162.5 225.0 237.5 80.8 112.5 154.2 150.0 
 
E 126 50 52 N 37 29 49 
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No. Address Apt. Complex 
  
Built 
year 
House-
holds 
Bed-
room 
Bath-
room 
Floor 
area 
  Price (10 US $/m²) Rent (Jeonse*) (10 US $/m²)   Longitude Latitude 
    1998 2001 2004 2007 1998 2001 2004 2007     ° ` ``   ° ` `` 
51 Seoul GeumCheon 가산 두산 
 
1997.12. 1495 3 1 60 
 
208.3 208.3 304.2 375.0 95.8 133.3 175.0 208.3 
 
E 126 53 33 N 37 28 28 
52 Seoul GeumCheon 독산 독산현대 
 
1997.03. 204 3 1 60 
 
191.7 175.0 250.0 254.2 104.2 120.8 158.3 158.3 
 
E 126 53 42 N 37 28 2 
53 Seoul GeumCheon 독산 동아 
 
1997.08. 106 3 1 60 
 
181.7 179.2 225.0 241.7 95.8 112.5 150.0 154.2 
 
E 126 54 23 N 37 28 12 
54 Seoul GeumCheon 시흥 남서울건영 2 차 
 
1989.07. 619 2 1 64 
 
156.3 144.5 226.6 234.4 97.7 105.5 132.8 148.4 
 
E 126 54 39 N 37 26 57 
55 Seoul GeumCheon 시흥 성지 
 
1986.09. 233 2 1 55 
 
161.8 150.0 272.7 281.8 95.5 109.1 136.4 136.4 
 
E 126 53 53 N 37 27 3 
56 Seoul NoWon 공릉 삼익 
 
1995.10. 845 2 1 51 
 
181.4 166.7 245.1 0.0 102.9 122.5 161.8 0.0 
 
E 127 4 55 N 37 37 36 
57 Seoul NoWon 상계 성원 
 
1998.01. 174 2 1 60 
 
166.7 175.0 220.8 266.7 95.8 137.5 154.2 158.3 
 
E 127 3 57 N 37 39 37 
58 Seoul NoWon 상계 중앙하이츠 
 
1997.10. 437 3 1 61 
 
188.5 196.7 262.3 323.8 106.6 135.2 168.0 204.9 
 
E 127 4 8 N 37 39 13 
59 Seoul NoWon 상계 불암대림 
 
1999.07. 634 2 1 59 
  
199.2 262.7 288.1 
 
135.6 165.3 186.4 
 
E 127 4 38 N 37 39 48 
60 Seoul NoWon 월계 서광 
 
1994.07. 274 3 1 60 
 
204.2 162.5 258.3 262.5 100.0 108.3 129.2 157.5 
 
E 127 3 54 N 37 37 23 
61 Seoul NoWon 중계 성원 
 
1996.02. 402 3 1 60 
  
204.2 333.3 416.7 
 
130.0 200.0 250.0 
 
E 127 4 11 N 37 39 0 
62 Seoul NoWon 중계 경남 
 
1989.07. 660 2 1 50 
 
162.0 157.0 245.0 290.0 103.0 125.0 160.0 180.0 
 
E 127 3 45 N 37 38 21 
63 Seoul NoWon 하계 벽산 
 
1988.05. 630 2 1 58 
 
159.5 159.5 237.1 306.0 107.8 125.0 150.9 181.0 
 
E 127 3 54 N 37 38 8 
64 Seoul DoBong 도봉 현대성우 
 
1998.12. 190 2 1 60 
 
150.0 175.0 225.0 300.0 91.7 116.7 133.3 145.8 
 
E 127 2 52 N 37 40 35 
65 Seoul DoBong 방학 벽산 
 
1996.11. 318 2 1 52 
 
153.8 139.4 192.3 192.3 101.0 110.6 129.8 134.6 
 
E 127 1 30 N 37 39 31 
66 Seoul DoBong 방학 신동아 2 단지 
 
1991.09. 660 3 1 73 
 
181.5 164.4 198.6 226.0 92.5 95.9 133.6 123.3 
 
E 127 1 34 N 37 39 37 
67 Seoul DoBong 쌍문 극동 
 
1995.07. 315 3 1 60 
 
201.7 170.8 229.2 266.7 106.7 108.3 141.7 150.0 
 
E 127 1 38 N 37 39 5 
68 Seoul DoBong 창 대우 
 
1995.11. 952 2 1 60 
 
220.8 183.3 254.2 258.3 112.5 127.5 158.3 158.3 
 
E 127 2 15 N 37 38 32 
69 Seoul DoBong 창 쌍용 
 
1997.02. 1352 3 1 60 
 
233.3 229.2 316.7 366.7 120.8 141.7 183.3 216.7 
 
E 127 2 53 N 37 39 35 
70 Seoul DongDaeMoon 답십리 신답경남 
 
1991.07. 225 2 1 59 
 
186.4 173.7 300.8 300.8 114.4 122.9 156.8 156.8 
 
E 127 2 40 N 37 34 29 
71 Seoul DongDaeMoon 답십리 동답한신 
 
1991.12. 600 3 1 59 
 
194.9 176.3 258.5 279.7 114.4 127.1 165.3 156.8 
 
E 127 3 45 N 37 34 15 
72 Seoul DongDaeMoon 용두 신동아 
 
1992.12. 772 2 1 59 
 
211.9 182.2 309.3 313.6 139.8 139.8 178.0 194.9 
 
E 127 1 56 N 37 34 21 
73 Seoul DongDaeMoon 이문 삼익 
 
1997.08. 353 3 1 60 
 
187.5 175.0 266.7 266.7 104.2 120.8 175.0 183.3 
 
E 127 4 33 N 37 35 45 
74 Seoul DongDaeMoon 전농 우성 
 
1991.07. 1234 2 1 60 
 
183.3 170.8 241.7 275.0 120.8 120.8 162.5 162.5 
 
E 127 3 54 N 37 34 38 
75 Seoul DongDaeMoon 회기 신현대 
 
1989.05. 736 2 1 56 
 
214.3 192.0 290.2 308.0 138.4 142.9 192.0 192.0 
 
E 127 3 6 N 37 35 22 
76 Seoul DongJak 노량진 우성 
 
1995.11. 901 2 1 60 
 
237.5 208.3 325.0 433.3 129.2 141.7 225.0 254.2 
 
E 126 56 52 N 37 30 34 
77 Seoul DongJak 대방 대림 
 
1993.10. 1628 3 1 60 
 
275.0 258.3 395.8 550.0 150.0 170.8 237.5 275.0 
 
E 126 55 28 N 37 30 27 
78 Seoul DongJak 본 신동아 
 
1993.07. 765 2 1 60 
 
208.3 212.5 337.5 466.7 137.5 145.8 158.3 216.7 
 
E 126 57 6 N 37 30 36 
79 Seoul DongJak 사당 극동 
 
1992.10. 1550 2 1 52 
 
240.4 254.8 379.8 480.8 139.4 168.3 226.0 254.8 
 
E 126 58 29 N 37 29 26 
80 Seoul DongJak 노량진 상도건영 
 
1997.08. 824 3 1 63 
 
242.1 261.9 388.9 460.3 138.9 150.8 230.2 261.9 
 
E 126 56 58 N 37 30 27 
81 Seoul DongJak 신대방 한성 
 
1994.12. 272 3 1 60 
 
250.0 229.2 358.3 433.3 137.5 154.2 216.7 250.0 
 
E 126 54 55 N 37 29 44 
82 Seoul Mapo 공덕 공덕현대 
 
1989.01. 183 2 1 52 
 
173.1 182.7 307.7 403.8 134.6 139.4 192.3 201.9 
 
E 126 57 0 N 37 32 53 
83 Seoul Mapo 도화 우성 
 
1991.03. 1230 2 1 55 
 
268.2 222.7 372.7 490.9 159.1 168.2 209.1 218.2 
 
E 126 56 54 N 37 32 10 
84 Seoul Mapo 도화 현대 1 차 
 
1993.08. 1021 2 1 55 
 
240.9 236.4 336.4 509.1 140.9 150.0 227.3 236.4 
 
E 126 57 14 N 37 32 22 
85 Seoul Mapo 신수 삼익 
 
1996.11. 391 3 1 60 
 
225.0 237.5 375.0 416.7 137.5 162.5 245.8 258.3 
 
E 126 56 8 N 37 33 4 
86 Seoul Mapo 연남 대명 
 
1996.01. 128 2 1 55 
  
227.3 272.7 345.5 
 
136.4 200.0 209.1 
 
E 126 55 25 N 37 33 42 
87 Seoul Mapo 중 현대 1 차 
 
2000.04. 477 3 1 60 
  
216.7 375.0 375.0 
 
137.5 191.7 225.0 
 
E 126 54 25 N 37 34 16 
88 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 북가좌 한양 
 
1986.12. 660 2 1 65 
 
180.8 161.5 265.4 315.4 111.5 103.8 153.8 150.0 
 
E 126 54 32 N 37 34 33 
89 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 대현 럭키대현 
 
1993.04. 855 2 1 60 
 
250.0 233.3 316.7 383.3 150.0 154.2 212.5 241.7 
 
E 126 56 52 N 37 33 34 
90 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 북아현 경남 1 차 
 
1995.10. 106 2 1 60 
 
225.0 237.5 300.0 391.7 129.2 162.5 191.7 200.0 
 
E 126 57 27 N 37 33 41 
91 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 남가좌 현대 
 
1998.10. 1485 2 1 59 
 
182.2 216.1 313.6 355.9 89.0 148.3 178.0 194.9 
 
E 126 55 14 N 37 34 28 
92 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍은 벽산 
 
1995.04. 1509 2 1 59 
 
190.7 190.7 283.9 288.1 139.8 139.8 178.0 194.9 
 
E 126 56 41 N 37 35 41 
93 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍은 풍림 2 차 
 
1989.09. 390 3 1 58 
 
202.6 163.8 250.0 254.3 133.6 137.9 163.8 176.7 
 
E 126 56 34 N 37 35 35 
94 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍제 한양 
 
1992.07. 998 2 1 60 
 
220.8 195.8 300.0 337.5 129.2 154.2 191.7 212.5 
 
E 126 56 49 N 37 34 59 
95 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍제 홍제현대 
 
1992.01. 704 2 1 60 
 
233.3 208.3 291.7 316.7 129.2 141.7 200.0 183.3 
 
E 126 56 28 N 37 35 20 
96 Seoul SeoCho 반포 새서울 
 
1994.07. 154 2 1 60 
 
279.2 258.3 566.7 583.3 141.7 200.0 275.0 283.3 
 
E 127 0 36 N 37 29 57 
97 Seoul SeoCho 반포 한신서래 
 
1988.01. 414 3 1 64 
 
273.4 257.8 523.4 757.8 143.0 168.0 257.8 468.8 
 
E 127 2 3 N 37 29 57 
98 Seoul SeoCho 방배 삼호한숲 
 
1998.10. 116 3 1 59 
 
279.7 339.0 567.8 669.5 144.1 211.9 322.0 372.9 
 
E 126 59 56 N 37 28 40 
99 Seoul SeoCho 서초 한빛삼성 
 
1999.12. 264 2 2 60 
  
375.0 616.7 750.0 
 
233.3 291.7 375.0 
 
E 127 0 28 N 37 29 18 
100 Seoul SeoCho 서초 서초현대 
 
1999.12. 299 2 1 63 
  
381.0 579.4 730.2 
 
238.1 309.5 333.3 
 
E 127 1 13 N 37 29 27 
101 Seoul SeoCho 서초 우성 5 차 
 
1996.05. 408 2 1 57 
 
280.7 350.9 605.3 921.1 166.7 236.8 289.5 333.3 
 
E 127 1 36 N 37 29 40 
102 Seoul SeoCho 양재 우성 
 
1990.12. 997 3 1 73 
 
260.3 256.8 493.2 828.8 126.7 174.7 239.7 274.0 
 
E 127 1 50 N 37 28 31 
103 Seoul SeoCho 우면 코오롱 
 
1994.09. 300 2 1 52 
 
326.9 317.3 596.2 865.4 158.7 197.1 278.8 307.7 
 
E 127 1 40 N 37 28 21 
104 Seoul SeoCho 잠원 잠원현대훼밀리 
 
1997.07. 113 3 1 60 
 
283.3 325.0 604.2 791.7 191.7 225.0 283.3 333.3 
 
E 127 0 53 N 37 31 9 
105 Seoul SeongDong 금호 두산 
 
1993.12. 1267 2 1 60 
 
266.7 233.3 366.7 475.0 154.2 162.5 216.7 241.7 
 
E 127 0 58 N 37 32 59 
106 Seoul SeongDong 성수 현대그린 
 
1994.11. 219 2 1 57 
  
254.4 377.2 543.9 
 
153.5 201.8 210.5 
 
E 127 2 59 N 37 32 26 
107 Seoul SeongDong 옥수 극동그린 
 
1996.06. 583 2 1 60 
 
275.0 283.3 433.3 516.7 162.5 191.7 266.7 266.7 
 
E 127 0 36 N 37 32 30 
108 Seoul SeongDong 응봉 신동아 
 
1996.04. 434 2 1 60 
 
216.7 191.7 308.3 325.0 129.2 137.5 191.7 191.7 
 
E 127 1 45 N 37 32 59 
109 Seoul SeongDong 하왕십리 청계벽산 
 
1996.12. 1332 3 1 71 
 
250.0 235.9 422.5 443.7 119.7 147.9 176.1 211.3 
 
E 127 1 54 N 37 34 7 
110 Seoul SeongDong 행당 신동아 
 
1995.07. 636 2 1 60 
 
216.7 200.0 308.3 370.8 129.2 145.8 191.7 208.3 
 
E 127 1 57 N 37 33 14 
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111 Seoul SeongDong 행당 삼부 
 
1997.11. 498 3 1 68 
 
242.6 261.0 360.3 470.6 143.4 154.4 213.2 235.3 
 
E 127 2 15 N 37 33 35 
112 Seoul SeongBook 길음 삼부 
 
1992.09. 684 2 1 60 
 
179.2 179.2 279.2 333.3 112.5 141.7 175.0 175.0 
 
E 127 1 25 N 37 36 9 
113 Seoul SeongBook 돈암 현대 
 
1991.06. 619 2 1 60 
 
175.0 183.3 241.7 270.8 100.0 133.3 158.3 175.0 
 
E 127 1 41 N 37 36 15 
114 Seoul SeongBook 동소문 송산 
 
1997.08. 345 2 1 59 
 
224.6 216.1 279.7 271.2 131.4 156.8 194.9 190.7 
 
E 127 0 38 N 37 35 33 
115 Seoul SeongBook 상월곡 우남 
 
1994.11. 225 2 1 63 
 
230.2 182.5 238.1 254.0 123.0 131.0 142.9 146.8 
 
E 127 2 48 N 37 36 21 
116 Seoul SeongBook 종암 선경종암 
 
1995.10. 238 2 1 60 
 
220.8 212.5 275.0 291.7 125.0 137.5 191.7 216.7 
 
E 127 2 1 N 37 35 39 
117 Seoul SeongBook 하월곡 아남 
 
1996.12. 198 2 1 60 
 
220.8 208.3 254.2 308.3 120.8 145.8 162.5 175.0 
 
E 127 2 5 N 37 36 20 
118 Seoul SongPa 가락 우성 
 
1986.12. 838 2 1 58 
 
250.0 254.3 482.8 814.7 140.5 172.4 232.8 258.6 
 
E 127 7 4 N 37 29 49 
119 Seoul SongPa 방이 신동아 
 
1995.06. 96 2 1 50 
 
245.0 215.0 298.0 310.0 135.0 150.0 210.0 210.0 
 
E 127 6 40 N 37 30 56 
120 Seoul SongPa 거여 우방 
 
1999.05. 257 3 1 60 
  
229.2 383.3 466.7 
 
154.2 216.7 216.7 
 
E 127 8 32 N 37 29 33 
121 Seoul SongPa 송파 성지 
 
1992.09. 298 2 1 66 
 
265.2 234.8 439.4 590.9 140.2 159.1 219.7 257.6 
 
E 127 7 2 N 37 30 1 
122 Seoul SongPa 오금 우방 
 
2000.12. 196 2 1 60 
  
245.8 375.0 470.8 
 
158.3 216.7 237.5 
 
E 127 8 23 N 37 30 5 
123 Seoul SongPa 문정 동아 
 
1996.11. 78 3 1 71 
  
193.7 345.1 422.5 
 
140.8 176.1 197.2 
 
E 127 7 43 N 37 29 16 
124 Seoul SongPa 잠실 우성 4 차 
 
1983.09. 555 2 1 81 
 
185.2 194.4 463.0 672.8 104.9 114.2 197.5 185.2 
 
E 127 4 58 N 37 30 10 
125 Seoul SongPa 풍납 갑을 
 
1996.07. 85 3 1 60 
  
195.8 320.8 375.0 
 
137.5 190.0 208.3 
 
E 127 6 45 N 37 32 7 
126 Seoul YangCheon 목 금호 
 
1997.10. 224 3 1 60 
 
250.0 258.3 475.0 808.3 108.3 175.0 241.7 300.0 
 
E 126 52 29 N 37 31 31 
127 Seoul YangCheon 목 삼익 
 
1997.06. 277 2 1 60 
 
241.7 241.7 416.7 425.0 129.2 162.5 241.7 233.3 
 
E 126 52 35 N 37 31 23 
128 Seoul YangCheon 목 성원 
 
1997.02. 200 2 1 58 
 
267.2 267.2 413.8 534.5 125.0 168.1 215.5 241.4 
 
E 126 52 9 N 37 31 35 
129 Seoul YangCheon 신월 성원 
 
1997.01. 170 2 1 60 
 
0.0 145.8 212.5 175.0 
 
104.2 137.5 116.7 
 
E 126 50 1 N 37 31 41 
130 Seoul YangCheon 신정 목동현대 
 
1996.04. 2076 3 1 71 
 
235.9 232.4 415.5 605.6 105.6 144.4 204.2 246.5 
 
E 126 52 37 N 37 31 13 
131 Seoul YeongDeungPo 당산 강마을삼성 
 
1995.05. 348 3 1 60 
  
250.0 366.7 485.0 
 
154.2 216.7 258.3 
 
E 126 54 21 N 37 32 3 
132 Seoul YeongDeungPo 대림 한신 1 차 
 
1998.12. 143 3 1 60 
  
216.7 308.3 358.3 
 
129.2 204.2 208.3 
 
E 126 54 14 N 37 29 41 
133 Seoul YeongDeungPo 도림 한라 
 
1998.08. 142 3 1 60 
 
200.0 175.0 245.8 275.0 100.0 125.0 175.0 191.7 
 
E 126 53 51 N 37 30 27 
134 Seoul YeongDeungPo 신길 한성 
 
1997.04. 420 3 1 60 
 
241.7 266.7 366.7 383.3 120.8 166.7 225.0 241.7 
 
E 126 55 9 N 37 30 17 
135 Seoul YeongDeungPo 양평 한신 
 
1990.01. 457 3 1 60 
 
208.3 191.7 316.7 425.0 112.5 129.2 170.8 191.7 
 
E 126 53 32 N 37 32 24 
136 Seoul YeongDeungPo 여의도 미성 
 
1978.06. 577 3 1 74 
 
283.8 277.0 560.8 912.2 141.9 165.5 223.0 216.2 
 
E 126 55 28 N 37 31 11 
137 Seoul YongSan 보광 삼성리버빌 
 
2000.10. 242 3 1 60 
  
258.3 400.0 541.7 
 
175.0 233.3 225.0 
 
E 127 0 4 N 37 31 27 
138 Seoul YongSan 산천 한강타운 
 
1999.11. 285 3 1 60 
  
216.7 341.7 391.7 
 
158.3 191.7 241.7 
 
E 126 56 59 N 37 32 9 
139 Seoul YongSan 이촌 대림 
 
1994.05. 638 2 1 59 
 
254.2 254.2 428.0 728.8 135.6 148.3 211.9 211.9 
 
E 126 57 18 N 37 31 29 
140 Seoul YongSan 이촌 현대한강 
 
1996.10. 516 3 1 60 
 
304.2 300.0 525.0 775.0 158.3 175.0 225.0 250.0 
 
E 126 57 30 N 37 31 22 
141 Seoul YongSan 이태원 남산대림 
 
1994.10. 400 3 1 60 
 
375.0 366.7 500.0 716.7 200.0 208.3 283.3 283.3 
 
E 126 59 19 N 37 32 27 
142 Seoul EunPyung 녹번 현대 
 
1989.05. 132 2 1 62 
 
173.4 169.4 205.6 290.3 100.8 112.9 157.3 225.8 
 
E 126 55 45 N 37 36 18 
143 Seoul EunPyung 불광 미성 
 
1988.06. 1340 2 1 65 
 
203.8 188.5 292.3 434.6 119.2 126.9 169.2 192.3 
 
E 126 55 41 N 37 36 53 
144 Seoul EunPyung 신사 라이프시티 
 
1992.12. 298 3 1 60 
 
170.8 154.2 200.0 220.8 106.7 108.3 137.5 125.0 
 
E 126 54 19 N 37 36 8 
145 Seoul EunPyung 신사 신성 
 
1988.04. 238 2 1 56 
 
151.8 142.9 214.3 223.2 93.8 111.6 147.3 142.9 
 
E 126 54 19 N 37 35 23 
146 Seoul EunPyung 응암 경남 
 
1995.12. 160 2 1 59 
 
207.6 165.3 216.1 241.5 118.6 122.9 156.8 169.5 
 
E 126 55 13 N 37 34 59 
147 Seoul EunPyung 응암 우성 
 
1988.07. 292 2 1 64 
 
156.3 152.3 179.7 203.1 101.6 113.3 152.3 132.8 
 
E 126 55 5 N 37 35 2 
148 Seoul JongRo 교북 동아 
 
1995.11. 48 2 1 60 
   
316.7 383.3 
  
200.0 216.7 
 
E 126 57 43 N 37 34 17 
149 Seoul JongRo 명륜 명륜아남 3 차 
 
1999.01. 136 2 1 59 
  
300.8 406.8 474.6 
 
224.6 266.9 275.4 
 
E 127 0 0 N 37 35 8 
150 Seoul JongRo 무악 현대 
 
1999.11. 1514 3 1 60 
  
283.3 433.3 420.8 
 
175.0 266.7 279.2 
 
E 126 57 39 N 37 34 31 
151 Seoul JongRo 창신 쌍용 2 차 
 
1993.06. 919 2 1 55 
 
204.5 181.8 263.6 290.9 122.7 134.5 172.7 172.7 
 
E 127 0 43 N 37 34 49 
152 Seoul JongRo 평창 삼성 
 
1998.01 176 3 1 60 
  
220.8 283.3 287.5 0.0 145.8 191.7 200.0 
 
E 126 58 43 N 37 36 39 
153 Seoul Joong 신당 현대 
 
1990.06. 942 3 1 66 
 
204.5 189.4 318.2 363.6 121.2 125.0 189.4 197.0 
 
E 127 1 17 N 37 33 35 
154 Seoul Joong 신당 남산타운 
 
2000.06. 5150 3 1 53 
  
372.6 528.3 622.6 
 
235.8 283.0 330.2 
 
E 127 0 35 N 37 32 59 
155 Seoul JoongRang 면목 신성 
 
1998.10. 266 3 1 60 
 
154.2 175.0 275.0 275.0 79.2 116.7 162.5 170.8 
 
E 127 4 22 N 37 30 25 
156 Seoul JoongRang 면목 두산 1 차 
 
1993.12. 122 2 1 60 
  
200.0 275.0 283.3 
 
145.8 175.0 183.3 
 
E 127 5 2 N 37 34 53 
157 Seoul JoongRang 상봉 LG 쌍용 
 
1996.02. 858 3 1 68 
 
227.9 187.5 268.4 323.5 106.6 114.0 154.4 183.8 
 
E 127 5 23 N 37 36 11 
158 Seoul JoongRang 신내 동성 3 차 
 
1995.07. 1844 3 1 59 
 
207.6 178.0 245.8 305.1 114.4 122.9 148.3 186.4 
 
E 127 5 45 N 37 36 29 
159 Seoul JoongRang 신내 두산화성 
 
1995.12. 763 3 1 67 
 
246.3 194.0 287.3 358.2 104.5 123.1 164.2 197.8 
 
E 127 5 42 N 37 36 47 
160 Seoul JoongRang 중화 한신 
 
1996.09. 1544 2 1 50 
 
205.0 195.0 270.0 300.0 135.0 140.0 185.0 190.0 
 
E 127 4 53 N 37 35 48 
161 InCheon GangHwa 강화 현대 
 
1994.04. 219 3 1 59 
  
105.9 122.9 131.4 
 
50.8 72.0 63.6 
 
E 126 29 8 N 37 44 46 
162 InCheon GyeYang 계산 극동 
 
1987.01. 630 2 1 53 
 
115.1 117.9 193.4 221.7 53.8 69.8 89.6 99.1 
 
E 126 43 26 N 37 32 46 
163 InCheon GyeYang 오류 신동아 
 
1998.09. 1192 3 1 60 
  
129.2 179.2 204.2 
 
66.7 91.7 104.2 
 
E 126 44 0 N 37 34 50 
164 InCheon GyeYang 계산 현대 
 
1992.02. 1248 3 1 69 
 
134.1 131.9 199.3 235.5 58.0 90.6 126.8 134.1 
 
E 126 43 58 N 37 32 14 
165 InCheon GyeYang 작전 동보 1 차 
 
1995.10. 1187 3 1 60 
  
121.7 170.8 166.7 
 
87.5 120.8 112.5 
 
E 126 44 21 N 37 31 56 
166 InCheon GyeYang 효성 현대 1 차 
 
1992.01. 874 3 1 71 
 
118.3 109.2 179.6 204.2 59.9 73.9 116.2 116.2 
 
E 126 42 50 N 37 31 59 
167 InCheon Nam 관교 신비마을 
 
1994.05. 960 2 1 60 
 
131.7 113.3 165.0 183.3 79.2 77.5 112.5 120.8 
 
E 126 41 12 N 37 26 42 
168 InCheon Nam 주안 진흥 
 
1994.01. 828 3 1 60 
 
131.7 145.8 229.2 220.8 70.8 95.8 129.2 150.0 
 
E 126 40 56 N 37 26 47 
169 InCheon Nam 도화 나산 
 
1997.07. 211 3 1 59 
 
144.1 139.8 186.4 173.7 80.5 80.5 93.2 118.6 
 
E 126 40 2 N 37 27 54 
170 InCheon Nam 숭의 극동 
 
1997.10. 133 3 1 58 
  
121.6 159.5 181.0 
 
64.7 86.2 99.1 
 
E 126 38 54 N 37 28 3 
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171 InCheon Nam 용현 한국 
 
1996.07. 297 3 1 59 
  
123.7 178.0 186.4 
 
79.7 114.4 122.9 
 
E 126 38 19 N 37 26 47 
172 InCheon Nam 주안 쌍용 
 
1985.12. 768 2 1 71 
 
88.0 93.0 154.9 146.5 45.8 57.7 81.0 88.0 
 
E 126 40 48 N 37 26 48 
173 InCheon Nam 학익 신동아 5 차 
 
1993.06. 594 2 1 57 
 
111.4 120.2 177.2 184.2 76.3 74.6 127.2 127.2 
 
E 126 40 39 N 37 26 36 
174 InCheon NamDong 간석 금호 
 
1988.10. 630 2 1 59 
 
109.3 111.9 200.8 199.2 64.4 89.8 144.1 138.1 
 
E 126 41 58 N 37 27 28 
175 InCheon NamDong 간석 극동 
 
1989.05. 760 2 1 56 
 
114.3 111.6 198.2 198.2 64.3 89.3 138.4 129.5 
 
E 126 42 58 N 37 27 21 
176 InCheon NamDong 구월 벽산 
 
1989.11. 150 2 1 54 
 
60.2 78.7 138.9 115.7 46.3 50.0 88.0 81.5 
 
E 126 43 30 N 37 26 58 
177 InCheon NamDong 만수 효성상아 1 차 
 
1985.07. 720 3 1 60 
 
126.7 113.3 158.3 179.2 79.2 91.7 108.3 125.0 
 
E 126 43 21 N 37 27 27 
178 InCheon NamDong 만수 신동아 
 
1990.06. 750 3 1 67 
 
104.5 110.4 164.2 156.7 70.9 85.8 115.7 115.7 
 
E 126 44 13 N 37 27 59 
179 InCheon NamDong 남촌 풍림 3 차 
 
1999.10. 735 3 1 59 
  
146.6 216.1 199.2 
 
89.0 139.8 127.1 
 
E 126 42 59 N 37 25 44 
180 InCheon Dong 송현 동부 
 
1992.01. 1140 2 1 57 
 
100.9 107.0 143.0 148.2 48.2 68.4 74.6 92.1 
 
E 126 38 6 N 37 28 56 
181 InCheon BooPyung 갈산 동아 
 
1993.06. 280 2 1 59 
 
122.0 119.5 186.4 190.7 72.0 89.8 122.9 131.4 
 
E 126 43 47 N 37 30 39 
182 InCheon BooPyung 부개 현대 
 
1993.05. 200 2 1 60 
  
129.2 162.5 191.7 
 
95.8 125.0 125.0 
 
E 126 44 28 N 37 29 14 
183 InCheon BooPyung 부평 동아 2 차 
 
1995.02. 2128 3 1 60 
 
154.2 147.5 212.5 250.0 87.5 104.2 141.7 154.2 
 
E 126 43 6 N 37 29 47 
184 InCheon BooPyung 부평 대림 
 
1989.12. 1470 2 1 50 
 
117.0 125.0 177.0 195.0 85.0 95.0 132.0 145.0 
 
E 126 43 2 N 37 30 7 
185 InCheon BooPyung 산곡 현대 5 차 
 
1993.12. 1161 3 1 59 
 
131.4 122.0 194.9 173.7 72.0 89.0 135.6 139.8 
 
E 126 42 38 N 37 30 20 
186 InCheon BooPyung 산곡 우성 5 차 
 
1996.12. 299 3 1 60 
  
112.5 175.0 175.0 
 
87.5 112.5 123.3 
 
E 126 42 16 N 37 29 59 
187 InCheon BooPyung 청천 쌍용 
 
1990.09. 510 2 1 56 
 
102.7 108.9 169.6 175.0 67.0 86.6 120.5 117.0 
 
E 126 42 57 N 37 30 25 
188 InCheon Seo 가정 하나 2 차 
 
1992.02. 495 2 1 58 
 
93.1 86.2 114.7 142.2 52.6 57.8 81.9 77.6 
 
E 126 41 2 N 37 31 36 
189 InCheon Seo 가좌 진주 3 단지 
 
1989.12. 798 2 1 59 
 
114.4 102.5 165.3 161.9 76.3 78.8 114.4 105.9 
 
E 126 40 57 N 37 29 32 
190 InCheon Seo 왕길 원흥 
 
1993.07. 354 2 1 60 
 
90.0 73.3 120.8 186.7 48.3 48.3 62.5 70.8 
 
E 126 39 2 N 37 36 0 
191 InCheon Seo 가좌 범양 
 
1990.07. 510 3 1 70 
 
125.0 117.9 203.6 185.7 78.6 78.6 117.9 117.9 
 
E 126 41 17 N 37 29 44 
192 InCheon Seo 마전 동아 
 
1998.11. 1351 3 1 60 
  
118.3 160.0 250.0 
 
66.7 87.5 104.2 
 
E 126 40 22 N 37 35 50 
193 InCheon Seo 심곡 삼성 
 
1997.06. 421 3 1 60 
  
123.3 181.7 216.7 
 
79.2 108.3 116.7 
 
E 126 40 12 N 37 32 40 
194 InCheon Seo 연희 한국 1 차 
 
1994.10. 356 2 1 58 
 
124.1 105.2 150.9 185.3 69.0 69.0 94.8 116.4 
 
E 126 40 31 N 37 33 3 
195 InCheon YeonSoo 동춘 무지개마을 
 
1995.08. 1068 3 1 60 
 
147.5 141.7 258.3 270.8 79.2 95.8 150.0 150.0 
 
E 126 40 15 N 37 24 5 
196 InCheon YeonSoo 동춘 대림 3 차 
 
1993.07. 408 2 1 53 
 
133.0 127.4 193.4 205.7 71.7 91.5 136.8 141.5 
 
E 126 40 0 N 37 24 25 
197 InCheon YeonSoo 선학 대동 
 
1992.06. 390 3 1 73 
 
114.4 113.0 178.1 188.4 65.1 85.6 119.9 119.9 
 
E 126 42 8 N 37 25 28 
198 InCheon YeonSoo 선학 대진 
 
1991.01. 300 2 1 64 
 
82.0 87.5 147.7 171.9 46.9 60.9 101.6 117.2 
 
E 126 41 59 N 37 25 20 
199 InCheon YeonSoo 연수 풍림 1 차 
 
1992.03. 769 3 1 69 
 
123.9 118.8 210.1 202.9 65.2 83.3 141.3 137.7 
 
E 126 41 31 N 37 25 3 
200 InCheon YeonSoo 연수 대림 
 
1993.05. 640 3 1 62 
 
137.1 130.6 234.7 255.6 72.6 91.1 149.2 161.3 
 
E 126 41 38 N 37 25 10 
201 InCheon YeonSoo 옥련 우성 
 
1996.01. 498 3 1 60 
 
129.2 137.5 212.5 215.0 70.8 87.5 125.0 150.0 
 
E 126 38 50 N 37 25 25 
202 InCheon YeonSoo 옥련 현대 5 차 
 
1997.07. 621 3 1 60 
 
152.5 145.8 212.5 205.8 75.8 95.8 133.3 145.8 
 
E 126 38 47 N 37 25 38 
203 InCheon YeonSoo 옥련 쌍용 
 
1998.08. 574 3 1 60 
 
129.2 142.5 215.0 225.0 62.5 87.5 129.2 138.3 
 
E 126 39 12 N 37 25 30 
204 GyeongGi GoYang 고양 삼성 
 
1998.11. 282 3 1 60 
  
142.5 185.8 201.7 0.0 83.3 129.2 120.8 
 
E 126 54 9 N 37 42 10 
205 GyeongGi GoYang 고양 현대 
 
1997.11. 791 3 1 60 
  
137.5 179.2 208.3 0.0 83.3 120.8 125.0 
 
E 126 54 0 N 37 42 4 
206 GyeongGi GoYang 대화 장성동부 
 
1995.11. 410 2 1 52 
 
187.5 173.1 245.2 312.5 91.3 120.2 149.0 158.7 
 
E 126 44 45 N 37 40 29 
207 GyeongGi GoYang 마두 백마한성 
 
1994.12. 576 2 1 50 
 
175.0 165.0 240.0 290.0 95.0 115.0 145.0 160.0 
 
E 126 47 33 N 37 39 30 
208 GyeongGi GoYang 마두 백마벽산 
 
1994.08. 438 3 1 60 
 
183.3 170.8 258.3 375.0 87.5 112.5 175.0 175.0 
 
E 126 47 22 N 37 39 28 
209 GyeongGi GoYang 백석 백송대우 
 
1994.06. 228 2 1 59 
 
156.8 148.3 211.9 203.4 84.7 101.7 135.6 135.6 
 
E 126 47 41 N 37 39 14 
210 GyeongGi GoYang 백석 흰돌국제한진 
 
1994.08. 816 2 1 49 
 
186.7 178.6 280.6 326.5 104.1 132.7 173.5 188.8 
 
E 126 47 2 N 37 38 38 
211 GyeongGi GoYang 성사 신원당동문 
 
1992.10. 354 3 1 63 
 
166.7 158.7 222.2 301.6 91.3 115.1 142.9 166.7 
 
E 126 50 22 N 37 39 11 
212 GyeongGi GoYang 성사 신원당태영 
 
1993.11. 604 2 1 55 
 
150.0 146.4 209.1 272.7 86.4 104.5 140.9 154.5 
 
E 126 50 4 N 37 39 5 
213 GyeongGi GoYang 중산 중산마을 1 단지두산 
 
1995.11. 888 3 1 60 
 
170.8 148.3 190.0 270.8 81.7 95.0 120.8 141.7 
 
E 126 46 51 N 37 41 51 
214 GyeongGi GoYang 일산 후곡코오롱 
 
1995.10. 474 2 1 49 
 
178.6 168.4 260.2 306.1 96.9 117.3 148.0 137.8 
 
E 126 46 6 N 37 40 33 
215 GyeongGi GoYang 일산 에이스 
 
1994.12. 332 2 1 59 
 
139.8 128.0 161.0 216.1 72.0 89.0 122.9 118.6 
 
E 126 46 35 N 37 41 16 
216 GyeongGi GoYang 장항 호수청구 
 
1994.03. 668 2 1 50 
 
205.0 190.0 315.0 350.0 103.0 125.0 200.0 210.0 
 
E 126 46 34 N 37 39 0 
217 GyeongGi GoYang 주엽 강선 LG 
 
1993.01. 483 3 1 60 
 
191.7 191.7 287.5 387.5 90.0 129.2 158.3 204.2 
 
E 126 45 59 N 37 40 11 
218 GyeongGi GoYang 주엽 문촌우성 1 단지 
 
1994.12. 892 2 1 50 
 
185.0 165.0 245.0 285.0 95.0 115.0 145.0 165.0 
 
E 126 45 30 N 37 40 40 
219 GyeongGi GoYang 탄현 탄현건영 5 
 
1995.03. 624 3 1 68 
 
160.3 134.6 186.0 338.2 73.5 78.7 106.6 128.7 
 
E 126 45 58 N 37 41 46 
220 GyeongGi GoYang 행신 무원두산 
 
1995.01. 688 3 1 71 
 
197.2 169.0 281.7 369.7 88.0 102.1 137.3 162.0 
 
E 126 49 52 N 37 36 49 
221 GyeongGi GoYang 행신 소만동성 
 
1994.11. 377 2 1 60 
 
158.3 150.0 208.3 275.0 79.2 104.2 129.2 147.5 
 
E 126 50 39 N 37 36 58 
222 GyeongGi GoYang 화정 달빛부영 
 
1996.07. 1391 3 1 60 
 
183.3 170.8 233.3 279.2 87.5 112.5 145.8 162.5 
 
E 126 50 11 N 37 38 50 
223 GyeongGi GoYang 화정 옥빛풍산 
 
1996.06. 112 3 1 60 
 
200.0 166.7 245.8 283.3 91.7 112.5 154.2 158.3 
 
E 126 50 2 N 37 37 49 
224 GyeongGi GoYang 화정 별빛부영 
 
1995.12. 1232 3 1 60 
 
202.5 179.2 265.0 375.0 95.8 116.7 95.8 208.3 
 
E 126 49 43 N 37 37 55 
225 GyeongGi GwangMyung 광명 중앙하이츠 1 차 
 
1993.07. 909 2 1 49 
 
148.0 144.9 224.5 250.0 86.7 102.0 148.0 173.5 
 
E 126 51 18 N 37 28 9 
226 GyeongGi GwangMyung 소하 미도 2 차 
 
1993.03. 193 2 1 60 
 
150.0 148.3 308.3 241.7 87.5 104.2 141.7 145.8 
 
E 126 52 36 N 37 26 11 
227 GyeongGi GwangMyung 소하 성원 
 
1994.05. 193 2 1 67 
 
134.3 135.1 279.9 246.3 82.1 93.3 126.9 126.9 
 
E 126 52 37 N 37 26 7 
228 GyeongGi GwangMyung 철산 쌍마한신 
 
1992.11. 384 2 1 66 
 
185.6 174.2 287.9 318.2 98.5 117.4 143.9 166.7 
 
E 126 52 4 N 37 28 37 
229 GyeongGi GwangMyung 하안 현대 
 
1995.11. 593 2 1 53 
 
155.7 144.3 278.3 250.0 89.6 103.8 141.5 155.7 
 
E 126 51 50 N 37 28 5 
230 GyeongGi GwangJoo 경안 나산 
 
1996.01. 236 3 1 59 
  
133.9 182.2 271.2 
 
83.1 110.2 127.1 
 
E 127 15 9 N 37 24 59 
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231 GyeongGi GwangJoo 태전 성원 1 차 
 
1999.07. 654 3 1 60 
  
154.2 212.5 337.5 
 
87.5 120.8 129.2 
 
E 127 13 44 N 37 23 23 
232 GyeongGi GwangJoo 실촌 쌍용 1 차 
 
1998.11. 440 3 1 60 
 
104.2 123.3 175.0 229.2 45.8 69.2 95.8 112.5 
 
E 127 20 17 N 37 20 47 
233 GyeongGi GwangJoo 실촌 LG 
 
1997.01. 222 2 1 58 
 
129.3 103.4 142.2 211.2 60.3 73.3 90.5 112.1 
 
E 127 23 39 N 37 21 57 
234 GyeongGi GwangJoo 오포 쌍용 
 
1999.02. 313 2 1 59 
  
135.6 194.9 245.8 
 
76.3 105.9 118.6 
 
E 127 15 24 N 37 22 50 
235 GyeongGi GwangJoo 탄벌 동보 
 
1996.06. 815 3 1 59 
 
148.3 139.8 194.9 250.0 74.6 89.0 118.6 144.1 
 
E 127 14 55 N 37 24 55 
236 GyeongGi GooRi 교문 대우동양고속 
 
1994.11. 680 3 1 61 
 
176.2 153.3 262.3 385.2 102.5 114.8 147.5 184.4 
 
E 127 8 7 N 37 35 19 
237 GyeongGi GooRi 교문 구리우성 
 
1994.08. 341 3 1 60 
 
181.7 154.2 262.5 358.3 101.7 112.5 154.2 170.8 
 
E 127 8 13 N 37 35 17 
238 GyeongGi GooRi 수택 대림한숲 
 
1995.08. 956 2 1 52 
 
171.2 153.8 250.0 326.9 101.0 110.6 149.0 173.1 
 
E 127 8 20 N 37 35 25 
239 GyeongGi GooRi 수택 쌍용 
 
1996.12. 241 3 1 60 
 
195.8 162.5 250.0 341.7 104.2 108.3 150.0 162.5 
 
E 127 8 23 N 37 35 39 
240 GyeongGi GooRi 인창 삼호 
 
1992.05. 240 2 1 57 
 
131.6 118.4 210.5 219.3 78.9 92.1 127.2 127.2 
 
E 127 8 10 N 37 36 12 
241 GyeongGi GooRi 인창 건영 
 
1993.11. 573 2 1 62 
 
173.4 137.1 221.8 258.1 88.7 92.7 116.9 129.0 
 
E 127 8 12 N 37 36 44 
242 GyeongGi GoonPo 궁내 우륵주공 7 단지 
 
1994.07. 1312 2 1 58 
 
191.4 168.1 258.6 422.4 90.5 131.9 163.8 224.1 
 
E 126 55 34 N 37 21 35 
243 GyeongGi GoonPo 당 두산 
 
1993.01. 248 2 1 55 
 
159.1 140.9 209.1 295.5 81.8 109.1 131.8 168.2 
 
E 126 56 44 N 37 20 52 
244 GyeongGi GoonPo 당 주공 3 단지 
 
1997.10. 830 3 1 60 
 
133.3 166.7 245.8 345.8 54.2 116.7 150.0 195.8 
 
E 126 56 44 N 37 20 42 
245 GyeongGi GoonPo 금정 다산주공 3 
 
1992.06. 829 2 1 58 
 
142.2 151.7 238.8 387.9 86.2 129.3 150.9 215.5 
 
E 126 55 52 N 37 21 4 
246 GyeongGi GimPo 감정 쌍용 
 
1998.07. 586 3 1 60 
 
115.8 129.2 195.8 216.7 54.2 79.2 104.2 100.0 
 
E 126 41 53 N 37 37 30 
247 GyeongGi GimPo 감정 한국 
 
1995.09. 620 3 1 77 
 
139.6 100.6 168.8 194.8 64.9 61.7 87.7 87.7 
 
E 126 42 0 N 37 37 34 
248 GyeongGi GimPo 북변 대우 
 
1995.04. 543 2 1 53 
 
146.2 111.3 184.0 188.7 80.2 75.5 108.5 108.5 
 
E 126 43 23 N 37 37 23 
249 GyeongGi GimPo 풍무 길훈 1 차 
 
1993.01. 219 2 1 60 
  
96.7 141.7 141.7 
 
62.5 79.2 91.7 
 
E 126 43 9 N 37 36 47 
250 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 별내 동부 
 
1996.04. 456 3 1 60 
 
112.5 108.3 145.8 154.2 54.2 69.2 87.5 104.2 
 
E 127 12 47 N 37 41 29 
251 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 오남 한신 1 차 
 
1997.12. 283 3 1 60 
 
104.2 113.3 139.2 120.8 35.8 62.5 75.0 70.8 
 
E 127 12 44 N 37 40 54 
252 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 와부 주공 1 차 
 
1996.04. 910 3 1 58 
 
150.9 137.1 224.1 258.6 73.3 86.2 116.4 129.3 
 
E 127 13 2 N 37 35 11 
253 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 진건 현대 
 
1998.04. 399 3 1 60 
 
120.8 133.3 175.0 164.2 39.2 75.0 104.2 87.5 
 
E 127 10 56 N 37 39 27 
254 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 진접 대명 
 
1995.09. 405 3 1 60 
  
100.0 141.7 141.7 
 
66.7 87.5 87.5 
 
E 127 9 40 N 37 42 11 
255 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 퇴계원 극동 
 
1999.03. 498 3 1 60 
  
145.8 208.3 233.3 
 
87.5 120.8 116.7 
 
E 127 8 19 N 37 38 55 
256 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 화도 삼신 
 
1995.01. 345 3 1 60 
  
100.8 137.5 150.0 
 
58.3 79.2 93.3 
 
E 127 19 27 N 37 38 59 
257 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 화도 마석건영 
 
1997.01. 213 3 1 60 
  
77.5 119.2 123.3 
 
50.0 66.7 66.7 
 
E 127 18 9 N 37 39 29 
258 GyeongGi DongDooCheon 지행 현대 1 차 
 
1997.07. 227 3 1 60 
  
125.0 129.2 125.0 
 
52.5 69.2 59.2 
 
E 127 3 34 N 37 53 38 
259 GyeongGi DongDooCheon 생연 우성 
 
1992.12. 163 2 1 60 
  
91.7 73.3 71.7 
 
43.3 45.0 39.5 
 
E 127 3 46 N 37 54 31 
260 GyeongGi DongDooCheon 생연 건영 
 
1995.11. 397 2 1 59 
  
89.0 87.3 73.7 
 
46.6 53.4 40.7 
 
E 127 2 37 N 37 53 44 
261 GyeongGi BooCheon 괴안 삼익 
 
1989.08. 682 2 1 57 
 
140.4 122.8 179.8 250.0 90.4 96.5 114.0 122.8 
 
E 126 48 11 N 37 28 38 
262 GyeongGi BooCheon 괴안 삼익세라믹 
 
1988.12. 781 2 1 57 
 
135.1 127.2 180.7 241.2 83.3 92.1 122.8 122.8 
 
E 126 48 7 N 37 28 32 
263 GyeongGi BooCheon 상 반달삼익 
 
1993.04. 828 3 1 62 
  
165.3 262.1 350.8 
 
116.9 149.2 185.5 
 
E 126 45 32 N 37 29 46 
264 GyeongGi BooCheon 상 한아름현대 
 
1994.06. 824 3 1 59 
 
182.2 152.5 224.6 271.2 97.5 123.7 148.3 161.0 
 
E 126 44 55 N 37 29 41 
265 GyeongGi BooCheon 소사 한신 
 
1988.10. 916 2 1 64 
 
128.1 117.2 175.8 273.4 75.8 82.0 109.4 105.5 
 
E 126 48 2 N 37 28 26 
266 GyeongGi BooCheon 소사 주공 
 
1994.03. 1210 3 1 58 
 
145.7 137.9 204.3 280.2 73.3 99.1 125.0 133.6 
 
E 126 48 8 N 37 28 5 
267 GyeongGi BooCheon 송내 뉴서울 
 
1995.10. 971 3 1 60 
 
170.8 154.2 241.7 270.8 95.8 120.8 154.2 175.0 
 
E 126 45 45 N 37 29 9 
268 GyeongGi BooCheon 송내 현대 2 차 
 
1990.02. 372 2 1 52 
 
135.6 134.6 177.9 200.0 89.4 105.8 129.8 134.6 
 
E 126 45 39 N 37 28 59 
269 GyeongGi BooCheon 송내 건우 1 차 
 
1987.11. 120 3 1 58 
 
107.8 107.8 202.6 248.3 56.0 64.7 107.8 106.9 
 
E 126 45 35 N 37 29 11 
270 GyeongGi BooCheon 심곡 극동 
 
1980.04. 495 2 1 70 
 
100.0 102.1 153.6 200.0 59.3 75.0 96.4 92.9 
 
E 126 46 52 N 37 28 36 
271 GyeongGi BooCheon 심곡 태경삼익 
 
1985.05. 128 2 1 53 
 
129.2 113.2 174.5 207.5 78.3 84.9 127.4 113.2 
 
E 126 46 52 N 37 28 40 
272 GyeongGi BooCheon 역곡 한국 
 
1996.08. 497 3 1 60 
 
162.5 150.0 220.8 216.7 95.8 104.2 137.5 141.7 
 
E 126 48 49 N 37 29 35 
273 GyeongGi BooCheon 원미 풍림 
 
1999.01. 808 2 1 60 
  
166.7 220.8 258.3 
 
112.5 137.5 141.7 
 
E 126 47 29 N 37 29 29 
274 GyeongGi BooCheon 원종 신동문 
 
1998.07. 216 2 1 60 
  
140.8 204.2 225.0 
 
87.5 112.5 120.8 
 
E 126 47 53 N 37 31 45 
275 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 그린타운우성 2 차 
 
1994.12. 340 3 1 59 
 
200.8 182.2 334.7 406.8 105.9 122.9 178.0 194.9 
 
E 126 46 11 N 37 29 51 
276 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 연화건영 
 
1994.04. 424 2 1 54 
 
162.0 157.4 222.2 287.0 97.2 115.7 138.9 162.0 
 
E 126 46 48 N 37 29 56 
277 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 보람아주 
 
1995.05. 1398 3 1 60 
 
183.3 179.2 325.0 391.7 79.2 120.8 162.5 179.2 
 
E 126 45 30 N 37 29 55 
278 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 미리내동성 
 
1993.02. 970 2 1 53 
 
165.1 165.1 268.9 339.6 99.1 127.4 155.7 179.2 
 
E 126 46 8 N 37 29 57 
279 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 꿈삼환 
 
1994.07. 348 3 1 59 
 
175.4 165.3 266.9 389.8 99.2 122.9 148.3 169.5 
 
E 126 46 46 N 37 30 3 
280 GyeongGi SeongNam 구미 까치대우 
 
1995.12. 976 2 1 51 
 
235.3 235.3 397.1 509.8 112.7 161.8 220.6 250.0 
 
E 127 7 2 N 37 21 0 
281 GyeongGi SeongNam 금곡 청솔한라 
 
1995.12. 768 3 1 59 
 
241.5 228.8 457.6 593.2 101.7 156.8 211.9 245.8 
 
E 127 6 24 N 37 21 21 
282 GyeongGi SeongNam 이매동 아름두산 
 
1992.08. 566 3 1 59 
 
228.8 228.8 508.5 610.2 121.2 156.8 224.6 245.8 
 
E 127 7 11 N 37 24 0 
283 GyeongGi SeongNam 분당 샛별동성 
 
1992.06. 582 3 1 59 
 
207.6 211.9 423.7 533.9 105.9 148.3 211.9 237.3 
 
E 127 7 55 N 37 22 20 
284 GyeongGi SeongNam 서현 효자동아 
 
1992.07. 648 3 1 59 
 
228.8 228.8 466.1 593.2 110.2 144.1 228.8 237.3 
 
E 127 8 7 N 37 22 39 
285 GyeongGi SeongNam 서현 효자화성 
 
1994.09. 564 2 1 54 
 
231.5 203.7 388.9 518.5 115.7 143.5 203.7 268.5 
 
E 127 8 10 N 37 22 20 
286 GyeongGi SeongNam 성남 현대 
 
1991.07. 375 2 1 55 
 
159.1 140.9 236.4 286.4 95.5 100.0 127.3 140.9 
 
E 127 8 25 N 37 25 45 
287 GyeongGi SeongNam 수내 푸른신성 
 
1992.06. 642 3 1 60 
 
225.0 225.0 416.7 616.7 120.8 158.3 220.8 266.7 
 
E 127 7 37 N 37 22 6 
288 GyeongGi SeongNam 수진 현대 
 
1994.10. 107 3 1 60 
  
150.0 225.0 375.0 
 
104.2 150.0 191.7 
 
E 127 7 54 N 37 26 23 
289 GyeongGi SeongNam 신흥 두산 
 
1993.02. 570 3 1 60 
 
175.0 175.0 325.0 533.3 95.8 120.8 175.0 175.0 
 
E 127 8 58 N 37 26 42 
290 GyeongGi SeongNam 신흥 청구 
 
1993.05. 493 3 1 63 
 
198.4 202.4 317.5 515.9 95.2 123.0 182.5 182.5 
 
E 127 9 4 N 37 26 38 
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291 GyeongGi SeongNam 야탑 장미동부 
 
1993.02. 1134 3 1 60 
 
233.3 233.3 508.3 633.3 120.8 150.0 225.0 270.8 
 
E 127 7 39 N 37 24 55 
292 GyeongGi SeongNam 수내 양지금호 
 
1993.02. 1490 2 1 60 
 
241.7 216.7 441.7 625.0 129.2 154.2 225.0 266.7 
 
E 127 7 2 N 37 22 25 
293 GyeongGi SeongNam 하대원 현대 
 
1995.04. 314 3 1 60 
 
187.5 166.7 279.2 354.2 104.2 116.7 158.3 170.8 
 
E 127 9 5 N 37 25 57 
294 GyeongGi SeongNam 야탑 탑선경 
 
1992.08. 976 2 1 52 
 
221.2 221.2 413.5 528.8 120.2 158.7 235.6 250.0 
 
E 127 7 15 N 37 24 27 
295  SooWon GwonSeon 당수 삼정 
 
1997.02. 898 3 1 60 
  
106.7 168.3 204.2 
 
70.8 100.0 131.7 
 
E 126 56 34 N 37 17 23 
296  SooWon GwonSeon 구운 삼환 1 차 
 
1991.04. 780 2 1 55 
 
96.4 95.5 177.3 218.2 40.9 75.5 100.0 127.3 
 
E 126 58 42 N 37 17 2 
297  SooWon GwonSeon 권선 삼천리 1 차 
 
1994.05. 496 2 1 61 
 
145.1 118.9 204.9 217.2 90.2 102.5 135.2 147.5 
 
E 127 1 26 N 37 15 7 
298  SooWon GwonSeon 권선 현대 
 
1996.04. 809 3 1 60 
 
150.0 125.0 237.5 258.3 79.2 95.8 137.5 170.8 
 
E 127 2 12 N 37 15 11 
299  SooWon GwonSeon 금곡 삼익 1 차 
 
1995.05. 400 3 1 59 
  
105.9 153.4 203.4 
 
80.5 101.7 110.2 
 
E 126 57 16 N 37 16 16 
300  SooWon YoungTong 매탄 우성 
 
1997.01. 230 2 1 59 
 
114.4 122.9 182.2 173.7 72.0 93.2 122.9 118.6 
 
E 127 2 17 N 37 16 24 
301  SooWon YoungTong 매탄 삼성 2 차 
 
1989.07. 624 2 1 55 
 
131.8 105.5 188.2 231.8 77.3 90.9 127.3 145.5 
 
E 127 2 36 N 37 16 9 
302  SooWon YoungTong 매탄 현대 
 
1988.01. 690 3 1 71 
 
140.8 116.2 218.3 320.4 88.0 88.0 123.2 154.9 
 
E 127 2 34 N 37 16 5 
303  SooWon GwonSeon 세류 삼익 
 
1999.01. 344 3 1 60 
  
120.8 183.3 225.0 
 
79.2 133.3 141.7 
 
E 127 1 2 N 37 15 40 
304  SooWon GwonSeon 세류 성원 
 
1996.04. 366 2 1 59 
 
97.5 127.1 211.9 228.8 63.6 80.5 131.4 127.1 
 
E 127 0 56 N 37 15 48 
305  SooWon YoungTong 영통 황골쌍용 
 
1998.03. 872 2 1 59 
 
155.1 178.0 288.1 355.9 55.1 121.2 148.3 178.0 
 
E 127 5 1 N 37 15 48 
306  SooWon JangAn 영화 태영 
 
1992.11. 117 3 1 59 
  
101.7 161.0 161.0 
 
89.0 110.2 118.6 
 
E 127 0 27 N 37 17 19 
307  SooWon PalDal 우만 선경 
 
1995.10. 372 2 1 60 
 
155.8 139.2 197.5 225.0 95.8 112.5 137.5 145.8 
 
E 127 2 11 N 37 16 30 
308  SooWon JangAn 율전 삼성 2 단지 
 
1998.08. 700 3 1 59 
  
165.3 266.9 317.8 
 
114.4 156.8 211.9 
 
E 126 58 8 N 37 17 39 
309  SooWon PalDal 인계 선경 1 차 
 
1993.06. 360 2 1 59 
 
161.0 144.1 199.2 237.3 84.7 101.7 131.4 156.8 
 
E 127 2 11 N 37 16 34 
310  SooWon JangAn 정자 동신 
 
1987.03. 1548 2 1 57 
 
92.1 96.5 161.4 232.5 59.6 84.2 109.6 107.0 
 
E 126 59 38 N 37 18 13 
311  SooWon JangAn 조원 벽산 
 
1989.07. 740 2 1 55 
  
90.0 155.5 200.0 
 
72.7 104.5 131.8 
 
E 127 1 16 N 37 17 51 
312  SooWon JangAn 파장 현대 
 
1992.04. 225 3 1 60 
  
123.3 166.7 275.0 
 
87.5 104.2 150.0 
 
E 127 0 2 N 37 18 28 
313  SooWon GwonSeon 호매실 삼익 2 차 
 
1998.06. 354 3 1 60 
  
104.2 150.8 204.2 
 
79.2 100.0 112.5 
 
E 126 57 26 N 37 16 8 
314  GyeongGi SiHeung 거모 아주 4 차 
 
1993.01. 299 3 1 60 
  
82.5 116.7 118.3 
 
52.5 69.2 70.8 
 
E 126 46 58 N 37 20 42 
315  GyeongGi SiHeung 대야 극동 
 
2000.07. 350 3 1 60 
  
150.0 212.5 229.2 
 
87.5 125.0 133.3 
 
E 126 47 13 N 37 26 55 
316  GyeongGi SiHeung 대야 우남한신 
 
1997.02. 350 3 1 60 
  
121.7 162.5 195.8 
 
85.8 112.5 115.8 
 
E 126 47 38 N 37 27 0 
317  GyeongGi SiHeung 도창 에이스 
 
1997.01. 798 3 1 59 
  
104.2 136.4 186.4 
 
72.0 76.3 101.7 
 
E 126 49 0 N 37 24 35 
318  GyeongGi SiHeung 신천 우남한신 
 
1997.01. 186 3 1 60 
  
125.8 158.3 204.2 
 
70.8 87.5 119.2 
 
E 126 47 17 N 37 25 55 
319  GyeongGi SiHeung 은행 대우 3 차 
 
1998.10. 1272 3 1 60 
 
133.3 150.0 225.0 278.3 55.8 104.2 137.5 141.7 
 
E 126 47 48 N 37 26 33 
320  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 미주 
 
1996.11. 492 3 1 59 
  
116.1 151.7 199.2 
 
75.4 97.5 122.9 
 
E 126 43 43 N 37 21 33 
321  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 신동아 
 
1996.10. 790 3 1 60 
 
110.0 107.5 135.8 169.2 45.8 73.3 87.5 112.5 
 
E 126 43 15 N 37 21 30 
322  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 한신 
 
1996.03. 406 3 1 60 
  
120.8 152.5 166.7 
 
77.5 100.0 125.0 
 
E 126 43 57 N 37 21 18 
323  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 한일 
 
1996.07. 580 3 1 60 
 
112.5 109.2 143.3 191.7 45.8 73.3 95.8 125.0 
 
E 126 43 26 N 37 21 29 
324  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 건영 1 차 
 
1997.08. 620 3 1 60 
  
106.7 137.5 158.3 
 
72.5 95.8 108.3 
 
E 126 44 43 N 37 20 23 
325  GyeongGi AnSan 본오 신안 
 
1993.07. 2132 2 1 62 
 
133.9 110.5 164.5 229.8 81.5 85.5 118.5 123.4 
 
E 126 51 54 N 37 17 42 
326  GyeongGi AnSan 본오 한양고층 
 
1990.12. 2300 3 1 71 
 
128.9 109.2 169.0 218.3 79.6 84.5 114.1 109.2 
 
E 126 51 42 N 37 17 42 
327  GyeongGi AnSan 사 선경 
 
1994.07. 550 2 1 55 
 
140.9 131.8 195.5 236.4 86.4 90.9 118.2 142.7 
 
E 126 51 1 N 37 17 30 
328  GyeongGi AnSan 사 현대 2 차 
 
1995.02. 520 3 1 60 
 
125.0 125.8 191.7 233.3 64.2 87.5 112.5 141.7 
 
E 126 51 17 N 37 17 29 
329  GyeongGi AnSan 선부 수정한양 
 
1992.10. 1870 3 1 70 
 
132.1 117.9 178.6 240.7 75.0 82.1 110.7 103.6 
 
E 126 48 55 N 37 20 21 
330  GyeongGi AnSan 성포 선경 
 
1990.12. 1768 2 1 62 
 
114.5 114.5 153.2 208.1 68.5 84.7 103.2 108.9 
 
E 126 50 34 N 37 19 32 
331  GyeongGi AnSan 월피 한양 1 차 
 
1990.03. 1362 2 1 58 
 
107.8 107.8 140.5 198.3 64.7 75.0 90.5 125.0 
 
E 126 50 54 N 37 19 56 
332  GyeongGi AnSeong 금산 주은청설 
 
1999.10. 457 3 1 60 
  
106.7 135.8 141.7 0.0 58.3 79.2 83.3 
 
E 127 16 2 N 37 0 52 
333  GyeongGi AnSeong 봉산 한주 
 
1994.01. 395 3 1 60 
 
91.7 90.0 68.3 116.7 50.0 50.0 44.2 75.0 
 
E 127 16 41 N 37 0 36 
334  GyeongGi AnSeong 당왕 대우경남 
 
1997.04. 984 3 1 59 
  
110.2 133.9 140.7 
 
55.1 80.5 84.7 
 
E 127 15 35 N 37 0 54 
335  GyeongGi AnSeong 숭인 동신 
 
1995.10. 496 2 1 60 
  
92.5 125.0 137.5 
 
50.0 70.8 82.5 
 
E 127 16 31 N 37 0 43 
336  GyeongGi AnSeong 당왕 대우 1 차 
 
1993.11. 762 3 1 70 
 
96.4 110.7 127.1 135.7 50.0 57.1 71.4 85.7 
 
E 127 15 19 N 37 0 52 
337  GyeongGi AnYang 석수 럭키 
 
1987.06. 735 2 1 59 
 
146.6 131.4 228.8 305.1 87.3 104.2 131.4 165.3 
 
E 126 54 28 N 37 24 34 
338  GyeongGi AnYang 관양 공작 LG 
 
1994.03. 766 2 1 50 
 
200.0 180.0 252.0 390.0 123.0 142.0 160.0 200.0 
 
E 126 57 27 N 37 24 2 
339  GyeongGi AnYang 안양 성원 1 차 
 
1995.11. 934 3 1 60 
 
175.0 154.2 237.5 250.0 101.7 112.5 137.5 145.8 
 
E 126 54 52 N 37 23 40 
340  GyeongGi AnYang 박달 금호 
 
1996.10. 752 2 1 59 
 
169.5 139.8 237.3 296.6 89.0 97.5 127.1 135.6 
 
E 126 54 5 N 37 23 56 
341  GyeongGi AnYang 관양 한가람삼성 
 
1995.03. 708 3 1 60 
 
204.2 208.3 300.0 491.7 112.5 141.7 195.8 230.0 
 
E 126 57 20 N 37 23 59 
342  GyeongGi AnYang 비산 관악부영 4 차 
 
1993.10. 796 3 1 60 
 
208.3 191.7 287.5 466.7 120.8 137.5 175.0 216.7 
 
E 126 56 42 N 37 23 47 
343  GyeongGi AnYang 비산 성원 
 
1995.12. 282 3 1 59 
 
178.0 148.3 194.9 322.0 84.7 97.5 114.4 152.5 
 
E 126 57 9 N 37 24 24 
344  GyeongGi AnYang 호계 삼익 
 
1996.10. 262 2 1 60 
 
154.2 131.7 166.7 229.2 87.5 98.3 108.3 145.8 
 
E 126 57 31 N 37 21 57 
345  GyeongGi YangJoo 덕계 신우 
 
1994.12. 135 3 1 60 
  
100.0 108.3 120.8 
 
58.3 66.7 66.7 
 
E 127 2 47 N 37 48 59 
346  GyeongGi YangJoo 덕정 융보 
 
1992.11. 195 3 1 59 
  
67.8 80.5 72.0 
 
46.6 46.6 38.1 
 
E 127 3 47 N 37 50 11 
347  GyeongGi YangJoo 백석 세아 1 차 
 
1993.09. 282 3 1 58 
  
69.0 81.9 73.3 
 
47.4 47.4 38.8 
 
E 126 59 26 N 37 47 48 
348  GyeongGi YangJoo 광사 신도 
 
1999.09. 400 3 1 60 
  
107.5 125.0 125.0 
 
63.3 70.8 52.5 
 
E 127 4 27 N 37 47 34 
349  GyeongGi YangPyung 양서 훼미리 
 
1992 115 2 1 65 
  
103.8 107.7 106.2 
 
42.3 52.3 51.5 
 
E 127 19 6 N 37 32 45 
350  GyeongGi OSan 갈곶 우방 
 
1999.04. 386 3 1 59 
  
105.9 178.0 168.6 
 
72.0 105.9 102.5 
 
E 127 4 7 N 37 8 1 
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351  GyeongGi OSan 수청 대우 
 
1994.01. 1144 2 1 54 
  
88.0 162.0 144.4 
 
60.2 88.0 88.0 
 
E 127 3 45 N 37 9 54 
352  GyeongGi OSan 서 신동아 2 차 
 
1999.11. 844 3 1 60 
  
100.0 162.5 154.2 
 
51.7 95.8 87.5 
 
E 127 2 45 N 37 8 35 
353  GyeongGi OSan 서 신동아 1 차 
 
1995.08. 498 2 1 60 
  
83.3 119.2 120.8 
 
45.0 68.3 70.8 
 
E 127 2 33 N 37 8 39 
354  GyeongGi OSan 수청 삼익 
 
1992.11. 220 2 1 54 
   
180.6 143.5 
  
83.3 88.0 
 
E 127 4 9 N 37 9 55 
355  GyeongGi YongIn 영덕 두진 
 
1996.10. 541 3 1 60 
 
145.8 125.0 225.0 258.3 70.8 95.8 154.2 129.2 
 
E 127 5 48 N 37 16 2 
356  GyeongGi YongIn 신갈 신갈삼익 
 
1996.12. 296 3 1 60 
 
154.2 131.7 191.7 291.7 70.8 95.8 112.5 129.2 
 
E 127 6 22 N 37 16 41 
357  GyeongGi YongIn 김량장 현대 
 
1995.12. 755 3 1 60 
 
120.8 120.8 175.0 200.0 70.8 87.5 112.5 120.8 
 
E 127 12 41 N 37 13 44 
358  GyeongGi YongIn 마평 라이프 
 
1994.06. 350 3 1 58 
 
116.4 99.1 112.1 129.3 73.3 69.0 77.6 64.7 
 
E 127 12 55 N 37 13 54 
359  GyeongGi YongIn 풍덕천 한국 
 
1995.05. 416 3 1 62 
 
181.5 173.4 254.0 423.4 88.7 108.9 133.1 165.3 
 
E 127 5 37 N 37 19 24 
360  GyeongGi YongIn 풍덕천 현대 
 
1994.12. 1168 3 1 60 
 
183.3 154.2 229.2 366.7 95.8 104.2 112.5 162.5 
 
E 127 5 40 N 37 19 34 
361  GyeongGi YongIn 죽전 죽전벽산 1 단지 
 
1997.08. 612 3 1 60 
 
220.8 200.0 325.0 445.8 104.2 129.2 183.3 208.3 
 
E 127 6 20 N 37 20 9 
362  GyeongGi YongIn 유방 인정프린스 2 차 
 
1995.06. 330 3 1 59 
 
120.3 104.2 131.4 197.5 65.3 70.3 82.2 97.5 
 
E 127 12 51 N 37 15 40 
363  GyeongGi EuiWang 삼 운양까치 
 
1991.01. 178 2 1 62 
 
108.9 100.8 121.0 233.9 67.7 68.5 84.7 112.9 
 
E 126 57 19 N 37 19 5 
364  GyeongGi EuiWang 오전 무궁화선경 
 
1995.01. 330 2 1 53 
 
155.7 135.8 179.2 287.7 83.0 99.1 117.9 150.9 
 
E 126 58 44 N 37 21 4 
365  GyeongGi EuiWang 오전 진달래 
 
1998.05. 565 3 1 60 
 
141.7 154.2 220.8 291.7 55.8 116.7 150.0 187.5 
 
E 126 57 58 N 37 22 0 
366  GyeongGi EuiWang 포일 동부 
 
1997.12. 269 2 1 60 
 
150.0 175.0 245.8 313.3 83.3 154.2 175.0 191.7 
 
E 126 58 52 N 37 23 31 
367  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 금오 거성 
 
1998.05. 531 3 1 60 
 
120.8 120.8 137.5 141.7 54.2 70.8 95.8 104.2 
 
E 127 4 31 N 37 45 29 
368  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 녹양 동원 1 차 
 
1995.07. 406 2 1 60 
 
110.8 95.8 124.2 137.5 65.8 70.8 87.5 70.8 
 
E 127 2 16 N 37 45 22 
369  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 신곡 효자벽산 
 
1994.04. 297 3 1 71 
 
139.4 116.2 133.8 147.9 78.9 73.9 98.6 105.6 
 
E 127 3 41 N 37 44 27 
370  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 용현 동문 
 
1991.08. 160 2 1 61 
 
99.2 84.4 114.8 121.3 60.7 57.4 69.7 59.0 
 
E 127 5 8 N 37 43 51 
371  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 장암 동아 
 
1997.06. 1488 3 1 60 
 
166.7 145.0 179.2 208.3 87.5 95.8 116.7 116.7 
 
E 127 3 15 N 37 43 30 
372  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 호원 건영 
 
1993.03. 900 2 1 60 
 
144.2 120.8 175.0 183.3 79.2 85.8 104.2 116.7 
 
E 127 3 0 N 37 42 22 
373  GyeongGi ECheon 갈산 우성 
 
1996.01. 298 3 1 60 
 
110.0 104.2 112.5 133.3 54.2 70.8 84.2 91.7 
 
E 127 27 51 N 37 17 26 
374  GyeongGi ECheon 부발 삼익 
 
1998.01. 493 3 1 60 
 
99.2 104.2 129.2 161.7 43.3 70.8 91.7 116.7 
 
E 127 28 38 N 37 15 32 
375  GyeongGi ECheon 장호원 동양 
 
1992 154 3 1 59 
   
84.7 86.4 
  
46.6 50.0 
 
E 127 36 57 N 37 6 51 
376  GyeongGi ECheon 증포 선경 
 
1997.01. 238 3 1 59 
  
104.2 135.6 161.0 
 
70.3 84.7 108.5 
 
E 127 27 12 N 37 17 34 
377  GyeongGi PaJoo 검산 성원 
 
2000.04. 656 3 1 60 
  
120.8 162.5 179.2 
 
65.0 91.7 87.5 
 
E 126 45 37 N 37 46 18 
378  GyeongGi PaJoo 금능 흰돌마을장안 6 차 
 
1999.10. 498 3 1 59 
  
135.6 161.0 237.3 
 
67.8 105.9 122.9 
 
E 126 47 1 N 37 45 19 
379  GyeongGi PaJoo 금촌 동문 1 차 
 
1993.01. 244 3 1 60 
  
104.2 125.0 125.0 
 
51.7 70.0 70.8 
 
E 126 46 17 N 37 46 18 
380  GyeongGi PaJoo 조리 동문 1 차 
 
1996.11. 118 3 1 59 
 
110.2 114.4 119.5 139.8 55.1 63.6 80.5 80.5 
 
E 126 48 28 N 37 44 30 
381  GyeongGi PyungTaek 독곡 삼익 2 차 
 
1994.01. 364 2 1 66 
  
79.5 125.0 115.9 0.0 47.7 81.1 72.0 
 
E 127 3 49 N 37 5 6 
382  GyeongGi PyungTaek 동삭 현대동삭 
 
1992.09 612 3 1 63 
 
88.1 71.4 107.1 99.2 50.0 38.9 51.6 63.5 
 
E 127 5 54 N 37 1 8 
383  GyeongGi PyungTaek 비전 벽산늘푸른 
 
1994.06. 368 3 1 60 
 
120.8 111.7 166.7 158.3 72.5 72.5 112.5 120.8 
 
E 127 7 11 N 36 59 30 
384  GyeongGi PyungTaek 비전 동아백합 
 
1994.01. 148 2 1 60 
  
91.7 112.5 119.2 
 
66.7 79.2 104.2 
 
E 127 6 34 N 36 59 27 
385  GyeongGi PyungTaek 세교 우성꿈그린 
 
1995.11. 580 3 1 63 
 
107.1 103.2 166.7 156.3 67.5 67.5 99.2 115.1 
 
E 127 4 48 N 37 0 7 
386  GyeongGi PyungTaek 안중 동환 
 
1995.01. 150 2 1 60 
   
100.0 102.5 
  
62.5 62.5 
 
E 126 55 16 N 36 59 11 
387  GyeongGi PyungTaek 통복 동아국화 
 
1994.05. 218 3 1 58 
  
94.8 118.1 119.0 
 
64.7 73.3 77.6 
 
E 127 5 18 N 37 0 5 
388  GyeongGi PoCheon 소흘 일신건영 
 
1993.04. 176 2 1 60 
  
85.8 98.3 95.8 
 
58.3 66.7 54.2 
 
E 127 8 30 N 37 49 32 
389  GyeongGi PoCheon 소흘 우정 1 차 
 
1997.01. 908 3 1 60 
  
95.0 113.3 104.2 
 
54.2 70.8 62.5 
 
E 127 8 19 N 37 49 33 
390  GyeongGi HaNam 덕풍 현대 
 
1995.11. 555 3 1 60 
  
162.5 262.5 283.3 
 
112.5 158.3 150.0 
 
E 127 12 2 N 37 31 58 
391  GyeongGi HaNam 덕풍 서해 
 
1996.04. 423 2 1 59 
  
182.2 275.4 322.0 
 
127.1 156.8 156.8 
 
E 127 11 50 N 37 32 35 
392  GyeongGi HaNam 신장 동일 
 
1999.09. 438 3 1 60 
  
200.0 312.5 400.0 
 
129.2 187.5 179.2 
 
E 127 13 11 N 37 32 28 
393  GyeongGi HaNam 창우 부영 
 
1994.12. 2055 2 1 49 
 
186.7 171.4 290.8 316.3 102.0 117.3 171.4 163.3 
 
E 127 13 32 N 37 32 27 
                             
* see footnote 94 
 
Table 38   Sample 3 bedroom apartment data of Seoul 
No. Address Apt. Complex   Built House- Bed- Bath- Floor   Price (10 US $/m²) Rent (JeonSe*) (10 US $/m²)   Longitude Latitude 
  
268 
 
  
year holds room room area 
  1998 2001 2004 2007 1998 2001 2004 2007     ° ` ``   ° ` `` 
                             1 Seoul GangNam 대치 우성 2 차 
 
1989.12. 354 3 2 84.81 
 
367.9 400.9 713.4 1120.2 182.8 247.6 294.8 365.5 
 
E 127 3 55 N 37 30 3 
2 Seoul GangNam 대치 쌍용 2 차 
 
1983.11 364 3 2 84.48 
 
331.4 331.4 828.6 1396.8 150.3 189.4 284.1 384.7 
 
E 127 4 15 N 37 29 53 
3 Seoul GangNam 도곡 도곡현대 
 
1992.12. 211 3 2 84.81 
 
277.1 300.7 595.4 707.5 143.9 182.8 224.0 247.6 
 
E 127 2 20 N 37 29 21 
4 Seoul GangNam 삼성 청구 
 
1992.02. 167 3 2 84.81 
 
341.9 330.1 607.2 913.8 165.1 182.8 283.0 324.3 
 
E 127 3 29 N 37 31 11 
5 Seoul GangNam 수서 삼익 
 
1992.12. 650 3 2 84.15 
 
314.9 285.2 683.3 820.0 148.5 172.3 237.7 285.2 
 
E 127 6 2 N 37 29 20 
6 Seoul GangNam 압구정 미성 2 차 
 
1988.07. 911 3 2 83.16 
 
294.6 288.6 631.3 1004.1 156.3 168.4 240.5 282.6 
 
E 127 1 10 N 37 31 24 
7 Seoul GangNam 일원 푸른마을 
 
1994.02. 930 3 2 84.48 
 
396.5 390.6 710.2 1041.7 171.6 219.0 307.8 355.1 
 
E 127 4 51 N 37 29 1 
8 Seoul GangNam 일원 현대 4 차 
 
1987.02. 142 3 2 84.81 
 
338.4 306.6 825.4 1179.1 159.2 182.8 283.0 336.0 
 
E 127 4 39 N 37 29 27 
9 Seoul GangNam 일원 한솔 
 
1993.12. 570 3 2 82.5 
 
375.8 430.3 781.8 1278.8 175.8 236.4 303.0 363.6 
 
E 127 4 36 N 37 28 54 
10 Seoul GangNam 도곡 역삼럭키 
 
1993.11. 1094 3 2 85 
 
329.4 305.9 641.2 982.4 152.9 194.1 276.5 329.4 
 
E 127 2 24 N 37 29 26 
11 Seoul GangNam 청담 현대 2 차 
 
1988.05. 214 3 2 84.81 
 
318.4 324.3 601.3 913.8 159.2 159.2 294.8 330.1 
 
E 127 2 26 N 37 31 16 
12 Seoul GangDong 길 길동우성 
 
1994.10. 811 3 2 84.81 
 
247.6 229.9 347.8 424.5 114.4 135.6 188.7 200.4 
 
E 127 8 38 N 37 32 13 
13 Seoul GangDong 둔촌 중앙하이츠 
 
1995.12. 232 3 2 84.48 
 
248.6 207.1 337.4 384.7 130.2 136.1 189.4 195.3 
 
E 127 8 32 N 37 31 46 
14 Seoul GangDong 명일 명일 LG 
 
1996.12 772 3 2 84.81 
 
277.1 259.4 459.9 536.5 120.3 149.7 212.2 224.0 
 
E 127 8 44 N 37 32 56 
15 Seoul GangDong 상일 중앙하이츠 
 
1992.05. 410 3 2 83.82 
 
229.1 196.9 387.7 590.6 109.8 125.3 167.0 190.9 
 
E 127 9 35 N 37 33 2 
16 Seoul GangDong 성내 현대 
 
1987.11. 277 3 2 84.15 
 
219.8 202.0 368.4 451.6 103.4 112.9 178.3 190.1 
 
E 127 7 34 N 37 32 6 
17 Seoul GangDong 천호 한신 
 
1990.03. 224 3 2 81.84 
 
189.4 185.7 268.8 354.3 95.3 106.3 134.4 158.8 
 
E 127 8 5 N 37 32 44 
18 Seoul GangBook 미아 현대 
 
1992.12. 231 3 2 84.48 
  
195.3 272.3 343.3 
 
114.8 153.9 153.9 
 
E 127 1 33 N 37 37 50 
19 Seoul GangBook 번 한양 
 
1991.03. 261 3 2 84.48 
 
184.7 145.6 197.7 230.8 94.7 97.1 130.2 112.5 
 
E 127 2 27 N 37 37 36 
20 Seoul GangBook 번 주공 4 단지 
 
1991.04. 900 3 2 84.48 
 
195.3 168.1 242.7 295.9 97.1 103.0 118.4 148.0 
 
E 127 2 23 N 37 37 51 
21 Seoul GangBook 수유 수유벽산 
 
1992.10. 1454 3 2 85.8 
 
206.3 177.2 244.8 320.5 107.2 104.9 139.9 151.5 
 
E 127 1 8 N 37 38 35 
22 Seoul GangBook 수유 극동 
 
1990.10. 574 3 2 84.81 
 
188.7 165.1 220.5 259.4 96.7 100.2 123.8 141.5 
 
E 127 0 43 N 37 38 30 
23 Seoul GangBook 우이 성원 
 
1990.09. 262 3 2 84.81 
 
162.7 147.4 185.1 229.9 90.8 96.7 106.1 112.0 
 
E 127 0 49 N 37 39 42 
24 Seoul GangSeo 가양 우성 
 
1990.10. 414 3 2 84.48 
 
215.4 195.3 295.9 503.1 97.1 118.4 118.4 153.9 
 
E 126 51 15 N 37 33 43 
25 Seoul GangSeo 등촌 현대 1 차 
 
1995.05. 170 3 2 84.15 
 
222.2 202.0 293.5 386.2 118.8 127.2 142.6 184.2 
 
E 126 51 19 N 37 33 21 
26 Seoul GangSeo 등촌 대림 
 
1995.07. 680 3 2 89.76 
 
311.9 258.5 412.2 612.7 124.8 158.2 178.3 211.7 
 
E 126 50 47 N 37 33 44 
27 Seoul GangSeo 마곡 신안 
 
1993.12. 253 3 2 84.81 
 
185.1 149.7 259.4 436.3 79.0 79.0 106.1 123.8 
 
E 126 49 26 N 37 34 4 
28 Seoul GangSeo 방화 동성 
 
1993.12. 686 3 2 84.48 
 
254.5 242.7 333.8 526.8 114.8 148.0 165.7 201.2 
 
E 126 48 44 N 37 34 46 
29 Seoul GangSeo 염창 삼성하나로 
 
1994.02. 178 3 2 84.48 
  
183.5 266.3 384.7 
 
117.2 148.0 171.6 
 
E 126 52 19 N 37 33 5 
30 Seoul GangSeo 화곡 대림 
 
1992.08. 416 3 2 84.81 
 
224.0 196.9 271.2 389.1 117.9 123.8 153.3 188.7 
 
E 126 50 13 N 37 31 59 
31 Seoul GwanAk 봉천 관악현대 
 
1991.11. 2134 3 2 84.48 
 
224.9 207.1 290.0 556.3 120.7 120.7 165.7 201.2 
 
E 126 57 36 N 37 29 33 
32 Seoul GwanAk 봉천 낙성현대 1 차 
 
1988.05. 251 3 2 84.81 
 
224.0 214.6 294.8 389.1 100.2 106.1 176.9 218.1 
 
E 126 57 56 N 37 28 22 
33 Seoul GwanAk 신림 신림현대 
 
1993.05. 1634 3 2 82.5 
 
244.8 218.2 284.8 412.1 127.3 127.3 163.6 181.8 
 
E 126 55 57 N 37 28 30 
34 Seoul GwanAk 신림 신동아 
 
1992.10. 107 3 2 84.15 
 
190.1 175.9 213.9 228.8 101.0 101.0 130.7 142.6 
 
E 126 56 26 N 37 27 51 
35 Seoul GwanAk 신림 건영 3 차 
 
1991.10. 783 3 2 84.48 
 
227.3 201.2 290.0 346.2 112.5 124.3 165.7 183.5 
 
E 126 57 6 N 37 28 37 
36 Seoul GwanAk 신림 동부 
 
1994.12. 592 3 2 84.48 
 
278.2 248.6 351.6 420.2 142.0 148.0 195.3 219.0 
 
E 126 55 45 N 37 28 50 
37 Seoul GwanAk 신림 건영 4 차 
 
1995.10. 236 3 2 84.48 
 
224.9 213.1 272.3 295.9 114.8 124.3 153.9 183.5 
 
E 126 55 59 N 37 28 49 
38 Seoul GwanAk 신림 미성 
 
1982.12. 280 3 2 91.08 
 
159.2 170.2 263.5 373.3 90.0 106.5 120.8 148.2 
 
E 126 54 12 N 37 28 56 
39 Seoul GwangJin 광장 현대 8 단지 
 
1994.09. 537 3 2 84.48 
 
290.0 295.9 497.2 591.9 136.1 148.0 224.9 290.0 
 
E 127 5 56 N 37 32 30 
40 Seoul GwangJin 광장 삼성 2 차 
 
1988.11. 195 3 2 84.48 
 
254.5 230.8 449.8 769.4 126.7 142.0 201.2 278.2 
 
E 127 6 7 N 37 32 32 
41 Seoul GwangJin 군자 일성파크 
 
1996.01. 357 3 2 84.81 
  
206.3 330.1 389.1 
 
123.8 176.9 182.8 
 
E 127 4 21 N 37 33 4 
42 Seoul GwangJin 노유 극동 
 
1990.11. 158 3 2 84.15 
 
213.9 196.1 362.4 522.9 101.0 118.8 178.3 202.0 
 
E 127 3 52 N 37 32 1 
43 Seoul GwangJin 자양 현대 2 차 
 
1993.05. 184 3 2 84.15 
 
255.5 231.7 356.5 564.5 130.7 142.6 166.4 213.9 
 
E 127 4 56 N 37 31 41 
44 Seoul GwangJin 자양 한라 
 
1996.02. 329 3 2 84.15 
 
249.6 210.3 374.3 522.9 124.8 136.7 178.3 210.9 
 
E 127 4 12 N 37 32 7 
45 Seoul GooRo 개봉 삼환 
 
1995.11. 783 3 2 84.48 
 
207.1 177.6 242.7 248.6 100.6 103.0 130.2 142.0 
 
E 126 51 16 N 37 29 40 
46 Seoul GooRo 고척 센츄리 
 
1994.05. 391 3 2 84.15 
  
162.8 234.1 320.9 
 
97.4 118.8 124.8 
 
E 126 51 44 N 37 30 15 
47 Seoul GooRo 구로 럭키 
 
1993.03. 427 3 2 84.48 
 
221.4 201.2 286.5 349.2 106.5 120.7 159.8 177.6 
 
E 126 53 38 N 37 29 31 
48 Seoul GooRo 구로 한국현대 
 
1993.10. 115 3 2 84.48 
 
156.3 142.0 185.8 278.2 94.7 106.5 100.6 159.8 
 
E 126 52 31 N 37 29 52 
49 Seoul GooRo 신도림 우성 1 차 
 
1994.12. 169 3 2 84.81 
 
188.7 176.9 253.5 436.3 84.9 102.6 141.5 165.1 
 
E 126 53 9 N 37 30 41 
50 Seoul GooRo 오류 동부 
 
1996.08. 252 3 2 84.48 
  
165.7 219.0 266.3 0.0 103.0 130.2 133.2 
 
E 126 50 52 N 37 29 49 
51 Seoul GeumCheon 가산 두산 
 
1997.12. 1495 3 2 84.81 
 
185.7 196.9 285.3 377.3 64.9 114.4 141.5 176.9 
 
E 126 53 33 N 37 28 28 
52 Seoul GeumCheon 독산 한신 
 
1990.12. 1000 3 2 89.463 
 
190.0 162.1 307.4 363.3 91.7 106.2 134.1 162.1 
 
E 126 53 22 N 37 27 19 
53 Seoul GeumCheon 독산 독산현대 
 
1997.03. 204 3 2 83.82 
 
211.2 184.9 250.5 274.4 103.8 103.8 131.2 149.1 
 
E 126 53 42 N 37 28 2 
54 Seoul GeumCheon 시흥 남서울건영 2 차 
 
1989.07. 619 3 2 84.81 
 
191.0 182.8 247.6 277.1 100.2 106.1 141.5 159.2 
 
E 126 54 39 N 37 26 57 
55 Seoul GeumCheon 시흥 성지 
 
1986.09. 233 3 2 84.81 
 
165.1 149.7 235.8 265.3 84.9 90.8 106.1 123.8 
 
E 126 53 53 N 37 27 3 
56 Seoul NoWon 공릉 삼익 
 
1995.10. 845 3 2 84.48 
 
201.2 179.9 242.7 369.9 103.0 103.0 148.0 171.6 
 
E 127 4 55 N 37 37 36 
57 Seoul NoWon 상계 금호 
 
1994.11. 230 3 2 84.48 
 
179.9 165.7 215.4 290.0 100.6 103.0 130.2 150.9 
 
E 127 4 7 N 37 40 2 
58 Seoul NoWon 상계 현대 4 차 
 
1993.12. 106 3 2 84.81 
 
167.4 152.1 200.4 265.3 84.9 96.7 106.1 144.4 
 
E 127 3 2 N 37 40 23 
59 Seoul NoWon 상계 1 수락현대 
 
1993 216 3 2 84.48 
 
191.8 165.7 230.8 272.3 85.2 103.0 118.4 165.7 
 
E 127 3 36 N 37 40 30 
60 Seoul NoWon 월계 서광 
 
1994.07. 274 3 2 84.15 
 
208.0 172.3 249.6 285.2 101.0 112.9 130.7 155.7 
 
E 127 3 54 N 37 37 23 
61 Seoul NoWon 중계 성원 
 
1996.02. 402 3 2 84.48 
 
215.4 201.2 219.0 438.0 97.1 118.4 189.4 236.7 
 
E 127 4 11 N 37 39 0 
62 Seoul NoWon 중계본 현대 2 차 
 
1993.11. 313 3 2 84.81 
 
194.6 159.2 241.7 309.5 96.7 108.5 165.1 176.9 
 
E 127 5 4 N 37 38 52 
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63 Seoul NoWon 하계 벽산 
 
1988.05. 630 3 2 84.48 
 
207.1 177.6 272.3 440.9 103.0 124.3 159.8 219.0 
 
E 127 3 54 N 37 38 8 
64 Seoul DoBong 도봉 럭키 
 
1992.09. 630 3 2 84.48 
 
183.5 162.2 219.0 278.2 85.2 97.1 106.5 136.1 
 
E 127 2 39 N 37 40 44 
65 Seoul DoBong 방학 신동아 3 단지 
 
1992.09. 210 3 2 84.48 
 
183.5 171.6 207.1 227.9 93.5 108.9 124.3 118.4 
 
E 127 1 22 N 37 39 36 
66 Seoul DoBong 방학 벽산 
 
1996.11. 318 3 2 84.81 
 
188.7 165.1 212.2 238.8 100.2 106.1 123.8 117.9 
 
E 127 1 30 N 37 39 31 
67 Seoul DoBong 쌍문 한양 7 차 
 
1991.05. 408 3 2 84.48 
 
197.7 174.0 207.1 284.1 103.0 108.9 124.3 136.1 
 
E 127 2 1 N 37 39 21 
68 Seoul DoBong 창 대우 
 
1995.11. 952 3 2 84.48 
 
215.4 191.8 248.6 287.1 91.1 108.9 130.2 153.9 
 
E 127 2 15 N 37 38 32 
69 Seoul DoBong 창 동아 
 
1989.01. 600 3 2 89.1 
 
202.0 179.6 246.9 426.5 97.6 114.5 134.7 165.5 
 
E 127 3 1 N 37 39 4 
70 Seoul DongDaeMoon 답십리 신답경남 
 
1991.07. 225 3 2 82.17 
 
191.1 166.7 286.0 310.3 97.4 112.0 146.0 152.1 
 
E 127 2 40 N 37 34 29 
71 Seoul DongDaeMoon 답십리 동답한신 
 
1991.12. 600 3 2 82.17 
 
209.3 178.9 237.3 264.7 105.9 105.9 146.0 146.0 
 
E 127 3 45 N 37 34 15 
72 Seoul DongDaeMoon 용두 신동아 
 
1992.12. 772 3 2 84.48 
 
224.9 197.7 316.1 349.2 136.1 130.2 153.9 177.6 
 
E 127 1 56 N 37 34 21 
73 Seoul DongDaeMoon 장안 장안현대 
 
1984.07. 456 3 2 95.04 
 
149.4 128.4 233.6 273.6 91.5 86.3 105.2 115.7 
 
E 127 4 8 N 37 34 52 
74 Seoul DongDaeMoon 전농 우성 
 
1991.07. 1234 3 2 84.48 
 
201.2 174.0 230.8 301.8 114.8 106.5 136.1 145.0 
 
E 127 3 54 N 37 34 38 
75 Seoul DongDaeMoon 회기 신현대 
 
1989.05. 736 3 2 84.81 
 
218.1 194.6 271.2 324.3 117.9 123.8 153.3 182.8 
 
E 127 3 6 N 37 35 22 
76 Seoul DongJak 노량진 우성 
 
1995.11. 901 3 2 84.81 
 
283.0 220.5 312.5 536.5 114.4 123.8 176.9 229.9 
 
E 126 56 52 N 37 30 34 
77 Seoul DongJak 대방 대림 
 
1993.10. 1628 3 2 84.48 
 
298.3 319.6 473.5 680.6 171.6 171.6 224.9 290.0 
 
E 126 55 28 N 37 30 27 
78 Seoul DongJak 본 신동아 
 
1993.07. 765 3 2 84.15 
 
228.2 202.0 297.1 487.2 115.3 115.3 136.7 184.2 
 
E 126 57 6 N 37 30 36 
79 Seoul DongJak 사당 극동 
 
1992.10. 1550 3 2 84.15 
 
243.6 255.5 338.7 558.5 124.8 142.6 178.3 219.8 
 
E 126 58 29 N 37 29 26 
80 Seoul DongJak 노량진 상도건영 
 
1997.08. 824 3 2 84.48 
 
278.2 236.7 333.8 550.4 112.5 142.0 189.4 224.9 
 
E 126 56 58 N 37 30 27 
81 Seoul DongJak 신대방 현대 
 
1995.10. 880 3 2 84.15 
 
255.5 234.1 338.7 505.1 121.2 136.7 178.3 225.8 
 
E 126 54 43 N 37 29 42 
82 Seoul Mapo 공덕 공덕현대 
 
1989.01. 183 3 2 84.15 
 
192.5 184.2 323.2 439.7 115.3 130.7 166.4 196.1 
 
E 126 57 0 N 37 32 53 
83 Seoul Mapo 도화 우성 
 
1991.03. 1230 3 2 79.53 
 
264.1 220.0 377.2 528.1 134.5 147.1 176.0 207.5 
 
E 126 56 54 N 37 32 10 
84 Seoul Mapo 도화 현대 
 
1993.08. 1021 3 2 79.53 
 
264.1 222.6 308.1 628.7 144.6 134.5 201.2 213.8 
 
E 126 57 14 N 37 32 22 
85 Seoul Mapo 신수 현대 
 
1990.12. 210 3 2 84.15 
 
228.2 208.0 338.7 404.0 124.8 127.2 154.5 190.1 
 
E 126 56 13 N 37 32 34 
86 Seoul Mapo 연남 대명 
 
1996.01. 128 3 2 84.81 
  
200.4 259.4 336.0 
 
153.3 165.1 176.9 
 
E 126 55 25 N 37 33 42 
87 Seoul Mapo 중 청구 
 
1993.09. 420 3 2 84.48 
  
227.3 402.5 503.1 
 
120.7 153.9 213.1 
 
E 126 54 6 N 37 34 26 
88 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 북가좌 한양 
 
1986.12. 660 3 2 84.15 
 
192.5 166.4 269.8 320.9 103.4 103.4 142.6 148.5 
 
E 126 54 32 N 37 34 33 
89 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 연희 대림 
 
1993.01. 220 3 2 84.48 
 
260.4 248.6 319.6 361.0 148.0 136.1 177.6 224.9 
 
E 126 56 10 N 37 34 31 
90 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 영천 독립문삼호 
 
1995.06. 895 3 2 84.48 
 
242.7 248.6 372.9 485.3 97.7 162.2 201.2 236.7 
 
E 126 57 30 N 37 34 11 
91 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 충정로 현대 
 
1992.12. 83 3 2 84.48 
  
195.3 349.2 355.1 
 
120.7 177.6 219.0 
 
E 126 57 47 N 37 33 49 
92 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍은 벽산 
 
1995.04. 1509 3 2 84.81 
 
229.9 194.6 279.4 333.1 112.0 123.8 153.3 171.0 
 
E 126 56 41 N 37 35 41 
93 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍은 풍림 2 차 
 
1989.09. 390 3 2 84.48 
 
219.0 183.5 254.5 272.3 108.9 114.8 142.0 168.7 
 
E 126 56 34 N 37 35 35 
94 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍제 한양 
 
1992.07. 998 3 2 84.48 
 
254.5 230.8 343.3 399.5 142.0 136.1 177.6 207.1 
 
E 126 56 49 N 37 34 59 
95 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍제 홍제현대 
 
1992.01. 704 3 2 82.83 
 
265.6 295.8 332.0 392.4 144.9 163.0 205.2 211.3 
 
E 126 56 28 N 37 35 20 
96 Seoul SeoCho 반포 새서울 
 
1994.07. 154 3 2 83.16 
 
276.6 282.6 547.1 655.4 144.3 174.4 228.5 324.7 
 
E 127 0 36 N 37 29 57 
97 Seoul SeoCho 반포 미도 1 차 
 
1988.12. 1260 3 1 82.5 
 
278.8 284.8 636.4 1121.2 133.3 175.8 206.1 321.2 
 
E 127 0 30 N 37 30 4 
98 Seoul SeoCho 방배 대우효령 
 
1992.12. 364 3 2 84.48 
 
361.0 331.4 562.3 840.4 171.6 195.3 224.9 325.5 
 
E 126 59 38 N 37 28 46 
99 Seoul SeoCho 방배 우성 
 
1990.12. 468 3 1 84.81 
 
247.6 253.5 456.3 748.7 129.7 153.3 206.3 277.1 
 
E 126 58 58 N 37 28 27 
100 Seoul SeoCho 서초 유원 
 
1992.08. 590 3 2 84.48 
 
355.1 351.6 639.2 905.5 183.5 213.1 272.3 307.8 
 
E 127 1 6 N 37 29 46 
101 Seoul SeoCho 서초 우성 5 차 
 
1996.05. 408 3 2 84.48 
 
319.6 337.4 532.7 964.7 148.0 203.6 230.8 313.7 
 
E 127 1 36 N 37 29 40 
102 Seoul SeoCho 양재 우성 
 
1990.12. 997 3 2 84.48 
 
274.6 260.4 485.3 787.2 130.2 159.8 213.1 260.4 
 
E 127 1 50 N 37 28 30 
103 Seoul SeoCho 우면 동양고속 
 
1995.04. 330 3 2 84.81 
 
377.3 371.4 589.6 849.0 176.9 218.1 271.2 306.6 
 
E 127 1 25 N 37 28 16 
104 Seoul SeoCho 잠원 현대 
 
1992.12. 238 3 2 84.48 
 
349.2 337.4 591.9 899.6 177.6 207.1 272.3 319.6 
 
E 127 0 45 N 37 31 5 
105 Seoul SeongDong 금호 두산 
 
1993.12. 1267 3 2 84.81 
 
294.8 225.2 371.4 648.5 147.4 141.5 200.4 224.0 
 
E 127 0 58 N 37 32 59 
106 Seoul SeongDong 성수 현대그린 
 
1994.11. 219 3 2 81.18 
  
203.3 357.2 560.5 
 
129.3 160.1 197.1 
 
E 127 2 59 N 37 32 26 
107 Seoul SeongDong 옥수 극동그린 
 
1996.06. 583 3 2 84.81 
 
312.5 312.5 418.6 542.4 171.0 153.3 218.1 259.4 
 
E 127 0 36 N 37 32 30 
108 Seoul SeongDong 응봉 신동아 
 
1996.04. 434 3 2 84.48 
 
233.2 207.1 307.8 355.1 114.8 120.7 165.7 162.8 
 
E 127 1 45 N 37 32 59 
109 Seoul SeongDong 하왕십리 청계벽산 
 
1996.06. 1332 3 2 85.14 
  
225.5 422.8 493.3 
 
146.8 164.4 193.8 
 
E 127 1 53 N 37 34 8 
110 Seoul SeongDong 행당 신동아 
 
1995.07. 636 3 2 84.81 
 
226.4 206.3 318.4 436.3 114.4 119.1 165.1 182.8 
 
E 127 1 57 N 37 33 14 
111 Seoul SeongDong 행당 삼부 
 
1996.11. 498 3 2 84.15 
 
285.2 249.6 356.5 582.3 118.8 142.6 190.1 249.6 
 
E 127 2 15 N 37 33 35 
112 Seoul SeongBook 길음 삼부 
 
1992.09. 684 3 2 84.81 
 
196.9 171.0 271.2 336.0 112.0 120.3 153.3 159.2 
 
E 127 1 25 N 37 36 9 
113 Seoul SeongBook 돈암 현대 
 
1991.06. 619 3 1 84.81 
 
179.2 173.3 235.8 300.7 106.1 114.4 129.7 150.3 
 
E 127 1 41 N 37 36 15 
114 Seoul SeongBook 보문 아남 
 
1994.10. 218 3 2 84.81 
 
194.6 171.0 229.9 324.3 96.7 94.3 117.9 165.1 
 
E 127 1 2 N 37 34 52 
115 Seoul SeongBook 석관 중앙하이츠 
 
1994.06. 315 3 2 84.81 
 
182.8 155.6 229.9 271.2 102.6 96.7 117.9 147.4 
 
E 127 3 58 N 37 36 42 
116 Seoul SeongBook 종암 종암선경 
 
1995.10. 238 3 2 84.48 
 
219.0 195.3 262.8 284.1 108.9 114.8 153.9 177.6 
 
E 127 2 1 N 37 35 39 
117 Seoul SeongBook 하월곡 아남 
 
1996.12. 198 3 2 84.48 
 
209.5 183.5 227.3 290.0 108.9 114.8 142.0 153.9 
 
E 127 2 5 N 37 36 20 
118 Seoul SongPa 가락 삼환 
 
1985.06. 648 3 1 84.48 
 
245.0 239.1 544.5 757.6 120.7 156.3 183.5 219.0 
 
E 127 8 12 N 37 29 43 
119 Seoul SongPa 거여 현대 3 차 
 
1993.07. 303 3 2 84.81 
 
224.0 208.7 324.3 577.8 108.5 123.8 165.1 191.6 
 
E 127 8 41 N 37 29 49 
120 Seoul SongPa 문정 건영 
 
1993.01. 545 3 2 77.55 
 
273.4 260.5 470.7 805.9 125.1 161.2 180.5 251.5 
 
E 127 7 32 N 37 28 53 
121 Seoul SongPa 송파 성지 
 
1992.09. 298 3 2 84.81 
 
277.1 247.6 459.9 636.7 129.7 155.6 212.2 247.6 
 
E 127 7 2 N 37 30 1 
122 Seoul SongPa 오금 대림 
 
1989.01. 749 3 1 84.81 
 
277.1 271.2 619.0 878.4 135.6 165.1 224.0 277.1 
 
E 127 7 45 N 37 30 36 
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123 Seoul SongPa 잠실 현대 
 
1990.09. 336 3 2 84.48 
 
284.1 278.2 538.6 763.5 144.4 162.2 201.2 230.8 
 
E 127 5 7 N 37 30 14 
124 Seoul SongPa 잠실 우성 4 차 
 
1983.09. 555 3 1 95.37 
 
243.3 230.7 540.0 707.8 120.6 131.1 209.7 204.5 
 
E 127 4 58 N 37 30 10 
125 Seoul SongPa 풍납 쌍용 
 
1995.07. 417 3 2 84.48 
 
272.3 254.5 428.5 651.0 124.3 136.1 201.2 230.8 
 
E 127 7 3 N 37 31 37 
126 Seoul YangCheon 목 대림 2 차 
 
1994.06. 262 3 2 84.48 
 
254.5 227.3 402.5 710.2 124.3 148.0 213.1 278.2 
 
E 126 52 27 N 37 31 24 
127 Seoul YangCheon 목 우성 
 
1992.05. 332 3 2 84.48 
 
250.9 236.7 449.8 840.4 132.6 148.0 213.1 266.3 
 
E 126 52 31 N 37 32 84 
128 Seoul YangCheon 목 한신청구 
 
1993.09. 1512 3 2 84.48 
 
254.5 230.8 467.6 858.2 124.3 162.2 213.1 284.1 
 
E 126 52 53 N 37 32 29 
129 Seoul YangCheon 신월 성원 
 
1997.01. 170 3 2 83.16 
  
128.7 198.4 186.4 
 
86.6 132.3 114.2 
 
E 126 50 1 N 37 31 41 
130 Seoul YangCheon 신정 대림 1 차 
 
1992.02. 210 3 2 84.48 
 
230.8 201.2 339.7 580.0 112.5 136.1 177.6 251.5 
 
E 126 52 24 N 37 31 3 
131 Seoul YeongDeungPo 당산 강마을삼성 
 
1995.05. 348 3 2 84.81 
  
235.8 371.4 518.8 
 
135.6 206.3 224.0 
 
E 126 54 21 N 37 32 3 
132 Seoul YeongDeungPo 대림 우성 2 차 
 
1992.12. 120 3 2 79.86 
 
244.2 206.6 296.8 394.4 121.5 121.5 175.3 200.4 
 
E 126 54 2 N 37 29 46 
133 Seoul YeongDeungPo 도림 청구 
 
1997.12. 200 3 2 84.81 
 
200.4 206.3 288.9 353.7 67.8 123.8 159.2 171.0 
 
E 126 53 43 N 37 30 33 
134 Seoul YeongDeungPo 신길 우성 5 차 
 
1993.05. 321 3 2 84.81 
 
202.8 179.2 261.8 341.9 108.5 117.9 141.5 179.8 
 
E 126 54 13 N 37 30 24 
135 Seoul YeongDeungPo 양평 한신 
 
1990.01. 457 3 2 85 
 
229.4 200.0 332.4 523.5 91.2 114.7 147.1 194.1 
 
E 126 53 32 N 37 32 24 
136 Seoul YeongDeungPo 여의도 미성 
 
1978.06. 577 3 1 82 
 
353.7 329.3 640.2 1115.9 158.5 182.9 231.7 280.5 
 
E 126 55 28 N 37 31 11 
137 Seoul YongSan 보광 신동아 
 
1991.12. 226 3 2 84.48 
 
272.3 248.6 355.1 568.2 142.0 153.9 201.2 189.4 
 
E 127 0 6 N 37 31 33 
138 Seoul YongSan 서빙고 신동아 
 
1984.06. 1326 3 1 95.37 
 
241.2 319.8 545.2 896.5 125.8 152.0 199.2 225.4 
 
E 126 59 16 N 37 31 5 
139 Seoul YongSan 이촌 대림 
 
1994.05. 638 3 2 84.48 
 
319.6 295.9 455.7 781.3 148.0 159.8 195.3 213.1 
 
E 126 57 18 N 37 31 29 
140 Seoul YongSan 이촌 현대한강 
 
1996.10. 516 3 2 84.48 
 
171.6 319.6 497.2 757.6 114.8 162.2 189.4 219.0 
 
E 126 57 30 N 37 31 22 
141 Seoul YongSan 이태원 남산대림 
 
1994.10. 400 3 2 84.48 
 
396.5 384.7 550.4 799.0 189.4 207.1 295.9 278.2 
 
E 126 59 19 N 37 32 27 
142 Seoul EunPyung 녹번 대림 
 
1993.09. 370 3 2 84.48   224.9 177.6 254.5 355.1 114.8 112.5 165.7 207.1 
 
E 126 56 13 N 37 35 59 
143 Seoul EunPyung 불광 미성 
 
1988.06. 1340 3 1 84.48 
 
239.1 195.3 310.1 455.7 124.3 124.3 165.7 201.2 
 
E 126 55 41 N 37 36 53 
144 Seoul EunPyung 신사 라이프시티 
 
1992.12. 298 3 2 82.83 
 
177.5 159.4 213.7 226.4 99.0 99.0 120.7 120.7 
 
E 126 54 19 N 37 36 8 
145 Seoul EunPyung 신사 현대 1 차 
 
1992.11. 445 3 2 84.15 
 
172.3 184.2 231.7 306.0 89.1 97.4 107.0 166.4 
 
E 126 54 31 N 37 35 36 
146 Seoul EunPyung 응암 경남 
 
1995.12. 160 3 2 84.48 
 
224.9 183.5 266.3 266.3 118.4 124.3 153.9 165.7 
 
E 126 55 13 N 37 34 59 
147 Seoul EunPyung 응암 우성 
 
1988.07. 292 3 1 80.52 
 
182.6 163.9 204.9 257.7 108.0 108.0 149.0 145.9 
 
E 126 55 5 N 37 35 2 
148 Seoul JongRo 교북 동아 
 
1995.11. 48 3 2 84.15 
   
291.1 309.0 
  
178.3 190.1 
 
E 126 57 43 N 37 34 17 
149 Seoul JongRo 명륜 2 명륜아남 
 
1996.01. 436 3 2 84.48 
 
295.9 301.8 420.2 523.8 165.7 177.6 236.7 266.3 
 
E 126 59 57 N 37 35 8 
150 Seoul JongRo 무악 현대 
 
1999.11. 1514 3 2 84.48 
  
319.6 479.4 526.8 
 
177.6 248.6 284.1 
 
E 126 57 39 N 37 34 31 
151 Seoul JongRo 창신 쌍용 2 차 
 
1993.06. 919 3 1 82.5 
 
206.1 193.9 260.6 327.3 109.1 111.5 145.5 139.4 
 
E 127 0 43 N 37 34 49 
152 Seoul JongRo 평창 삼성 
 
1998.01 176 3 2 84.81 
  
235.8 283.0 300.7 
 
126.2 176.9 188.7 
 
E 126 58 43 N 37 36 39 
153 Seoul Joong 신당 현대 
 
1990.06. 942 3 1 83.82 
 
202.8 173.0 292.3 429.5 107.4 119.3 167.0 167.0 
 
E 127 1 17 N 37 33 35 
154 Seoul Joong 신당 남산타운 
 
2000.06. 5150 3 2 84.81 
  
336.0 507.0 683.9 
 
188.7 224.0 283.0 
 
E 127 0 35 N 37 32 59 
155 Seoul JoongRang 면목 용마동아 
 
1993.01. 174 3 2 84.48 
  
162.2 233.2 307.8 
 
97.1 130.2 159.8 
 
E 127 5 42 N 37 34 43 
156 Seoul JoongRang 면목 두산 1 차 
 
1993.12. 122 3 2 84.48 
  
183.5 230.8 331.4 
 
108.9 153.9 177.6 
 
E 127 5 2 N 37 34 53 
157 Seoul JoongRang 상봉 LG 쌍용 
 
1996.02. 858 3 2 84.48 
 
242.7 213.1 290.0 369.9 106.5 108.9 148.0 171.6 
 
E 127 5 23 N 37 36 11 
158 Seoul JoongRang 신내 동성 3 차 
 
1995.07. 1844 3 2 83.82 
 
214.7 193.3 262.5 375.8 103.8 101.4 131.2 167.0 
 
E 127 5 45 N 37 36 29 
159 Seoul JoongRang 신내 두산화성 
 
1995.12. 763 3 2 84.81 
 
253.5 220.5 318.4 430.4 96.7 123.8 159.2 200.4 
 
E 127 5 42 N 37 36 47 
160 Seoul JoongRang 중화 한신 
 
1996.09. 1544 3 2 84.48 
 
221.4 197.7 278.2 372.9 97.1 112.5 148.0 183.5 
 
E 127 4 53 N 37 35 48 
161 InCheon GangHwa 강화 현대 
 
1994.04. 219 3 1 84.48 
  
97.1 100.6 112.5 
 
49.7 59.2 65.1 
 
E 126 29 8 N 37 44 46 
162 InCheon GyeYang 계산 극동 
 
1987.01. 630 4 1 84.81 
 
126.2 123.8 202.8 274.1 61.3 70.7 94.3 106.1 
 
E 126 43 26 N 37 32 46 
163 InCheon GyeYang 계산 한국 
 
1991.05. 416 3 1 82.5 
 
111.5 105.5 161.2 193.9 60.6 63.0 109.1 115.2 
 
E 126 43 43 N 37 32 30 
164 InCheon GyeYang 계산 현대 
 
1992.02. 1248 3 2 84.81 
 
135.6 129.7 194.6 235.8 54.2 82.5 112.0 135.6 
 
E 126 43 58 N 37 32 14 
165 InCheon GyeYang 작전 현대 2 차 
 
1990.12. 840 3 2 84.81 
 
143.9 103.8 181.6 200.4 64.9 73.1 100.2 103.2 
 
E 126 44 18 N 37 31 44 
166 InCheon GyeYang 효성 현대 2 차 
 
1992.12. 340 3 2 84.48 
 
136.1 108.9 189.4 224.9 55.6 67.5 106.5 109.5 
 
E 126 42 47 N 37 31 58 
167 InCheon Nam 관교 동부 
 
1991.09. 420 3 2 84.81 
 
132.1 129.7 208.7 209.3 73.1 84.9 129.7 135.6 
 
E 126 41 47 N 37 26 29 
168 InCheon Nam 관교 쌍용 
 
1991.07. 464 3 2 84.48 
 
136.1 132.6 207.1 219.0 73.4 88.8 142.0 148.0 
 
E 126 41 43 N 37 26 34 
169 InCheon Nam 도화 동아 
 
1992.04. 496 3 2 84.48 
  
111.3 171.6 165.7 
 
73.4 100.6 91.7 
 
E 126 39 58 N 37 27 56 
170 InCheon Nam 숭의 극동 
 
1997.10. 133 3 1 84.81 
  
114.4 167.4 179.8 
 
69.6 70.7 88.4 
 
E 126 38 54 N 37 28 3 
171 InCheon Nam 용현 한국 
 
1996.07. 297 3 2 84.15 
  
114.1 178.3 181.2 
 
73.7 101.0 104.0 
 
E 126 38 19 N 37 26 47 
172 InCheon Nam 주안 쌍용 
 
1985.12. 768 3 2 94.71 
 
95.0 89.7 155.2 166.3 52.8 54.9 89.7 89.7 
 
E 126 40 48 N 37 26 48 
173 InCheon Nam 학익 신동아 5 차 
 
1993.06. 594 3 2 84.48 
 
124.3 106.5 195.3 201.2 73.4 79.3 118.4 118.4 
 
E 126 40 39 N 37 26 36 
174 InCheon NamDong 간석 금호 
 
1988.10. 630 3 2 84.48 
 
125.5 113.6 210.7 206.0 67.5 79.3 118.4 136.1 
 
E 126 41 58 N 37 27 28 
175 InCheon NamDong 간석 현대 
 
1991.09. 390 3 2 84.81 
 
120.9 120.3 206.3 191.6 67.8 82.5 117.9 123.8 
 
E 126 41 35 N 37 28 4 
176 InCheon NamDong 구월 동아 
 
1991.09. 486 3 2 84.48 
 
114.8 114.8 189.4 183.5 73.4 76.9 106.5 112.5 
 
E 126 42 40 N 37 26 53 
177 InCheon NamDong 만수 효성상아 2 차 
 
1989.08. 180 3 1 84.48 
 
119.6 111.3 171.6 177.6 71.0 74.6 88.8 112.5 
 
E 126 43 21 N 37 27 26 
178 InCheon NamDong 만수 신동아 
 
1990.06. 750 3 1 84.48 
 
108.9 105.4 179.9 174.6 67.5 73.4 106.5 112.5 
 
E 126 44 13 N 37 27 59 
179 InCheon NamDong 남촌 풍림 3 차 
 
1999.10. 735 3 2 83.16 
  
122.7 204.4 192.4 
 
75.8 114.2 108.2 
 
E 126 42 59 N 37 25 44 
180 InCheon Dong 송현 동부 
 
1992.01. 1140 3 2 84.48 
  
108.9 148.0 159.2 
 
73.4 82.9 94.7 
 
E 126 38 6 N 37 28 56 
181 InCheon BooPyung 갈산 동아 
 
1993.06. 280 3 1 84.48 
 
118.4 106.5 197.7 213.1 65.1 79.3 106.5 112.5 
 
E 126 43 47 N 37 30 39 
182 InCheon BooPyung 부개 현대 
 
1993.05. 200 3 2 84.81 
  
117.9 165.1 227.0 
 
79.0 94.3 120.9 
 
E 126 44 28 N 37 29 14 
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183 InCheon BooPyung 부평 동아 2 차 
 
1995.02. 2128 3 2 84.48 
 
174.0 156.3 268.7 355.1 73.4 97.1 130.2 165.7 
 
E 126 43 6 N 37 29 47 
184 InCheon BooPyung 부평 대림 
 
1989.12. 1470 3 2 84.81 
 
120.3 110.8 188.7 218.1 67.2 73.1 112.0 115.0 
 
E 126 43 2 N 37 30 7 
185 InCheon BooPyung 산곡 현대 5 차 
 
1993.12. 1161 3 2 84.81 
 
159.2 127.3 208.7 232.9 73.1 80.2 117.9 129.7 
 
E 126 42 38 N 37 30 20 
186 InCheon BooPyung 산곡 우성 5 차 
 
1996.12. 299 3 2 83.16 
  
114.2 164.7 195.4 
 
74.6 102.2 114.2 
 
E 126 42 16 N 37 29 59 
187 InCheon BooPyung 청천 쌍용 
 
1990.09. 510 3 2 84.48 
 
108.9 104.2 183.5 230.8 59.2 79.3 106.5 127.2 
 
E 126 42 57 N 37 30 25 
188 InCheon Seo 가정 한국 
 
1994.01. 620 3 2 83.82 
  
97.8 149.1 198.6 
 
62.0 95.4 101.4 
 
E 126 40 39 N 37 30 50 
189 InCheon Seo 가좌 진주 5 단지 
 
1991.06. 268 3 2 84.48 
  
118.4 191.8 189.4 
 
76.9 118.4 106.5 
 
E 126 41 8 N 37 29 30 
190 InCheon Seo 가좌 현대 
 
1985.08. 460 3 1 84.81 
 
96.7 90.8 165.1 153.3 67.2 67.2 94.3 97.3 
 
E 126 40 53 N 37 29 42 
191 InCheon Seo 가좌 범양 
 
1990.07. 510 3 2 84.81 
 
114.4 108.5 179.2 168.0 67.2 70.7 106.1 103.2 
 
E 126 41 17 N 37 29 44 
192 InCheon Seo 마전 동아 
 
1998.11. 1351 3 2 84.48 
  
106.5 161.0 307.8 
 
59.2 65.1 85.8 
 
E 126 40 22 N 37 35 50 
193 InCheon Seo 심곡 삼성 
 
1997.06. 421 3 2 84.48 
  
124.3 168.1 227.9 
 
73.4 94.7 100.6 
 
E 126 40 12 N 37 32 40 
194 InCheon Seo 연희 한국 1 차 
 
1994.10. 356 3 2 84.48 
 
111.3 103.0 159.8 201.2 59.2 71.0 71.0 96.5 
 
E 126 40 31 N 37 33 3 
195 InCheon YeonSoo 동춘 대우삼환 
 
1994.05. 1776 3 2 89.76 
 
150.4 133.7 241.8 306.4 69.1 85.8 133.7 161.5 
 
E 126 40 42 N 37 24 19 
196 InCheon YeonSoo 동춘 현대대림 
 
1993.08. 700 3 2 96.03 
 
142.7 130.2 249.9 255.1 64.6 75.0 125.0 125.0 
 
E 126 40 24 N 37 24 31 
197 InCheon YeonSoo 선학 뉴서울 
 
1992.10. 720 3 2 84.15 
 
117.6 114.1 190.1 205.0 67.7 83.2 112.9 130.7 
 
E 126 42 0 N 37 25 30 
198 InCheon YeonSoo 선학 금호 
 
1993.01. 540 3 2 84.48 
 
136.1 126.7 209.5 242.7 67.5 82.9 118.4 136.1 
 
E 126 42 0 N 37 25 35 
199 InCheon YeonSoo 연수 풍림 1 차 
 
1992.03. 769 3 2 84.81 
 
119.1 106.1 200.4 229.9 59.0 79.0 117.9 135.6 
 
E 126 41 31 N 37 25 3 
200 InCheon YeonSoo 연수 대림 
 
1993.05. 640 3 2 84.48 
 
136.1 121.9 227.3 271.1 59.2 79.3 118.4 148.0 
 
E 126 41 38 N 37 25 10 
201 InCheon YeonSoo 옥련 럭키 
 
1993.11. 1304 3 2 84.48 
 
130.2 103.0 177.6 216.0 61.6 67.5 94.7 130.2 
 
E 126 38 34 N 37 25 27 
202 InCheon YeonSoo 옥련 현대 5 차 
 
1997.07. 621 3 2 84.15 
 
162.8 145.0 213.9 228.8 67.7 79.6 107.0 133.7 
 
E 126 38 47 N 37 25 38 
203 InCheon YeonSoo 청학 서해 
 
1993.08. 294 3 2 84.48 
 
136.1 112.5 203.6 221.9 62.1 73.4 112.5 142.0 
 
E 126 39 56 N 37 25 18 
204 GyeongGi GoYang 고양 삼성 
 
1998.11. 282 3 2 84.81 
  
135.6 185.1 218.1 
 
82.5 94.3 109.1 
 
E 126 54 9 N 37 42 10 
205 GyeongGi GoYang 고양 현대 
 
1997.11. 791 3 2 84.48 
  
132.6 177.6 219.0 
 
79.3 94.7 112.5 
 
E 126 54 0 N 37 42 4 
206 GyeongGi GoYang 대화 장성동부 
 
1995.11. 410 3 2 84.81 
 
214.6 206.3 303.0 512.9 84.9 114.4 129.7 176.9 
 
E 126 44 45 N 37 40 29 
207 GyeongGi GoYang 마두 강촌우방 
 
1993.03. 766 3 2 84.81 
 
229.9 218.1 347.8 613.1 94.3 117.9 165.1 206.3 
 
E 126 46 52 N 37 39 20 
208 GyeongGi GoYang 마두 백마벽산 
 
1994.08. 438 3 2 84.81 
 
208.7 188.7 288.9 554.2 79.0 102.6 165.1 165.1 
 
E 126 47 22 N 37 39 28 
209 GyeongGi GoYang 백석 백송대우 
 
1994.06. 228 3 2 84.81 
 
194.6 182.8 259.4 430.4 76.6 102.6 141.5 159.2 
 
E 126 47 41 N 37 39 14 
210 GyeongGi GoYang 백석 흰돌국제한진 
 
1994.08. 816 3 2 84.48 
 
210.7 189.4 278.2 438.0 84.0 103.0 142.0 186.4 
 
E 126 47 2 N 37 38 38 
211 GyeongGi GoYang 성사 신원당동문 
 
1992.10. 354 3 2 84.81 
 
173.3 161.5 224.0 356.7 73.1 96.7 129.7 159.2 
 
E 126 50 22 N 37 39 11 
212 GyeongGi GoYang 성사 신원당태영 
 
1993.11. 604 3 2 84.81 
 
176.9 161.5 247.6 383.2 73.1 97.9 141.5 159.2 
 
E 126 50 4 N 37 39 5 
213 GyeongGi GoYang 중산 중산경남 
 
1995.03. 304 3 2 84.48 
 
189.4 153.9 201.2 319.6 71.0 85.2 118.4 121.3 
 
E 126 46 42 N 37 41 16 
214 GyeongGi GoYang 일산 후곡코오롱 
 
1995.10. 474 3 2 84.48 
 
221.4 224.9 361.0 532.7 85.2 103.0 159.8 189.4 
 
E 126 46 6 N 37 40 33 
215 GyeongGi GoYang 일산 에이스 
 
1994.12. 332 3 2 84.48 
 
171.6 132.6 177.6 248.6 65.1 73.4 100.6 94.7 
 
E 126 46 35 N 37 41 16 
216 GyeongGi GoYang 장항 호수청구 
 
1994.03. 668 3 2 84.81 
 
241.7 232.3 341.9 589.6 90.8 120.3 176.9 200.4 
 
E 126 46 34 N 37 39 0 
217 GyeongGi GoYang 주엽 강선 LG 
 
1993.01. 483 3 2 84.81 
 
214.6 214.6 306.6 536.5 84.9 108.5 153.3 200.4 
 
E 126 45 59 N 37 40 11 
218 GyeongGi GoYang 주엽 문촌우성 1 단지 
 
1994.12. 892 3 2 84.81 
 
214.6 191.0 312.5 536.5 84.9 106.1 141.5 165.1 
 
E 126 45 30 N 37 40 40 
219 GyeongGi GoYang 탄현 탄현건영 5 
 
1995.03. 624 3 2 84.15 
 
184.2 145.0 198.5 421.9 67.7 79.6 95.1 124.8 
 
E 126 45 58 N 37 41 46 
220 GyeongGi GoYang 행신 무원라이프 
 
1994.12. 396 3 2 84.81   194.6 165.1 271.2 389.1 76.6 96.7 129.7 159.2 
 
E 126 49 51 N 37 37 5 
221 GyeongGi GoYang 행신 소만신안 
 
1996.03. 150 3 2 84.48 
 
183.5 157.4 242.7 343.3 73.4 94.7 118.4 156.8 
 
E 126 50 45 N 37 36 58 
222 GyeongGi GoYang 화정 별빛벽산 
 
1995.11. 502 3 2 84.81 
 
196.9 179.2 271.2 459.9 76.6 104.9 153.3 179.8 
 
E 126 49 32 N 37 37 47 
223 GyeongGi GoYang 화정 옥빛주공 17 단지 
 
1997.06. 1120 3 2 84.48 
 
203.6 191.8 268.7 432.1 82.9 103.0 148.0 192.4 
 
E 126 50 3 N 37 37 32 
224 GyeongGi GoYang 화정 달빛동부 
 
1995.12. 446 3 2 84.48 
 
191.8 171.6 248.6 396.5 73.4 100.6 136.1 171.6 
 
E 126 49 53 N 37 38 50 
225 GyeongGi GwangMyung 광명 중앙하이츠 1 차 
 
1993.07. 909 3 2 84.81 
 
182.8 160.4 288.9 283.0 84.9 100.2 141.5 147.4 
 
E 126 51 18 N 37 28 9 
226 GyeongGi GwangMyung 소하 미도 2 차 
 
1993.03. 193 3 2 84.81 
 
155.6 147.4 336.0 294.8 73.1 84.9 117.9 147.4 
 
E 126 52 36 N 37 26 11 
227 GyeongGi GwangMyung 소하 성원 
 
1994.05. 193 3 2 84.81 
 
159.2 153.3 330.1 309.5 76.6 84.9 117.9 147.4 
 
E 126 52 37 N 37 26 7 
228 GyeongGi GwangMyung 철산 쌍마한신 
 
1992.11. 384 3 2 84.81 
 
208.7 212.2 336.0 383.2 94.3 108.5 147.4 171.0 
 
E 126 52 4 N 37 28 37 
229 GyeongGi GwangMyung 하안 현대 
 
1995.11. 593 3 2 84.48 
 
183.5 159.8 298.3 325.5 79.3 100.6 142.0 168.7 
 
E 126 51 50 N 37 28 5 
230 GyeongGi GwangJoo 경안 나산 
 
1996.01. 236 3 2 84.48 
  
124.3 165.7 272.3 
 
82.9 88.8 112.5 
 
E 127 15 9 N 37 24 59 
231 GyeongGi GwangJoo 태전 성원 2 차 
 
2000.10. 435 3 2 84.81 
  
147.4 206.3 395.0 
 
75.5 100.2 112.0 
 
E 127 12 14 N 37 24 36 
232 GyeongGi GwangJoo 탄벌 탄벌리현대 
 
2000.07. 545 3 2 84.48 
  
151.5 215.4 313.7 
 
82.9 106.5 118.4 
 
E 127 12 35 N 37 25 36 
233 GyeongGi GwangJoo 실촌 LG 
 
1997.01. 222 3 2 80.52 
 
124.2 100.6 126.7 201.8 57.7 58.4 74.5 90.0 
 
E 127 23 39 N 37 21 57 
234 GyeongGi GwangJoo 오포 쌍용 
 
1999.02. 313 3 2 84.81 
  
126.2 161.5 235.8 
 
64.9 88.4 91.4 
 
E 127 15 24 N 37 22 50 
235 GyeongGi GwangJoo 탄벌 동보 
 
1996.06. 815 3 2 84.81 
 
129.7 123.8 159.2 247.6 61.9 76.6 88.4 106.1 
 
E 127 14 55 N 37 24 55 
236 GyeongGi GooRi 교문 대우동양고속 
 
1994.11. 680 3 2 84.48 
 
207.1 183.5 292.4 414.3 85.2 94.7 130.2 159.8 
 
E 127 8 7 N 37 35 19 
237 GyeongGi GooRi 교문 구리우성 
 
1994.08. 341 3 2 84.81 
 
203.4 171.0 300.7 456.9 85.5 90.8 138.0 171.0 
 
E 127 8 13 N 37 35 17 
238 GyeongGi GooRi 수택 대림한숲 
 
1995.08. 956 3 2 84.15 
 
219.8 180.6 285.2 404.0 95.1 97.4 130.7 166.4 
 
E 127 8 20 N 37 35 25 
239 GyeongGi GooRi 수택 쌍용 
 
1996.12. 241 3 2 84.48 
 
207.1 174.0 233.2 349.2 88.8 94.7 126.7 153.9 
 
E 127 8 23 N 37 35 39 
240 GyeongGi GooRi 인창 삼호 
 
1992.05. 240 3 2 80.85 
 
173.2 120.0 191.7 235.0 74.2 74.2 92.8 117.5 
 
E 127 8 10 N 37 36 12 
241 GyeongGi GooRi 인창 건영 
 
1993.11. 573 3 2 84.81 
 
179.2 132.1 202.8 280.0 76.6 79.0 112.0 123.8 
 
E 127 8 12 N 37 36 44 
242 GyeongGi GoonPo 광정 목련우방.한국공영 
 
1994.10. 639 3 2 84.81 
 
220.5 191.0 250.6 471.6 90.8 114.4 153.3 212.2 
 
E 126 55 45 N 37 22 5 
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243 GyeongGi GoonPo 당 두산 
 
1993.01. 248 3 2 84.81 
 
155.6 135.6 188.7 324.3 73.1 96.7 117.9 162.1 
 
E 126 56 44 N 37 20 52 
244 GyeongGi GoonPo 당 동아 
 
1993.01. 482 3 2 84.48 
  
138.5 197.7 325.5 
 
97.1 118.4 159.8 
 
E 126 56 48 N 37 20 58 
245 GyeongGi GoonPo 금정 다산주공 3 
 
1992.06. 829 3 2 84.81 
 
202.8 186.3 259.4 451.0 88.4 119.1 153.3 206.3 
 
E 126 55 52 N 37 21 4 
246 GyeongGi GimPo 감정 신화 
 
1995.06. 654 3 2 84.81 
 
147.4 110.8 165.1 224.0 67.2 61.3 76.6 100.2 
 
E 126 42 2 N 37 37 29 
247 GyeongGi GimPo 감정 효성 
 
1996.07. 242 3 2 84.81 
 
185.1 141.5 200.4 312.5 79.0 70.7 82.5 97.3 
 
E 126 42 5 N 37 37 36 
248 GyeongGi GimPo 고촌 길훈 1 차 
 
1991.12. 163 3 2 84.81 
 
147.4 114.4 196.9 188.7 67.2 70.7 94.3 85.5 
 
E 126 46 11 N 37 36 16 
249 GyeongGi GimPo 풍무 길훈 1 차 
 
1993.01. 219 3 2 84.81 
  
99.0 135.6 162.1 
 
49.5 64.9 76.6 
 
E 126 43 9 N 37 36 47 
250 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 별내 동부 
 
1996.04. 456 3 2 84.81 
 
132.1 108.5 143.9 188.7 59.0 59.0 76.6 85.5 
 
E 127 12 47 N 37 41 29 
251 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 오남 오남청구 
 
2000.10. 429 3 2 84.81 
  
106.1 134.4 165.1 
 
48.3 64.9 59.0 
 
E 127 11 56 N 37 41 58 
252 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 와부 강변삼익 
 
1996.04. 880 3 2 84.81 
 
194.6 167.4 265.3 300.7 76.6 73.1 94.3 112.0 
 
E 127 12 27 N 37 35 10 
253 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 진건 한신그린 1 차 
 
1992.01. 706 3 2 84.81 
  
96.7 119.1 120.9 
 
59.0 76.6 67.8 
 
E 127 12 24 N 37 44 49 
254 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 진접 대명 
 
1995.09. 405 3 2 84.81 
  
96.7 115.6 132.6 
 
59.0 70.7 76.6 
 
E 127 9 40 N 37 42 11 
255 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 퇴계원 극동 
 
1999.03. 498 3 2 84.48 
  
138.5 191.8 248.6 
 
73.4 100.6 103.6 
 
E 127 8 19 N 37 38 55 
256 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 화도 삼신 
 
1995.01. 345 3 2 84.48 
  
92.3 130.2 142.0 
 
53.3 65.1 82.9 
 
E 127 19 27 N 37 38 59 
257 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 화도 마석건영 
 
1997.01. 213 3 2 83 
  
80.7 115.7 114.5 
 
44.6 60.2 57.2 
 
E 127 18 9 N 37 39 29 
258 GyeongGi DongDooCheon 생연 에이스 2 차 
 
1993.06. 286 3 2 84.48 
  
72.2 76.9 76.9 
 
41.4 39.1 43.2 
 
E 127 3 43 N 37 53 36 
259 GyeongGi DongDooCheon 생연 우성 
 
1992.12. 163 3 2 85 
  
82.4 68.2 67.1 
 
41.2 38.8 37.6 
 
E 127 3 46 N 37 54 31 
260 GyeongGi DongDooCheon 생연 2 건영 
 
1995.11. 397 3 2 84.81 
  
71.9 75.5 78.4 
 
38.9 44.8 38.9 
 
E 127 2 37 N 37 53 44 
261 GyeongGi BooCheon 괴안 삼익 
 
1989.08. 682 3 2 84.48 
 
153.9 130.2 203.6 278.2 85.2 94.7 112.5 112.5 
 
E 126 48 11 N 37 28 38 
262 GyeongGi BooCheon 여월 영화 
 
1990.01. 105 3 2 85 
  
108.8 123.5 164.7 
 
64.7 91.2 105.9 
 
E 126 47 59 N 37 31 13 
263 GyeongGi BooCheon 상 반달삼익 
 
1993.04. 828 3 2 84.81 
 
182.8 152.1 283.0 383.2 79.0 107.3 135.6 176.9 
 
E 126 45 32 N 37 29 46 
264 GyeongGi BooCheon 상 한아름현대 
 
1994.06. 824 3 2 84.48 
 
195.3 165.7 266.3 396.5 85.2 103.0 130.2 165.7 
 
E 126 44 55 N 37 29 41 
265 GyeongGi BooCheon 소사 한신 
 
1988.10. 916 3 1 83.82 
 
133.6 115.7 179.0 262.5 74.0 74.0 113.3 104.4 
 
E 126 48 2 N 37 28 26 
266 GyeongGi BooCheon 소사 풍림 
 
1996.09. 714 3 2 84.81 
 
162.1 149.7 235.8 324.3 79.6 96.7 106.1 135.6 
 
E 126 48 4 N 37 27 56 
267 GyeongGi BooCheon 송내 뉴서울 
 
1995.10. 971 3 2 84.81 
 
171.0 161.5 259.4 324.3 82.5 102.6 129.7 159.2 
 
E 126 45 45 N 37 29 9 
268 GyeongGi BooCheon 송내 현대 2 차 
 
1990.02. 372 4 2 84.81 
 
147.4 141.5 212.2 247.6 90.8 96.7 117.9 134.4 
 
E 126 45 39 N 37 28 59 
269 GyeongGi BooCheon 송내 우성고층 
 
1990.04. 798 3 2 84.81 
 
141.5 153.3 247.6 303.6 84.9 90.8 141.5 147.4 
 
E 126 45 36 N 37 29 5 
270 GyeongGi BooCheon 심곡 극동 
 
1980.04. 495 3 1 84.81 
 
153.3 135.6 212.2 250.6 82.5 90.8 112.0 117.9 
 
E 126 46 52 N 37 28 36 
271 GyeongGi BooCheon 심곡 태경삼익 
 
1985.05. 128 3 1 80.19 
 
134.1 130.9 168.4 190.2 81.1 74.8 112.2 115.4 
 
E 126 46 52 N 37 28 40 
272 GyeongGi BooCheon 역곡 한국 
 
1996.08. 497 3 2 84.48 
 
183.5 162.2 219.0 254.5 79.3 91.1 118.4 142.0 
 
E 126 48 49 N 37 29 35 
273 GyeongGi BooCheon 원미 풍림 
 
1999.01. 808 3 2 84.48 
  
165.7 219.0 325.5 
 
100.6 118.4 148.0 
 
E 126 47 29 N 37 29 29 
274 GyeongGi BooCheon 원종 신동문 
 
1998.07. 216 3 2 83.49 
  
140.1 200.0 251.5 
 
80.2 107.8 122.8 
 
E 126 47 53 N 37 31 45 
275 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 그린타운우성 2 차 
 
1994.12. 340 3 2 84.81 
 
194.6 173.3 314.8 436.3 84.9 108.5 141.5 176.9 
 
E 126 46 11 N 37 29 51 
276 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 연화건영 
 
1994.04. 424 3 2 84.15 
 
180.6 160.4 251.9 398.1 83.2 109.3 130.7 145.6 
 
E 126 46 48 N 37 29 56 
277 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 미리내금호 
 
1995.03. 336 3 2 84.81 
 
206.3 182.8 300.7 454.0 88.4 108.5 141.5 182.8 
 
E 126 46 26 N 37 29 59 
278 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 복사골건영 
 
1993.03. 330 3 2 84.15 
 
180.6 154.5 263.8 392.2 79.6 109.3 130.7 157.5 
 
E 126 46 5 N 37 29 42 
279 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 꿈삼환 
 
1994.07. 348 3 2 81.18 
 
187.2 168.8 283.3 455.8 82.5 107.2 135.5 160.1 
 
E 126 46 46 N 37 30 3 
280 GyeongGi SeongNam 구미 까치대우 
 
1995.12. 976 3 2 84.81 
 
279.4 271.2 507.0 754.6 106.1 155.6 206.3 253.5 
 
E 127 7 2 N 37 21 0 
281 GyeongGi SeongNam 금곡 청솔한라 
 
1995.12. 768 3 2 84.15 
 
237.7 243.6 457.5 665.5 95.1 136.7 178.3 219.8 
 
E 127 6 24 N 37 21 21 
282 GyeongGi SeongNam 이매동 아름두산 
 
1992.08. 566 3 2 84.48 
 
242.7 224.9 481.8 716.1 108.9 138.5 195.3 242.7 
 
E 127 7 11 N 37 24 0 
283 GyeongGi SeongNam 분당 샛별동성 
 
1992.06. 582 3 2 84.48 
 
245.0 236.7 473.5 710.2 103.0 136.1 201.2 248.6 
 
E 127 7 55 N 37 22 20 
284 GyeongGi SeongNam 서현 효자동아 
 
1992.07. 648 3 2 84.48 
 
248.6 230.8 532.7 739.8 106.5 148.0 195.3 266.3 
 
E 127 8 7 N 37 22 39 
285 GyeongGi SeongNam 서현 효자화성 
 
1994.09. 564 3 2 84.48 
 
260.4 248.6 485.3 692.5 108.9 159.8 189.4 260.4 
 
E 127 8 10 N 37 22 20 
286 GyeongGi SeongNam 성남 현대 
 
1991.07. 375 3 2 84.15 
 
172.3 156.9 255.5 326.8 85.6 101.0 124.8 148.5 
 
E 127 8 25 N 37 25 45 
287 GyeongGi SeongNam 수내 푸른신성 
 
1992.06. 642 3 2 84.48 
 
248.6 248.6 509.0 781.3 103.0 153.9 189.4 266.3 
 
E 127 7 37 N 37 22 6 
288 GyeongGi SeongNam 수진 현대 
 
1994.10. 107 3 2 84.81 
  
148.6 218.1 353.7 
 
106.1 141.5 147.4 
 
E 127 7 54 N 37 26 23 
289 GyeongGi SeongNam 신흥 두산 
 
1993.02. 570 3 2 84.48 
 
177.6 179.9 298.3 544.5 85.2 103.0 153.9 159.8 
 
E 127 8 58 N 37 26 42 
290 GyeongGi SeongNam 신흥 한신 
 
1990.09. 585 3 2 84.81 
 
176.9 171.0 297.1 548.3 84.9 102.6 153.3 159.2 
 
E 127 9 6 N 37 26 41 
291 GyeongGi SeongNam 야탑 장미동부 
 
1993.02. 1134 3 2 84.81 
 
250.0 253.5 489.3 742.8 108.5 141.5 188.7 247.6 
 
E 127 7 39 N 37 24 55 
292 GyeongGi SeongNam 은행 현대 
 
1992.05. 1258 3 2 84.48 
 
165.7 150.3 256.9 438.0 85.2 106.5 142.0 159.8 
 
E 127 9 46 N 37 27 5 
293 GyeongGi SeongNam 하대원 현대 
 
1995.04. 314 3 2 84.81 
 
179.2 176.9 283.0 392.1 96.7 108.5 141.5 168.0 
 
E 127 9 5 N 37 25 57 
294 GyeongGi SeongNam 야탑 탑선경 
 
1992.08. 976 3 2 83.49 
 
239.5 233.6 491.1 706.7 104.2 149.7 179.7 251.5 
 
E 127 7 15 N 37 24 27 
295  SooWon GwonSeon 곡반정 삼성 
 
2000.10. 442 3 2 84.48 
  
136.1 242.7 328.5 
 
85.2 112.5 130.2 
 
E 127 1 44 N 37 14 5 
296  SooWon GwonSeon 구운 성원 
 
1999.10. 458 3 2 84.81 
  
143.9 229.9 297.7 
 
79.0 129.7 159.2 
 
E 126 58 34 N 37 16 59 
297  SooWon GwonSeon 권선 삼천리 1 차 
 
1994.05. 496 3 2 84.81 
 
162.7 126.2 208.7 241.7 88.4 84.9 129.7 153.3 
 
E 127 1 26 N 37 15 7 
298  SooWon GwonSeon 권선 벽산삼호 
 
1996.03. 368 3 2 84.81 
 
185.1 146.2 253.5 383.2 96.7 102.6 141.5 199.3 
 
E 127 1 59 N 37 15 2 
299  SooWon GwonSeon 금곡 삼익 1 차 
 
1995.05. 400 3 2 84.48 
  
108.9 156.3 245.6 61.6 65.1 76.9 112.5 
 
E 126 57 16 N 37 16 16 
300  SooWon YoungTong 매탄 임광 
 
1990.12. 1320 3 2 84.81 
 
138.0 108.5 200.4 389.1 79.0 82.5 117.9 165.1 
 
E 127 2 27 N 37 15 18 
301  SooWon YoungTong 매탄 삼성 2 차 
 
1989.07. 624 3 2 84.81 
 
155.6 114.4 202.8 312.5 79.0 84.9 112.0 153.3 
 
E 127 2 36 N 37 16 9 
302  SooWon YoungTong 매탄 현대 
 
1988.01. 690 3 2 84.81 
 
149.7 117.9 212.2 368.5 94.3 90.8 106.1 147.4 
 
E 127 2 33 N 37 16 4 
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303  SooWon GwonSeon 세류 삼익 
 
1999.01. 344 3 2 84.81 
  
147.4 194.6 271.2 
 
82.5 112.0 147.4 
 
E 127 1 2 N 37 15 40 
304  SooWon GwonSeon 세류 현대 
 
1990.05 276 3 2 84.81 
  
94.3 181.6 200.4 
 
67.2 106.1 123.8 
 
E 127 1 1 N 37 15 37 
305  SooWon YoungTong 영통 청명벽산 
 
1997.12. 621 3 2 84.81 
 
175.1 188.7 314.8 507.0 61.9 108.5 141.5 206.3 
 
E 127 4 31 N 37 15 26 
306  SooWon JangAn 영화 태영 
 
1992.11. 117 3 2 84.81 
  
114.4 147.4 176.9 
 
73.1 106.1 103.2 
 
E 127 0 27 N 37 17 19 
307  SooWon PalDal 우만 선경 
 
1995.10. 372 3 2 84.81 
 
191.0 159.2 215.8 283.0 83.7 102.6 129.7 165.1 
 
E 127 2 11 N 37 16 30 
308  SooWon JangAn 율전 삼성 2 단지 
 
1998.08. 700 3 2 84.81 
  
149.7 253.5 339.0 
 
94.3 123.8 179.8 
 
E 126 58 8 N 37 17 39 
309  SooWon PalDal 인계 선경 1 차 
 
1993.06. 360 3 2 85 
 
164.7 147.1 211.8 305.9 76.5 100.0 129.4 152.9 
 
E 127 2 11 N 37 16 34 
310  SooWon JangAn 정자 동신 
 
1987.03. 1548 3 1 76.89 
 
118.4 101.4 176.9 292.6 74.1 84.5 104.0 105.3 
 
E 126 59 38 N 37 18 13 
311  SooWon JangAn 조원 벽산 
 
1989.07. 740 3 2 84.15 
  
104.6 172.3 261.4 
 
79.6 101.0 112.9 
 
E 127 1 16 N 37 17 51 
312  SooWon JangAn 파장 현대 
 
1992.04. 225 3 2 79.2 
  
109.8 166.7 227.3 
 
75.8 94.7 121.8 
 
E 127 0 2 N 37 18 28 
313  SooWon GwonSeon 호매실 삼익 2 차 
 
1998.06. 354 3 2 84.81 
  
102.6 156.8 241.7 
 
64.9 76.6 113.2 
 
E 126 57 26 N 37 16 8 
314  GyeongGi SiHeung 거모 아주 4 차 
 
1993.01. 299 3 2 84.81 
  
87.3 126.2 156.2 
 
49.5 70.7 79.6 
 
E 126 46 58 N 37 20 42 
315  GyeongGi SiHeung 대야 벽산 
 
1992.02. 246 3 2 84.81 
 
135.6 112.0 159.2 235.8 67.2 70.7 100.2 106.1 
 
E 126 47 34 N 37 26 53 
316  GyeongGi SiHeung 대야 우남한신 
 
1997.02. 350 3 2 84.81 
  
123.8 155.6 229.9 
 
66.0 106.1 120.9 
 
E 126 47 38 N 37 27 0 
317  GyeongGi SiHeung 도창 에이스 
 
1997.01. 798 3 2 84.81 
  
101.4 142.7 194.6 
 
64.9 59.0 97.3 
 
E 126 49 0 N 37 24 35 
318  GyeongGi SiHeung 신천 우남한신 
 
1997.01. 186 3 2 84.81 
  
112.0 153.3 221.1 
 
67.2 82.5 112.0 
 
E 126 47 17 N 37 25 55 
319  GyeongGi SiHeung 장곡 진말우성 
 
1999.06. 320 3 2 84.48 
  
138.5 182.3 266.3 
 
71.0 82.9 121.3 
 
E 126 47 11 N 37 22 50 
320  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 미주 
 
1996.11. 492 3 2 84.48 
  
101.8 148.0 219.0 
 
63.9 82.9 106.5 
 
E 126 43 43 N 37 21 33 
321  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 신동아 
 
1996.10. 790 3 2 84.81 
 
108.5 95.5 132.1 200.4 38.9 63.7 76.6 100.2 
 
E 126 43 15 N 37 21 30 
322  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 한신 
 
1996.03. 406 3 2 84.48 
 
112.5 103.0 126.7 189.4 37.9 65.1 82.9 100.6 
 
E 126 43 57 N 37 21 18 
323  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 한일 
 
1996.07. 580 3 2 84.48 
 
108.9 98.2 138.5 213.1 39.1 66.3 76.9 112.5 
 
E 126 43 26 N 37 21 29 
324  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 건영 1 차 
 
1997.08. 620 3 2 84.48 
  
99.4 137.3 177.6 
 
61.6 82.9 100.6 
 
E 126 44 43 N 37 20 23 
325  GyeongGi AnSan 본오 신안 
 
1993.07. 2132 3 1 84.48 
 
124.3 113.6 163.4 272.3 67.5 88.8 112.5 121.3 
 
E 126 51 54 N 37 17 42 
326  GyeongGi AnSan 본오 태영고층 
 
1991.07. 372 3 2 84.81 
 
149.7 129.7 191.0 312.5 75.5 79.0 97.9 147.4 
 
E 126 51 41 N 37 17 51 
327  GyeongGi AnSan 사 선경 
 
1994.07. 550 3 2 84.81 
 
149.7 129.7 191.0 277.1 79.0 84.9 106.1 127.3 
 
E 126 51 1 N 37 17 30 
328  GyeongGi AnSan 사 현대 2 차 
 
1995.02. 520 3 2 84.81 
 
142.7 129.7 188.7 283.0 73.1 84.9 88.4 165.1 
 
E 126 51 17 N 37 17 29 
329  GyeongGi AnSan 선부 공작한양고층 
 
1992.05. 1470 3 2 84.48 
 
138.5 112.5 174.0 266.3 71.0 79.3 106.5 139.1 
 
E 126 48 44 N 37 20 23 
330  GyeongGi AnSan 성포 선경 
 
1990.12. 1768 3 2 84.81 
 
139.1 128.5 188.7 238.8 73.1 90.8 106.1 120.9 
 
E 126 50 34 N 37 19 32 
331  GyeongGi AnSan 월피 현대 2 차 
 
1990.11. 360 3 1 84.48 
 
124.3 108.9 162.2 224.9 75.8 91.1 94.7 118.4 
 
E 126 50 59 N 37 19 51 
332  GyeongGi AnSeong 금산 삼부 
 
1994.04. 400 3 2 84.48 
  
103.0 103.0 124.3 
 
67.5 59.2 88.8 
 
E 127 16 10 N 37 0 44 
333  GyeongGi AnSeong 낙원 서광 
 
1995.01. 146 3 2 84.48 
  
97.1 105.4 130.2 
 
47.3 59.2 76.9 
 
E 127 16 24 N 37 0 16 
334  GyeongGi AnSeong 당왕 쌍용 
 
1994.01. 360 3 2 84.81 
  
97.9 120.3 153.3 
 
53.1 64.9 88.4 
 
E 127 15 52 N 37 0 56 
335  GyeongGi AnSeong 숭인 동신 
 
1995.10. 496 3 2 84.81 
  
106.1 129.7 159.2 
 
49.5 70.7 94.3 
 
E 127 16 31 N 37 0 43 
336  GyeongGi AnSeong 당왕 대우 1 차 
 
1993.11. 762 3 2 84.48 
 
94.7 103.0 124.3 153.9 49.7 53.3 71.0 88.8 
 
E 127 15 19 N 37 0 52 
337  GyeongGi AnYang 호계 샘대우 
 
1994.01. 536 3 2 84.81 
 
229.9 208.7 312.5 577.8 100.2 129.7 141.5 212.2 
 
E 126 57 51 N 37 22 33 
338  GyeongGi AnYang 관양 현대 
 
1985.04. 904 3 1 84.48 
 
197.7 171.6 284.1 532.7 97.1 118.4 142.0 189.4 
 
E 126 57 26 N 37 24 24 
339  GyeongGi AnYang 평촌 꿈라이프 
 
1993.02. 548 3 2 84.81 
 
226.4 208.7 320.7 678.0 106.1 123.8 176.9 259.4 
 
E 126 58 4 N 37 23 11 
340  GyeongGi AnYang 박달 금호 
 
1996.10. 752 3 2 84.48 
 
171.6 142.0 224.9 307.8 85.2 91.1 112.5 115.4 
 
E 126 54 5 N 37 23 56 
341  GyeongGi AnYang 관양 한가람삼성 
 
1995.03. 708 3 2 84.48 
 
219.0 215.4 307.8 562.3 97.1 126.7 159.8 219.0 
 
E 126 57 20 N 37 23 59 
342  GyeongGi AnYang 비산 관악부영 4 차 
 
1993.10. 796 3 2 84.81 
 
209.3 186.3 288.9 542.4 97.3 114.4 141.5 194.6 
 
E 126 56 42 N 37 23 47 
343  GyeongGi AnYang 비산 성원 
 
1995.12. 282 3 2 84.48 
 
177.6 150.3 183.5 372.9 85.2 97.1 100.6 148.0 
 
E 126 57 9 N 37 24 24 
344  GyeongGi AnYang 호계 삼익 
 
1996.10. 262 3 2 84.81 
 
161.5 143.9 185.1 277.1 90.8 90.8 100.2 147.4 
 
E 126 57 31 N 37 21 57 
345  GyeongGi YangJoo 덕계 신우 
 
1994.12. 135 3 2 84.81 
  
94.3 106.1 115.0 
 
47.2 59.0 53.1 
 
E 127 2 47 N 37 48 59 
346  GyeongGi YangJoo 덕정 융보 
 
1992.11. 195 3 2 81.18 
  
83.1 86.2 91.2 
 
46.2 49.3 49.3 
 
E 127 3 47 N 37 50 11 
347  GyeongGi YangJoo 백석 세아 1 차 
 
1993.09. 282 3 2 84.15 
  
68.3 70.1 68.3 
 
38.6 35.7 37.4 
 
E 126 59 26 N 37 47 48 
348  GyeongGi YangJoo 고읍 현대 
 
1999.12. 293 3 2 84.81 
  
94.3 123.8 141.5 
 
47.2 59.0 64.9 
 
E 127 4 45 N 37 48 7 
349  GyeongGi YangPyung 양서 훼미리 
 
1992 115 3 2 84.48 
  
94.7 106.5 97.7 
 
40.2 53.3 49.1 
 
E 127 19 6 N 37 32 45 
350  GyeongGi OSan 갈곶 우방 
 
1999.04. 386 3 2 84.81 
  
103.8 179.2 186.3 
 
61.3 94.3 97.3 
 
E 127 4 7 N 37 8 1 
351  GyeongGi OSan 수청 대우 
 
1994.01. 1144 3 2 91.74 
  
92.7 163.5 147.2 
 
49.1 76.3 84.5 
 
E 127 3 45 N 37 9 54 
352  GyeongGi OSan 서 신동아 2 차 
 
1999.11. 844 3 2 84.48 
  
94.7 150.3 171.6 
 
48.5 76.9 84.6 
 
E 127 2 45 N 37 8 35 
353  GyeongGi OSan 서 신동아 1 차 
 
1995.08. 498 3 2 84.48 
  
80.5 114.8 137.3 
 
39.1 59.2 68.7 
 
E 127 2 33 N 37 8 39 
354  GyeongGi OSan 수청 삼익 
 
1992.11. 220 3 2 84.48 
   
138.5 127.2 
  
65.1 68.1 
 
E 127 4 9 N 37 9 55 
355  GyeongGi YongIn 영덕 두진 
 
1996.10. 541 3 2 84.81 
 
159.2 129.7 229.9 306.6 67.2 73.1 117.9 103.2 
 
E 127 5 48 N 37 16 2 
356  GyeongGi YongIn 신갈 신갈삼익 
 
1996.12. 296 3 2 84.81 
 
173.3 135.6 171.0 283.0 73.1 84.9 88.4 106.1 
 
E 127 6 22 N 37 16 41 
357  GyeongGi YongIn 김량장 현대 
 
1995.12. 755 3 2 84.15 
 
136.7 124.8 178.3 273.3 62.4 83.2 95.1 130.7 
 
E 127 12 41 N 37 13 44 
358  GyeongGi YongIn 마평 라이프 
 
1994.06. 350 3 2 84.81 
 
108.5 84.9 94.3 112.0 67.2 59.0 64.9 76.6 
 
E 127 12 55 N 37 13 54 
359  GyeongGi YongIn 풍덕천 한국 
 
1995.05. 416 3 2 84.15 
 
216.3 180.6 255.5 505.1 85.6 103.4 101.0 157.5 
 
E 127 5 37 N 37 19 24 
360  GyeongGi YongIn 풍덕천 현대 
 
1994.12. 1168 3 2 84.48 
 
233.2 191.8 278.2 509.0 91.1 106.5 106.5 165.7 
 
E 127 5 40 N 37 19 34 
361  GyeongGi YongIn 죽전 죽전벽산 1 단지 
 
1997.08. 612 3 2 84.81 
 
229.9 218.1 330.1 518.8 96.7 117.9 135.6 188.7 
 
E 127 6 20 N 37 20 9 
362  GyeongGi YongIn 유방 인정프린스 2 차 
 
1995.06. 330 3 2 84.81 
 
123.8 106.1 126.2 228.7 67.2 61.3 76.6 91.4 
 
E 127 12 51 N 37 15 40 
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363  GyeongGi EuiWang 삼 운양까치 
 
1991.01. 178 3 2 81.18 
 
107.2 101.0 129.3 215.6 64.1 64.1 86.2 107.8 
 
E 126 57 19 N 37 19 5 
364  GyeongGi EuiWang 오전 무궁화선경 
 
1995.01. 330 3 2 84.81 
 
173.3 141.5 188.7 318.4 79.0 90.8 106.1 153.3 
 
E 126 58 44 N 37 21 4 
365  GyeongGi EuiWang 왕곡 신안포은 
 
1994.12. 342 3 2 84.81 
 
171.0 146.2 191.0 365.5 76.6 84.9 106.1 159.2 
 
E 126 58 45 N 37 20 40 
366  GyeongGi EuiWang 포일 인덕원삼호 
 
1991.04. 684 3 2 84.81 
 
206.3 176.9 271.2 642.6 90.8 102.6 129.7 206.3 
 
E 265 85 1 N 37 23 49 
367  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 금오 세아 
 
1993.01. 249 3 2 84.81 
  
96.7 112.0 128.5 
 
49.5 70.7 79.6 
 
E 127 4 24 N 37 45 29 
368  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 녹양 동원 1 차 
 
1995.07. 406 3 2 82.83 
 
103.8 86.9 114.7 144.9 55.5 62.8 78.5 69.4 
 
E 127 2 16 N 37 45 22 
369  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 신곡 효자벽산 
 
1994.04. 297 3 2 84.81 
 
147.4 108.5 134.4 150.3 74.3 73.1 82.5 85.5 
 
E 127 3 41 N 37 44 27 
370  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 용현 동문 
 
1991.08. 160 3 1 78 
 
105.1 83.3 106.4 103.2 57.7 52.6 70.5 60.3 
 
E 127 5 8 N 37 43 51 
371  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 장암 우성 
 
1992.12. 510 3 2 84.81 
 
149.7 117.9 143.9 179.8 67.2 77.8 82.5 106.1 
 
E 127 3 41 N 37 43 28 
372  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 호원 건영 
 
1993.03. 900 3 2 84.81 
 
149.7 128.5 176.9 212.2 69.6 73.1 94.3 117.9 
 
E 127 3 0 N 37 42 22 
373  GyeongGi ECheon 갈산 현대 2 차 
 
1991.01 194 3 2 84.48 
  
100.6 106.5 136.1 
 
66.3 61.6 88.8 
 
E 127 27 14 N 37 16 58 
374  GyeongGi ECheon 부발 삼익 
 
1998.01. 493 3 2 84.81 
 
92.6 97.9 141.5 181.6 33.6 61.3 64.9 103.2 
 
E 127 28 38 N 37 15 32 
375  GyeongGi ECheon 장호원 동양 
 
1992 154 3 2 81.84 
  
75.8 81.9 84.3 
 
36.7 36.7 42.2 
 
E 127 36 57 N 37 6 51 
376  GyeongGi ECheon 증포 선경 
 
1997.01. 238 3 2 84.48 
  
108.9 148.0 170.5 
 
67.5 82.9 100.6 
 
E 127 27 12 N 37 17 34 
377  GyeongGi PaJoo 검산 성원 
 
2000.04. 656 3 2 84.48 
  
119.6 144.4 180.5 
 
59.2 59.2 71.0 
 
E 126 45 37 N 37 46 18 
378  GyeongGi PaJoo 금능 흰돌마을장안 6 차 
 
1999.10. 498 3 2 82.17 
  
142.4 163.1 240.4 
 
73.0 73.0 103.4 
 
E 126 47 1 N 37 45 19 
379  GyeongGi PaJoo 금촌 동문 1 차 
 
1993.01. 244 3 2 84.81 
  
93.1 117.9 117.9 
 
47.2 64.9 61.9 
 
E 126 46 17 N 37 46 18 
380  GyeongGi PaJoo 조리 동문 1 차 
 
1996.11. 118 3 2 84.81 
  
117.9 132.1 168.0 
 
61.3 64.9 67.8 
 
E 126 48 28 N 37 44 30 
381  GyeongGi PyungTaek 독곡 삼익 2 차 
 
1994.01. 364 3 2 84.48 
  
74.6 148.0 121.3 
 
41.4 82.9 74.0 
 
E 127 3 49 N 37 5 6 
382  GyeongGi PyungTaek 동삭 현대동삭 
 
1992.09 612 3 2 84.81 
 
83.7 69.6 138.0 112.0 42.4 36.6 62.5 67.8 
 
E 127 5 54 N 37 1 8 
383  GyeongGi PyungTaek 비전 벽산늘푸른 
 
1994.06. 368 3 2 84.48 
 
118.4 113.6 162.2 174.6 73.4 71.0 100.6 127.2 
 
E 127 7 11 N 36 59 30 
384  GyeongGi PyungTaek 비전 동아백합 
 
1994.01. 148 3 2 84.81 
 
117.9 106.1 126.2 147.4 73.1 73.1 82.5 109.1 
 
E 127 6 34 N 36 59 27 
385  GyeongGi PyungTaek 세교 우성꿈그린 
 
1995.11. 580 3 2 84.81 
 
114.4 97.9 165.1 168.0 64.9 67.2 94.3 123.8 
 
E 127 4 48 N 37 0 7 
386  GyeongGi PyungTaek 안중 동환 
 
1995.01. 150 3 2 84.81 
 
0.0 0.0 93.1 96.1 0.0 0.0 50.1 56.0 
 
E 126 55 16 N 36 59 11 
387  GyeongGi PyungTaek 통복 삼성 
 
1993.05. 624 3 2 84.48 
 
88.8 80.5 136.1 129.0 54.5 53.3 71.0 88.8 
 
E 127 4 46 N 36 59 30 
388  GyeongGi PoCheon 소흘 원일 1 차 
 
1993.05. 318 3 2 81.84 
   
97.8 103.9 
  
55.0 55.0 
 
E 127 8 32 N 37 49 35 
389  GyeongGi PoCheon 소흘 우정 1 차 
 
1997.01. 908 3 2 84.81 
  
90.8 102.6 106.1 
 
48.3 59.0 53.1 
 
E 127 8 19 N 37 49 33 
390  GyeongGi HaNam 덕풍 현대 
 
1995.11. 555 3 2 84.48 
 
195.3 159.8 254.5 316.6 79.3 91.1 136.1 130.2 
 
E 127 12 2 N 37 31 58 
391  GyeongGi HaNam 덕풍 서해 
 
1996.04. 423 3 2 84.48 
 
203.6 171.6 260.4 355.1 85.2 103.0 142.0 153.9 
 
E 127 11 50 N 37 32 35 
392  GyeongGi HaNam 신장 동일 
 
1999.09. 438 3 2 84.48 
  
189.4 307.8 420.2 0.0 108.9 153.9 171.6 
 
E 127 13 11 N 37 32 28 
393  GyeongGi HaNam 창우 신안 
 
1994.12. 1704 3 2 84.81 
 
214.6 185.1 300.7 430.4 90.8 106.1 141.5 171.0 
 
E 127 13 33 N 37 32 13 
                             
* see footnote 94 
 
Table 39   Sample 4 bedroom apartment of Seoul 
No. Address Apt. Complex 
  
Built 
year 
House-
holds 
Bed-
room 
Bath-
room 
Floor 
area 
  Price (10 US $/m²) Rent (JeonSe*) (10 US $/m²)   Longitude Latitude 
    1998 2001 2004 2007 1998 2001 2004 2007     ° ` ``   ° ` `` 
                             1 Seoul GangNam 대치 쌍용 2 차 
 
1983.11 364 4 2 132 
 
367.4 359.8 795.5 1314.4 149.2 200.8 299.2 348.5 
 
E 127 4 15 N 37 29 53 
2 Seoul GangNam 압구정 미성 2 차 
 
1988.07. 911 4 2 117 
 
406.0 397.4 726.5 1141.0 209.4 222.2 333.3 320.5 
 
E 127 1 10 N 37 31 24 
3 Seoul GangNam 도곡 역삼럭키 
 
1993.11. 1094 4 2 125 
 
420.0 400.0 640.0 1060.0 168.0 208.0 300.0 328.0 
 
E 127 2 24 N 37 29 26 
4 Seoul GangNam 삼성 풍림 1 차 
 
1998.08. 252 4 2 116 
 
288.8 340.5 573.3 732.8 116.4 206.9 288.8 310.3 
 
E 127 3 42 N 37 30 56 
5 Seoul GangNam 수서 한아름 
 
1993.11. 498 4 2 130 
 
334.6 328.8 619.2 796.2 146.2 169.2 257.7 300.0 
 
E 127 6 13 N 37 29 21 
6 Seoul GangNam 대치 대치현대 
 
1999.06. 630 4 2 114 
  
504.4 802.6 1206.1 
 
280.7 412.3 460.5 
 
E 127 3 39 N 37 30 3 
7 Seoul GangNam 도곡 한신 
 
1988.05. 421 4 2 112 
 
375.0 370.5 638.4 1026.8 169.6 214.3 290.2 370.5 
 
E 127 2 27 N 37 29 14 
8 Seoul GangNam 논현 논현경남 
 
1996.09. 60 4 2 114 
  
342.1 513.2 530.7 
 
171.1 206.1 250.0 
 
E 127 2 17 N 37 30 38 
9 Seoul GangNam 논현 신동아 
 
1997.07. 644 4 2 115 
 
413.0 373.9 517.4 847.8 160.9 191.3 269.6 326.1 
 
E 127 1 21 N 37 30 53 
10 Seoul GangNam 청담 삼성청담공원 
 
1999.08. 391 4 2 115 
  
473.9 673.9 934.8 
 
221.7 326.1 317.4 
 
E 127 3 1 N 37 31 20 
11 Seoul GangNam 일원 목련타운 
 
1993.12. 650 4 2 135 
 
448.1 463.0 777.8 1222.2 163.0 229.6 322.2 363.0 
 
E 127 5 6 N 37 29 5 
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12 Seoul GangDong 둔촌 중앙하이츠 
 
1995.12. 232 4 2 115 
 
273.9 256.5 354.3 391.3 119.6 134.8 182.6 221.7 
 
E 127 8 32 N 37 31 46 
13 Seoul GangDong 둔촌 신성미소지움 1 차 
 
1998.4. 461 4 2 115 
 
256.5 304.3 417.4 547.8 73.9 160.9 226.1 217.4 
 
E 127 8 34 N 37 31 40 
14 Seoul GangDong 명일 고덕삼환 
 
1987.06. 120 4 2 122 
 
233.6 225.4 401.6 561.5 104.5 135.2 209.0 245.9 
 
E 127 9 7 N 37 32 58 
15 Seoul GangDong 천호 삼익 
 
1997.09. 150 4 2 114 
 
210.5 232.5 307.0 372.8 83.3 114.0 153.5 179.8 
 
E 127 7 43 N 37 32 55 
16 Seoul GangDong 성내 삼성 2 단지 
 
1999.09. 436 4 2 115 
  
352.2 517.4 691.3 
 
182.6 239.1 269.6 
 
E 127 7 33 N 37 31 50 
17 Seoul GangDong 암사 중앙하이츠 
 
1998.05. 126 4 2 116 
 
163.8 168.1 267.2 280.2 56.0 88.4 155.2 155.2 
 
E 127 7 55 N 37 33 5 
18 Seoul GangBook 미아 SK 북한산시티 
 
2001.12. 5327 4 2 115 
  
226.1 278.3 400.0 
 
108.7 113.0 147.8 
 
E 127 0 45 N 37 37 6 
19 Seoul GangBook 번 동문 
 
1998.08. 167 4 2 134 
 
149.3 153.0 205.2 223.9 63.4 78.4 108.2 108.2 
 
E 127 2 17 N 37 37 26 
20 Seoul GangBook 번 완성 
 
1994.12. 54 4 2 130 
 
107.7 115.4 180.8 176.9 57.7 73.1 96.2 96.2 
 
E 127 2 13 N 37 37 30 
21 Seoul GangBook 수유 수유벽산 
 
1992.10. 1454 4 2 123 
 
201.2 162.6 223.6 292.7 101.6 97.6 126.0 130.1 
 
E 127 1 8 N 37 38 35 
22 Seoul GangBook 수유 극동 
 
1990.10. 574 4 2 134 
 
222.0 171.6 209.0 253.7 78.4 82.1 115.7 134.3 
 
E 127 0 43 N 37 38 30 
23 Seoul GangBook 수유 삼성래미안 
 
2000.04. 690 4 2 115 
  
243.5 293.5 360.9 
 
126.1 171.7 169.6 
 
E 127 1 5 N 37 38 41 
24 Seoul GangSeo 가양 현대 2 차 
 
2001.08. 114 4 2 115 
  
247.8 347.8 543.5 
 
165.2 147.8 147.8 
 
E 126 51 20 N 37 33 41 
25 Seoul GangSeo 등촌 대림 
 
1995.07. 680 4 2 124 
 
306.5 270.2 419.4 633.1 100.8 143.1 173.4 201.6 
 
E 126 50 47 N 37 33 44 
26 Seoul GangSeo 등촌 태영 
 
1998.06. 186 4 2 115 
 
226.1 213.0 293.5 426.1 78.3 100.0 154.3 156.5 
 
E 126 51 50 N 37 33 21 
27 Seoul GangSeo 마곡 신안 
 
1993.12. 253 4 2 108 
 
182.9 150.5 263.9 435.2 78.7 71.8 106.5 111.1 
 
E 126 49 26 N 37 34 4 
28 Seoul GangSeo 방화 현대 2 차 
 
1999.12. 202 4 2 114 
  
203.9 298.2 368.4 
 
103.1 136.0 149.1 
 
E 126 49 10 N 37 34 23 
29 Seoul GangSeo 염창 동아 
 
1997.10. 778 4 2 115 
 
243.5 226.1 321.7 500.0 80.4 119.6 139.1 160.9 
 
E 126 52 22 N 37 33 16 
30 Seoul GangSeo 화곡 대림 
 
1992.08. 416 4 2 110 
 
218.2 200.0 263.6 377.3 118.2 118.2 154.5 172.7 
 
E 126 50 13 N 37 31 59 
31 Seoul GwanAk 봉천 관악현대 
 
1991.11. 2134 4 2 123 
 
239.8 207.3 268.3 500.0 109.8 109.8 150.4 170.7 
 
E 126 57 36 N 37 29 33 
32 Seoul GwanAk 봉천 낙성현대 1 차 
 
1988.05. 251 4 2 136 
 
220.6 220.6 297.8 334.6 95.6 110.3 161.8 161.8 
 
E 126 57 56 N 37 28 22 
33 Seoul GwanAk 신림 신림현대 
 
1993.05. 1634 4 2 119 
 
254.2 214.3 271.0 458.0 113.4 113.4 157.6 176.5 
 
E 126 55 57 N 37 28 30 
34 Seoul GwanAk 신림 동부 
 
1994.12. 592 4 2 114 
 
271.9 245.6 344.3 469.3 114.0 136.0 188.6 188.6 
 
E 126 55 45 N 37 28 50 
35 Seoul GwanAk 신림 현대 2 차 
 
1996.12. 112 4 2 113 
  
230.1 269.9 298.7 
 
132.7 146.0 172.6 
 
E 126 54 32 N 37 29 4 
36 Seoul GwanAk 신림 건영 5 차 
 
1994.03. 77 4 2 115 
  
234.8 287.0 304.3 
 
100.0 169.6 169.6 
 
E 126 56 30 N 37 28 5 
37 Seoul GwanAk 신림 우방 
 
1999.11. 201 4 2 115 
  
210.9 317.4 347.8 
 
130.4 160.9 156.5 
 
E 126 55 8 N 37 29 20 
38 Seoul GwanAk 신림 쌍용 
 
1998.01. 373 4 2 115 
 
200.0 210.9 278.3 347.8 91.3 104.3 139.1 147.8 
 
E 126 54 42 N 37 28 20 
39 Seoul GwangJin 광장 극동 1 차 
 
1985.08. 448 4 2 127 
 
326.8 299.2 551.2 866.1 149.6 161.4 228.3 287.4 
 
E 127 6 14 N 37 32 35 
40 Seoul GwangJin 군자 일성파크 
 
1996.01. 357 4 2 115 
  
287.0 308.7 395.7 
 
134.8 165.2 156.5 
 
E 127 4 21 N 37 33 4 
41 Seoul GwangJin 자양 대동 
 
1998.06. 314 4 2 114 
 
271.9 289.5 394.7 675.4 109.6 144.7 184.2 245.6 
 
E 127 4 6 N 37 32 11 
42 Seoul GwangJin 중곡 선경 
 
1999.09. 182 4 2 113 
  
252.2 323.0 402.7 
 
154.9 199.1 230.1 
 
E 127 5 11 N 37 34 8 
43 Seoul GwangJin 자양 현대 6 차 
 
1999.02. 178 4 2 115 
  
300.0 526.1 695.7 
 
152.2 234.8 265.2 
 
E 127 4 18 N 37 31 58 
44 Seoul GooRo 개봉 삼환 
 
1995.11. 783 4 2 114 
 
188.6 153.5 221.5 289.5 87.7 87.7 114.0 131.6 
 
E 126 51 16 N 37 29 40 
45 Seoul GooRo 고척 청구 
 
1998.09. 448 4 2 114 
 
166.7 193.0 258.8 359.6 59.2 92.1 127.2 127.2 
 
E 126 51 50 N 37 30 5 
46 Seoul GooRo 개봉 두산 
 
1997.04. 561 4 2 111 
 
157.7 159.9 214.0 288.3 67.6 87.8 117.1 121.6 
 
E 126 51 10 N 37 29 42 
47 Seoul GooRo 구로 구일우성 
 
1998.01. 829 4 2 114 
 
182.0 188.6 267.5 372.8 72.4 109.6 136.0 188.6 
 
E 126 52 37 N 37 29 25 
48 Seoul GooRo 신도림 동아 1 차 
 
1999.11. 1095 4 2 148 
  
219.6 314.2 493.2 
 
111.5 128.4 138.5 
 
E 126 52 59 N 37 30 39 
49 Seoul GooRo 오류 동부 
 
1996.08. 252 4 2 115 
 
165.2 156.5 200.0 250.0 60.9 80.4 117.4 128.3 
 
E 126 50 52 N 37 29 49 
50 Seoul GeumCheon 가산 두산 
 
1997.12. 1495 4 2 135 
 
187.0 187.0 244.4 377.8 51.9 92.6 125.9 161.1 
 
E 126 53 33 N 37 28 28 
51 Seoul GeumCheon 독산 한신 
 
1990.12. 1000 4 2 130 
 
207.7 173.1 284.6 396.2 80.8 96.2 115.4 157.7 
 
E 126 53 22 N 37 27 19 
52 Seoul GeumCheon 독산 태영 
 
2001.04. 90 4 2 111 
  
252.3 238.7 232.0 
 
108.1 153.2 135.1 
 
E 126 53 29 N 37 27 58 
53 Seoul GeumCheon 시흥 벽산타운 1 단지 
 
1997.11. 2336 4 2 115 
 
217.4 187.0 256.5 343.5 62.2 100.0 113.0 139.1 
 
E 126 55 10 N 37 27 4 
54 Seoul GeumCheon 시흥 금강 
 
2000.09. 185 4 2 115 
  
193.5 243.5 278.3 
 
104.3 126.1 134.8 
 
E 126 54 29 N 37 27 47 
55 Seoul NoWon 공릉 삼익 
 
1995.10. 845 4 2 115 
 
204.3 169.6 243.5 358.7 91.3 84.8 126.1 139.1 
 
E 127 4 55 N 37 37 36 
56 Seoul NoWon 상계 성원 
 
1998.01. 174 4 2 115 
 
182.6 187.0 239.1 326.1 82.6 108.7 134.8 173.9 
 
E 127 3 57 N 37 39 37 
57 Seoul NoWon 상계 중앙하이츠 
 
1997.10. 437 4 2 135 
 
214.8 214.8 325.9 407.4 57.4 98.1 144.4 155.6 
 
E 127 4 8 N 37 39 13 
58 Seoul NoWon 상계 불암대림 
 
1999.07. 634 4 2 115 
  
195.7 317.4 408.7 
 
102.2 147.8 182.6 
 
E 127 4 38 N 37 39 48 
59 Seoul NoWon 월계 대우 
 
1998.07. 344 4 2 135 
 
218.5 214.8 266.7 366.7 85.2 92.6 140.7 140.7 
 
E 127 3 5 N 37 37 59 
60 Seoul NoWon 중계 성원 
 
1996.02. 402 4 2 135 
 
218.5 203.7 425.9 463.0 77.8 94.8 177.8 237.0 
 
E 127 4 11 N 37 39 0 
61 Seoul NoWon 중계 경남 
 
1989.07. 660 4 2 114 
 
214.9 179.8 285.1 460.5 92.1 114.0 149.1 193.0 
 
E 127 3 45 N 37 38 21 
62 Seoul NoWon 하계 학여울청구 
 
1997.06. 1476 4 2 114 
 
232.5 219.3 333.3 500.0 83.3 109.6 157.9 210.5 
 
E 127 3 43 N 37 38 6 
63 Seoul DoBong 도봉 현대성우 
 
1998.12. 190 4 2 115 
 
169.6 180.4 247.8 326.1 65.2 87.0 121.7 121.7 
 
E 127 2 52 N 37 40 35 
64 Seoul DoBong 방학 거성학마을 
 
1994.12. 347 4 2 134 
 
186.6 179.1 216.4 287.3 82.1 93.3 130.6 156.7 
 
E 127 2 22 N 37 39 60 
65 Seoul DoBong 방학 신동아 2 단지 
 
1991.09. 660 4 2 120 
 
233.3 216.7 258.3 312.5 100.0 110.4 120.8 133.3 
 
E 127 1 34 N 37 39 37 
66 Seoul DoBong 방학 신동아 1 단지 
 
1987.01. 3169 4 2 127 
 
220.5 185.0 248.0 250.0 106.3 104.3 133.9 129.9 
 
E 127 1 49 N 37 39 39 
67 Seoul DoBong 창 동아청솔 
 
1997.07. 1981 4 2 135 
 
274.1 229.6 325.9 474.1 96.3 103.7 140.7 170.4 
 
E 127 2 54 N 37 39 25 
68 Seoul DoBong 창 쌍용 
 
1997.02. 1352 4 2 135 
 
227.4 233.3 303.7 444.4 100.0 111.1 144.4 159.3 
 
E 127 2 53 N 37 39 35 
69 Seoul DongDaeMoon 답십리 동아 
 
1999.07. 1233 4 2 115 
  
208.7 273.9 360.9 
 
117.4 152.2 147.8 
 
E 127 3 41 N 37 34 10 
70 Seoul DongDaeMoon 답십리 대우 
 
2000.12. 427 4 2 115 
  
201.7 308.7 356.5 
 
108.7 156.5 160.9 
 
E 127 3 12 N 37 34 24 
71 Seoul DongDaeMoon 청량리 현대 
 
1987.09. 241 4 2 124 
 
213.7 191.5 241.9 262.1 100.8 102.8 121.0 112.9 
 
E 127 2 47 N 37 35 4 
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72 Seoul DongDaeMoon 이문 삼익 
 
1997.08. 353 4 2 115 
 
187.0 173.9 256.5 256.5 73.9 91.3 134.8 134.8 
 
E 127 4 33 N 37 35 45 
73 Seoul DongDaeMoon 전농 우성 
 
1991.07. 1234 4 2 127 
 
204.7 169.3 214.6 283.5 98.4 82.7 114.2 118.1 
 
E 127 3 54 N 37 34 38 
74 Seoul DongDaeMoon 휘경 롯데 
 
2000.09. 265 4 2 115 
  
213.0 278.3 291.3 
 
117.4 143.5 152.2 
 
E 127 3 48 N 37 35 28 
75 Seoul DongJak 노량진 우성 
 
1995.11. 901 4 2 125 
 
264.0 218.0 284.0 492.0 92.0 108.0 156.0 196.0 
 
E 126 56 52 N 37 30 34 
76 Seoul DongJak 대방 대림 
 
1993.10. 1628 4 2 134 
 
123.1 343.3 425.4 634.3 156.7 156.7 223.9 242.5 
 
E 126 55 28 N 37 30 27 
77 Seoul DongJak 본 신동아 
 
1993.07. 765 4 2 104 
 
223.6 211.5 278.8 495.2 120.2 120.2 132.2 168.3 
 
E 126 57 6 N 37 30 36 
78 Seoul DongJak 사당 극동 
 
1992.10. 1550 4 2 110 
 
250.0 245.5 345.5 527.3 113.6 127.3 168.2 204.5 
 
E 126 58 29 N 37 29 26 
79 Seoul DongJak 노량진 상도건영 
 
1997.08. 824 4 2 115 
 
282.6 247.8 330.4 543.5 95.7 126.1 169.6 213.0 
 
E 126 56 58 N 37 30 27 
80 Seoul DongJak 신대방 한성 
 
1994.12. 272 4 2 130 
 
250.0 230.8 330.8 507.7 111.5 123.1 169.2 200.0 
 
E 126 54 55 N 37 29 44 
81 Seoul Mapo 도화 삼성 
 
1994.07. 982 4 2 115 
 
360.9 313.0 426.1 691.3 152.2 165.2 208.7 256.5 
 
E 126 57 1 N 37 32 24 
82 Seoul Mapo 도화 우성 
 
1991.03. 1230 4 2 128 
 
285.2 226.6 347.7 507.8 121.1 121.1 168.0 160.2 
 
E 126 56 54 N 37 32 10 
83 Seoul Mapo 도화 현대 1 차 
 
1993.08. 1021 4 2 128 
 
275.4 230.5 316.4 539.1 105.5 113.3 156.3 171.9 
 
E 126 57 14 N 37 32 22 
84 Seoul Mapo 신수 삼익 
 
1996.11. 391 4 2 114 
 
271.9 271.9 355.3 429.8 118.4 136.0 197.4 219.3 
 
E 126 56 8 N 37 33 4 
85 Seoul Mapo 연남 대명 
 
1996.01. 128 4 2 112 
  
223.2 276.8 357.1 
 
138.4 183.0 178.6 
 
E 126 55 25 N 37 33 42 
86 Seoul Mapo 중 현대 1 차 
 
2000.04. 477 4 2 115 
  
245.7 356.5 402.2 
 
113.0 173.9 184.8 
 
E 126 54 25 N 37 34 16 
87 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 북가좌 한양 
 
1986.12. 660 4 2 117 
 
213.7 192.3 260.7 326.9 106.8 102.6 136.8 128.2 
 
E 126 54 32 N 37 34 33 
88 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 연희 대림 
 
1993.01. 220 4 2 119 
 
285.7 247.9 327.7 365.5 113.4 142.9 180.7 218.5 
 
E 126 56 10 N 37 34 31 
89 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 영천 독립문삼호 
 
1995.06. 895 4 2 114 
 
267.5 267.5 394.7 561.4 92.1 157.9 214.9 254.4 
 
E 126 57 30 N 37 34 11 
90 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 남가좌 현대 
 
1998.10. 1485 4 2 115 
 
187.0 230.4 319.6 426.1 67.4 117.4 169.6 178.3 
 
E 126 55 14 N 37 34 28 
91 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍은 벽산 
 
1995.04. 1509 4 2 115 
 
239.1 204.3 287.0 352.2 100.0 117.4 152.2 160.9 
 
E 126 56 41 N 37 35 41 
92 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍은 풍림 2 차 
 
1989.09. 390 4 2 107 
 
219.6 182.2 233.6 280.4 98.1 107.5 135.5 163.6 
 
E 126 56 34 N 37 35 35 
93 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍제 한양 
 
1992.07. 998 4 2 122 
 
252.0 233.6 332.0 409.8 90.2 108.6 176.2 180.3 
 
E 126 56 49 N 37 34 59 
94 Seoul SeoDaeMoon 홍제 홍제현대 
 
1992.01. 704 4 2 119 
 
273.1 231.1 310.9 399.2 79.8 130.3 172.3 176.5 
 
E 126 56 28 N 37 35 20 
95 Seoul SeoCho 반포 새서울 
 
1994.07. 154 4 2 130 
 
376.9 357.7 519.2 611.5 176.9 207.7 242.3 269.2 
 
E 127 0 36 N 37 29 57 
96 Seoul SeoCho 반포 한신서래 
 
1988.01. 414 4 2 118 
 
334.7 305.1 512.7 741.5 156.8 161.0 233.1 309.3 
 
E 127 2 3 N 37 29 57 
97 Seoul SeoCho 방배 삼호한숲 
 
1998.10. 116 4 2 114 
 
328.9 394.7 557.0 728.1 166.7 223.7 293.9 298.2 
 
E 126 59 56 N 37 28 40 
98 Seoul SeoCho 방배 우성 
 
1990.12. 468 4 2 117 
  
290.6 517.1 782.1 
 
162.4 230.8 273.5 
 
E 126 58 58 N 37 28 27 
99 Seoul SeoCho 서초 서초현대 
 
1999.12. 299 4 2 115 
  
495.7 634.8 847.8 
 
256.5 313.0 313.0 
 
E 127 1 13 N 37 29 27 
100 Seoul SeoCho 서초 우성 5 차 
 
1996.05. 408 4 2 135 
 
444.4 483.3 622.2 922.2 166.7 250.0 248.1 300.0 
 
E 127 1 36 N 37 29 40 
101 Seoul SeoCho 우면 대림 
 
1995.03. 412 4 2 131 
 
458.0 454.2 667.9 954.2 160.3 213.7 278.6 313.0 
 
E 127 1 22 N 37 28 22 
102 Seoul SeoCho 잠원 한신타워 
 
1996.04. 250 4 2 131 
 
423.7 438.9 477.1 1007.6 183.2 209.9 248.1 324.4 
 
E 127 0 22 N 37 30 39 
103 Seoul SeongDong 금호 두산 
 
1993.12. 1267 4 2 125 
 
272.0 244.0 352.0 748.0 128.0 124.0 176.0 260.0 
 
E 127 0 58 N 37 32 59 
104 Seoul SeongDong 성수 동아그린 
 
1998.09. 331 4 2 112 
  
250.0 343.8 531.3 
 
138.4 160.7 200.9 
 
E 127 2 54 N 37 33 3 
105 Seoul SeongDong 옥수 극동그린 
 
1996.06. 583 4 2 114 
 
359.6 333.3 434.2 561.4 166.7 162.3 197.4 250.0 
 
E 127 0 36 N 37 32 30 
106 Seoul SeongDong 응봉 신동아 
 
1996.04. 434 4 2 115 
 
247.8 226.1 308.7 373.9 110.9 113.0 156.5 165.2 
 
E 127 1 45 N 37 32 59 
107 Seoul SeongDong 하왕십리 청계벽산 
 
1996.06. 1332 4 2 115 
 
221.7 221.7 378.3 456.5 87.0 126.1 141.3 173.9 
 
E 127 1 53 N 37 34 8 
108 Seoul SeongDong 행당 신동아 
 
1995.07. 636 4 2 115 
 
243.5 221.7 317.4 430.4 108.7 113.0 156.5 165.2 
 
E 127 1 57 N 37 33 14 
109 Seoul SeongDong 행당 삼부 
 
1997.11. 498 4 2 122 
 
278.7 250.0 315.6 504.1 118.9 131.1 172.1 229.5 
 
E 127 2 15 N 37 33 35 
110 Seoul SeongBook 길음 삼부 
 
1992.09. 684 4 2 112 
 
187.5 176.3 276.8 339.3 102.7 104.9 138.4 138.4 
 
E 127 1 25 N 37 36 9 
111 Seoul SeongBook 돈암 한신 
 
1995.06. 1795 4 2 114 
 
302.6 258.8 298.2 443.0 116.2 127.2 179.8 175.4 
 
E 127 0 34 N 37 35 37 
112 Seoul SeongBook 동소문 송산 
 
1997.08. 345 4 2 115 
 
256.5 243.5 282.6 330.4 113.0 126.1 160.9 165.2 
 
E 127 0 38 N 37 35 33 
113 Seoul SeongBook 상월곡 우남 
 
1994.11. 225 4 2 114 
 
223.7 190.8 214.9 232.5 127.2 109.6 118.4 122.8 
 
E 127 2 48 N 37 36 21 
114 Seoul SeongBook 정릉 중앙하이츠 
 
1995.01. 261 4 2 115 
 
252.2 230.4 247.8 239.1 117.4 121.7 121.7 126.1 
 
E 127 0 8 N 37 37 11 
115 Seoul SeongBook 하월곡 동신 
 
1997.07. 746 4 2 115 
 
234.8 221.7 256.5 330.4 95.7 108.7 134.8 160.9 
 
E 127 2 7 N 37 36 16 
116 Seoul SongPa 가락 삼환 
 
1985.06. 648 4 2 121 
 
243.8 252.1 524.8 690.1 99.2 128.1 177.7 177.7 
 
E 127 8 12 N 37 29 43 
117 Seoul SongPa 문정 올림픽훼밀리 
 
1988.12. 4494 4 2 117 
 
329.1 320.5 649.6 1111.1 132.5 175.2 239.3 247.9 
 
E 127 6 55 N 37 29 21 
118 Seoul SongPa 거여 우방 
 
1999.05. 257 4 2 115 
  
260.9 400.0 502.2 
 
134.8 182.6 187.0 
 
E 127 8 32 N 37 29 33 
119 Seoul SongPa 가락 우성 
 
1986.12. 838 4 2 129 
 
259.7 275.2 418.6 629.8 118.2 147.3 209.3 217.1 
 
E 127 7 4 N 37 29 49 
120 Seoul SongPa 오금 대림 
 
1989.01. 749 4 2 126 
 
313.5 313.5 575.4 853.2 158.7 158.7 238.1 257.9 
 
E 127 7 45 N 37 30 36 
121 Seoul SongPa 오금 우방 
 
2000.12. 196 4 2 115 
  
267.4 352.2 539.1 
 
134.8 182.6 204.3 
 
E 127 8 23 N 37 30 5 
122 Seoul SongPa 잠실 우성 4 차 
 
1983.09. 555 4 2 106 
 
278.3 264.2 580.2 801.9 132.1 146.2 221.7 217.0 
 
E 127 4 58 N 37 30 10 
123 Seoul SongPa 풍납 갑을 
 
1996.07. 85 4 2 110 
  
231.8 311.4 400.0 
 
129.5 190.9 193.2 
 
E 127 6 45 N 37 32 7 
124 Seoul YangCheon 목 금호 
 
1997.10. 224 4 2 115 
  
291.3 443.5 817.4 
 
152.2 221.7 282.6 
 
E 126 52 29 N 37 31 31 
125 Seoul YangCheon 목 삼익 
 
1997.06. 277 4 2 114 
 
241.2 271.9 407.9 570.2 118.4 144.7 197.4 219.3 
 
E 126 52 35 N 37 31 23 
126 Seoul YangCheon 목 성원 
 
1997.02. 200 4 2 115 
 
300.0 304.3 391.3 660.9 134.8 163.0 226.1 287.0 
 
E 126 52 9 N 37 31 35 
127 Seoul YangCheon 신월 금용 
 
2001.10. 215 4 2 114 
  
201.8 263.2 364.0 
 
122.8 144.7 140.4 
 
E 126 50 33 N 37 31 15 
128 Seoul YangCheon 신정 목동현대 
 
1996.04. 2076 4 2 115 
 
282.6 278.3 491.3 656.5 104.3 147.8 208.7 226.1 
 
E 126 52 37 N 37 31 13 
129 Seoul YeongDeungPo 당산 강마을삼성 
 
1995.05. 348 4 2 115 
  
256.5 356.5 500.0 
 
126.1 187.0 200.0 
 
E 126 54 21 N 37 32 3 
130 Seoul YeongDeungPo 대림 한신 1 차 
 
1998.12. 143 4 2 114 
  
214.9 254.4 377.2 
 
127.2 138.2 171.1 
 
E 126 54 14 N 37 29 41 
131 Seoul YeongDeungPo 도림 청구 
 
1997.12. 200 4 2 127 
 
208.7 192.9 261.8 362.2 57.1 106.3 151.6 149.6 
 
E 126 53 44 N 37 30 33 
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132 Seoul YeongDeungPo 신길 한성 
 
1997.04. 420 4 2 134 
 
287.3 287.3 347.0 410.4 93.3 130.6 160.4 175.4 
 
E 126 55 9 N 37 30 17 
133 Seoul YeongDeungPo 양평 동보 
 
1998.04. 184 4 2 136 
 
172.8 176.5 235.3 397.1 55.1 99.3 114.0 143.4 
 
E 126 53 27 N 37 32 17 
134 Seoul YeongDeungPo 여의도 미성 
 
1978.06. 577 4 2 114 
 
302.6 289.5 546.1 921.1 131.6 157.9 201.8 210.5 
 
E 126 55 28 N 37 31 11 
135 Seoul YongSan 효창 한신 
 
1987.01. 120 4 2 121 
 
186.0 227.3 297.5 371.9 95.0 95.0 161.2 167.4 
 
E 126 57 27 N 37 32 30 
136 Seoul YongSan 서빙고 신동아 
 
1984.06. 1326 4 2 140 
 
389.3 414.3 575.0 1025.0 164.3 182.1 228.6 257.1 
 
E 126 59 16 N 37 31 5 
137 Seoul YongSan 이촌 대림 
 
1994.05. 638 4 2 115 
 
300.0 308.7 491.3 743.5 147.8 143.5 187.0 208.7 
 
E 126 57 18 N 37 31 29 
138 Seoul YongSan 이촌 동아그린 
 
1999.06. 499 4 2 115 
  
291.3 373.9 534.8 
 
143.5 187.0 189.1 
 
E 126 57 29 N 37 31 26 
139 Seoul YongSan 이태원 남산대림 
 
1994.10. 400 4 2 135 
 
429.6 425.9 537.0 629.6 177.8 192.6 288.9 222.2 
 
E 126 59 19 N 37 32 27 
140 Seoul EunPyung 녹번 대림 
 
1993.09. 370 5 2 134 
 
257.5 194.0 250.0 466.4 100.7 108.2 145.5 201.5 
 
E 126 56 13 N 37 35 59 
141 Seoul EunPyung 불광 미성 
 
1988.06. 1340 4 2 126 
 
230.2 206.3 297.6 436.5 123.0 123.0 162.7 178.6 
 
E 126 55 41 N 37 36 53 
142 Seoul EunPyung 갈현 한솔 
 
1997.12. 193 4 2 115 
  
204.3 243.5 247.8 
 
108.7 147.8 152.2 
 
E 126 54 36 N 37 37 5 
143 Seoul EunPyung 대조 삼성타운 
 
1997.10. 357 4 2 123 
  
235.8 300.8 341.5 
 
134.1 166.7 215.4 
 
E 126 55 18 N 37 36 32 
144 Seoul EunPyung 수색 청구 
 
1998.10. 196 4 2 127 
  
248.0 358.3 397.6 
 
122.0 149.6 177.2 
 
E 126 54 4 N 37 34 50 
145 Seoul EunPyung 응암 우성 
 
1988.07. 292 4 2 115 
 
173.9 152.2 200.0 213.0 91.3 104.3 139.1 126.1 
 
E 126 55 5 N 37 35 2 
146 Seoul JongRo 교북 동아 
 
1995.11. 48 4 2 99 
   
308.1 328.3 
  
207.1 207.1 
 
E 126 57 43 N 37 34 17 
147 Seoul JongRo 명륜 명륜아남 3 차 
 
1999.01. 136 4 2 115 
  
360.9 443.5 521.7 
 
204.3 269.6 273.9 
 
E 127 0 0 N 37 35 8 
148 Seoul JongRo 무악 현대 
 
1999.11. 1514 4 2 115 
  
308.7 439.1 565.2 
 
165.2 256.5 278.3 
 
E 126 57 39 N 37 34 31 
149 Seoul JongRo 창신 쌍용 2 차 
 
1993.06. 919 4 2 116 
 
202.6 202.6 267.2 357.8 99.1 99.1 133.6 135.8 
 
E 127 0 43 N 37 34 49 
150 Seoul JongRo 평창 롯데 
 
2001.04. 156 4 2 110 
  
331.8 513.6 563.6 
 
209.1 272.7 295.5 
 
E 126 58 32 N 37 36 33 
151 Seoul Joong 신당 현대 
 
1990.06. 942 4 2 122 
 
213.1 184.4 286.9 397.5 94.3 96.3 143.4 155.7 
 
E 127 1 17 N 37 33 35 
152 Seoul Joong 신당 남산타운 
 
2000.06. 5150 4 2 115 
  
387.0 504.3 739.1 
 
195.7 247.8 304.3 
 
E 127 0 35 N 37 32 59 
153 Seoul JoongRang 면목 신성 
 
1998.10. 266 4 2 103 
 
174.8 174.8 235.4 257.3 58.3 92.2 131.1 126.2 
 
E 127 4 22 N 37 30 25 
154 Seoul JoongRang 면목 삼호 
 
1996.11. 183 4 2 113 
  
181.4 234.5 296.5 
 
115.0 137.2 150.4 
 
E 127 5 20 N 37 34 35 
155 Seoul JoongRang 상봉 동부 
 
1999.04. 368 4 2 119 
 
176.5 189.1 285.7 390.8 92.4 102.9 128.2 149.2 
 
E 127 5 38 N 37 36 8 
156 Seoul JoongRang 신내 동성 3 차 
 
1995.07. 1844 4 2 130 
 
226.9 178.8 246.2 365.4 88.5 84.6 115.4 153.8 
 
E 127 5 45 N 37 36 29 
157 Seoul JoongRang 신내 진로 
 
1995.11. 818 4 2 134 
 
272.4 227.6 317.2 459.0 93.3 87.7 145.5 175.4 
 
E 127 5 15 N 37 37 2 
158 Seoul JoongRang 묵 신안 1 차 
 
1999.10. 285 4 2 104 
  
278.8 298.1 379.8 
 
120.2 158.7 168.3 
 
E 127 4 53 N 37 36 45 
159 InCheon GangHwa 강화 그랑드빌 
 
2000.12. 98 4 2 121 
  
146.3 121.9 113.6 
 
39.3 47.5 45.5 
 
E 126 29 31 N 37 44 44 
160 InCheon GyeYang 계산 은행삼보 
 
1997.08. 436 4 2 115 
 
165.2 158.7 247.8 365.2 71.7 91.3 126.1 156.5 
 
E 126 44 27 N 37 32 13 
161 InCheon GyeYang 오류 신동아 
 
1998.09. 1192 4 2 115 
  
121.7 195.7 252.2 
 
52.2 78.3 73.9 
 
E 126 44 0 N 37 34 50 
162 InCheon GyeYang 계산 현대 
 
1992.02. 1248 4 2 135 
 
135.2 133.3 207.4 233.3 57.4 68.5 107.4 103.7 
 
E 126 43 58 N 37 32 14 
163 InCheon GyeYang 작전 동보 1 차 
 
1995.10. 1187 4 2 118 
  
120.8 197.0 237.3 
 
67.8 110.2 97.5 
 
E 126 44 21 N 37 31 56 
164 InCheon GyeYang 효성 현대 2 차 
 
1992.12. 340 4 2 129 
 
133.7 112.4 197.7 251.9 56.2 62.0 104.7 108.5 
 
E 126 42 47 N 37 31 58 
165 InCheon Nam 관교 동아 
 
1990.10. 390 4 2 131 
 
141.2 124.0 190.8 232.8 64.9 72.5 114.5 129.8 
 
E 126 41 40 N 37 26 40 
166 InCheon Nam 관교 삼환 
 
1992.04. 352 4 2 133 
 
139.1 133.5 208.6 229.3 69.5 71.4 116.5 127.8 
 
E 126 41 46 N 37 26 35 
167 InCheon Nam 주안 진흥 
 
1994.01. 828 4 2 127 
 
122.0 128.0 192.9 198.8 55.1 74.8 110.2 114.2 
 
E 126 40 56 N 37 26 47 
168 InCheon Nam 용현 한양 2 차 
 
1991.09. 352 4 2 133 
 
84.6 78.9 124.1 133.5 38.7 48.9 78.9 75.2 
 
E 126 37 54 N 37 27 10 
169 InCheon Nam 용현 대림 
 
1991.12. 598 4 2 128 
 
89.8 85.9 142.6 152.3 43.0 56.6 82.0 78.1 
 
E 126 38 11 N 37 26 56 
170 InCheon Nam 주안 쌍용 
 
1985.12. 768 4 2 128 
 
85.9 82.0 164.1 160.2 43.0 44.9 85.9 78.1 
 
E 126 40 48 N 37 26 48 
171 InCheon Nam 학익 신동아 5 차 
 
1993.06. 594 4 2 127 
 
128.0 116.1 171.3 171.3 63.0 61.0 110.2 94.5 
 
E 126 40 39 N 37 26 36 
172 InCheon NamDong 간석 금호 
 
1988.10. 630 4 2 99 
 
118.7 120.2 197.0 199.5 68.2 74.7 121.2 141.4 
 
E 126 41 58 N 37 27 28 
173 InCheon NamDong 간석 현대 
 
1991.9. 390 4 2 127 
 
118.1 116.1 177.2 173.2 53.1 65.0 106.3 98.4 
 
E 126 41 35 N 37 28 4 
174 InCheon NamDong 구월 동아 
 
1991.09. 486 4 2 127 
 
118.1 118.1 177.2 200.8 72.8 72.8 126.0 114.2 
 
E 126 42 40 N 37 26 53 
175 InCheon NamDong 만수 효성상아 1 차 
 
1985.07. 720 4 2 121 
 
104.1 100.8 173.6 186.0 62.0 68.2 95.0 101.2 
 
E 126 43 21 N 37 27 27 
176 InCheon NamDong 만수 신동아 
 
1990.06. 750 4 2 118 
 
116.5 108.5 182.2 192.8 63.6 69.9 105.9 110.2 
 
E 126 44 13 N 37 27 59 
177 InCheon NamDong 남촌 풍림 3 차 
 
1999.10. 735 4 2 123 
  
130.1 195.1 199.2 
 
65.4 101.6 101.6 
 
E 126 42 59 N 37 25 44 
178 InCheon NamDong 서창 태창 2 차 
 
1997.10. 577 4 2 121 
 
105.4 121.9 210.7 239.7 41.3 64.0 103.3 119.8 
 
E 126 45 8 N 37 26 7 
179 InCheon BooPyung 갈산 두산 
 
1992.12. 574 4 2 132 
 
123.1 113.6 219.7 287.9 49.2 66.3 98.5 128.8 
 
E 126 43 40 N 37 30 39 
180 InCheon BooPyung 부개 한국 
 
1992.07. 580 4 2 120 
 
120.8 125.0 170.8 208.3 54.2 72.9 91.7 87.5 
 
E 126 43 55 N 37 29 2 
181 InCheon BooPyung 부평 동아 2 차 
 
1995.02. 2128 4 2 135 
 
177.8 155.6 277.8 344.4 81.5 88.9 125.9 131.5 
 
E 126 43 6 N 37 29 47 
182 InCheon BooPyung 부개 푸른마을삼부 
 
1999.06. 680 4 2 135 
  
163.0 277.8 355.6 
 
81.5 111.1 135.2 
 
E 126 44 30 N 37 30 10 
183 InCheon BooPyung 산곡 현대 5 차 
 
1993.12. 1161 4 2 133 
 
146.6 118.4 203.0 236.8 67.7 77.1 116.5 131.6 
 
E 126 42 38 N 37 30 20 
184 InCheon BooPyung 산곡 우성 4 차 
 
1993.01. 494 4 2 109 
 
105.5 105.5 178.9 188.1 78.0 78.0 110.1 119.3 
 
E 126 42 17 N 37 30 0 
185 InCheon BooPyung 청천 금호 
 
1998.03. 2539 4 2 134 
 
153.0 149.3 257.5 298.5 61.6 82.1 126.9 132.5 
 
E 126 42 43 N 37 30 26 
186 InCheon Seo 가정 한국 
 
1994.01. 620 4 2 127 
  
92.5 129.9 153.5 
 
47.2 70.9 72.8 
 
E 126 40 39 N 37 30 50 
187 InCheon Seo 가좌 진주 5 단지 
 
1991.06. 268 4 2 136 
  
99.3 150.7 183.8 
 
57.0 80.9 77.2 
 
E 126 41 8 N 37 29 30 
188 InCheon Seo 왕길 원흥 
 
1993.07. 354 4 2 135 
 
85.2 75.9 116.7 207.4 42.6 42.6 53.7 55.6 
 
E 126 39 2 N 37 36 0 
189 InCheon Seo 가좌 범양 
 
1990.07. 510 4 2 110 
 
125.0 103.2 175.0 165.9 56.8 61.4 88.6 95.5 
 
E 126 41 17 N 37 29 44 
190 InCheon Seo 마전 동아 
 
1998.11. 1351 4 2 135 
  
105.6 151.9 281.5 
 
44.4 53.7 70.4 
 
E 126 40 22 N 37 35 50 
191 InCheon Seo 심곡 한국 2 차 
 
1995.04. 392 4 2 130 
 
107.7 96.2 173.1 188.5 42.3 51.9 75.0 73.1 
 
E 126 40 42 N 37 32 36 
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192 InCheon Seo 연희 한국 1 차 
 
1994.10. 356 4 2 130 
 
111.5 101.9 161.5 207.7 53.8 51.9 65.4 96.2 
 
E 126 40 31 N 37 33 3 
193 InCheon YeonSoo 동춘 대우삼환 
 
1994.05. 1776 4 2 121 
 
164.5 148.8 272.7 338.8 70.2 76.4 144.6 157.0 
 
E 126 40 42 N 37 24 19 
194 InCheon YeonSoo 동춘 현대대림 
 
1993.08. 700 4 2 134 
 
175.4 149.3 279.9 306.0 72.8 69.0 130.6 141.8 
 
E 126 40 24 N 37 24 31 
195 InCheon YeonSoo 선학 뉴서울 
 
1992.10. 720 4 2 127 
 
126.0 124.0 189.0 206.7 57.1 65.0 122.0 110.2 
 
E 126 42 0 N 37 25 30 
196 InCheon YeonSoo 선학 금호 
 
1993.01. 540 4 2 124 
 
153.2 131.0 225.8 241.9 62.5 66.5 121.0 121.0 
 
E 126 42 0 N 37 25 35 
197 InCheon YeonSoo 연수 동남 
 
1994.03. 420 4 2 122 
 
143.4 118.9 209.0 258.2 55.3 69.7 106.6 110.7 
 
E 126 40 30 N 37 25 26 
198 InCheon YeonSoo 연수 대우 1 차 
 
1992.06. 390 4 2 128 
 
113.3 111.3 203.1 253.9 52.7 56.6 109.4 128.9 
 
E 126 41 14 N 37 25 3 
199 InCheon YeonSoo 옥련 우성 
 
1996.01. 498 4 2 125 
 
124.0 124.0 188.0 244.0 48.0 66.0 104.0 108.0 
 
E 126 38 50 N 37 25 25 
200 InCheon YeonSoo 청학 현대 
 
2000.06. 420 4 2 139 
  
136.7 226.6 230.2 
 
73.7 125.9 133.1 
 
E 126 40 11 N 37 25 44 
201 InCheon YeonSoo 옥련 쌍용 
 
1998.08. 574 4 2 124 
 
127.0 155.2 229.8 241.9 46.4 74.6 104.8 112.9 
 
E 126 39 12 N 37 25 30 
202 GyeongGi GoYang 고양 화성그린빌 
 
1998.06. 122 4 2 124 
 
121.0 125.0 157.3 217.7 36.3 60.5 76.6 84.7 
 
E 126 53 56 N 37 42 13 
203 GyeongGi GoYang 대화 장성건영 
 
1996.02. 354 4 2 134 
 
209.0 197.8 298.5 578.4 63.4 79.1 106.3 141.8 
 
E 126 44 46 N 37 40 21 
204 GyeongGi GoYang 대화 장성대명 
 
1995.11. 162 4 2 130 
 
200.0 175.0 269.2 519.2 65.4 80.8 113.5 123.1 
 
E 126 44 38 N 37 40 22 
205 GyeongGi GoYang 마두 강촌우방 
 
1993.03. 766 4 2 132 
 
227.3 231.1 340.9 674.2 66.3 109.8 147.7 208.3 
 
E 126 46 52 N 37 39 20 
206 GyeongGi GoYang 마두 백마벽산 
 
1994.08. 438 4 2 135 
 
244.4 207.4 314.8 648.1 64.8 92.6 127.8 151.9 
 
E 126 47 22 N 37 39 28 
207 GyeongGi GoYang 일산 후곡동신 
 
1994.08. 434 4 2 117 
 
211.5 205.1 324.8 611.1 70.5 91.9 141.0 149.6 
 
E 126 45 43 N 37 40 44 
208 GyeongGi GoYang 중산 중산마을 12 단지현대 
 
1996.05. 110 4 2 131 
 
221.4 187.0 194.7 416.0 63.0 72.5 95.4 99.2 
 
E 126 46 54 N 37 41 14 
209 GyeongGi GoYang 성사 신원당동신 
 
1992.11. 885 4 2 135 
 
170.4 140.7 218.5 388.9 61.1 72.2 100.0 140.7 
 
E 126 50 16 N 37 39 6 
210 GyeongGi GoYang 성사 신원당삼보 
 
1992.10. 480 4 2 114 
 
131.6 155.7 206.1 403.5 65.8 81.1 114.0 133.8 
 
E 126 50 8 N 37 39 13 
211 GyeongGi GoYang 중산 중산마을 9 단지두산 
 
1996.02. 240 4 2 134 
 
181.0 143.7 195.9 395.5 52.2 63.4 93.3 104.5 
 
E 126 46 47 N 37 41 22 
212 GyeongGi GoYang 일산 동문 2 차 
 
1997.11. 667 4 2 134 
  
145.5 182.8 347.0 
 
63.4 82.1 82.1 
 
E 126 45 51 N 37 41 9 
213 GyeongGi GoYang 일산 에이스 
 
1994.12. 332 4 2 131 
 
152.7 122.1 141.2 271.0 50.8 58.4 91.6 91.6 
 
E 126 46 35 N 37 41 16 
214 GyeongGi GoYang 장항 호수유원 
 
1994.05. 440 4 2 132 
 
231.1 223.5 303.0 602.3 68.2 89.0 136.4 170.5 
 
E 126 46 32 N 37 38 51 
215 GyeongGi GoYang 주엽 강선건영 
 
1994.01. 264 4 2 132 
 
227.3 219.7 310.6 560.6 66.3 90.9 121.2 151.5 
 
E 126 46 4 N 37 40 18 
216 GyeongGi GoYang 주엽 강선우성 
 
1994.03. 412 4 2 125 
 
234.0 228.0 340.0 720.0 74.0 98.0 140.0 168.0 
 
E 126 45 39 N 37 39 57 
217 GyeongGi GoYang 탄현 탄현동성 
 
1994.11. 652 4 2 122 
 
192.6 155.7 209.0 405.7 55.3 67.6 90.2 102.5 
 
E 126 46 2 N 37 41 55 
218 GyeongGi GoYang 행신 무원신안 
 
1995.12. 328 4 2 135 
 
185.2 153.7 225.9 414.8 61.1 75.9 101.9 137.0 
 
E 126 49 54 N 37 36 53 
219 GyeongGi GoYang 행신 햇빛동신 
 
1997.08. 458 4 2 135 
 
151.9 168.5 248.1 455.6 51.9 77.8 107.4 155.6 
 
E 126 50 29 N 37 37 17 
220 GyeongGi GoYang 화정 은빛 LG 
 
1995.11. 384 4 2 135 
 
218.5 181.5 266.7 474.1 61.1 85.2 127.8 144.4 
 
E 126 50 8 N 37 38 31 
221 GyeongGi GoYang 화정 달빛현대 
 
1995.08. 300 4 2 134 
 
220.1 179.1 259.3 466.4 59.7 87.7 115.7 145.5 
 
E 126 49 57 N 37 38 30 
222 GyeongGi GoYang 화정 은빛부영 
 
1996.10. 1320 4 2 133 
 
236.8 184.2 272.6 556.4 69.5 90.2 124.1 172.9 
 
E 126 49 46 N 37 38 11 
223 GyeongGi GwangMyung 광명 중앙하이츠 1 차 
 
1993.07. 909 4 2 132 
 
164.8 143.9 265.2 265.2 72.0 83.3 125.0 113.6 
 
E 126 51 18 N 37 28 9 
224 GyeongGi GwangMyung 소하 동양 1 차 
 
2000.05 216 4 2 130 
  
163.5 311.5 392.3 
 
84.6 142.3 146.2 
 
E 126 53 11 N 37 27 20 
225 GyeongGi GwangMyung 철산 철산한신 
 
1992.11. 1568 4 2 130 
 
215.4 207.7 300.0 396.2 92.3 111.5 142.3 161.5 
 
E 126 52 35 N 37 28 21 
226 GyeongGi GwangMyung 철산 주공 13 단지 
 
1986.08. 2460 4 2 121 
 
252.1 227.3 367.8 537.2 99.2 115.7 173.6 194.2 
 
E 126 52 12 N 37 28 45 
227 GyeongGi GwangMyung 철산 주공도덕파크 
 
2002.06. 2351 4 2 115 
   
382.6 504.3 
  
160.9 191.3 
 
E 126 51 54 N 37 28 12 
228 GyeongGi GwangJoo 장지 현대 
 
2000.09. 477 4 2 117 
  
162.4 198.7 337.6 
 
66.2 89.7 106.8 
 
E 127 14 2 N 37 23 35 
229 GyeongGi GwangJoo 태전 성원 2 차 
 
2000.10. 435 4 2 134 
  
149.3 186.6 406.7 
 
57.8 84.0 89.6 
 
E 127 12 14 N 37 24 36 
230 GyeongGi GwangJoo 탄벌 탄벌리현대 
 
2000.07. 545 4 2 135 
  
160.7 183.0 307.4 
 
76.3 92.6 96.3 
 
E 127 12 35 N 37 25 36 
231 GyeongGi GwangJoo 실촌 쌍용 1 차 
 
1998.11. 440 4 2 135 
 
98.1 114.8 159.3 240.7 33.3 48.1 72.2 70.4 
 
E 127 20 17 N 37 20 47 
232 GyeongGi GwangJoo 오포 쌍용 
 
1999.02. 313 4 2 134 
  
130.6 141.8 253.7 
 
50.4 69.0 70.9 
 
E 127 15 24 N 37 22 50 
233 GyeongGi GwangJoo 태전 성원 1 차 
 
1999.07. 654 4 2 134 
  
134.3 156.7 361.9 
 
56.0 72.8 80.2 
 
E 127 13 44 N 37 23 23 
234 GyeongGi GooRi 교문 대우동양고속 
 
1994.11. 680 4 2 135 
 
211.1 166.7 270.4 385.2 75.9 66.7 92.6 144.4 
 
E 127 8 8 N 37 35 20 
235 GyeongGi GooRi 교문 구리우성 
 
1994.08. 341 4 2 134 
 
212.7 164.2 264.9 459.0 76.5 69.0 115.7 141.8 
 
E 127 8 13 N 37 35 17 
236 GyeongGi GooRi 교문 덕현 
 
1994.01. 1077 4 2 135 
 
211.1 155.6 266.7 388.9 81.5 70.4 100.0 133.3 
 
E 127 7 59 N 37 35 25 
237 GyeongGi GooRi 인창 성원 2 차 
 
2000.10. 461 4 2 135 
  
175.9 248.1 314.8 
 
70.4 100.0 118.5 
 
E 127 8 11 N 37 36 41 
238 GyeongGi GooRi 인창 LG 
 
1999.06. 482 4 2 121 
  
171.5 252.1 281.0 
 
78.5 107.4 115.7 
 
E 127 7 56 N 37 36 24 
239 GyeongGi GooRi 인창 삼보 
 
1996.12. 906 4 2 115 
 
228.3 189.1 291.3 439.1 73.9 80.4 115.2 160.9 
 
E 127 8 26 N 37 36 25 
240 GyeongGi GoonPo 궁내 묘향롯데 
 
1993.06. 784 4 2 134 
 
216.4 201.5 235.1 485.1 74.6 85.8 123.1 175.4 
 
E 126 55 16 N 37 21 45 
241 GyeongGi GoonPo 당 쌍용 
 
1998.07. 770 4 2 125 
 
128.0 172.0 228.0 432.0 40.0 90.0 116.0 164.0 
 
E 126 56 32 N 37 20 41 
242 GyeongGi GoonPo 당 동아 
 
1993.01. 482 4 2 120 
  
141.7 177.1 313.8 
 
83.3 95.8 129.2 
 
E 126 56 48 N 37 20 58 
243 GyeongGi GoonPo 금정 무궁화화성 
 
1993.05. 402 4 2 135 
 
185.2 150.0 214.8 433.3 70.4 81.5 114.8 163.0 
 
E 126 56 10 N 37 21 31 
244 GyeongGi GimPo 감정 쌍용 
 
1998.07. 586 4 2 115 
 
121.7 132.6 191.3 247.8 37.0 58.7 71.7 82.6 
 
E 126 41 53 N 37 37 30 
245 GyeongGi GimPo 감정 효성 
 
1996.07. 242 4 2 126 
 
154.8 103.2 170.6 257.9 57.5 51.6 67.5 73.4 
 
E 126 42 5 N 37 37 36 
246 GyeongGi GimPo 고촌 길훈 1 차 
 
1991.12. 163 4 2 114 
 
140.4 116.2 214.9 168.9 63.6 65.8 78.9 74.6 
 
E 126 46 11 N 37 36 16 
247 GyeongGi GimPo 풍무 길훈 1 차 
 
1993.01. 219 4 2 137 
  
98.5 127.7 149.6 
 
42.0 56.6 51.1 
 
E 126 43 9 N 37 36 47 
248 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 별내 주공 5 단지 
 
2000.09. 592 4 2 118 
  
152.5 190.7 266.9 
 
72.0 91.1 97.5 
 
E 127 7 16 N 37 42 27 
249 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 오남 오남청구 
 
2000.10. 429 4 2 119 
  
100.8 130.3 155.5 
 
39.9 54.6 58.8 
 
E 127 11 56 N 37 41 58 
250 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 와부 현대 
 
1997.12. 982 4 2 134 
 
164.2 179.1 201.5 384.3 39.2 61.6 78.4 115.7 
 
E 127 12 51 N 37 34 52 
251 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 진건 화성타운 
 
1999.04. 249 4 2 122 
  
116.8 147.5 149.6 
 
53.3 61.5 63.5 
 
E 127 10 26 N 37 39 32 
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252 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 진접 한신 
 
1999.03. 395 4 2 120 
  
104.2 127.1 154.2 
 
50.0 62.5 62.5 
 
E 127 10 1 N 37 42 29 
253 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 퇴계원 극동 
 
1999.03. 498 4 2 115 
  
134.8 187.0 243.5 
 
58.7 95.7 95.7 
 
E 127 8 19 N 37 38 55 
254 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 화도 경향 
 
1997.12. 312 4 2 115 
 
100.0 100.0 147.8 187.0 37.0 50.0 69.6 65.2 
 
E 127 18 5 N 37 38 48 
255 GyeongGi NamYangJoo 화도 창현두산 
 
1997.12. 1150 4 2 135 
 
114.8 109.3 153.7 200.0 31.5 46.3 66.7 59.3 
 
E 127 18 11 N 37 38 57 
256 GyeongGi DongDooCheon 생연 에이스 2 차 
 
1993.06. 286 4 2 123 
 
73.2 70.3 78.0 81.3 43.9 44.3 39.0 37.4 
 
E 127 3 43 N 37 53 36 
257 GyeongGi DongDooCheon 생연 에이스 3 차 
 
1993.06. 270 4 2 104 
  
82.7 94.2 93.8 
 
48.1 43.8 43.3 
 
E 127 3 43 N 37 53 53 
258 GyeongGi DongDooCheon 생연 에이스 5 차 
 
1999.07. 326 4 2 102 
  
107.8 98.0 93.1 
 
44.1 44.6 41.7 
 
E 127 3 37 N 37 53 50 
259 GyeongGi BooCheon 괴안 삼익 
 
1989.08. 682 4 2 109 
 
146.8 130.7 215.6 279.8 71.1 80.3 105.5 114.7 
 
E 126 48 11 N 37 28 38 
260 GyeongGi BooCheon 괴안 삼익세라믹 
 
1988.12. 781 4 2 109 
 
151.4 135.3 201.8 289.0 71.1 73.4 103.2 114.7 
 
E 126 48 7 N 37 28 32 
261 GyeongGi BooCheon 상 사랑벽산 
 
1994.05. 324 4 2 135 
 
194.4 170.4 285.2 488.9 81.5 92.6 127.8 155.6 
 
E 126 45 33 N 37 29 45 
262 GyeongGi BooCheon 상 꿈동산신안 
 
1994.06. 668 4 2 135 
 
200.0 174.1 300.0 514.8 70.4 96.3 129.6 159.3 
 
E 126 45 26 N 37 29 35 
263 GyeongGi BooCheon 소사 두산 
 
1995.03. 524 4 2 135 
 
151.9 133.3 214.8 322.2 61.1 68.5 96.3 96.3 
 
E 126 48 0 N 37 28 4 
264 GyeongGi BooCheon 소사 청구 
 
1995.03. 202 4 2 136 
 
143.4 128.7 213.2 301.5 60.7 68.0 95.6 95.6 
 
E 126 47 58 N 37 28 8 
265 GyeongGi BooCheon 송내 뉴서울 
 
1995.10. 971 4 2 124 
 
161.3 143.1 250.0 340.7 70.6 84.7 116.9 137.1 
 
E 126 45 45 N 37 29 9 
266 GyeongGi BooCheon 송내 대한 
 
1994.10. 161 4 2 111 
 
157.7 148.6 202.7 346.8 67.6 81.1 108.1 144.1 
 
E 126 46 1 N 37 28 41 
267 GyeongGi BooCheon 송내 우성고층 
 
1990.04. 798 4 2 128 
 
144.5 144.5 234.4 324.2 74.2 74.2 109.4 132.8 
 
E 126 45 36 N 37 29 5 
268 GyeongGi BooCheon 원미 풍림 
 
1999.01. 808 4 2 114 
  
157.9 201.8 320.2 
 
83.3 109.6 127.2 
 
E 126 47 29 N 37 29 29 
269 GyeongGi BooCheon 원미 두산 
 
1998.10. 820 4 2 119 
 
130.3 155.5 193.3 294.1 50.4 84.0 113.4 105.0 
 
E 126 47 39 N 37 29 43 
270 GyeongGi BooCheon 역곡 한국 
 
1996.08. 497 4 2 134 
 
156.7 156.7 192.2 242.5 67.2 78.4 100.7 111.9 
 
E 126 48 49 N 37 29 35 
271 GyeongGi BooCheon 원미 풍림 
 
1999.01. 808 4 2 114 
  
157.9 201.8 320.2 
 
83.3 109.6 127.2 
 
E 126 47 29 N 37 29 29 
272 GyeongGi BooCheon 원종 신동문 
 
1998.07. 216 4 2 109 
  
142.2 211.0 266.1 
 
80.3 100.9 110.1 
 
E 126 47 53 N 37 31 45 
273 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 은하동부 
 
1993.12. 316 4 2 135 
 
174.1 155.6 288.9 481.5 64.8 81.5 100.0 140.7 
 
E 126 45 55 N 37 30 21 
274 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 중흥두산 
 
1993.04. 258 4 2 134 
 
167.9 143.7 250.0 485.1 61.6 82.1 97.0 141.8 
 
E 126 46 27 N 37 30 16 
275 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 보람아주 
 
1995.05. 1398 4 2 126 
 
194.4 170.6 297.6 460.3 73.4 91.3 127.0 146.8 
 
E 126 45 30 N 37 29 55 
276 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 연화쌍용 
 
1994.02. 349 4 2 134 
 
182.8 145.5 253.7 485.1 69.0 78.4 108.2 115.7 
 
E 126 46 51 N 37 29 51 
277 GyeongGi BooCheon 중 꿈삼환 
 
1994.07. 348 4 2 134 
 
175.4 143.7 246.3 485.1 65.3 78.4 100.7 115.7 
 
E 126 46 46 N 37 30 3 
278 GyeongGi SeongNam 구미 까치대우 
 
1995.12. 976 4 2 135 
 
300.0 288.9 425.9 777.8 88.9 122.2 159.3 207.4 
 
E 127 7 2 N 37 21 0 
279 GyeongGi SeongNam 금곡 청솔동아 
 
1995.02. 204 4 2 135 
 
244.4 251.9 425.9 603.7 85.2 114.8 144.4 181.5 
 
E 127 6 56 N 37 21 19 
280 GyeongGi SeongNam 이매동 아름두산 
 
1992.08. 566 4 2 132 
 
261.4 219.7 454.5 765.2 87.1 106.1 151.5 200.8 
 
E 127 7 11 N 37 24 0 
281 GyeongGi SeongNam 분당 샛별동성 
 
1992.06. 582 4 2 134 
 
264.9 276.1 488.8 794.8 85.8 138.1 194.0 253.7 
 
E 127 7 55 N 37 22 20 
282 GyeongGi SeongNam 서현 효자동아 
 
1992.07. 648 4 2 128 
 
246.1 234.4 449.2 781.3 84.0 121.1 171.9 257.8 
 
E 127 8 7 N 37 22 39 
283 GyeongGi SeongNam 서현 효자삼환 
 
1993.03. 632 4 2 130 
 
246.2 246.2 434.6 780.8 80.8 134.6 161.5 226.9 
 
E 127 8 2 N 37 22 24 
284 GyeongGi SeongNam 단대 진로 
 
1998.12. 499 4 2 115 
 
171.7 184.8 260.9 367.4 73.9 104.3 134.8 143.5 
 
E 127 9 22 N 37 27 4 
285 GyeongGi SeongNam 수내 푸른신성 
 
1992.06. 642 4 2 130 
 
253.8 246.2 434.6 826.9 80.8 123.1 169.2 219.2 
 
E 127 7 37 N 37 22 6 
286 GyeongGi SeongNam 수진 현대 
 
1994.10. 107 4 2 124 
  
177.4 197.6 310.5 
 
127.0 116.9 141.1 
 
E 127 7 54 N 37 26 23 
287 GyeongGi SeongNam 수진 삼부 
 
1996.11. 834 4 2 135 
 
229.6 181.5 277.8 418.5 92.6 100.0 140.7 166.7 
 
E 127 7 26 N 37 26 19 
288 GyeongGi SeongNam 수내 양지금호 
 
1993.02. 1490 4 2 134 
 
313.4 276.1 477.6 895.5 97.0 130.6 186.6 246.3 
 
E 127 7 2 N 37 22 25 
289 GyeongGi SeongNam 야탑 장미동부 
 
1993.02. 1134 4 2 132 
 
253.8 231.1 473.5 765.2 87.1 108.0 159.1 212.1 
 
E 127 7 39 N 37 24 55 
290 GyeongGi SeongNam 정자 정든동아 
 
1995.04. 1006 4 2 124 
 
290.3 274.2 423.4 778.2 88.7 133.1 177.4 221.8 
 
E 127 7 16 N 37 21 37 
291 GyeongGi SeongNam 하대원 현대 
 
1995.04. 314 4 2 121 
 
210.7 173.6 256.2 376.0 82.6 86.8 111.6 132.2 
 
E 127 9 5 N 37 25 57 
292 GyeongGi SeongNam 야탑 탑선경 
 
1992.08. 976 4 2 131 
 
251.9 217.6 438.9 744.3 80.2 103.1 141.2 183.2 
 
E 127 7 15 N 37 24 27 
293  SooWon GwonSeon 곡반정 삼성 
 
2000.10. 442 4 2 119 
  
127.7 205.9 289.9 
 
69.3 113.4 111.3 
 
E 127 1 44 N 37 14 5 
294  SooWon GwonSeon 구운 성원 
 
1999.10. 458 4 2 135 
  
128.9 201.9 263.0 
 
64.8 100.0 120.4 
 
E 126 58 34 N 37 16 59 
295  SooWon GwonSeon 권선 동아 
 
1994.04. 360 4 2 135 
 
151.9 114.8 200.0 255.6 75.9 70.4 103.7 140.7 
 
E 127 1 29 N 37 14 58 
296  SooWon GwonSeon 권선 신안 
 
1996.07. 276 4 2 134 
 
156.7 138.1 235.1 343.3 78.4 78.4 115.7 167.9 
 
E 127 2 4 N 37 15 14 
297  SooWon GwonSeon 금곡 삼익 1 차 
 
1995.05. 400 4 2 125 
  
100.0 134.0 214.0 
 
60.4 74.0 104.0 
 
E 126 57 16 N 37 16 16 
298  SooWon YoungTong 매탄 임광 
 
1990.12. 1320 4 2 125 
 
142.0 122.0 208.0 412.0 78.0 78.0 100.0 144.0 
 
E 127 2 27 N 37 15 18 
299  SooWon YoungTong 매탄 한국 1 차 
 
1993.04. 496 4 2 130 
 
146.2 115.4 188.5 342.3 82.7 73.1 96.2 96.2 
 
E 127 3 23 N 37 16 8 
300  SooWon YoungTong 매탄 현대 
 
1988.01. 690 4 2 125 
 
158.0 122.0 214.0 378.0 76.0 78.0 108.0 148.0 
 
E 127 2 33 N 37 16 4 
301  SooWon GwonSeon 세류 삼익 
 
1999.01. 344 4 2 114 
  
140.4 177.6 276.3 
 
76.8 100.9 118.4 
 
E 127 1 2 N 37 15 40 
302  SooWon GwonSeon 세류 성원 
 
1996.04. 366 4 2 135 
 
103.7 111.1 183.3 288.9 53.7 64.8 100.0 100.0 
 
E 127 0 56 N 37 15 48 
303  SooWon YoungTong 영통 살구골동아 
 
1998.02. 320 4 2 135 
 
148.1 174.1 288.9 488.9 44.4 85.2 114.8 153.7 
 
E 127 4 7 N 37 14 52 
304  SooWon JangAn 영화 동성영화타운 
 
1997.01. 178 4 2 135 
 
125.9 129.6 146.7 192.6 70.4 70.4 74.1 100.0 
 
E 127 0 43 N 37 17 28 
305  SooWon PalDal 우만 선경 
 
1995.10. 372 4 2 134 
 
190.3 160.4 179.1 272.4 117.5 82.1 93.3 106.3 
 
E 127 2 11 N 37 16 30 
306  SooWon JangAn 율전 신일 
 
1997.12. 824 4 2 126 
 
144.8 134.9 198.4 337.3 55.6 63.5 107.1 150.8 
 
E 126 57 59 N 37 17 59 
307  SooWon PalDal 인계 선경 1 차 
 
1993.06. 360 4 2 134 
 
138.1 147.4 179.1 309.7 63.4 82.1 97.0 119.4 
 
E 127 2 11 N 37 16 34 
308  SooWon JangAn 정자 벽산 3 차 
 
2000.08. 389 4 2 136 
  
147.1 235.3 345.6 
 
75.4 117.6 147.1 
 
E 126 59 46 N 37 17 41 
309  SooWon JangAn 조원 벽산 
 
1989.07. 740 4 2 110 
  
104.5 177.3 293.2 
 
70.5 95.5 100.0 
 
E 127 1 16 N 37 17 51 
310  SooWon GwonSeon 탑 삼성 
 
1998.09. 299 4 2 132 
 
123.1 111.7 159.1 214.0 54.9 64.4 79.5 98.5 
 
E 126 58 30 N 37 16 27 
311  SooWon GwonSeon 호매실 LG 삼익 
 
1997.09. 1754 4 2 128 
 
121.1 119.1 187.5 277.3 39.1 64.5 89.8 109.4 
 
E 126 57 33 N 37 16 4 
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312  GyeongGi SiHeung 대야 우성 1 차 
 
1996.01. 188 4 2 135 
 
113.0 118.5 177.8 253.7 53.7 61.1 98.1 100.0 
 
E 126 47 36 N 37 26 46 
313  GyeongGi SiHeung 대야 청구 2 차 
 
1997.07. 462 4 2 135 
 
129.6 148.1 214.8 283.3 40.7 72.2 100.0 111.1 
 
E 126 47 34 N 37 26 31 
314  GyeongGi SiHeung 대야 극동 
 
2000.07. 350 4 2 119 
  
134.5 176.5 176.5 
 
71.4 117.6 117.6 
 
E 126 47 13 N 37 26 55 
315  GyeongGi SiHeung 도창 에이스 
 
1997.01. 798 4 2 102 
  
107.8 149.5 205.9 
 
71.1 71.1 98.0 
 
E 126 49 0 N 37 24 35 
316  GyeongGi SiHeung 은행 대우 3 차 
 
1998.10. 1272 4 2 103 
 
128.6 152.9 220.9 320.4 41.3 85.0 121.4 131.1 
 
E 126 47 48 N 37 26 33 
317  GyeongGi SiHeung 장곡 진말우성 
 
1999.06. 320 4 2 134 
  
132.5 175.4 272.4 
 
54.1 72.8 104.5 
 
E 126 47 11 N 37 22 50 
318  GyeongGi SiHeung 장곡 숲속마을 1 단지 
 
1999.08. 1246 4 2 135 
  
125.9 172.2 214.8 
 
55.6 72.2 103.7 
 
E 126 46 50 N 37 22 42 
319  GyeongGi SiHeung 장현 새재마을대동 
 
1999.09. 480 4 2 114 
  
132.0 166.7 263.2 
 
59.2 74.6 92.1 
 
E 126 47 59 N 37 22 46 
320  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 동원 
 
1998.03. 358 4 2 120 
 
97.9 118.8 179.2 270.8 35.4 60.4 91.7 116.7 
 
E 126 44 1 N 37 21 59 
321  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 화성 
 
1997.08. 420 4 2 128 
 
87.9 111.3 162.1 171.9 32.0 56.6 76.2 78.1 
 
E 126 44 3 N 37 21 32 
322  GyeongGi SiHeung 정왕 대림 3 단지 
 
1998.03. 280 4 2 115 
 
105.7 123.9 187.0 247.8 34.8 58.7 95.7 104.3 
 
E 126 43 52 N 37 21 55 
323  GyeongGi AnSan 본오 우성고층 
 
1990.04. 1080 4 2 127 
 
129.9 110.2 192.9 318.9 61.0 65.0 86.6 110.2 
 
E 126 51 52 N 37 17 51 
324  GyeongGi AnSan 본오 태영고층 
 
1991.07. 372 4 2 121 
 
121.9 110.7 170.2 314.0 55.8 66.1 86.8 136.4 
 
E 126 51 41 N 37 17 51 
325  GyeongGi AnSan 사 선경 
 
1994.07. 550 4 2 130 
 
138.5 115.4 178.8 257.7 61.5 65.4 96.2 112.7 
 
E 126 51 1 N 37 17 30 
326  GyeongGi AnSan 사 현대 2 차 
 
1995.02. 520 4 2 135 
 
131.5 113.0 190.7 292.6 53.7 66.7 92.6 140.7 
 
E 126 51 17 N 37 17 29 
327  GyeongGi AnSan 선부 공작한양고층 
 
1992.05. 1470 4 2 131 
 
118.3 95.4 148.9 248.1 55.3 51.5 80.2 97.3 
 
E 126 48 44 N 37 20 23 
328  GyeongGi AnSan 성포 선경 
 
1990.12. 1768 4 2 129 
 
145.3 119.0 178.3 234.5 69.8 79.5 91.1 110.5 
 
E 126 50 34 N 37 19 32 
329  GyeongGi AnSan 월피 현대 2 차 
 
1990.11. 360 4 2 122 
 
123.0 104.5 143.4 221.3 54.1 73.8 86.1 123.0 
 
E 126 50 59 N 37 19 51 
330  GyeongGi AnSeong 금산 주은청설 
 
1999.10. 457 4 2 121 
  
109.1 132.2 165.3 
 
53.7 78.5 90.9 
 
E 127 16 2 N 37 0 52 
331  GyeongGi AnSeong 봉산 한주 
 
1994.01. 395 4 2 123 
 
95.5 81.3 79.3 101.6 36.6 38.2 42.7 65.0 
 
E 127 16 41 N 37 0 36 
332  GyeongGi AnSeong 당왕 태영 
 
2000.04. 234 4 2 115 
  
108.7 139.1 165.2 
 
63.0 82.6 95.7 
 
E 127 15 31 N 37 0 55 
333  GyeongGi AnSeong 숭인 동신 
 
1995.10. 496 4 2 131 
  
91.6 110.7 133.6 
 
42.0 57.3 80.2 
 
E 127 16 31 N 37 0 43 
334  GyeongGi AnSeong 공도 삼성 
 
2002.08. 348 4 2 129 
   
137.6 162.8 
  
73.6 85.3 
 
E 127 8 29 N 36 59 40 
335  GyeongGi AnYang 호계 샘대우 
 
1994.01. 536 4 2 135 
 
214.8 211.1 292.6 611.1 77.8 100.0 114.8 174.1 
 
E 126 57 51 N 37 22 33 
336  GyeongGi AnYang 관양 현대 
 
1985.04. 904 4 2 123 
 
211.4 178.9 280.5 548.8 85.4 93.5 126.0 170.7 
 
E 126 57 26 N 37 24 24 
337  GyeongGi AnYang 평촌 꿈라이프 
 
1993.02. 548 4 2 110 
 
213.6 200.9 318.2 722.7 88.6 113.6 168.2 259.1 
 
E 126 58 4 N 37 23 11 
338  GyeongGi AnYang 박달 금호 
 
1996.10. 752 4 2 127 
 
167.3 143.7 198.8 326.8 80.7 72.8 102.4 102.4 
 
E 126 54 5 N 37 23 56 
339  GyeongGi AnYang 석수 럭키 
 
1987.06. 735 4 2 114 
 
163.6 136.0 223.7 416.7 75.9 76.8 109.6 136.0 
 
E 126 54 28 N 37 24 34 
340  GyeongGi AnYang 안양 성원 1 차 
 
1995.11. 934 4 2 139 
 
187.1 156.5 199.6 295.0 82.7 82.7 111.5 111.5 
 
E 126 54 52 N 37 23 40 
341  GyeongGi AnYang 비산 뉴타운삼호 5 차 
 
1985.11. 540 4 2 129 
 
189.9 176.4 246.1 569.8 89.1 87.2 100.8 162.8 
 
E 126 56 39 N 37 24 8 
342  GyeongGi AnYang 평촌 꿈금호 
 
1994.05. 254 4 2 134 
 
227.6 223.9 317.2 768.7 85.8 111.9 160.4 250.0 
 
E 126 57 56 N 37 23 7 
343  GyeongGi YangJoo 광사 신도 
 
1999.09. 400 4 2 125 
  
112.0 124.0 132.0 
 
38.4 42.0 42.0 
 
E 127 4 27 N 37 47 34 
344  GyeongGi YangJoo 덕정 청담주공 
 
2001.06. 960 4 2 108 
  
112.5 150.5 175.9 
 
62.5 62.5 69.4 
 
E 127 4 0 N 37 49 59 
345  GyeongGi YangJoo 백석 동화은하수장미 
 
1999.07. 443 4 2 123 
  
105.7 109.8 132.1 
 
40.7 50.8 50.8 
 
E 126 59 2 N 37 46 57 
346  GyeongGi YangJoo 고읍 현대 
 
1999.12. 293 4 2 134 
  
108.2 125.0 145.5 
 
37.3 42.9 46.6 
 
E 127 4 45 N 37 48 7 
347  GyeongGi YangPyung 양서 훼미리 
 
1992 115 4 2 120 
  
79.2 97.9 112.5 
 
35.4 50.0 59.2 
 
E 127 19 6 N 37 32 45 
348  GyeongGi OSan 갈곶 동부 2 차 
 
2000.07. 753 4 2 102 
  
112.7 178.9 171.6 
 
66.2 93.1 90.7 
 
E 127 4 10 N 37 7 49 
349  GyeongGi OSan 수청 대우 
 
1994.01. 1144 4 2 101 
  
104.0 173.3 173.3 
 
49.5 86.6 84.2 
 
E 127 3 45 N 37 9 54 
350  GyeongGi OSan 누읍 한라그린 
 
2000.06. 784 4 2 116 
  
106.5 150.9 163.8 
 
40.1 71.1 73.3 
 
E 127 2 58 N 37 8 32 
351  GyeongGi OSan 오산 현대 
 
2000.04. 530 4 2 135 
  
125.9 218.5 227.8 
 
66.7 114.8 111.1 
 
E 127 4 32 N 37 9 9 
352  GyeongGi OSan 원 두산동아 
 
1999.07. 516 4 2 130 
  
115.4 165.4 173.1 
 
61.5 84.6 80.8 
 
E 127 4 15 N 37 8 3 
353  GyeongGi YongIn 영덕 신일 
 
1998.11. 901 4 2 127 
 
114.2 141.7 169.3 303.1 41.3 68.9 74.8 110.2 
 
E 127 5 40 N 37 16 5 
354  GyeongGi YongIn 신갈 신갈삼익 
 
1996.12. 296 4 2 101 
 
170.8 131.2 178.2 321.8 71.8 76.7 81.7 94.1 
 
E 127 6 22 N 37 16 41 
355  GyeongGi YongIn 동천 풍림 
 
1998.08. 271 4 2 114 
  
188.6 254.4 438.6 0.0 109.6 96.5 144.7 
 
E 127 6 1 N 37 20 30 
356  GyeongGi YongIn 마북 구성우림 
 
1998.01. 362 4 2 133 
 
131.6 165.4 184.2 357.1 50.8 63.9 67.7 90.2 
 
E 127 6 48 N 37 17 47 
357  GyeongGi YongIn 마평 우성 
 
1995.06. 358 4 2 135 
 
118.5 114.8 129.6 137.0 55.6 70.4 77.8 77.8 
 
E 127 12 54 N 37 14 6 
358  GyeongGi YongIn 풍덕천 삼성 1 차 
 
1995.01. 576 4 2 135 
 
300.0 211.1 292.6 444.4 100.0 85.2 85.2 118.5 
 
E 127 5 19 N 37 19 35 
359  GyeongGi YongIn 죽전 죽전벽산 1 단지 
 
1997.08. 612 4 2 115 
 
271.7 234.8 343.5 521.7 95.7 108.7 143.5 173.9 
 
E 127 6 20 N 37 20 9 
360  GyeongGi YongIn 언남 동부 
 
1998.12. 446 4 2 135 
 
148.1 155.6 170.4 311.1 51.9 63.0 79.6 77.8 
 
E 127 7 23 N 37 17 36 
361  GyeongGi EuiWang 삼 효성청솔 
 
1997.09. 469 4 2 117 
 
141.0 145.3 217.9 299.1 64.1 66.2 106.8 153.8 
 
E 126 57 20 N 37 19 7 
362  GyeongGi EuiWang 오전 진달래 
 
1998.05. 565 4 2 114 
 
140.4 175.4 258.8 399.1 46.1 89.9 120.6 153.5 
 
E 126 57 58 N 37 22 0 
363  GyeongGi EuiWang 오전 이삭민들레 
 
2000.06. 369 4 2 115 
  
171.7 200.0 326.1 
 
89.1 108.7 130.4 
 
E 126 58 46 N 37 20 57 
364  GyeongGi EuiWang 포일 인덕원삼호 
 
1991.04. 684 4 2 127 
  
194.9 303.1 582.7 
 
102.4 129.9 295.3 
 
E 126 58 51 N 37 23 49 
365  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 금오 세아 
 
1993.01. 249 4 2 122 
  
94.3 110.7 131.1 
 
47.1 59.4 77.9 
 
E 127 4 24 N 37 45 29 
366  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 신곡 성원 1 차 
 
1993.07. 525 4 2 115 
 
121.7 100.0 121.7 134.8 54.3 65.2 71.7 73.9 
 
E 127 4 20 N 37 44 12 
367  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 용현 건영 
 
1998.07. 930 4 2 113 
 
108.0 103.1 126.1 146.0 33.2 55.3 66.4 70.8 
 
E 127 4 46 N 37 44 11 
368  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 호원 미도 
 
1995.11. 552 4 2 134 
 
164.2 136.2 153.0 179.1 56.0 61.6 85.8 82.1 
 
E 127 2 32 N 37 43 29 
369  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 장암 우성 
 
1992.12. 510 4 2 127 
 
147.6 108.3 133.9 185.0 61.0 57.1 74.8 81.1 
 
E 127 3 41 N 37 43 28 
370  GyeongGi EuiJeongBoo 호원 신도 6 차 
 
1997.11. 741 4 2 127 
 
165.4 153.5 173.2 171.3 63.0 65.0 98.4 90.6 
 
E 127 2 19 N 37 43 36 
371  GyeongGi ECheon 백사 현대 
 
1998.01. 495 4 2 115 
  
73.9 87.0 160.9 
 
41.3 60.9 73.9 
 
E 127 28 7 N 37 18 15 
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No. Address Apt. Complex 
  
Built 
year 
House-
holds 
Bed-
room 
Bath-
room 
Floor 
area 
  Price (10 US $/m²) Rent (JeonSe*) (10 US $/m²)   Longitude Latitude 
    1998 2001 2004 2007 1998 2001 2004 2007     ° ` ``   ° ` `` 
372  GyeongGi ECheon 부발 청구 
 
1999.12. 304 4 2 127 
  
92.5 128.0 153.5 
 
49.2 72.8 72.8 
 
E 127 29 1 N 37 15 24 
373  GyeongGi ECheon 장호원 현대 
 
1997.01. 362 4 2 132 
 
75.8 75.8 73.9 121.2 45.5 41.7 43.6 56.8 
 
E 127 37 6 N 37 6 52 
374  GyeongGi ECheon 증포 선경 
 
1997.01. 238 4 2 118 
 
112.3 112.3 139.8 178.0 42.4 59.3 84.7 97.5 
 
E 127 27 12 N 37 17 34 
375  GyeongGi PaJoo 검산 성원 
 
2000.04. 656 4 2 136 
  
115.8 126.8 191.2 
 
46.0 57.0 58.8 
 
E 126 44 56 N 37 46 23 
376  GyeongGi PaJoo 금능 흰돌마을장안 6 차 
 
1999.10. 498 4 2 132 
  
138.3 159.1 261.4 
 
58.7 66.3 72.0 
 
E 126 47 1 N 37 45 19 
377  GyeongGi PaJoo 금촌 동문 1 차 
 
1993.01. 244 4 2 119 
 
96.6 96.6 107.1 115.5 39.9 50.4 52.9 51.7 
 
E 126 46 29 N 37 46 13 
378  GyeongGi PaJoo 조리 한라 
 
2000.06. 1202 4 2 117 
  
132.5 153.8 265.0 
 
57.7 66.2 66.2 
 
E 126 48 2 N 37 44 30 
379  GyeongGi PyungTaek 독곡 라이프 
 
1992.10. 483 4 2 131 
 
84.0 80.2 179.4 133.6 43.9 53.4 99.2 74.4 
 
E 127 3 39 N 37 4 59 
380  GyeongGi PyungTaek 동삭 삼익 
 
2000.11. 672 4 2 119 
  
96.6 153.4 159.7 
 
46.2 67.2 86.1 
 
E 127 5 48 N 37 1 19 
381  GyeongGi PyungTaek 비전 한빛경남선경 
 
1997.01. 448 4 2 135 
 
129.6 138.9 225.9 235.2 64.8 68.5 129.6 140.7 
 
E 127 6 56 N 36 59 46 
382  GyeongGi PyungTaek 비전 동아목련 
 
1993.10. 418 4 2 135 
 
124.1 118.5 159.3 159.3 59.3 59.3 81.5 88.9 
 
E 127 6 7 N 36 59 32 
383  GyeongGi PyungTaek 이충 건영 
 
1998.01. 560 4 2 135 
 
103.7 109.3 222.2 185.2 48.1 57.4 114.8 107.4 
 
E 127 4 7 N 37 3 49 
384  GyeongGi PyungTaek 합정 참이슬 
 
1999.08. 862 4 2 125 
  
126.0 204.0 212.0 0.0 70.0 116.0 140.0 
 
E 127 7 7 N 36 59 24 
385  GyeongGi PyungTaek 통복 삼성 
 
1993.05. 624 4 2 102 
 
85.8 88.2 144.6 152.0 52.9 53.9 80.9 84.3 
 
E 127 4 46 N 36 59 30 
386  GyeongGi PoCheon 소흘 원일 1 차 
 
1993.05. 318 4 2 130 
   
88.5 100.0 
  
54.6 48.1 
 
E 127 8 32 N 37 49 35 
387  GyeongGi PoCheon 소흘 일신건영 
 
1993.04. 176 4 2 113 
  
79.6 92.9 97.3 
 
48.7 50.9 50.9 
 
E 127 8 30 N 37 49 32 
388  GyeongGi HaNam 덕풍 쌍용 
 
1997.11. 585 4 2 115 
 
160.9 160.9 256.5 295.7 82.6 82.6 126.1 130.4 
 
E 127 11 58 N 37 31 59 
389  GyeongGi HaNam 덕풍 서해 
 
1996.04. 423 4 2 103 
 
199.0 179.6 252.4 373.8 85.0 94.7 131.1 145.6 
 
E 127 11 50 N 37 32 35 
390  GyeongGi HaNam 신장 동일 
 
1999.09. 438 4 2 134 
  
186.6 257.5 388.1 
 
82.1 123.1 149.3 
 
E 127 13 11 N 37 32 28 
391  GyeongGi HaNam 창우 은행 
 
1994.05. 1360 4 2 135 
 
203.7 177.8 300.0 396.3 72.2 85.2 129.6 140.7 
 
E 127 13 21 N 37 32 19 
                             
* see footnote 94 
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Appendix 6-3   Location of centre of spatial submarkets in Seoul 
 
 
Table 40   Location of centre of spatial submarkets in Seoul  
Spatial submarket Centre Longitude Latitude X* Y* 
GS YeokSam station 127°02′12″ 37°30′03″ 3.24 km E 55.59 km N 
JJ EulJiRo 1Ga station 126°58′57″ 37°33′57″ 1.55 km W 62.81 km N 
YG YeoUiDo station 126°55′27″ 37°31′18″ 6.70 km W 57.91 km N 
* the longitude base of X is 127° and the latitude base of Y is 37° 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6-4   ID codes of local authorities in Seoul Metropolitan Area 
 
Table 41   ID codes of local authorities in Seoul Metropolitan Area 
Local authority id Local authority id Local authority id 
      
JongRo 1 GangNam 23 GoYang 45 
Joong 2 SongPa 24 GwaCheon 46 
YongSan 3 GangDong 25 GooRi 47 
SeongDong 4 Joong(InCheon) 26 NamYangJoo 48 
GwangJin 5 Dong 27 OSan 49 
DongDaeMoon 6 Nam 28 SiHeung 50 
JoongRang 7 YonSoo 29 GoonPo 51 
SeongBook 8 NamDong 30 EuiWang 52 
GangBook 9 BooPyoung 31 HaNam 53 
DoBong 10 GyeYang 32 YongIn 54 
NoWon 11 Seo 33 PaJoo 55 
EunPyoung 12 GangHwa 34 ECheon 56 
SeoDaeMoon 13 OngJin 35 AnSeong 57 
MaPo 14 SooWon 36 GimPo 58 
YangCheon 15 SeongNam 37 HwaSeong 59 
GangSeo 16 EuiJungBoo 38 GwangJoo 60 
GooRo 17 AnYang 39 YangJoo 61 
GeumCheon 18 BooCheon 40 PoCheon 62 
YongDeungPo 19 GwangMyoung 41 YeoJoo 63 
DongJak 20 PyoungTaek 42 YeonCheon 64 
GwanAk 21 DongDooCheon 43 GaPyoung 65 
SeoCho 22 AnSan 44 YangPyoung 66 
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Appendix 6-5   Commuting data in Seoul 
 
 
Table 42   Commuting flow matrix in Seoul 
 
GangNam GangDong GangBook GangSeo GwanAk GwangJin GooRo GeumCheon NoWon DoBong DongDaeMoon DongJak MaPo SeoDaeMoon SeoCho SeongDong SeongBook SongPa YoungDeungPo YongSan EunPyoung JongRo Joong JoongRang Total 
                          
GangNam 148028 19904 9664 11570 30124 21745 11008 5616 19765 10253 11593 20105 10672 8981 29102 17375 12446 40914 11767 8066 11536 4013 5455 15516 495218 
GangDong 1884 101517 800 661 970 3615 413 180 2126 807 1690 657 473 582 1125 1884 1139 10426 562 417 734 259 376 2458 135755 
GangBook 424 369 59458 431 351 400 265 53 5922 11265 1329 463 292 503 258 496 6687 512 257 387 575 537 271 1061 92566 
GangSeo 994 577 630 113704 2489 515 3930 1124 1011 495 540 2052 2862 1917 1035 637 940 859 4413 759 1784 275 442 596 144580 
GwanAk 3894 1143 713 2713 108014 1208 3964 5794 1117 781 739 9380 1673 1222 4702 953 1083 1896 3995 1063 1054 431 530 933 158995 
GwangJin 4265 7024 1484 1329 2214 78726 1022 388 5782 2622 4827 1817 1641 1148 2226 6542 2238 7019 1072 883 1234 686 561 8937 145687 
GooRo 1847 1139 1086 6705 8135 1305 79521 6976 1870 1324 1208 4447 2935 1985 1825 1263 1368 1511 7882 1215 2207 512 567 1358 140191 
GeumCheon 929 393 283 2071 6281 460 7126 60332 639 368 359 2801 1109 748 1096 479 567 676 3657 450 833 230 154 407 92448 
NoWon 1690 1848 8007 1009 749 2432 815 203 130315 15844 4388 1064 1181 914 1155 1354 8619 1882 728 580 1279 609 421 10338 197424 
DoBong 454 394 6823 317 248 473 247 128 8385 65896 1172 387 302 327 289 657 2866 613 315 161 650 286 157 1691 93238 
DongDaeMoon 4663 4452 6381 2558 2733 6914 2020 954 11661 6852 96509 2878 2705 2647 2992 6659 10268 4726 2433 1713 3245 1920 1063 15815 204761 
DongJak 3254 1454 1050 4199 13514 1459 4398 3473 2468 1328 1495 73954 1983 1401 4393 1014 1970 2563 7740 2004 1744 775 608 1536 139777 
MaPo 3647 2139 2254 8646 4902 2197 4449 1869 3334 2366 2405 4145 75354 10961 2803 2148 3335 2851 6587 4043 10037 1565 1753 1972 165762 
SeoDaeMoon 6033 2829 2436 5686 3453 2214 3102 1072 3538 2703 2335 3094 12513 71250 4503 2403 3495 3990 4120 2337 13772 2589 1396 1984 162847 
SeoCho 21096 5982 3712 5477 19473 6000 6254 3093 7407 3337 3923 17424 4971 4517 80247 5659 5472 11064 6378 4072 5435 1902 1963 5209 240067 
SeongDong 4757 4749 2764 2022 2411 10710 1183 586 5246 2971 6317 2103 2224 1897 2582 71025 3926 5423 1430 1481 2174 1028 1718 5926 146653 
SeongBook 4512 3020 14007 2635 2330 2647 1896 596 12173 8597 7122 2414 2874 2825 3142 2452 91028 3575 1880 1487 3614 2594 1084 4445 182949 
SongPa 7674 25443 1726 2175 4486 8746 1305 716 4301 2140 2865 2957 1710 1400 3429 3953 2498 147179 1885 1201 1916 569 767 4337 235378 
YoungDeungPo 6051 2843 2520 20629 13226 3208 16159 6634 4710 3217 3079 12188 11460 5664 5993 3635 4554 3984 83745 3996 5715 1701 1427 2455 228793 
YongSan 4704 2630 3028 3713 5654 2110 4146 2156 5037 2882 2832 7138 6373 3487 3986 4190 4294 3599 5929 44484 4618 1510 2155 2369 133024 
EunPyoung 542 308 730 1469 648 372 791 277 798 545 653 588 3043 8492 510 314 966 514 996 472 90878 809 264 555 115534 
JongRo 7836 6194 11248 7287 6038 6423 4996 2204 14124 10196 9951 6505 9051 14456 7062 6861 18677 6443 5767 4903 15433 40673 3291 7235 232854 
Joong 11393 7415 12213 14107 9678 10222 7198 2981 16899 11714 11558 10093 16140 12937 9585 17109 17629 9912 10320 11324 14510 7461 63803 9832 326033 
JoongRang 686 1187 1542 239 429 2666 255 212 7597 2004 4866 489 478 464 349 1219 2085 1031 321 310 607 466 255 87352 117109 
                          
Total 251257 204953 154559 221352 248550 176767 166463 107617 276225 170507 183755 189143 174019 160725 174389 160281 208150 273162 174179 97808 195584 73400 90481 194317 4327643 
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Appendix 6-6   Pajek data of commuting in Seoul (over 10000 trip) 
 
 
 
 
*Vertices 51 
1 3 0.1981455 0.4476797 0.5 
2 2 0.1995408 0.4508622 0.5 
3 4 0.2035431 0.4498832 0.5 
4 23 0.2054818 0.443829 0.5 
5 5 0.2076375 0.4492964 0.5 
6 6 0.204785 0.4532635 0.5 
7 7 0.2081423 0.4550527 0.5 
8 11 0.2065427 0.4611381 0.5 
9 8 0.2014582 0.455927 0.5 
10 1 0.1979478 0.4546354 0.5 
11 9 0.2008976 0.4601032 0.5 
12 10 0.2027745 0.4629748 0.5 
13 12 0.1936391 0.457529 0.5 
14 13 0.1945412 0.4528346 0.5 
15 14 0.1919418 0.4507793 0.5 
16 45 0.1819961 0.4628996 0.5 
17 19 0.1919386 0.4467032 0.5 
18 15 0.187174 0.4469617 0.5 
19 16 0.1843704 0.4510196 0.5 
20 17 0.1871805 0.4435629 0.5 
21 20 0.1956391 0.4441049 0.5 
22 22 0.2026384 0.4412746 0.5 
23 21 0.1951202 0.440559 0.5 
24 24 0.2101797 0.4447211 0.5 
25 25 0.2130003 0.4497728 0.5 
26 37 0.2144427 0.4367846 0.5 
27 28 0.1702991 0.4390329 0.5 
28 26 0.1665244 0.4428175 0.5 
29 30 0.175776 0.4365457 0.5 
30 29 0.1706645 0.435212 0.5 
31 31 0.1752823 0.4438743 0.5 
32 32 0.1764745 0.4505968 0.5 
33 33 0.1692387 0.4509597 0.5 
34 40 0.1803861 0.4442176 0.5 
35 36 0.2044498 0.4191771 0.5 
36 39 0.1959839 0.4331572 0.5 
37 54 0.2196487 0.4132859 0.5 
38 59 0.1888248 0.4072004 0.5 
39 60 0.2265954 0.4334654 0.5 
40 38 0.2059084 0.4704261 0.5 
41 61 0.2000217 0.4784479 0.5 
42 51 0.1929458 0.4268247 0.5 
43 50 0.181356 0.4319172 0.5 
44 41 0.1879821 0.43812 0.5 
45 18 0.1911224 0.4398419 0.5 
46 44 0.1786027 0.4213096 0.5 
47 55 0.1835207 0.4838568 0.5 
48 48 0.2214013 0.4623046 0.5 
49 47 0.2115244 0.4551754 0.5 
50 49 0.2043845 0.4070119 0.5 
51 52 0.1990226 0.4289177 0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Arcs 
1 2 110.64 
3 2 169.88 
3 4 173.75 
5 2 101.37 
5 3 107.1 
5 4 217.45 
6 2 114.44 
6 4 115.93 
7 6 158.15 
7 8 103.38 
7 4 155.16 
9 10 
186.77 
9 2 174.41 
9 6 102.68 
9 4 124.46 
11 10 
112.48 
11 2 
120.08 
11 9 
140.07 
12 10 
101.96 
12 2 
115.52 
12 11 
112.65 
12 8 
158.44 
12 4 
102.53 
8 10 
141.24 
8 2 167.18 
8 6 116.61 
8 9 121.73 
8 4 197.65 
13 10 
154.33 
13 2 
141.39 
13 14 
137.72 
13 15 
100.37 
13 4 
115.36 
13 16 
122.52 
14 10 
144.56 
14 2 
126.74 
14 15 
109.61 
15 2 155.07 
15 14 
125.13 
15 17 114.6 
15 4 106.72 
18 19 
190.75 
18 17 
200.79 
18 4 105.1 
19 18 
212.24 
19 17 
206.29 
19 4 115.7 
20 17 
161.59 
20 4 110.08 
17 4 117.67 
21 17 
121.88 
21 22 
174.24 
21 4 201.05 
23 17 
132.26 
23 21 
135.14 
23 22 
194.73 
23 4 301.24 
22 4 291.02 
4 2 111.14 
4 22 210.96 
24 22 
110.64 
24 4 409.14 
24 25 
104.26 
24 26 
126.68 
25 4 199.04 
25 24 
254.43 
27 28 
168.67 
27 29 
268.44 
30 27 
146.37 
30 29 
263.67 
29 27 
184.85 
31 27 136.07 
31 29 189.65 
31 32 126.26 
31 33 159.58 
31 34 175.83 
32 31 164.79 
32 33 106.12 
33 31 112.94 
35 36 101.74 
35 37 357.89 
35 38 520.15 
26 22 208.74 
26 4 434.46 
26 24 197.73 
26 37 171.45 
26 39 143.73 
40 41 117.14 
36 22 114.1 
36 4 134.67 
36 42 152.24 
34 20 124.71 
34 17 128.64 
34 43 108.98 
44 20 114.24 
44 45 104.44 
46 43 323.15 
16 10 151.14 
16 2 180.51 
16 13 113.68 
16 14 118.03 
16 15 119.06 
16 17 129.27 
16 4 129.46 
16 47 164.85 
48 49 152.74 
50 38 120.29 
43 46 234.95 
42 36 193.66 
51 36 145.12 
37 22 120.04 
37 4 220.76 
37 35 199.27 
37 26 306.38 
47 16 154.5 
38 35 211.56 
          39 26 145.4 
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Appendix 6-7   Regression result in Seoul 
Table 43   OLS Regression of 2 bedroom apt price on distance to centre in Seoul (GS) 
  Price 1998 Price 2001 Price 2004 Price 2007 
Number of obs 116 154 154 154 
F 257.91 368.9 265.37 206.84 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.694 0.708 0.636 0.576 
Adj R-squared 0.691 0.706 0.633 0.574 
Root MSE 34.6 39.9 92.5 140.3 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -6.0 287.6 -7.1 296.9 -13.9 526.7 -18.6 694.8 
Std. Err. 0.4 6.3 0.4 6.2 0.9 14.5 1.3 22.0 
t -16.1 45.4 -19.2 47.5 -16.3 36.4 -14.4 31.6 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -6.8 275.0 -7.8 284.5 -15.6 498.1 -21.2 651.4 
Interval] -5.3 300.1 -6.3 309.2 -12.2 555.3 -16.1 738.2 
 
Table 44   OLS Regression of 2 bedroom apt price on distance to centre in Seoul (JJ) 
  Price 1998 Price 2001 Price 2004 Price 2007 
Number of obs 90 121 122 121 
F 84.47 176.24 162.25 96.36 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.490 0.597 0.575 0.447 
Adj R-squared 0.484 0.594 0.571 0.443 
Root MSE 32.7 34.9 60.9 100.5 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -5.6 249.7 -5.4 241.6 -9.0 365.0 -11.4 443.4 
Std. Err. 0.6 7.0 0.4 5.7 0.7 9.8 1.2 16.3 
t -9.2 35.7 -13.3 42.4 -12.7 37.1 -9.8 27.3 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -6.8 235.8 -6.2 230.4 -10.4 345.6 -13.7 411.2 
Interval] -4.4 263.6 -4.6 252.9 -7.6 384.5 -9.1 475.7 
 
Table 45   OLS Regression of 2 bedroom apt price on distance to centre in Seoul (YG) 
  Price 1998 Price 2001 Price 2004 Price 2007 
Number of obs 103 130 130 130 
F 156.56 236.49 198.67 102.48 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.608 0.649 0.608 0.445 
Adj R-squared 0.604 0.646 0.605 0.440 
Root MSE 28.9 28.4 50.9 95.2 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -4.9 231.6 -5.2 229.7 -8.5 355.2 -11.4 454.2 
Std. Err. 0.4 5.7 0.3 5.0 0.6 9.0 1.1 16.8 
t -12.5 41.0 -15.4 45.9 -14.1 39.6 -10.1 27.1 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -5.7 220.4 -5.8 219.8 -9.7 337.4 -13.7 421.0 
Interval] -4.1 242.8 -4.5 239.6 -7.3 373.0 -9.2 487.5 
 
  
286 
 
Table 46   OLS Regression of 3 bedroom apt price on distance to centre in Seoul (GS) 
  Price 1998 Price 2001 Price 2004 Price 2007 
Number of obs 127 154 154 154 
F 212.07 310.01 211.23 180.77 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.629 0.671 0.582 0.543 
Adj R-squared 0.626 0.669 0.579 0.540 
Root MSE 40.9 43.8 107.4 174.7 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -6.3 311.8 -7.1 302.8 -14.4 542.6 -21.6 814.5 
Std. Err. 0.4 6.7 0.4 6.8 1.0 16.7 1.6 27.1 
t -14.6 46.5 -17.6 44.5 -14.5 32.5 -13.4 30.0 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -7.2 298.6 -7.9 289.4 -16.3 509.7 -24.8 760.9 
Interval] -5.5 325.1 -6.3 316.3 -12.4 575.6 -18.4 868.1 
 
Table 47   OLS Regression of 3 bedroom apt price on distance to centre in Seoul (JJ) 
  Price 1998 Price 2001 Price 2004 Price 2007 
Number of obs 90 120 122 122 
F 55.59 152.1 148.36 84.4 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.387 0.563 0.553 0.413 
Adj R-squared 0.380 0.559 0.549 0.408 
Root MSE 35.6 39.0 67.5 124.5 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -5.6 264.1 -5.7 246.1 -9.4 369.7 -13.0 498.3 
Std. Err. 0.8 8.0 0.5 6.4 0.8 10.8 1.4 19.9 
t -7.5 33.0 -12.3 38.7 -12.2 34.3 -9.2 25.1 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -7.1 248.2 -6.6 233.5 -10.9 348.3 -15.8 458.9 
Interval] -4.1 280.0 -4.8 258.7 -7.8 391.0 -10.2 537.7 
 
Table 48   OLS Regression of 3 bedroom apt price on distance to centre in Seoul (YG) 
  Price 1998 Price 2001 Price 2004 Price 2007 
Number of obs 105 129 129 129 
F 142.14 201 135.12 65.51 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.580 0.613 0.516 0.340 
Adj R-squared 0.576 0.610 0.512 0.335 
Root MSE 33.1 29.9 58.2 129.4 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -5.3 252.6 -5.0 227.6 -8.1 352.1 -12.5 514.1 
Std. Err. 0.4 6.4 0.4 5.3 0.7 10.3 1.5 23.0 
t -11.9 39.4 -14.2 42.8 -11.6 34.0 -8.1 22.4 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -6.2 239.9 -5.8 217.0 -9.4 331.6 -15.5 468.6 
Interval] -4.4 265.3 -4.3 238.1 -6.7 372.5 -9.4 559.6 
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Table 49   OLS Regression of 4 bedroom apt price on distance to centre in Seoul (GS) 
  Price 1998 Price 2001 Price 2004 Price 2007 
Number of obs 110 152 152 152 
F 205.63 327.28 226.66 133.66 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.656 0.686 0.602 0.471 
Adj R-squared 0.653 0.684 0.599 0.468 
Root MSE 52.8 54.1 101.2 184.4 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -8.5 353.8 -9.4 357.5 -14.7 542.9 -20.5 803.8 
Std. Err. 0.6 9.8 0.5 8.7 1.0 16.3 1.8 29.8 
t -14.3 36.0 -18.1 41.0 -15.1 33.2 -11.6 27.0 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -9.6 334.3 -10.5 340.3 -16.6 510.6 -24.1 745.0 
Interval] -7.3 373.3 -8.4 374.8 -12.7 575.1 -17.0 862.7 
 
Table 50   OLS Regression of 4 bedroom apt price on distance to centre in Seoul (JJ) 
  Price 1998 Price 2001 Price 2004 Price 2007 
Number of obs 81 119 121 121 
F 57.85 134.72 118.22 54.29 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.423 0.535 0.498 0.313 
Adj R-squared 0.415 0.531 0.494 0.308 
Root MSE 48.1 46.3 72.4 136.8 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -6.4 285.5 -6.5 276.0 -9.2 379.7 -11.8 508.6 
Std. Err. 0.8 10.1 0.6 7.7 0.8 11.8 1.6 22.3 
t -7.6 28.2 -11.6 35.8 -10.9 32.2 -7.4 22.8 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -8.0 265.4 -7.6 260.7 -10.9 356.3 -14.9 464.5 
Interval] -4.7 305.7 -5.4 291.2 -7.5 403.0 -8.6 552.7 
 
Table 51   OLS Regression of 4 bedroom apt price on distance to centre in Seoul (YG) 
  Price 1998 Price 2001 Price 2004 Price 2007 
Number of obs 97 127 128 128 
F 149.81 264.06 152.09 74.31 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.612 0.679 0.547 0.371 
Adj R-squared 0.608 0.676 0.543 0.366 
Root MSE 36.8 31.5 51.7 112.5 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -6.1 259.6 -6.3 252.3 -7.8 351.4 -11.9 518.8 
Std. Err. 0.5 7.5 0.4 5.6 0.6 9.2 1.4 20.0 
t -12.2 34.6 -16.3 45.0 -12.3 38.3 -8.6 26.0 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -7.1 244.8 -7.0 241.2 -9.0 333.2 -14.6 479.2 
Interval] -5.1 274.5 -5.5 263.4 -6.5 369.5 -9.1 558.3 
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Table 52   OLS Regression of 2 bedroom apt rent on distance to centre in Seoul (GS) 
  Rent 1998 Rent 2001 Rent 2004 Rent 2007 
Number of obs 116 154 154 154 
F 281.81 395.83 398.42 291.3 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.712 0.723 0.724 0.657 
Adj R-squared 0.710 0.721 0.722 0.655 
Root MSE 18.6 23.8 33.8 44.6 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -3.4 157.3 -4.4 194.5 -6.2 268.1 -7.0 302.2 
Std. Err. 0.2 3.4 0.2 3.7 0.3 5.3 0.4 7.0 
t -16.8 46.2 -19.9 52.2 -20.0 50.6 -17.1 43.3 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -3.8 150.5 -4.8 187.1 -6.8 257.6 -7.8 288.4 
Interval] -3.0 164.0 -3.9 201.8 -5.6 278.6 -6.2 316.0 
 
Table 53   OLS Regression of 2 bedroom apt rent on distance to centre in Seoul (JJ) 
  Rent 1998 Rent 2001 Rent 2004 Rent 2007 
Number of obs 90 121 122 121 
F 197.8 342.19 287.65 213.85 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.692 0.742 0.706 0.643 
Adj R-squared 0.689 0.740 0.703 0.640 
Root MSE 15.7 18.7 27.9 35.5 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -4.1 150.8 -4.0 167.2 -5.5 221.8 -6.0 240.2 
Std. Err. 0.3 3.4 0.2 3.1 0.3 4.5 0.4 5.7 
t -14.1 44.9 -18.5 54.7 -17.0 49.2 -14.6 41.8 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -4.7 144.1 -4.5 161.1 -6.1 212.9 -6.8 228.8 
Interval] -3.5 157.4 -3.6 173.3 -4.8 230.7 -5.2 251.5 
 
Table 54   OLS Regression of 2 bedroom apt rent on distance to centre in Seoul (YG) 
  Rent 1998 Rent 2001 Rent 2004 Rent 2007 
Number of obs 103 130 130 130 
F 130.96 209.79 229.72 136.74 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.565 0.621 0.642 0.517 
Adj R-squared 0.560 0.618 0.639 0.513 
Root MSE 17.4 19.5 25.8 34.5 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -2.7 127.2 -3.4 155.3 -4.6 207.1 -4.8 225.5 
Std. Err. 0.2 3.4 0.2 3.4 0.3 4.5 0.4 6.1 
t -11.4 37.3 -14.5 45.1 -15.2 45.6 -11.7 37.1 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -3.2 120.5 -3.8 148.5 -5.2 198.1 -5.6 213.5 
Interval] -2.2 134.0 -2.9 162.1 -4.0 216.1 -4.0 237.5 
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Table 55   OLS Regression of 3 bedroom apt rent on distance to centre in Seoul (GS) 
  Rent 1998 Rent 2001 Rent 2004 Rent 2007 
Number of obs 128 154 154 154 
F 252.78 286.94 305.66 206.17 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.667 0.654 0.668 0.576 
Adj R-squared 0.665 0.651 0.666 0.573 
Root MSE 18.7 24.9 34.0 47.3 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -3.1 150.3 -3.9 175.4 -5.5 235.9 -6.2 281.7 
Std. Err. 0.2 3.1 0.2 3.9 0.3 5.3 0.4 7.4 
t -15.9 49.1 -16.9 45.3 -17.5 44.6 -14.4 38.3 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -3.5 144.3 -4.3 167.7 -6.1 225.5 -7.1 267.2 
Interval] -2.8 156.4 -3.4 183.0 -4.9 246.4 -5.4 296.2 
 
Table 56   OLS Regression of 3 bedroom apt rent on distance to centre in Seoul (JJ) 
  Rent 1998 Rent 2001 Rent 2004 Rent 2007 
Number of obs 90 120 122 122 
F 143.87 308.24 261.96 200.51 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.621 0.723 0.686 0.626 
Adj R-squared 0.616 0.721 0.683 0.623 
Root MSE 15.6 17.6 26.5 35.0 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -4.0 142.1 -3.6 148.8 -4.9 194.4 -5.6 223.8 
Std. Err. 0.3 3.5 0.2 2.9 0.3 4.2 0.4 5.6 
t -12.0 40.5 -17.6 52.0 -16.2 46.0 -14.2 40.1 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -4.6 135.1 -4.0 143.1 -5.5 186.0 -6.4 212.8 
Interval] -3.3 149.1 -3.2 154.5 -4.3 202.8 -4.8 234.9 
 
Table 57   OLS Regression of 3 bedroom apt rent on distance to centre in Seoul (YG) 
  Rent 1998 Rent 2001 Rent 2004 Rent 2007 
Number of obs 105 129 129 129 
F 145.37 164.4 162.83 100.05 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.585 0.564 0.562 0.441 
Adj R-squared 0.581 0.561 0.558 0.436 
Root MSE 16.1 18.1 23.7 35.0 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -2.6 122.8 -2.8 136.1 -3.6 175.9 -4.2 210.5 
Std. Err. 0.2 3.1 0.2 3.2 0.3 4.2 0.4 6.2 
t -12.1 39.3 -12.8 42.3 -12.8 41.8 -10.0 33.8 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -3.0 116.6 -3.2 129.8 -4.2 167.6 -5.0 198.2 
Interval] -2.2 129.0 -2.3 142.5 -3.0 184.3 -3.3 222.8 
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Table 58   OLS Regression of 4 bedroom apt rent on distance to centre in Seoul (GS) 
  Rent 1998 Rent 2001 Rent 2004 Rent 2007 
Number of obs 110 152 152 152 
F 223.69 317.75 299.74 238.31 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.674 0.679 0.667 0.614 
Adj R-squared 0.671 0.677 0.664 0.611 
Root MSE 22.7 28.6 40.2 47.8 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -3.8 150.4 -4.9 184.3 -6.7 249.9 -7.1 283.7 
Std. Err. 0.3 4.2 0.3 4.6 0.4 6.5 0.5 7.7 
t -15.0 35.6 -17.8 39.9 -17.3 38.5 -15.4 36.7 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -4.3 142.0 -5.5 175.1 -7.5 237.1 -8.0 268.4 
Interval] -3.3 158.7 -4.4 193.4 -5.9 262.7 -6.2 299.0 
 
Table 59   OLS Regression of 4 bedroom apt rent on distance to centre in Seoul (JJ) 
  Rent 1998 Rent 2001 Rent 2004 Rent 2007 
Number of obs 81 119 121 121 
F 93.01 193.11 215.65 156.88 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.541 0.623 0.644 0.569 
Adj R-squared 0.535 0.620 0.641 0.565 
Root MSE 21.1 22.9 30.9 39.5 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -3.5 126.2 -3.8 146.0 -5.3 197.5 -5.8 219.4 
Std. Err. 0.4 4.5 0.3 3.8 0.4 5.0 0.5 6.4 
t -9.6 28.4 -13.9 38.4 -14.7 39.2 -12.5 34.1 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -4.3 117.4 -4.4 138.5 -6.0 187.5 -6.7 206.7 
Interval] -2.8 135.1 -3.3 153.5 -4.6 207.5 -4.9 232.2 
 
Table 60   OLS Regression of 4 bedroom apt rent on distance to centre in Seoul (YG) 
  Rent 1998 Rent 2001 Rent 2004 Rent 2007 
Number of obs 97 127 128 128 
F 100.96 247.6 193.52 85.09 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.515 0.665 0.606 0.403 
Adj R-squared 0.510 0.662 0.603 0.398 
Root MSE 18.3 16.4 22.7 34.5 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -2.5 107.7 -3.2 132.1 -3.9 173.5 -3.9 192.7 
Std. Err. 0.2 3.7 0.2 2.9 0.3 4.0 0.4 6.1 
t -10.1 28.9 -15.7 45.1 -13.9 43.1 -9.2 31.5 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -3.0 100.3 -3.6 126.3 -4.4 165.6 -4.7 180.6 
Interval] -2.0 115.1 -2.8 137.9 -3.3 181.5 -3.1 204.8 
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Appendix 6-8   Employment growth by local authorty in Seoul 
Table 61   Employment growth by local authority in Seoul 
      
Rate of growth 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  1999-2001 2001-2003 1999-2003 
         
Seoul 3367652 3574824 3763794 3805462 3791943 11.8 0.7 12.6 
         
JongRo 215706 220414 227902 234011 224177 5.7 -1.6 3.9 
Joong 328359 344329 359843 380263 374048 9.6 3.9 13.9 
YongSan 117148 115570 123951 115765 117452 5.8 -5.2 0.3 
SeongDong 111150 115256 110897 107184 117487 -0.2 5.9 5.7 
GwangJin 80415 96663 101076 103022 102234 25.7 1.1 27.1 
DongDaeMoon 124869 121753 120228 116210 119877 -3.7 -0.3 -4.0 
JoongRang 79450 83149 83861 84880 83053 5.6 -1.0 4.5 
SeongBook 79544 83751 85483 87336 89302 7.5 4.5 12.3 
GangBook 53555 53641 56422 59261 61255 5.4 8.6 14.4 
DoBong 55246 57324 57587 57888 58964 4.2 2.4 6.7 
NoWon 80168 87136 90489 94640 95955 12.9 6.0 19.7 
EunPyung 65768 70505 70697 72347 71563 7.5 1.2 8.8 
SeoDaeMoon 81663 79729 86841 92073 89920 6.3 3.5 10.1 
MaPo 129153 127826 136667 149094 147751 5.8 8.1 14.4 
YangCheon 77753 92558 96080 101358 101910 23.6 6.1 31.1 
GangSeo 128972 118258 132416 133630 131746 2.7 -0.5 2.2 
GooRo 99326 113619 120216 117603 130381 21.0 8.5 31.3 
GeumCheon 102757 103425 104232 108273 108799 1.4 4.4 5.9 
YoungDeungPo 248161 249862 284448 284461 264595 14.6 -7.0 6.6 
DongJak 79812 87647 86905 85857 93670 8.9 7.8 17.4 
GwanAk 92147 99762 101933 104744 102207 10.6 0.3 10.9 
SeoCho 241381 275292 305580 289442 302572 26.6 -1.0 25.4 
GangNam 443589 496192 523107 517603 497874 17.9 -4.8 12.2 
SongPA 158797 183926 194357 206722 204811 22.4 5.4 29.0 
GangDong 92763 97237 102576 101795 100340 10.6 -2.2 8.2 
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Appendix 7-1   House and condominium data in Los Angeles 
 
Table 62   Distribution of units of house in Los Angels 
Units Frequency Percent 
0 1,886 0.18 
1 1,041,366 99.76 
2 497 0.05 
3 64 0.01 
Total 1,043,887 100 
 
 
Table 63   Distribution of bedrooms/bathrooms of house in Los Angeles (frequency) 
 
 
Number of bathrooms 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
 
         
Number 
of 
bedrooms 
0 1,076 246 17 4 1 1 0 1,345 
1 21 15,975 1,300 110 14 1 0 17,421 
2 13 198,009 59,035 4,770 325 22 2 262,176 
3 10 138,758 309,564 51,381 4,187 429 57 504,386 
4 3 8,278 111,876 74,237 12,696 2,819 362 210,271 
5 3 981 8,737 17,743 7,455 3,862 1,091 39,872 
6 0 147 821 2,234 1,661 871 389 6,123 
7 0 18 137 283 315 178 106 1,037 
8 0 4 16 54 72 51 20 217 
9 0 0 8 14 13 17 16 68 
10 0 0 1 4 4 5 4 18 
         
 Total 1,126 362,416 491,512 150,834 26,743 8,256 2,047 1042934 
 
         
 
       
Total 1043887* 
* the total number of houses is the single family detached house which has less than 11 bedrooms and less than 7 bathrooms 
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Table 64   Distribution of bedrooms/bathrooms of house in Los Angeles (percentage) 
 
 
Number of bathrooms 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
 
         
Number 
of 
bedrooms 
0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 
1 0.0 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 
2 0.0 19.0 5.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 25 
3 0.0 13.3 29.7 4.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 48 
4 0.0 0.8 10.7 7.1 1.2 0.3 0.0 20 
5 0.0 0.1 0.8 1.7 0.7 0.4 0.1 4 
6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 1 
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 
 
         
 Total 0 35 47 14 3 1 0 100 
 
 
Table 65   Distribution of units of condominium in Los Angeles 
Units Frequency Percent 
0 1,045 0.53 
1 197,090 99.43 
2 42 0.02 
Total 198,214 100 
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Table 66   Distribution of bedrooms/bathrooms of condominium in Los Angeles (frequency) 
 
 
Number of bathrooms 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
 
         
Number 
of 
bedrooms 
0 236 1,035 244 12 1 0 0 1,528 
1 1 14,209 4,353 348 7 0 0 18,918 
2 3 6,275 61,300 36,025 376 13 0 103,992 
3 3 202 16,078 46,165 2,129 111 39 64,727 
4 2 1 892 6,130 1,375 149 16 8,565 
5 0 0 96 124 126 50 28 424 
6 0 0 1 0 4 0 1 6 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 
         
 Total 245 21,722 82,964 88,804 4,018 323 85 198,161* 
* the total number of condominium is the single family condominium which has less than 9 bedrooms and less than 7 bathrooms 
 
Table 67   Distribution of bedrooms/bathrooms of condominium in Los Angeles (percentage) 
 
 
Number of bathrooms 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
 
         
Number 
of 
bedrooms 
0 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
1 0.0 7.2 2.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 
2 0.0 3.2 30.9 18.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 52.5 
3 0.0 0.1 8.1 23.3 1.1 0.1 0.0 32.7 
4 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.1 0.7 0.1 0.0 4.3 
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
         
 Total 0.1 11.0 41.9 44.8 2.0 0.2 0.0 100.0 
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Appendix 7-2   House and condominium data in Los Angeles (summary) 
 
 
Table 68   Housing data of Los Angeles (detached houses, summary) 
Variable Unit Number of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Percentiles (%) 
10 25 50 75 90 
            
Floor area m² 85111 134.3 10.3 117.4 153.8 120.4 125.4 133.8 143.0 149.0 
Distance1* km 424 4.9 1.9 0.4 9.4 2.2 3.4 5.1 6.4 7.4 
Distance2** km 339 7.5 2.2 1.3 12.6 4.5 6.0 7.3 9.2 10.8 
Distance3*** km 867 7.4 2.5 0.9 13.6 3.4 6.0 7.3 9.2 10.3 
Price 1998 
10 $/m² 
2479 135.8 50.1 28.0 466.0 89.0 108.0 127.0 150.0 196.0 
Price 2001 2985 173.0 63.9 1.0 627.0 110.0 137.0 163.0 194.0 249.0 
Price 2004 4203 268.7 96.3 49.0 1,050.0 151.0 208.0 260.0 313.0 383.0 
Price 2007 3763 410.4 122.7 26.0 1,774.0 248.0 356.0 406.0 457.0 536.0 
* distance to the centre of CU submarket 
** distance to the centre of LD submarket 
*** distance to the centre of EL submarket 
 
Table 69   Housing data of Los Angeles (condominiums, summary) 
Variable Unit Number of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Percentiles (%) 
10 25 50 75 90 
            
Floor area m² 14300 104.0 8.2 91.4 120.9 93.8 96.9 102.9 110.4 116.3 
Distance1* km 180 5.3 3.1 1.0 9.1 1.6 1.6 5.1 9.0 9.1 
Distance2** km 120 4.1 2.3 0.4 8.5 1.2 1.5 5.3 5.7 7.1 
Distance3*** km 227 6.7 1.7 2.5 11.1 3.6 5.3 7.5 7.6 8.1 
Price 1998 
10 $/m² 
457 110.4 40.8 19.0 396.0 67.0 84.0 103.0 126.0 161.0 
Price 2001 756 145.9 58.0 30.0 536.0 88.0 118.0 140.0 168.0 214.0 
Price 2004 1158 263.4 86.3 61.0 841.0 170.0 204.0 252.0 312.0 376.0 
Price 2007 1028 387.8 90.5 158.0 968.0 311.0 336.0 368.0 417.0 495.0 
* distance to the centre of CU submarket 
** distance to the centre of LD submarket 
*** distance to the centre of EL submarket 
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Appendix 7-3   Centres of commuting inflow in Los Angeles 
 
Table 70   Top 50 major centres of commuting inflow in Los Angeles 
Rank Centres of commuting inflow Tract ID Commuting inflow (trip) 
    
1 LAX 278000 49288 
2 LA downtown 207710 47310 
3 El Segundo 620003 42885 
4 Vernon 532400 35466 
5 Century city 267100 34863 
6 LA downtown 207400 34286 
7 LA downtown 207300 31548 
8 UCLA 265301 30398 
9 LA downtown 226000 29459 
10 Long Beach airport 573500 27070 
11 Beverly Hills 700800 25113 
12 Rancho Dominguez 543305 24987 
13 LA downtown 207500 24182 
14 Commerce 532303 23830 
15 Industry 408202 22857 
16 Torrance (Zamperini field) 651101 22024 
17 Vernon 206050 21612 
18 Santa Monica 701900 21273 
19 Universal city 311600 20424 
20 Commerce 532304 20247 
21 Torrance (Pueblo) 650901 19390 
22 Long Beach 576000 17768 
23 Warner center 137102 17585 
24 LA downtown 207900 16649 
25 Chatsworth 113303 16443 
26 Pasadena 461900 16429 
27 Pasadena 463600 16339 
28 Palmdale 910100 15565 
29 Industry 408211 14941 
30 Santa Clarita 920107 14616 
31 Santa fe springs 502700 14563 
32 Warner center 134902 14128 
33 Park La Brea 216300 13933 
34 UCLA 265510 13839 
35 Harbor Gateway 292000 13482 
36 Van Nuys airport 127510 13360 
37 Irwindale 404600 12654 
38 East LA 203300 12571 
39 La Mirada 504102 12464 
40 Warner center 135112 12368 
41 Santa fe springs 502800 12253 
42 Torrance 650400 11977 
43 Glendale 301800 11628 
44 El Segundo 620501 11524 
45 Santa Monica 701801 11468 
46 Hidden Hills 800201 11235 
47 Gardena 602900 11210 
48 LA downtown 207100 11143 
49 Bob hope airport 310500 11121 
50 Beverly Hills 700400 11054 
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Appendix 7-4   Pajek data of commuting in Los Angeles (over 180 trip) 
*Vertices 212 
1 115201 0.0358537 0.3790275 0.5 
2 115202 0.0358507 0.3789234 0.5 
3 117406 0.0364574 0.3788241 0.5 
4 113303 0.0354623 0.3790303 0.5 
5 125500 0.0374112 0.378065 0.5 
6 311600 0.0376594 0.3779911 0.5 
7 139702 0.0361257 0.3778813 0.5 
8 139701 0.0362118 0.3780605 0.5 
9 191110 0.037961 0.3773631 0.5 
10 190200 0.0377087 0.3774414 0.5 
11 194100 0.0374503 0.3775683 0.5 
12 267100 0.0368788 0.3769126 0.5 
13 207500 0.0384394 0.3768832 0.5 
14 207710 0.0383539 0.3768077 0.5 
15 208800 0.0382101 0.3769677 0.5 
16 226000 0.0384747 0.3766221 0.5 
17 208904 0.0382788 0.3769512 0.5 
18 207300 0.0384611 0.3768068 0.5 
19 209101 0.0383262 0.3769316 0.5 
20 209102 0.038302 0.3769017 0.5 
21 209403 0.0382439 0.3768791 0.5 
22 215100 0.0375371 0.3770091 0.5 
23 216300 0.0374286 0.3769636 0.5 
24 216400 0.0372637 0.3769476 0.5 
25 700800 0.0371528 0.3770868 0.5 
26 221820 0.0381231 0.3766284 0.5 
27 222700 0.0381198 0.3765281 0.5 
28 221900 0.0380946 0.3765881 0.5 
29 224700 0.0381752 0.3765872 0.5 
30 226410 0.0383465 0.3765556 0.5 
31 226700 0.0383466 0.3764794 0.5 
32 264101 0.0364501 0.3769555 0.5 
33 265301 0.0366627 0.3770829 0.5 
34 264302 0.0363689 0.3768391 0.5 
35 265200 0.0367374 0.3770283 0.5 
36 265510 0.0366858 0.3769361 0.5 
37 265303 0.0365876 0.3770573 0.5 
38 265304 0.0366087 0.3770611 0.5 
39 265305 0.0366273 0.3770048 0.5 
40 265600 0.0367733 0.3769448 0.5 
41 265700 0.0368617 0.3770074 0.5 
42 267200 0.0367446 0.37682 0.5 
43 267300 0.0366329 0.3768106 0.5 
44 267401 0.0365357 0.3768279 0.5 
45 267402 0.0364728 0.3767826 0.5 
46 267501 0.0365597 0.3767707 0.5 
47 267900 0.0369265 0.3768615 0.5 
48 269901 0.0370322 0.3765842 0.5 
49 269902 0.0369881 0.3765705 0.5 
50 271701 0.0369019 0.3766006 0.5 
51 271702 0.0368388 0.376567 0.5 
52 271802 0.0369559 0.3765252 0.5 
53 276000 0.0371669 0.3759609 0.5 
54 278000 0.0369799 0.3756638 0.5 
55 276602 0.036786 0.375819 0.5 
56 620003 0.0370843 0.3753417 0.5 
57 277200 0.0372275 0.3757754 0.5 
58 277400 0.0373006 0.3757348 0.5 
59 293305 0.0379221 0.3739018 0.5 
60 651101 0.0376208 0.3741711 0.5 
61 297300 0.0378544 0.3731863 0.5 
62 297600 0.0380717 0.3731226 0.5 
63 576000 0.0389025 0.3736812 0.5 
64 302202 0.038488 0.3778462 0.5 
65 301800 0.0383863 0.377982 0.5 
66 302501 0.0384894 0.3777964 0.5 
67 302400 0.0383837 0.3777451 0.5 
68 310200 0.0380159 0.3783938 0.5 
69 311500 0.0376626 0.3781224 0.5 
70 311800 0.0379319 0.3781704 0.5 
71 401800 0.0433917 0.3775066 0.5 
72 401901 0.0434633 0.3773539 0.5 
73 401902 0.0433108 0.3773571 0.5 
74 402802 0.043201 0.3767732 0.5 
75 402901 0.0432153 0.3765977 0.5 
76 404200 0.0417808 0.3776481 0.5 
77 400800 0.0418083 0.3777814 0.5 
78 404502 0.0416281 0.3774781 0.5 
79 404600 0.0411107 0.3775002 0.5 
80 407001 0.0409757 0.3769374 0.5 
81 408202 0.0410888 0.3764977 0.5 
82 407102 0.0409841 0.3767469 0.5 
83 407200 0.0411395 0.3766263 0.5 
84 407600 0.0412754 0.3766335 0.5 
85 408101 0.0418799 0.3763468 0.5 
86 408211 0.0415911 0.3762333 0.5 
87 408102 0.0417156 0.3763524 0.5 
88 408132 0.0415546 0.3764291 0.5 
89 403303 0.0420831 0.3762822 0.5 
90 408601 0.041156 0.3762797 0.5 
91 408721 0.0416697 0.3760335 0.5 
92 430900 0.040661 0.3777934 0.5 
93 430801 0.0405406 0.3777913 0.5 
94 431100 0.0408074 0.3777688 0.5 
95 433901 0.040585 0.3769157 0.5 
96 461500 0.0394746 0.3782135 0.5 
97 463600 0.039476 0.3778369 0.5 
98 461900 0.0394127 0.3779583 0.5 
99 462300 0.0396107 0.3779578 0.5 
100 463500 0.0396085 0.3778089 0.5 
101 463400 0.0397394 0.377835 0.5 
102 481901 0.0393403 0.3770638 0.5 
103 482001 0.0392961 0.376891 0.5 
104 502302 0.0401269 0.375899 0.5 
105 502700 0.0400993 0.3757686 0.5 
106 532500 0.0387154 0.3761752 0.5 
107 532400 0.0388076 0.3763082 0.5 
108 533300 0.0388951 0.3762015 0.5 
109 533401 0.0389779 0.3762115 0.5 
110 533501 0.0389109 0.3761214 0.5 
111 533602 0.0389464 0.3760285 0.5 
112 536101 0.0390881 0.3756595 0.5 
113 543501 0.0381255 0.3745145 0.5 
114 573600 0.0395872 0.3743385 0.5 
115 573500 0.0393491 0.374249 0.5 
116 574500 0.0398109 0.3739097 0.5 
117 577200 0.0393583 0.373644 0.5 
118 577603 0.0395522 0.3737058 0.5 
119 599100 0.0371876 0.363205 0.5 
120 599000 0.0376388 0.3690047 0.5 
121 602103 0.0374594 0.3755005 0.5 
122 602106 0.0374455 0.3754144 0.5 
123 602200 0.0373393 0.3754495 0.5 
124 602301 0.037374 0.3752641 0.5 
125 602402 0.0374562 0.3752904 0.5 
126 602501 0.0376605 0.375371 0.5 
127 602502 0.0376172 0.3752474 0.5 
128 602503 0.0376987 0.375247 0.5 
129 620001 0.0370236 0.3754974 0.5 
130 620002 0.0370243 0.3754149 0.5 
131 620101 0.0368762 0.3754999 0.5 
132 620102 0.0368953 0.3754198 0.5 
133 620302 0.0369262 0.3751249 0.5 
134 620400 0.0371721 0.3751316 0.5 
135 620501 0.0373316 0.3750493 0.5 
136 620521 0.0373697 0.3749278 0.5 
137 620522 0.0372836 0.3749288 0.5 
138 620602 0.0373752 0.3747702 0.5 
139 620701 0.0372226 0.3748581 0.5 
140 620702 0.0372411 0.3747701 0.5 
141 620800 0.0371669 0.3749723 0.5 
142 620902 0.0369845 0.3749839 0.5 
143 621002 0.0370312 0.3748608 0.5 
144 621101 0.037084 0.3747331 0.5 
145 621201 0.0372068 0.3746324 0.5 
146 621301 0.0372318 0.3744711 0.5 
147 621321 0.0371559 0.3744668 0.5 
148 650002 0.0376642 0.3749271 0.5 
149 650601 0.0375161 0.3745545 0.5 
150 650400 0.0376128 0.3745905 0.5 
151 650602 0.03742 0.3745472 0.5 
152 650800 0.0376357 0.3743807 0.5 
153 650901 0.0378014 0.3745613 0.5 
154 651001 0.0378363 0.3742115 0.5 
155 651002 0.0377439 0.374232 0.5 
156 651102 0.03754 0.3743125 0.5 
157 651222 0.0374312 0.3742204 0.5 
158 651302 0.037309 0.3741574 0.5 
159 651400 0.037582 0.3740007 0.5 
160 670003 0.0377521 0.3740373 0.5 
161 670100 0.0378134 0.3739082 0.5 
162 670407 0.0371581 0.373792 0.5 
163 700300 0.0373409 0.3773186 0.5 
164 700400 0.0372559 0.377204 0.5 
165 700500 0.0372237 0.377288 0.5 
166 700600 0.0370756 0.3773035 0.5 
167 700902 0.0371308 0.3769921 0.5 
168 701000 0.0370256 0.3769914 0.5 
169 701301 0.0360989 0.3766554 0.5 
170 701900 0.0362113 0.3764701 0.5 
171 701400 0.0361321 0.3765486 0.5 
172 701501 0.0362417 0.3766289 0.5 
173 702000 0.0362897 0.3763873 0.5 
174 702100 0.0363435 0.3763318 0.5 
175 800201 0.0346449 0.3780583 0.5 
176 137102 0.0353569 0.378259 0.5 
177 800403 0.033311 0.3766394 0.5 
178 800502 0.0345572 0.3769293 0.5 
179 900101 0.0422594 0.3829142 0.5 
180 910100 0.0403995 0.3831113 0.5 
181 900502 0.0398876 0.3838359 0.5 
182 900503 0.0401327 0.3837953 0.5 
183 900604 0.0399012 0.3840501 0.5 
184 900701 0.0395476 0.3838376 0.5 
185 900705 0.0394013 0.3836004 0.5 
186 901005 0.0392397 0.3839237 0.5 
187 901006 0.0391579 0.3836831 0.5 
188 900806 0.0395379 0.383997 0.5 
189 901102 0.0389125 0.3836062 0.5 
190 901205 0.0382881 0.3837868 0.5 
191 901003 0.0387547 0.3840087 0.5 
192 910000 0.0415885 0.3825744 0.5 
193 910203 0.0393055 0.3828785 0.5 
194 910204 0.0390522 0.3830583 0.5 
195 910301 0.0387923 0.3833601 0.5 
196 910302 0.0388071 0.3831865 0.5 
197 910503 0.0398688 0.3825306 0.5 
198 910603 0.0400483 0.3825304 0.5 
199 910703 0.0403402 0.3825063 0.5 
200 910710 0.0401653 0.3823593 0.5 
201 920017 0.035969 0.3812264 0.5 
202 920107 0.0355216 0.3813011 0.5 
203 920019 0.0360743 0.3813154 0.5 
204 920020 0.0363159 0.3815314 0.5 
205 920030 0.0363254 0.3809211 0.5 
206 920035 0.0365478 0.3809628 0.5 
207 920037 0.0366672 0.3808902 0.5 
208 920105 0.0349863 0.3815704 0.5 
209 920103 0.0352693 0.383185 0.5 
210 920329 0.035749 0.3808772 0.5 
211 920335 0.0359975 0.3805203 0.5 
212 920312 0.035952 0.3802996 0.5 
*Arcs 
1 2 39.6 
3 4 28.5 
5 6 34.8 
7 8 28.35 
9 10 29.25 
11 12 30 
13 14 28.5 
15 16 29.4 
17 18 57.6 
19 18 47.85 
19 16 41.4 
20 18 40.8 
20 16 44.55 
21 18 30 
22 23 38.25 
24 25 30.3 
26 27 76.5 
28 27 90 
29 27 129.75 
30 16 36.6 
31 16 27.3 
32 33 31.2 
34 12 29.1 
35 33 101.85 
35 36 39 
33 36 35.85 
37 33 133.5 
37 36 45 
38 33 102 
38 36 36.75 
39 33 55.5 
36 33 51.6 
40 33 33.45 
41 12 27.75 
42 33 31.95 
42 12 29.25 
43 33 35.85 
44 33 40.35 
44 12 38.1 
45 33 33.75 
46 33 41.25 
47 12 29.85 
48 33 35.85 
49 33 41.25 
50 33 32.7 
51 33 68.85 
52 33 27 
53 54 37.5 
55 54 36.6 
55 56 36.75 
57 54 48.45 
58 54 31.35 
59 60 27.75 
61 56 31.5 
62 63 30.45 
62 56 58.5 
64 65 28.95 
66 67 28.05 
68 6 29.1 
69 6 34.35 
70 6 28.35 
71 72 41.25 
71 73 27.75 
73 72 81.75 
74 75 27.6 
76 77 45.75 
78 79 27.6 
80 81 31.35 
82 81 30.6 
83 81 28.95 
84 81 37.65 
85 86 28.5 
87 81 31.35 
87 86 34.5 
88 81 45 
86 89 29.25 
90 81 31.2 
91 86 70.5 
92 93 28.35 
92 94 27 
95 81 27 
96 97 37.65 
98 97 28.95 
99 98 28.5 
99 100 35.7 
101 100 35.1 
97 14 27.75 
97 98 43.35 
97 100 60 
102 103 35.55 
104 105 27 
106 107 27.3 
108 107 34.35 
109 107 33.75 
110 107 28.05 
111 107 37.95 
112 107 36.6 
113 60 34.5 
114 115 37.35 
116 115 33.6 
117 63 32.25 
118 63 27.75 
119 120 29.25 
121 54 29.1 
122 54 35.1 
123 54 28.8 
123 56 30.6 
124 54 37.8 
124 56 33 
125 54 32.25 
126 54 48.6 
127 54 38.25 
128 54 33.75 
129 56 39.75 
130 56 45 
131 54 37.95 
131 56 53.25 
131 132 31.5 
132 56 38.25 
133 56 40.35 
134 56 30.6 
135 56 32.85 
136 56 36.75 
137 56 42 
138 56 37.35 
139 56 31.5 
139 135 27 
140 56 45.75 
141 56 41.85 
142 56 27.75 
143 56 29.25 
144 56 57 
145 56 30.75 
146 56 41.25 
147 56 33.75 
148 56 28.5 
149 56 49.5 
149 150 28.35 
149 60 34.5 
151 56 27.75 
152 153 30.75 
153 60 30 
154 60 27.75 
155 60 36.6 
156 60 27.75 
157 60 32.1 
158 56 27.75 
158 153 31.35 
159 60 37.5 
160 60 41.25 
161 60 37.5 
162 56 27 
163 25 27.75 
164 25 28.5 
165 12 27 
165 25 35.55 
166 25 30.6 
25 12 30.6 
167 25 30.6 
168 25 38.7 
169 170 32.25 
171 170 29.7 
172 170 27.6 
173 170 38.1 
174 170 39.6 
175 176 27 
177 178 47.25 
179 180 34.5 
181 180 30 
182 180 33.75 
183 184 33 
183 180 37.5 
185 180 43.5 
186 184 33 
186 180 30.75 
187 184 35.1 
187 188 32.1 
187 180 45.75 
189 180 33 
190 191 30.75 
192 180 33.75 
193 180 51.75 
194 180 30.75 
195 180 30 
196 180 28.5 
197 180 33.75 
198 180 27.75 
199 180 27 
200 180 41.25 
201 202 32.25 
203 202 48 
204 202 30 
205 202 30.75 
206 202 33.6 
207 202 34.5 
208 209 29.25 
208 202 42.75 
210 202 30.75 
211 175 34.8 
211 202 60.75 
211 212 36.9 
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Appendix 7-5   Modes of transportation to work in Los Angeles 
 
Table 71   Principal modes of transportation to work in Los Angeles 
Means of Transportation 
to Work 
2000 Census 1990 Census 
Number Percent Number Percent 
     
All Workers Age 16 & over 3,858,750 100.00% 4,115,248 100.00% 
Car, truck, or van 3,296,964 85.44% 3,524,185 85.64% 
Drove alone 2,714,944 70.36% 2,884,615 70.10% 
Carpooled 582,020 15.08% 639,570 15.54% 
Public transportation 254,091 6.58% 267,210 6.49% 
Bus or trolley bus 234,662 6.08% 262,732 6.38% 
Streetcar or trolley car 1,946 0.05% 1,320 0.03% 
Subway or elevated 6,200 0.16% 574 0.01% 
Railroad 7,660 0.20% 403 0.01% 
Ferryboat 366 0.01% 344 0.01% 
Taxicab 3,257 0.08% 1,837 0.04% 
Motorcycle 6,758 0.18% 19,838 0.48% 
Bicycle 24,015 0.62% 25,966 0.63% 
Walked 113,004 2.93% 133,927 3.25% 
Other means 29,275 0.76% 31,325 0.76% 
Worked at home 134,643 3.49% 112,797 2.74% 
     
Source: US Census bureau 
 
Appendix 7-6   Location of centres of spatial submarkets in Los Angeles 
 
Table 72   Location of centres of spatial submarkets in Los Angeles 
Spatial housing submarket Location of  centre X* Y* 
CU 
Central point between Century city, 
UCLA, and Beverly Hills 
369256 m 3769694 m 
LD Centre of  LA downtown block 384764 m 3768846 m 
EL Centre of  El Segundo block 371707 m 3752426 m 
* NAD_1983_UTM_Zone_11N (Projection: Transverse_Mercator) 
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Appendix 7-7   Regression result in Los Angeles 
Table 73   OLS Regression of house price on distance to centre in Los Angeles (CU) 
  Price 2000 Price 2003 Price 2006 Price 2009 
Number of obs 97 96 125 106 
F 40.37 10.38 22.54 17.84 
Prob > F 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.298 0.099 0.155 0.146 
Adj R-squared 0.291 0.090 0.148 0.138 
Root MSE 61.4 73.5 111.4 125.8 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -21.0 326.5 -13.7 382.3 -24.9 590.7 -24.5 780.6 
Std. Err. 3.3 16.9 4.2 22.3 5.2 27.9 5.8 31.3 
t -6.4 19.3 -3.2 17.1 -4.8 21.2 -4.2 25.0 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -27.6 292.8 -22.1 338.0 -35.2 535.4 -36.1 718.7 
Interval] -14.4 360.1 -5.3 426.6 -14.5 645.9 -13.0 842.6 
 
Table 74   OLS Regression of house price on distance to centre in Los Angeles (LD) 
  Price 2000 Price 2003 Price 2006 Price 2009 
Number of obs 53 66 122 98 
F 3.96 1.2 15.84 20.96 
Prob > F 0.052 0.277 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.072 0.019 0.117 0.179 
Adj R-squared 0.054 0.003 0.109 0.171 
Root MSE 22.4 45.5 88.9 109.5 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -2.7 136.4 -3.0 166.6 -14.6 331.4 -21.4 570.1 
Std. Err. 1.4 10.5 2.7 20.6 3.7 29.7 4.7 36.6 
t -2.0 13.0 -1.1 8.1 -4.0 11.2 -4.6 15.6 
P>t 0.052 0.000 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -5.4 115.4 -8.4 125.3 -21.9 272.7 -30.7 497.4 
Interval] 0.0 157.4 2.4 207.8 -7.4 390.1 -12.1 642.8 
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Table 75   OLS Regression of house price on distance to centre in Los Angeles (EL) 
  Price 2000 Price 2003 Price 2006 Price 2009 
Number of obs 192 188 230 257 
F 36.57 19.39 43.29 44.72 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.161 0.094 0.160 0.149 
Adj R-squared 0.157 0.090 0.156 0.146 
Root MSE 46.0 69.1 108.2 101.7 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -8.0 207.3 -8.7 255.4 -18.3 434.4 -17.3 563.9 
Std. Err. 1.3 10.2 2.0 15.1 2.8 21.7 2.6 20.7 
t -6.1 20.3 -4.4 17.0 -6.6 20.0 -6.7 27.3 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -10.5 187.1 -12.6 225.7 -23.8 391.7 -22.3 523.2 
Interval] -5.4 227.5 -4.8 285.1 -12.8 477.2 -12.2 604.6 
 
 
Table 76   OLS Regression of condominium price on distance to centre in Los Angeles (CU) 
  Price 2000 Price 2003 Price 2006 Price 2009 
Number of obs 37 33 67 43 
F 63.23 39.89 24.86 56.99 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.644 0.563 0.277 0.582 
Adj R-squared 0.634 0.549 0.266 0.571 
Root MSE 20.7 31.0 86.8 69.7 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -8.2 189.7 -11.1 269.1 -16.9 455.2 -28.1 673.7 
Std. Err. 1.0 6.2 1.8 11.1 3.4 19.8 3.7 24.9 
t -8.0 30.6 -6.3 24.3 -5.0 23.0 -7.6 27.0 
P>t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -10.2 177.1 -14.7 246.5 -23.6 415.7 -35.6 623.4 
Interval] -6.1 202.3 -7.5 291.7 -10.1 494.8 -20.6 724.1 
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Table 77   OLS Regression of condominium price on distance to centre in Los Angeles (LD) 
  Price 2000 Price 2003 Price 2006 Price 2009 
Number of obs 10 28 39 43 
F 1.58 7.35 7.21 29.73 
Prob > F 0.244 0.012 0.011 0.000 
R-squared 0.165 0.220 0.163 0.420 
Adj R-squared 0.061 0.191 0.141 0.406 
Root MSE 28.0 33.5 78.1 67.6 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -5.0 138.0 -7.6 202.0 -14.8 371.6 -24.8 603.0 
Std. Err. 4.0 17.5 2.8 11.7 5.5 27.1 4.6 22.7 
t -1.3 7.9 -2.7 17.3 -2.7 13.7 -5.5 26.6 
P>t 0.244 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -14.1 97.6 -13.3 177.9 -25.9 316.8 -34.0 557.2 
Interval] 4.2 178.4 -1.8 226.0 -3.6 426.4 -15.6 648.8 
 
Table 78   OLS Regression of condominium price on distance to centre in Los Angeles (EL) 
  Price 2000 Price 2003 Price 2006 Price 2009 
Number of obs 33 51 68 75 
F 6.53 3.7 5.56 19.79 
Prob > F 0.016 0.060 0.021 0.000 
R-squared 0.174 0.070 0.078 0.213 
Adj R-squared 0.147 0.051 0.064 0.203 
Root MSE 44.8 55.2 106.1 75.1 
 
Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant Distance Constant 
Coef. -12.1 215.5 -8.4 237.9 -17.6 394.6 -23.1 571.5 
Std. Err. 4.7 32.9 4.3 29.7 7.5 51.6 5.2 36.3 
t -2.6 6.6 -1.9 8.0 -2.4 7.6 -4.5 15.7 
P>t 0.016 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[95% Conf. -21.7 148.4 -17.1 178.1 -32.5 291.5 -33.5 499.1 
Interval] -2.4 282.6 0.4 297.6 -2.7 497.7 -12.8 643.8 
 
